




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INQUIRY

CONCERNING THE

NATURE, END, AND PRACTICABILITY

OF A COURSE OF


PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION;

TO WHICH IS SUBJOINED A

MORAL CATECHISM.

BY PAUL BROWN.

Luke 6th c. 44th v.—"For of thorns men do not gather figs;
nor of a bramble bush gather they grapes."



WASHINGTON CITY:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR,

By J. Gileon, Jr. 9th Street.

1822.

LB 605
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, to wit:

***** BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the twenty-
* L. S. * second day of May in the year of our Lord one thou-
***** sand eight hundred and twenty-two, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of America, the forty-sixth; Paul
Brown, of the said District, hath deposited in the office of the Clerk
of the District Court for the District of Columbia, the title of a
book, the right whereof he claims as proprietor in the words follow-
ing, to wit: "An inquiry concerning the nature, end, and practi-
cability of a course of philosophical education : " To which is sub-
joined a moral catechism. By Paul Brown.

"For of thorns men do not gather figs; nor of a bramble bush
gather they grapes."—*Luke 6th c. 44th v.*

In conformity to the act of the Congress of the United States,
entitled "An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing
the copies of maps, charts and books, to the authors and proprietors
of such copies during the times therein mentioned," and also to the
act, entitled "An Act, supplementary to an act, entitled "An Act
for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps,
charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies dur-
ing the times therein mentioned," and extending the benefits there-
of to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical and
other prints.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set
my hand, and affixed the public seal of my office, the
day and year aforesaid.

EDMUND I. LEE,
Clerk of the District Court for the District of Columbia.

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PART I.

OF EDUCATION IN GENERAL.

CHAPTER I.

Of the origin and use of the word Education.

THE Word Education is derived from the Latin word *Educo*, which signified to instruct and train. Its immediate formation is out of the verb *educate*, which is expressive of the Latin verb *educō*, and signifies the same thing. This same word, Education, is also French; that is, is used by the French for the same purpose as by the English. The idea of a particular action, is pre-existent to that of a species of action, because the latter requires an additional act of the mind, subsequent to the perception of that particular, whereby it ascendantly operates thereon, and modifies its particular ideas, from comparisons and references of which, it forms separate notions: therefore the names of species of actions, are derived from the verbs that signify the particular actions of which those species are. The Greeks by the word *ἑκτασις* expressed much of what is in the power of our verb educate. Almost every moral word has had, primitively, a mechanical sense, from which it has been transferred to its moral use, by reason of analogy or a habit of oratorical allusion. And this is the case with this tribe of

words I am speaking of. The ideas of planting and nourishing were anterior to that of instilling knowledge and persuasions of mind. This word has been used to some variety of signification; yet is less perplexedly ambiguous than many other moral words are by arbitrary use. It was formerly understood to signify the bringing up of children; and afterwards, the *art* of bringing up children: while, in the circle of philosophical propriety, it signified the training of young persons by methodical exercises, to certain investments of their intellective and moral capacities, separate from, and over and above, what the progress of nature itself independently of any intentional direction, would carry them to, in the same time. The word is sometimes, now, in vulgar converse, employed to denote discriminately that part of education which is drawn from seminaries, whether common schools, academies, or universities. Thus, one is said to have an *ordinary* education, a *liberal* education, a *public* education, or, but a *common* education. and in a more partial appropriation it is frequently even confined to the privileges of college acquirements; as when of a candidate for an influential post, is said *he has no education*. It seems, in frequent use, to mean merely an extensive knowledge of the ways of the world, joined with the fashionable or fine accomplishments, such as decorous moving,—elegant speaking or writing, dancing, &c. which set a man off in the view of the croud: as who should say, *he is a prudent, upright, and intelligent man, but has no education?* And there is scarce any remark much more common in tattling circles than that such an one has a fine education, but he is a very passionate man, and addicted to gaming, to drunkenness, to extortion. Moreover, common observation evinces that in the general acceptance of the word, as it is used among the commonalty, the idea of moral improvement does not participate

in the least. It now properly stands, (in its philosophical use) for "that series of operations by which the developement and cultivation of the faculties and affections of mankind are carried on and fashioned, between earliest infancy and the period when they are considered qualified to take part in active life."

The idea which I shall endeavour to uniformly denote by this word in the progress of the following discourse, is this, viz. *a superinduction of knowledge, and of habit to the capacities of percipient beings*: or in other words, *the superinduction of science and art*. For whether we form opinions, or add absolute knowledge and certainty, there is still a superinduction of light, and real knowledge, in those views the mind has of the relations of the ideas it compares together as proofs whether probable or demonstrative; and all art is but aptness and facility either in thinking or moving, acquired by repetition and custom. Whether men instruct themselves, by forming opinions and accumulating knowledge in their own minds, by their own independent voluntary exertions; or inform the minds of others; it is all the same sort of thing, and fit to be denoted by the same general sign.

For whether I form habits and ideas in my own mind or in another's, it is still but education: it is a voluntary teaching and learning of something: and all this too, whether they be mankind or beings of any other species of reasoning animals that from observation, experience, or else either from some hereditary or traditionary impressions of particular propensities or principles, form in themselves or others certain habits of thinking or muscular moving. Many deny that brutes possess the power of reasoning.

Notwithstanding, numerous instances of deliberate trains of motions and other signs observable in several quadrupeds and birds, indicative of a comparison or balancing of what they inwardly feel or perceive, ap-

proximating to the security of good and the avoidance of evil, all indubitably analogous to what in ourselves is consecutive to reasoning, prove almost to a demonstration that they *do* possess that faculty; which yet I am far from supposing them capable of using about general or abstract ideas, of which in fact I deem them not susceptible; abstraction seeming to be the settled boundary between man and all other species of animals, as perception is supposed to be that which divides the animal from the vegetable kingdom: since we can trace no signs of their separating their ideas from the connections of particular existence, and forming representatives of variously situated things, by exclusive consideration of a common property. Their reasoning, therefore is always about particulars: hence, of those animals who construct means of security or shelter, each species usually builds its habitations in one form, and of one sort of materials; yet there are those who maintain that all the sublimest artifices of brutes, are carried on by a blind unconscious impulse proceeding from their internal conformation, whereby desire and aversion act in them without the perceptions of good and evil in those things to or from which they propel them, and of the tendency of their movement to compass the one or avoid the other. Some one will ask, what induces the infant bee, in its first flight, to seek the honied flower? In reply to which, I would ask, what makes the human infant seek the breast whence it draws its sustenance? Both are led by perception of pleasing sensations excited by those objects. The inexperienced is capable of no better reasoning than this; to pursue that which appears the source of good,—the greatest good they can conceive. But it is well known, brutes come into the world nearer maturity than the human species. The lives of many of them are short; they have but little progress to make, to arrive at all the improve-

ment they are capable of. The insect tribes, in particular, have but a momentary advance (as it were) in increase either of their capacity of body or of mind. It will be sufficient for all the purposes of this place to take notice of some instances of communicating the knowledge of expedients and signs, exemplified in several birds; since nothing is better known than that several sorts of animals do progress to some degree of proficiency as they advance in age; that they have more experimental knowledge not only, but are more apt in their observance, and in the exercise of their several faculties, when they are three years old than when one day old; and daily observation as well as experiment teaches us that dogs, monkies, elephants, horses, cats, and the like, may, by discipline and culture, be brought to acquire a variety of habits. Birds of passage make use of signs to communicate to their young their ideas of changing, and their desire to change, their place. The turkey and hen have an artificial language of sounds though not what we call articulate, the significancy of which, is certainly transfused to the comprehension of their rising offspring by a constant practice that produces a habit of associating certain emotions and perceptions with those determinate sounds; for they act in invariable consistency with such trains of impressions, and seem to be perfectly sensible of an approach of danger, by its being intimated to them by a particular sound made by the parent or leader of the flock. Other ideas also are regularly communicated amongst them. Birds of passage, as wild geese and others, that divide their lives between regions a thousand miles asunder, communicate, by practice and habit, the expectation and desire of changing their situations at certain seasons. Parrots have learned articulation, and even verbal reasoning. Most of the larger animals we are acquainted with here, have artificial language. Artificial

language supposes desire to communicate ideas, thoughts, impressions of something felt or perceived ; and it also supposes habit ; for without this, there would be no permanent connection between the sign and thing signified. So then brutes are capable of education, passively and actively, in the proportion of the extent of their capacities, and the number of their faculties.

Education, I take then may be justly defined a superinduction of knowledge and habit to the capacities of percipient beings. For whether in this operation there is induced absolute knowledge either sensitive, demonstrative, or intuitive ; probable opinion ; aptness or facility in any mode of motion ; there is still in all this business, voluntary exertion, and (consecutively to such exertion) something added which existed not there before. There is one objection which I am aware awaits this use of the word I have been defining, and that is, that according to my definition, Education may be either a good thing or a bad one : knowledge and habit being equally the one appropriable, the other attributable to maleficent and beneficent purposes. I answer, habits may be bad or good ; but knowledge is not, *cannot* be bad (of itself) ; knowledge of evil and good being essential to virtue. Habit is called bad (I speak of moral good and evil in the actions of a social agent) only as the voluntary action whereof it implies a quality or relation, proceeds from bad motives or subserves a maleficent purpose. And the superinduction of either the one or the other is *bad* no otherwise than as those divers modes which go to constitute this, are so, in reference to some paramount concern. A habit is reckoned a bad or a good habit as it is a habit of a bad or a good action. And this is the criterion of a *good* or *bad* Education ; of *right* Education, or wrong, perverted, abused, or misguided Education. Again ; every thing in the world becomes bad by being per-

verted and turned to bad uses : and thus knowledge, genius, health, strength, and all the pre-eminent talents and privileges wherein men transcend brutes, may be made evils and sources of misery to our own and other species. And, if I may be permitted to speak so boldly, if mankind had never had any experience at all of the malign effects of vicious habits, in destroying safety, health, quiet, &c. I know not how they would have come to fully comprehend the excellence of virtue. It may furthermore be said, that the essence of this definition simply implies the addition of something to a system, which it is capable of receiving. Let us see whether this addition of something compatible to the natural wants and aptitudes of a being, be an improvement of that system or not ; whether this be improving, ameliorating, helping a system towards its designed end or not. And, for this, it seems rational to conclude that knowledge and facility are an improvement of an intelligent free agent. Whereupon I say, in another view of the subject I don't know how to get rid of this definition on account of the following considerations :

1. If man was endued with the capacity of knowledge, with the design that he should acquire knowledge, and with the power of beginning motion that he should act, it is evident that if he acquires knowledge by means of this capacity, and habit by means of a practical exertion of those powers of action he possesses, the acquisition of both the one and the other of these is an improvement of his system ; inasmuch as it is the immediate accomplishment of designs apparent in his construction.

2. The ultimate end of nature, in the construction of man, wherein he is invested with progressive powers, seems to comprehend these two ideas, *preservation of existence, and consummation of enjoyment*. Now, in the way to this end lie knowledge and habit :

and these are indispensable to its attainment. The dispensation of the natural powers of man, therefore, by the superinduction of these two properties, is improving. It is essential to a free agent to be susceptible of evil as well as good. Now, this susceptibility, in itself, is not a bad thing, any more than liberty, will, understanding, and judgment, are such; it being necessary to the first of these, and originating to the others matter of exercise. But the use (or rather the abuse) of our faculties, is that to which this epithet properly belongs.

3. Using the word in this latitude of sense, places it upon that bottom which gives all their significancy to those very common observations in the mouths of the populace, which keep up a distinction of the thing into good and bad, which being relative terms, I do not perfectly comprehend the meaning of *good* Education, unless there may be the *reverse*, or something which in one comparative view or other, passes for it. And, since any thing that is designed for common use, should be represented in a common way, it seemed to me that the dimensive term to the subject of a communication intended for the benefit of all parts of a community, ought to be used in the most general sense that term has been usually understood in, that the vulgar comprehending the elementary ideas upon which the rest depend, may be capable of applying it, to the designed end. A superinduction of knowledge and habit to the capacities of percipient beings, I call Education. And this I shall consider only in its application to the human species.

CHAPTER II.

Division of the Subject.

EDUCATION, in this comprehensive sense of the word, I distinguish into *adventitious* and *systematical*. *Adventitious* Education is that wherein by an uncontrolled course of occurrences, light, and knowledge of things physical and moral, is naturally accumulated, and habits gradually formed, without any intent extension of the voluntary power to a regular catenation of instituted means to form these upon a studied plan; and herein the creature seems, in general, passive. When I call Education *systematical*, certain set of instituted means or causes is laid out and applied to the special purpose of bringing about such an effect as the qualifying of the capacities of rationals with certain habits and views. This is a science and an art. As a science it comprises the knowledge of the suitable means to the end; as an art, the rules and measures of the use of them. This is a momentous project in social life; and, properly, embraces the teaching of *natural, moral, and rational philosophy*; that is to say, the regular training of the intellectual powers, the furnishing of knowledge and just views of physical existences; the forming of just combinations of ideas of moral modes and relations; forming habits of good moral actions whether of voluntary thinking or muscular motion; and the investiture of such valuable arts and trades as are respectively necessary or fit for the condition of each being included in the sphere of its designed operation. The execution of this important purpose, should take its rise in moulding the delicate minds of infants. The greatest and most in-

dispensable concernment of this purpose is with association of ideas. Association of ideas influences all moral productions in the world. All that is consecutive to the act of willing, in the universal world, is eminently influenced if not altogether controuled, by associated ideas. Those associations which are formed in infancy, are more durable and inveterately efficient than any other. The first step, then, in this business, is the forming and regulating of associate ideas in the tender minds of infants : the second is to gradually unfold to their apprehensions, just views of natural realities, the third, to conduct the use of their organs of sound to proper articulation ; and the fourth is to form good habits of voluntary action conformably to the purposes of social virtue, under a controuling discipline through means of practical repetition which is the natural rise of all habit. This last should also include the incipient approximation to such associate *mechanical* movements as are connected with the designed or most proper occupation or art of livelihood, contemplated as a fixture of their future existence on the stage of action. Thus much is comprehended in what is to be done to infants. If we except the conduct of rudimental articulation which is very rarely protracted beyond childhood, this same round is to be trodden in youth, in manhood, that is, in each successive stage of the life and experience of the intellectual being, with an extension and complication of each part of the process, according to the progressive amplification of the capacity by experience and use. For, whether we teach ourselves, or teach our fellow beings, in infancy, in youth, or in manhood, it is but to do either or each of these things upon a more or less extended scale, namely, to form right associations of ideas or perceptions, which are to govern the prevailing motives of the voluntary power ; to store the mind with knowledge and proofs ; to conduct the organs of

speech to the habit of forming proper sounds to communicate ideas to others ; to form habits of good actions, to wit, such habits of associate movements in the muscular organs as agree with, and are congenially applicative of, good purposes, or in other words, purposes of social virtue, which are no other than purposes of an equitable diffusion of the enjoyment of existence ; and to form habits of particular *mechanical* movements which are to serve as means of life and comfort. All which being done, Education is completed : which yet seldom is finished in the life of man ; every day being sufficient to bring forth some new knowledge ; and men being beset with such a variety of temptations, the multitude going into such a maze of erroneous movements, are always susceptible to make or amend some habit. For I am inclined to think it is possible for a man to learn something every day he lives. Yet this I would not confine to those different perceptions of external things which are perpetually varying around him, according to the seasons, change of place, climate, &c. but I am persuaded the new associations of ideas, and new trains of thought, which may take their rise from the successive transfigurations of his environing scene of sensation, wherewith he is mechanically affected, besides being in themselves subjects of actual speculative knowledge, may evince physical and moral truths of a more or less general and important nature, whereon he may frame new observations, of practical benefit to himself and others. "With the ancient is wisdom, and with length of days, understanding." Old age has a pre-eminent claim to proficiency in science and art, by the exclusive advantage of long experience. Experiment is a test which substantiates as many axioms in some branches of lore, as demonstration does in others. Those in which it has the more conspicuous prevalence, and is most usually indispensable, are *mo-*

rality, medicine and chymistry. Handicraft, mechanics, medicine, and chymistry, owe their intire structure to experiment. Several races of inferior animals have made considerable advance in arts of sustenance and defence, which certainly has not been so much by the aid of the operations of reflection, as by experiment. This is not saying that grammar and music, which are almost entirely made up of experienced concurrences either of general customs, or events which are the effects following certain relations of sounds, do not depend as much on experiment as almost any other. Now *young* folks have experience as well as *old*: but they have not so *long* experience. Not so long a course of *repetition* of *perceptions*, which substantiates the validity of this sort of knowledge. An effect may fail, after one or two instances: but after a great number of returns of the same appearance upon the same conflux of circumstances, we feel sure that such is the invariable effect of such a cause, and that the same thing will always operate in the like way. And because old people have had the opportunity of observing more instances of this kind, and have seen some things through a longer course of repetitious operations, they are said to possess greater treasures of wisdom than the young. But to return: since the drift of Education proximately terminates in things to be *known* and things to be *done*, (for where we have not certain knowledge of the existence of things without and separate from the understanding, we have yet certain knowledge of a certain degree of probability or improbability thereof, and certain knowledge that it is prudent to conduct in a certain manner in consequence of it;) since in furnishing the mind with these materials of action, we can do nothing more than either to introduce ideas or appearances of things into it, or, when they are there, so to connect two or more of them together as to make their

re concurrence or consecution incident, or else to make one person capable of transfusing the experience of his own mind into that of another, which affords great furtherance to men's improvement in knowledge; and since to accomplish men for *doing* what is fit by them to be done, is but, by connecting the motions of two or more sets of fibres or muscles, setting them into a course of repetition and continuing that repetition, *to establish habits of their associate motions* catenated to volition; of which, it being something conspicuously different, still, to establish those general movements which implying the idea of sympathy, form what is called moral character, from establishing those particular knacks called *arts and trades*; it is evident that the whole compass of human Education, may be divided into these five parts or processes, viz:

1. *Direction and establishment of associations between ideas*, whereby we make some apt to accompany or succeed each other rather than others. I mention this first in order, because over the first ideas infants receive, we have no controul: so that before we can dictate their impressions or stock their minds with ideas of our own choice, they already have perceptions and notices of things, within their apprehensions, which being prone variously to combine by the intervention of pleasure or pain or some peculiar emotions, into very odd groups, call upon our circumspection to set those associations right. Thus, the idea of *pain* should be associated with that of the touch of burning matter in the relation of cause and effect, instead of *pleasure*, which attends the perception of light and a due degree of heat, although these may originate in the same substance at a proper distance; the idea of *misery*, accompanied by emotion of *horror*, with that of *disobedience to parents*, in the same relation;—until, by following a gradation of this sort of natural connec-

tions, we come at length to associate the idea of the highest degree of enjoyment the creature is capable of comprehending, with that of gratitude. The relation of cause and effect is grounded in the natural constitution of things; being, properly, of the class called natural relation; and the association is unavoidable when the subjects of it are discerned. But all these processes are done promiscuously in youth and in manhood; so that the times of perfecting each of these branches of human qualifications, are as various as the conditions of the individuals to be qualified.

This is a delicate process; and is not without its difficulties too; for although by dint of a careful reflection we can readily discover and rectify any anomalies that take place in our own trains of thought; yet in the supervision of others' we are fain to be guided altogether by the assumed representativeness of signs, which, in the case of infants, being indeterminate, and in some measure capricious, we must be often at a loss. This part cannot be too much studied. A right understanding of the nature of association, in the abstract, will do much towards qualifying one for the conducting of every part of Education. For, whether considered as influencing the movements of the various fibres in the system, or making its appearance in the modification of our bare *perceptions* in a metaphysical view, it is a principle upon which every part of the work more or less immediately depends. Associations, in the human constitution, are of three kinds: 1. Association of ideas one with another; 2. Association of ideas with other fibrous movements; and 3. Association of other fibrous movements one with another. The first includes our speculative opinions and persuasions; the second our passions; and the third our customary nervous and muscular motions. Of associations of ideas, there are three sorts: contiguity, causation, and resemblance. The first of these

sorts is a connection of ideas of qualities co-existing in the same subject; of the ideas of objects perceived at the same time, or of events happening at the same place. The second represents the union of the ideas of effect and cause, one of which cannot make its appearance without suggesting the other: and the idea of any object considered as an effect, has always along with it, an idea (however indeterminate) of an object that is considered as its cause. The third is a connection of like ideas, or of ideas that have a likeness or coincidence, in any of their parts: in which case, one naturally exciting the other, thence arises a concomitance. Of either one or the other of these sorts, all are yet distinguishable into *general* or *implicit* associations, and *individual* or *definite* associations. All our associations of ideas mainly resolve themselves into two kinds or allotments which are distinguished merely by the quantity of the ideas themselves, as they are *general* ideas or *particular* ones; whence they may be termed *general* or *implicit* associations, and *definite* associations. Instances to exemplify these kinds, are observable in all parts of common life. Some *implicit* associations are derived from *definite* ones: that is, some associations being at first definite and particular, do afterwards, by continuance, and repeated coalescence of analogous ideas, become general and implicit. Every association which is circumscribed to a particular person or place, or other object as an individual, is a definite association: as the association of the idea of superior excellence with the appearance of one particular person, the association of the idea of innocence, or of deep wisdom, with that of a particular place; of that of a certain tune with a particular tree, field, or carriage, &c. Now in these instances, the person, the place, the tree, &c. are the *principals*; and the others are the *adjunctives*: for we may observe that almost every such combination

has two links, the *primary*, and the *secondary or subordinate* ; and that whatever number of ideas is comprised in each, the former usually constitutes that to which the latter is attributed as a quality, affection, incident, or accompaniment : and now it is sufficient to make any association *implicit*, that the *principal* is an *abstract* idea, even if the other part be a *particular* idea. That which being first produced to perception, suggests the other, or introduces it into the mind, and without which it would not have been suggested and induced, may be called the *principal* ; and this, the *primary link* in the connection. A tree, a carriage, a name, a place, a person, considered as individuals, are *particular* ideas. But, a man with a certain fashion of dress, dialect, or gait ; a tree of certain species ; a shape or structure of a house ; a manner of walking ; a tone ; a manner of speaking, are *abstract* ideas. *Implicit associations*, then, (by which I mean such as imply a reference to other particular objects than that which in any present instance principally excites the understanding ; with which particulars the adjunctive has an equal aptness to combine) may be furthermore distinguished into those wherein *abstract ideas only* are associated together, and those wherein *particular ideas* are associated with *abstract* ones. Subject to a correspondent subdivision are also definite associations, that is, into associations of particulars with particulars, and of *particulars* with *generals* ; the generic distinction adhering to the principals, as they are respectively abstract or particular. If giving the first occasion to the entrance of an idea by way of suggestion, is that which defines the *principal*, it will be easy to distinguish associations by these measures : and if continuance and repetition cause *definite* associations to grow into *implicit* ones, it will be easy to see that they partake of the nature of habit, and consequently, as such, are subject to the influence of inten-

tional direction. Some implicit associations are more general than others, as some ideas are more abstracted than others. Some examples of this kind of associations, are what follow :

1. Association of ideas of the same kind or sort : as the painful irritation of disagreeable or hurtful objects suggests and excites the painful ideas of disagreeable reflections ; all such as accompany the passions. anger, jealousy, sorrow, hatred, &c. This is when all sorts and varieties of pain spontaneously embody and combine together.

2. Eminence in possessions, relatively called riches, has a very extensive implicit association ; inasmuch that the idea of all human excellence is frequently confounded with it ; when it shall be thought that a man inferior to all others in respect to this incident, is inferior in *intellect*, and extremely wanting in *knowledge* : and a man, on the other hand, *vastly rich*, shall be conceived as excelling in *skill* and *fortitude*, as he excels in *possession*.

3. When with the circumstance of meeting persons of one's own country on the road (without personal discrimination,) is associated the idea of *overbearing*, arising from instances of hard usage from individuals, we have an example of implicit associations.

4 Association of the ideas of causes of the same effect ; and of those of effects of the same cause.

There is a connection of handsome and pleasing countenance with the idea of benignant intention. This is by the way of intervention of the idea of pleasure, common to both : as *good intention* is a cause of pleasure in originating such actions as bring happiness ; and also *beauty* is a cause of pleasure. But this is an association of the ideas of causes of the same effect. Here, the intervening idea, (which is pleasure,) becomes the *principal* ; which first occurring to the mind, suggests the other two in connection.

5. Association of the ideas of contempt and aversion, with the relation of certain words, phrases, modes of address from others, laughs, smiles, and jestful railery. This circumstance, when these are directed to the subject's self in infancy, is a relation with which the association of the idea of contempt, has a pernicious tendency; for it progresses to the perversion of judgment, and disorders his estimate of others actions and views.

6. The sound of g associated with the figure f, and the sound of f associated to the figure g by their connection in train or rote: so that the subject as readily and confidently calls g by the name of f, or f by the name of g, as by the reverse.

7. Sound of b associated with the figure d, and also p, and *vice versa*, by *resemblance* both in the figures and the sounds, through dullness of discernment or perception, or both, and this either inherent and native, or from want of practice of those faculties on those sorts of objects, their energy being otherwise directed by habit.

8. Sound of q associated with the figure b or d or p, and *vice versa*, by *resemblance* in the figures only, through dullness and want of habitual attention.

9. The impression made by the voluntary sounding of certain characters in a particular way, that is, in associating certain names with them, is so influential and strongly confirming that it bears down all other associations before it out of the memory, in connection with that particular perception of the figures of the characters, and by repetition increases the assurance against them, and against the senses. A rare case.

10. The names of letters more strongly and truly associated with the sounds of words made of them, when spoken with natural and clear articulation, than with the sight of the letters themselves, for want of

practice of *inspection*, while more attention is exercised about *sounds*, and the imitative faculty practiced on *them* in the use of the organs of speech.

11. Idea of the pain that follows experience of inhospitality, apathy, and suppression of sympathy in others, associated with certain shapes of men's bodies, and their countenances and airs, originating in accidental concurrence of those things in real perceptions.

12. Great and surprizing *sounds* easily get associated in the minds of children, with the ideas of superior dignity of person, worthiness of notice, and power to command attention. These sounds being at first particular, are afterwards abstracted; and the association, which supervened upon a *particular occasion*, becomes *general*. The same is to be observed of any sound with which is connected the idea of aversion, or of spite. Let such a sound, entering the ears of a child from a particular person, accede to such a coalition; and the same sound heard thirty years afterwards, from a different person, at a place a thousand miles distant from the first, shall suggest the like ideas.

II. *Furnishing the mind with real ideas and knowledge.* The first perceptions and knowledge infants get, anticipate our efficiency. For as soon as they come into the world, they are exposed to the different sensations of heat and cold; and as soon as their eyes are open, they begin to perceive different colors as well as other simple ideas, and discerning one to be different from another, know that blue is not red, that black is not white, and that round is not square. This stage takes a very extensive circuit of applicatives; comprehending whatsoever contributes to produce knowledge of every sort, not only, but all the variety of ideas and proofs, which are the materials out of which that knowledge is made; and being the subject of the scientific parts of natural, moral, and rational philosophy. For the knowledge of figures, characters,

signs, with all the instruments and materials of communication, and their relations and use, as well as of the fit methods of all arts, make no less a part of the scope of this process than that of the distinguishing properties of substances. Yet of what we can do to infants, this is the second step. For, after regulating what views they have, (which seem to be spontaneous,) the next thing in our course, is to *enlarge* their views, by presenting the natural subjects of real existence in such manner as to exhibit their true discriminations and proper habitudes. All the objects in the natural world, concur in the instrumentality of this part: and I imagine our *fantastical* ideas are but the shreds and clippings of our *real* ones, or at least that they are *real ideas unnaturally put together*. This is a part of education which cannot be finished so long as the universe can afford a diversity of ideas reducible to a valuable appropriation; as that which contemplates the cultivation of *active powers*, and the advancement of *art*, is not terminable while the species is susceptible of improvement.

III. *The conduct of the organs of speech to correct articulation of sonif rous signs*. This includes in one design, both the modulation and choice of sounds, in the relation of signs of ideas. I separate this from all other muscular associations, and make it a separate branch of Education, for these three following reasons.

1. The power of articulating is a distinguishing talent wherein we are privileged above all other animals whereof we have any knowledge. Thus it has been called the *gift of speech*; as if it were an endowment parallel with abstraction and recollection: and in fact it makes a prevailing part of the essential excellence of the species.

2. This operation is done by organs adapted to this particular end of producing articulate sounds; and

some of the muscles employed in articulation, are used for little or nothing else, or at least are not so precisely fitted to any other purpose : whereby, it appears to be an art whereof nature seems to have fashioned the materials and measures to our hands.

3. The exigency of our infant state, and the indispensable moment of the art to the enjoyment of society, make it necessary to attend to the inculcation of this, long before children are capable of any other mechanical process. Writing, whereby we preserve the delineation of those figures we make the representatives of significant sounds, falls under the class of mechanic arts ;—to habituate the distinctive modifications of which sounds, is the business of the part of Education we are now speaking of. And there is not another mechanical association whereof mankind is so early susceptible : wherein, we may or ought to remark, children require a clear and distinct idea of the sound to be made, to be in their minds, before such sound can be by them effected : for it is frivolous to expect any thing like an imitation, without a pattern to imitate. Of such ideas children are admirably capable. Furthermore, a propriety of orthoepy, is of great use towards intelligible communication ; since in many cases we might as well change a word, and substitute one of an intirely different meaning from that in which we would be understood, or one with no determinate meaning at all, as to change the sound of it ; and an inattention to this thing, often introduces perplexity and obscurity into verbal intercourse.

IV. *Settling habits of those associate motions which conform to true measures of good and evil.* This is moral Education, of which if men had duly considered the importance and true rise, I suppose that most of the moral evil which has incumbered all periods of human society with complicated miseries, would not have disgraced the annals of the species. The scope

of this, terminates wholly in moral character. The character of a social agent, comprises the ultimate concernment of this aim ; which takes into its account the idea of sympathy, subject to the influence of moral discernment. The associations here contemplated, are aptly founded in those of ideas. And there is no plainer consequence ; since the latter beget motives to the will : as the idea of happiness being associated with that of *sailing*, determines the will on the pursuit of that manner of spending time in preference to others ; that is, this connection makes the predominant desire to be this exclusive way of subsisting, rather than any other : and this *determining of the will*, being the beginning of all moral action, and the same principle of preference causing its repetition, it is evident muscular habits flow immediately from associate ideas. Therefore judicious culterers of so noble a soil as human nature, carefully look to this ground ; inspect the abstrusest radiction of what they aim to rear ; and carry their work, upon a natural scale, to its proper consolidation of character. These moral associations contain the following particulars ; *desire, will, purpose, nerval and muscular organs, and motion*. These are to be trained into certain connections, partial or universal ; these connexions to be conformed to the purpose of advancing the greatest good of the species ; and lastly, these connexions to be made habitual : which fulfils the process of this part of the business of Education ; which yet we find never complete ; such is the nature of man ; such the imperfection of all our advantages, we are perpetually liable to be secretly drawn off from the trace of casuistical rectitude.

V. *The teaching and establishing of certain mechanical movements to be used for expedients to execute the ordinary purposes of life.* The whole essence of these, consists in the apt consort of the motions of se-

veral muscular fibres used to act simultaneously or consecutively, and this catenated to voluntary thinking and volition : but contains nothing of sympathy ; it being a question that very little bears upon the finishing of a plough, or a watch, whether the maker be one who is scrupulous with regard to the feelings of others, or the grossest idolator or fanatic ; so that in the capacity of a mechanic he has sufficient incitements from the references of its influence, to excel in that workmanship. All this has nothing to do with the idea of sympathy and farther than, as an appendice of social life, it may be mediately influenced by it. Yet the endowing with these trades becomes an essential part of the practice of true morality ; and an important branch of Education. For it is the duty of every one who has children, or wards of whose destiny he has the controul, to qualify them with such talents as will enable them to get the materials of sustenance without the intervention of charity or public taxation, on the one hand ; or of dishonourary resorts, which counterwork justice and revert or overbear the force of sympathy, on the other. And it is the duty of every young person likewise, whose condition makes him look to the application of his own powers for subsistence, to acquire the command of some one such useful art or another, which is adapted to secure him a livelihood by honest ways. And both the one and the other of these, who neglects it, is guilty of the neglect of an important moral duty, and of a conspicuous part of moral Education ; although its morality lies altogether in the consideration of instrumentality. This relation of subsidiary utility, which has reference to the primary scope of all moral teaching, *the greatest good of social beings*, makes it a question of great concernment to correct morality whether these trades be taught or learned in their proper season or no. To neglect these things, is omitting to do the good which

is in our power to do. The principles of such valuable associations may be insinuated; in some situations, very early. We shall see more of this, hereafter. It will suffice here to observe that without these trades, men were not privileged above brutes, in subsistence, and, of course, in the exterior machinery of improvement.

These are the five separate offices of Education, into which, however promiscuously it be necessary and customary to employ them to accomplish its designed end, in the different stages of life and under the different conditions in which it finds its objects, all parts of the work ultimately resolve themselves

Indeed the whole of this business may be resolved into that of the modifying of associations by mechanical influence. The connecting of all other movements in the system besides ideas, proceeds from our natural capacity of it, and is only modified by way of a mechanical influence, which constitutes these branches of Education, which in fact are all one kind of operation: yet there is proper distinction of it into several species; and there will be found a difference among these in reference to an adaptation of fit expedients that subserve them, and extent of efficiency, that makes it very convenient to designate them by separate heads. For the effect we bring about upon the connections of the ideas children or adults get, wherein we impress a certain tendency of coincidence of their trains and tribes, is a mechanical association. The training of the organs of articulation to the purpose of communication, is a mechanical association; since it is but to associate the movements of different sensitive and muscular fibres imitative of what appearances we would make them expressive of; to associate the voluntary production of sounds, with the perception of certain visible marks and characters which we arbitrarily make representatives of them; or, to associate these

with certain sentiments or ideas in the mind, which as names we by habitual use affixing to them, design them constantly to signify. The stocking of the mind with real ideas and knowledge. and the extending of those reflective views of the things about us, which it is capable of arriving at by the various arranging and combining of its successive perceptions, is also a mechanical association ; for in this we no more than associate a variety and multiplicity of ideas with the consciousness of existence, which is only increasing the number and variety of connections with the idea of self-existence, which being inseparable from a percipient being, to have knowledge of any kind, e. g. that gold has a ductility and susceptibility of fusion, is but to have such an idea, *to wit*, that of the co-existence of those perceived properties with the other perceived qualities of gold, associated with our conscious intuition of our existence, in such sort that it is inseparable from it: to associate certain motions of our muscular organs moving conjunctively, with certain sort of moral purposes, without any particular connection, but only an accordance with the direction of our sympathy to promote the diffusion of general happiness and improvement, which is a concatenation of certain determination of the will to certain trains of reflection, is also a factitious association ; and, likewise, to establish the connection and facility of the motions of several parts of our muscular frame moving simultaneously, in catenation with particular designs subordinately subservient to our existence without any immediate and essential intervolution with the purpose of moral virtue, which trains of associate movement are called trades and arts, is evidently a mechanical association : so that the whole of this business, is about associations of the different movements the parts of the human fabric are susceptible of. Yet these five departments into which it is here apportioned, are in some

respects all different and distinct one from another, and require different measures of experimental agency to carry them respectively to their ultimate appropriations. One train of expedients is fitted to modify the association of the earliest accessions of the apprehensive capacity, and establish proper coalitions of ideas in the mind, considered as separate from all particular connections with muscular movement; another train of expedients is proper to induce those habits of the organs of sound, and their connection with separate ideas, appropriate to the purpose of communication; while a somewhat different train of expedients subserves our purpose to superinduce those notices of things, those opinions, and that knowledge, which constitute the furniture of a well improved mind, and the immediate result of a regular development and proper application of all its faculties; quite another course, with additional expedients, are sometimes necessary to carry on the business of moral Education, by the catenating of the general course of voluntary exertion, to a sympathetic purpose of human happiness; and still another compass of recourses is suited to make artisans, and adepts in those nice processes of motions infinitely diversified in their directions, which constitute the mechanical medium of the subsistence of human society. Therefore these are properly considered as so many distinct and separate stages in the work of human Education. In this view and distribution of the subject matter of Education, I consider the pupil merely as a subject possessed of understanding and will: but it is necessary in our treatment of it, to conduct these several parts of the work with a regard to the organization of the system as the subject of several passive powers, wherein we are to consider it sometimes as also our *patient*, susceptible of several physical associations with which the will and understanding have, in the pupil itself,

nothing to do; yet are essential to such a temperament of the parts of the fabric, and the habits of their physical moving, as adapts them to the readiest development of all those excellences we pursue in these different parts of our work, whether called, intellectual, moral, or mechanical. This consideration of the conduct of our treatment of the pupil, in these parts of Education, with advertance to animal organization as of a fabric of matter which is the subject of passive powers, with a view to preserve all its parts in health and vigour, to the end that we may the better facilitate our operations and insure their designed results, has by some been put under a distinct predicament, which has been called *physical Education*; which is here properly resolved into a *recourse* to carry on with success and facility the several parts of what may be called *intellectual* and *moral Education*; which I think constitute the *sum total* of the concerns of this pursuit considered as an operation upon percipient beings to superinduce the accession of all their susceptible improvement, as such; though as a subsidiary expedient pertaining to the province of a physician as a mechanic artisan, it be necessary to treat the pupil as an organized piece of matter, in a manner independently of perceptivity and volition, in order to make it capable of the utmost extent and degree of those excellences which it is the object of our operations to develope. That the sensitive and muscular organs be qualified with health and due activity, may be an indispensable requisite to the perfection of Education. This is one of our *recourses*; and an expedient, of remote reference, to any design, cannot properly be reckoned a constitutive part of the business of executing that design. Education is the superinducing of knowledge and habit to the capacity of percipient beings: and *this* is, to the *natural* capacity; what is adherent to the original constitution of the fa-

bric as it comes to our hands. Habit itself enlarges the capacity, in almost every point of view in which we can view it. But to superinduce this capacity to an organized system of matter without any intentional operation upon understanding or will, is not a distinct part of Education, in the sense in which I here consider it. For, to induce health and vigour, or to increase the energy of parts, which extends the susceptibility of the effects contemplated in this pursuit, although an indispensable expedient to secure the facility and success of it, yet is not a part of the work itself, any more than any other appropriate expedient, of which the diversity may be governed by contingencies. The creature is supposed to be possessed of the distinctive faculties of a percipient being. To superinduce knowledge and habit to that being, in any of those ways above defined, is Education. To take advantage of health, soundness, and vigour of organs, or to produce those qualities of them, is a propitious and effective aid to the performance of it in those ways.

CHAPTER III.

Of a contrast of Education with the privation of it.

MUCH has been said of a contrast of Education with a want and privation of it. To me, this is circumscribed in sense. There is no such thing as a total privation of this advantage. Every percipient being gradually acquires knowledge; progressively receives ideas of natural beings; and, if possessed of *voluntary power*, not universally without some consentaneous exertion of *this* faculty. New ideas, new combinations of ideas, successively find admission to the apprehension of every percipient being that exists. In getting knowledge and opinion, we are partly voluntary. Comparing ideas, is an act of the will: therefore the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, necessarily pre-supposes voluntary power. Of systematical Education, we observe instances of utter neglect. Men deplorably slight and disregard a *systematical* process to bring this about, according to a judicious plot. They are too prone to rush heedlessly forward, from the impulsion of untempered and ungoverned passions, and suffer themselves and those under their gard, to catch their opinions, their knowledge, and their habits, at random, from the insuperable operation of extraneous causes. The advantages of a judicious Education, are conspicuous in a diffusion of happiness. For whether men have extensive knowledge of means to live at ease and comfort, with a competent supply to their natural wants; or have such a knowledge of human nature as disposes them to placidity; or, which is more than both these, such ha-

bits of mind as having associated pleasure with whatsoever is seriously lovely, make it their meat and drink to form and execute philanthropical purposes, which is to communicate happiness; real enjoyment of existence among social mankind, is extended; the happiness of the community is increased. Absence of care and vigilant attention to appropriate means, cherishes barbarity. This is leaving the reins to passion; whereby the mind of man, like a shattered barque upon tempestuous waters without rudder, tossed in imminent hazard at the mercy of capricious winds, is without that fixed course which is indispensable to serenity and permanency of enjoyment. The blessings resulting from a good Education, to mankind, in their individual and social capacity, in contrast with the effects of a neglect of it, I take to be principally these:

I. Extension of natural capacity. Cultivation of intellect enlarges the capacity of it, by the same rule that the repetition of an action makes it easy and pleasurable: and indeed it is the same thing. The oftener any fibre is moved, with the greater ease it moves, and consequently the greater number of contractions or vibrations it is capable of making, within a given space of time. Sloth and inaction contract and debase the capacity of intellect. Who should sit perpetually still, would become incapable of moving. It is custom that adds power as well as ease.

II. Multiplication of the causes of pleasure. The farther we extend our views into nature, the more objects we furnish the mind for contemplation. Pleasure being associated with these objects, the same recurs in their reminiscence. Memory and imagination revolve them in this connection. Evil comes in the same channel with good; but the tendency of a judiciously plotted cultivation of mind, is to a preponderance of good. Moreover, the search being voluntary, the

discovery is desirable: and, being desirable, the gratification of that desire, associates pleasure with it. This extending of views setting out from curiosity, and reality not being affected hereby, the philosophic mind regrets not the discovery even though it disclose evils: which, indeed, may be turned to as good account to know what we are to avoid, as the use the mariner makes of his delineation of rocks, quicksands, and whirlpools. Whereas one whose views are circumscribed, enjoys fewer possibilities of entertainment; fewer concomitants of pleasurable ideas. It may be objected, that this pleasure is more intense; as the constriction of waters, adds to their momentum. I reply, this same intenseness is a detraction from tranquillity. It may be further objected, savages of confined views, are more constant, more firm in their resolutions, not being subject to such levity as men of cultivated minds and multivious views, where the power of apprehension being dissipated upon the notice of a great diversity of objects, breaks down the force of the voluntary power, and induces irresolution. This objection is bottomed on a capital defect in Education. I say this,—it is the business of this very refined cultivation, and indeed the noblest part of it, to prevent that evil. It does not consist with the scope of true philosophy, to suffer the effects of extensive knowledge, to countermine good qualities and virtuous habits; for, by strictly observing the dogmas of sound morality, we foster constancy as a virtue, and do not permit any corrupt desire or vicious quality arising from extensive views, to supersede it.

III. Multiplying the means of animal comfort. All those thousands of easing arts, methods, and materials, of convenient sustenance, which replenish and adorn the stage of social life, arise from studied systematized cultivation of mind, and expansion of the powers of man. At least their perfection originates solely here-

in; and I know of no art, no degree of dexterity in advancing the purposes of active life, which depends not on the regulation of thought, and proper application of faculties : and this may be reckoned incipient cultivation : since it is only by the medium of use, that our faculties are capable of making any progression, in regard either of aptness, facility, or capacity. The rudest steps towards the first of all arts of subsistence, *hunting* and *clothing*, suppose the exercise and use of the reasoning faculty.

IV. A general diffusion and increase of true happiness in the social world. A good Education dignifies the intellectual being with those godlike attributes which make the greatest degree of happiness consist in the communication of happiness. This results from true morality. This is the jewel of the art. This is the master-piece of those who educate, to associate pleasure with what is good to be done. When this is accomplished, there remains very little difficulty in the way of determining the will into a course of right conduct. Let me suffer obscurity and contempt ; but let me take pleasure in virtuous deeds. Let me take pleasure in forming and putting in execution, purposes of benevolence, gratitude, hospitality, and philanthropy. Nay ; let me be treated with rigorous injustice ; but let my greatest pleasure be in virtue. Let me not abandon my conscientious duty to pursue the phantom *eclat*, or to get rid of oppression. Even if I be divested of all practicable means of carrying into accomplishment my purposes ; yet, not the less is it virtue to cultivate these purposes.

CHAPTER IV.

Of instituted mechanical means of Education.

MEN have contrived certain formulary and visible means, for their more convenient furtherance of the accomplishment of a purpose of Education. The principal whereof are books, and certain established situations wherein are maintained select persons to explain their books, and communicate what by their own observation, experience, and reading, they have acquired, to those who attend them to get instruction; to which they commonly give the names, schools and colleges; which are vulgarly reckoned indispensable to carry to perfection what they call a liberal education. *Books*, wherein are preserved the result of the experience of studious and industrious men, and exhibited to succeeding generations, from age to age, treasures of knowledge and art, for their guides in all means of sustenance and active virtue, are of inestimable moment to the civilized world of mankind in this behalf. The advantage of seminaries is *popular*, and consists in exonerating the community of parents from the burden of educating their families of children. There is, furthermore, another advantage, in securing permanency and uniformity to the manners of educating large numbers of persons. For parents differing in their views and habits, naturally tend to different ways of educating. But all the children of a society being collected under the superintendency of one, or a certain set of instructors, there interposes a coincidence which is propitious to the public weal. The invention of *characters* is one of those little fatalities

that extended a beneficial influence to the whole human race. That of *printing*, was afterwards a weightier benefit to the more improved part of the community of rationals. By instrumentality of *this*, men in the same moment of time communicated an idea to millions of their species. Yet this blessing, as most other of the gifts of Providence, is greatly abused. Much abuse has crept into the practice of this noble art. All true happiness resulting from this and all other business, stands intimately connected with speculative virtue. This art (not perversely appropriated) labors to attractively represent what is really good i. e. purposes of social virtue, with its beauties and advantages. Books and seminaries, then, are the first material implements we use, to bring forward the business of Education. To which if we add religious establishments, and artificial signs in general, (in distinction from what in the constructure of books is particular modification of them) I think we shall in these four, comprehend whatsoever is of moment in the material part of the means of Education. These are the visible apparatus, the *materialia secularis*, we employ for instruments to effectuate the design of superinducing a set of truths, opinions, and habits, to the capacity of a percipient being. *Artificial signs, books, seminaries, and religious establishments*—these, I say are but the material, or mixed applicatives of the project of Education. The project of Education, is the general purpose of such sorts of movement as eventuate in the accomplishment of Education, or superinduction of knowledge and habit in the highest and most advantageous operable measure and degree. A project is a compounded complex idea, to which is associated exertion of voluntary power. A project consists of four parts: 1st, *motive*; 2d, *determination*; 3d, *applicatives*; 4th, *object*. The *motive* is the prevailing desire, which constitutes the proximate cause of the determi-

nation of the will. *Determination* is the final settling of the choice and concludent act of the will, extending to the operative organs of the system; whereby the man is set upon the pursuit of a given end, in consecution to the influence of a given desire operating upon the mind. *Applicatives* are the intermediate beings the man employs as instruments, as to apply the extremes of a project to one another; and to produce the object to real perception; and are resolvable to two sorts—*substantive*, and *modal*. The *substantive*, are substances, and called *apparatus, implements, materials*:—*modal applicatives* are actions, events, circumstances, accidents, relations. *Mixed applicatives* are those which are compounded of substantative and modal ones, or whose composition comprises both substances and modes. *Applicatives* are the instituted or assumptive causes of the production or development of an object. Substantive applicatives, (purely speaking) are made up of substances, about which the contemplation, arrangement, application, appropriation, and whatever exertions are used to apply these, practically, to their ends, are called modal or moral applicatives, which in opposition to substances, consist of modes and relations. The adaption or adaptedness of these applicatives to their objects, is that which is called *use*, in the substantive sense of the word.

Object is the end; that which the motive is pointed at and directs the will to the pursuit of; the idea of which, causes the motive. *Object* is that which is the consummation of that whereof the motive is the desire or wish, and the idea of which, however inadequate, that is taken to be a representation of the thing, is the cause that originates the motive: since every thing must have a cause: even the first moving principle we are susceptible of a conception of, being still referable to a first cause beyond the verge of our comprehension. The first desire has a moving original: the

first desire that prompts to action, has a cause. The ascendancy of desire, has a cause; whereby one desire comes to prevail over another, and to be the greatest desire, (for the time being) that exists, instead of another one. The object is the issue of the application of a project, whereunto all the energy of the operation is conducted; the idea whereof, is the excitement of the motive itself.

Objects have several degrees, which denominate them *mediate, immediate, intermediate, primary, final, ultimate, proximate, and remote*. But the universal distribution which the object of every project may admit, is merely into *immediate object, and ultimate object*. An *immediate object* is that which may be converted to an applicative to another object. An *ultimate object* is that beyond which there is not conceived to be any reference to another. In one sense, these may belong to every project: when it is a subject of successive variation according to the gradual vicissitudes of our views of life; one project continually running into another, changing its immediate object to an applicative, and its ultimate object to an immediate one, making its ultimate object that which belongs to the succeeding project, and so on: (but in the inconvertible sense of the word, an ultimate object can be no other than consummate enjoyment.) So in the project of healing, the immediate object is expulsion of morbid matter, and the ultimate, the instauration, of health and ease. In the project of Education, the immediate object is improvement of the human powers, and the ultimate, their perfection of enjoyment. In the project of society, the immediate object is self-defence; the ultimate, security; which when gain'd, is converted into an applicative in another derivative project, whereof civilization is the first object, and increase of happiness, the ultimate. This refining advancement may proceed to several successive degrees

of amelioration in respect of moral and physical power, and of enjoyment; —each considered as effect of the preceding, and cause of the succeeding.

Artificial signs, books, seminaries, and religious establishments, are the substantive applicatives (or, rather, the mixed applicatives, being neither altogether substantive nor modal) of the project of Education; the vizable machinery, by which we carry on this business. To enter into a description of the particulars whereof these are made up, and how their construction has been advanced, is a speculation however amusing and even useful in another view, I shall defer, as lying out of the way of my present design, which is only to open a general view of the mechanical part of this project, and the capital means by which it is put forward: of which, since I shall have occasion hereafter to speak more at length of these applicatives so far as they comport with the predicament *institutes*, I suppose sufficient has already been said for that purpose in this place.

PART II.

Of abuses and defects in Education.

CHAPTER I.

Of abuses and defects, in respect to morals.

AMONG all the blunders mankind has fallen into, one of the most extensively mischievous and fatal errors which the civilized part of the human race has been guilty of, appears to arise from their miscalculations in the matter of the Education of young. It is at first view, in no small degree astonishing to a philosophical observer, that there should be found on the stage of civil society (taking civilization a thing which rises on a refined Education, pre-supposing a plodded proficiency in the arts, methods, and means of improving and expanding the human faculties) multitudes of youth more passionately wild, and capable of more extravagance than even is to be seen in savages who range the uncultivated woods, who are scarcely allowed to have advanced a single step towards polished civilization, among whom are yet found instances of mildness, generosity, hospitality, a surpassing sincerity and frankness, and such a pure operation of natural sympathy as reflects a reproach upon the fastidious board of civilized life. How is it that civilization does

possibly progress to this deplorable reverse ? How is it that the civilized man becomes an object more to be dreaded and shunned than the barbarian ?—Nay, even more horrible than the tyger, the wolf, the catamount, and the hyæna ? How is it that we come to behold many of the youth of enlightened, organized societies, where all arts and sciences flourish, and their dissemination prevails—how is it, I say, we find here youth descriptively the imps of the famed *evil principle* of the Universe, the author of all obliquity and pain ? It is, in short, by leaving aside morals ; and perverting those physical acquests ; or acquisitions of physical knowledge to the understanding, which extend its power over the means of improvement and happiness : and this lies mainly in the conduct of parents, that influence the treatment of Education. It is unquestionably the duty of every parent to educate his children well ; yet where is the parent who does it perfectly ? A defect in this thing, spreads contagiously ; it even flows in the blood : which being matured in the example of grown freemen, it is very difficult for any one parent to educate a family with effectual correctness—still his task is superable ; but the finishing must devolve to the subject's conscious self ; as every man of skill is found to be, ultimately, his own tutor. This stage has its difficulties from the same cause, which obtrudes not only temptations, but confusion of mind. To come now more closely upon the subject I set out to investigate ; Education is a matter of much greater importance than is generally thought. It is of almost infinite consequence, flowing from generation to generation : and the first part of it, which is generally reckoned the least, is, in fact, of the greatest consequence of all. The earliest sentiments take the deepest root : the first impressions are the most durable, and of the strongest cast. Whereas the unreflecting parent passes over with perfect indifferency the

Education of infants, which is a very important part of the science of Education. He talks at random to his child, plays at random ; and follows very rarely any other guide than his multivious caprice, in his whole treatment. This neglect of infant Education, paves the way for all the impediments, that follow, in the course of the prosecution of the remaining parts. The science and art of Education, any more than any other science and art, cannot be comprehended without study. An assiduous application of the intellectual faculties to voluntary thinking, is indispensably pre-requisite to the comprehending and effectual putting into practice, of this important business. Now, the unsuspecting unguarded mind of the vulgar, taking the first part to be no science and no education at all, finally omits the study, intirely, of every part, and never comes persuaded that it is a science to be learned, and capable of method ;—which yet the main business of moral philosophy consists in. This gross negligence, this delinquency, I am apt to imagine is attributable to none more than to the following causes :

First. A sensuous scrupulosity, on an advertance to the prospects and circumstantiality that incidentally concomitate this subject, which repels the energy of contemplation from its special bearings. Thus, when any one whose Education having been corrupt, inadvertant, or governed by chance, he, in consequence of it, urged by the baleful influence of example *without*, and the impulse of his ungoverned passions *within*, has committed several faults, crimes, and follies in the early part of life, comes to reflect seriously within himself, the reminiscence of those past points of his experience, induces inevitable compunction. The sight of his own children and of their congenial propensities, excites this reminiscence, while it stays the hand of a judicious discipline by dint of a vicious sympathy, an unregenerate love, and the whole, by way of

association of ideas, drags a train of sentiments of multifarious formation indeed, but of wonderful efficiency, which, consisting of the idea of a fond parent, an apt veneration for that parent, the idea of his own juvenile weaknesses and obliquities (for which his self-love may still retain in him too favorable a regard,) and that compunction which arises from the effects of these, all together conspire to generate such a state of suspense, incertitude, and confusion of mind, as is very obstructive to the studying and effectually executing of the design here referred to. Reflection being unpleasant, the man shrinks from it; and this shrinking from reflection being indulged till it becomes a habit, contracts and debases the intellectual capacity. Thus from being unwilling, he becomes unable to execute well, that of which he has not taught himself to think highly enough at first. For it is the greatest uneasiness present, not the greatest good in future prospect, by which the will is determined. The earlier the business of educating children is systematically begun, the easier is the task; for "as the twig is bent, the tree will incline." It is an easy task, not a laborious one, to mould an infant mind, but it is a matter of nicety, and requires attention, very different from the jumbled and vulgar course of the uncultivated world.

Secondly. That general aversion to study and contemplation, which pervades mankind at large. Men are generally averse to close voluntary thinking; not only because it obtrudes on them contristating ideas, but from that common indolency which more especially affects voluntary thinking than voluntary muscular motion, on account of early custom, as well as on account of its being easier to find pleasurable fantazies in a quiescent state of the mind, than pleasurable sensations in a quiescent state of the body. *Quiescent* I would here be understood to oppose merely to that

activity which implies application of voluntary power. Now, a man that is uniformly averse to study, cannot educate youth well ; for an art must be learned before it can be practiced. To be learnt, it must have abstract and intent application of mind : and this, of all other arts, requires at the outset, the most dispassionate perpension. This dullness is the cause of all that awkwardness and indocility in regard to all other arts and sciences as well as those of Education. If men will not exercise their faculties by an examination of natural causes and effects, they cannot be apt in any art or operation whatever. Ignorance is reckoned by some philosophers, the true original sin : and surely there is no sin anterior to this criminal neglect to apply the faculties to acquire knowledge. For there can be no sin where is no knowledge at all ; and this is the first general knowledge any can have of themselves, that they have a capacity and a need to acquire knowledge : this is amongst the first of our knowledge.

Now, as in the want of knowledge in any important art or science that is of great consequence to the public, and to one's self, and not only to one's cotemporaries but to those who come after him, proportionable guilt is implicated ; so, in this case, in regard to Education, the greater degree of turpitude pertains to this species of fault forasmuch as there is no event which drags after it more extensive and weighty effects, than the manner in which children are trained.

Thirdly. Example. Under this head I comprehend the example of some parents as well as that of the multitude of youth viciously trained : both of which are very oppressive to some few parents in the throng of a community, with which they are connected by several ties of relation ; who would gladly keep the path of rectitude in this thing, were it possible for them to pursue it, clear of such insuperable obstacles, where the intrusive intervention of these ill-bred adversaries

of social happiness, incessantly countermines all their wholesome precepts and judicious example: not to say, one man's carelessness makes another man careless by a continual excitation of the imitative propensity. From this point, sets in a general dissolution of manners gradually prostrating the dignity of moral maxims through the social world. O shame to the boasting inheritors of christian liberty! Ah, melancholy reflection upon the stage of civil life? The fact is, there is a track struck out by a few extravagant pursuers of fantastical pleasure, whose glorification is in a public exhibition of luxury and pageantry; whose course, meteor-like, is attractively resplendant; to whom the multitude of a poorer condition, are ultroneously obsequious, and catch their manners in all the ardour of imitative felicitation. Hence that strange deity fashion is set upon a throne, to mete out the bounds and lines of human transactions, and there become established some sacred (though rather vague) general rules and measures for the commonalty to square their conduct by, in building, painting, furniture, dress, educating youth, eating, drinking, singing, speaking, and every part of the business of civil life: which rules and measures, for want of the study of nature, come to be more venerated and observed than any other laws whatsoever. Thus flows the pregnant spring of human depravity. One ill-bred youth infects hundreds of others with the poisonous principles of licentiousness, too easily taking root in the soil of inexperienced minds when not guarded by the hand of a judicious culturer. So, the good parent is even discouraged: and by being discouraged, he loses his inclination and his ability to work sedulously in this field. The worst of it is, these influential personages usually are particularly loose in the Education of their young. Now, what can be expected will be the impressions youth will feel, when, coming abroad among his compeers,

he hears uttered familiarly by all, profane expression, lewd expression, expression of anger, of indignation, of contempt for superiors, vain blasphemous words treating with ridicule the names of the greatest beings in the universe, vulgar words, incorrect dialect, &c.? Apt as he is to take good impressions when free from interception, he is, alas! equally apt to take bad ones, in the same habitude. Many of our popular personages fancy if they can learn youth to read, write, and compute well, and to deport with fashionable decorum, their task is accomplished; thinking little or nothing of morality. A perversion of physical acquirements, causes a neglect of morals; and a neglect of morals causes, in its turn, a perversion of physical acquirements.

Fourthly. The public preaching is of a sort that does not promote, but rather retards the cultivation of this art. Instituted teachers in pulpits, do not emphatically inculcate the principles of Education. They either entirely leave morals aside, or they very much distort and entangle them, while they offer them in an adulterate state. There are those sects who go so far as to alledge that he who trusts to good works, i. e. he who depends upon the merit of his voluntary conduct for his final good; and who practices virtue for the reward of virtue, is damned.

This is laying the axe to the root of human excellence. This dissuades men from the practical pursuit of social virtue. When mankind are told they merit nothing by their own voluntary good purposes and good actions (which certainly are the supreme embellishment of human kind); and, further, that it is criminal to consider any merit in them; where will they look for their pre-eminence? Wherein shall they make their excellence to consist, when they are trained or persuaded to believe such a proposition? For, if one thing be not more conducive to happiness (to the

greatest good) than another; by what means shall men be incited to pursue one thing rather than another? And if men be not incited to pursue one thing in preference to another, what becomes of order, safety, peace, and propriety? And where is the mighty import of attending to the discrimination, establishment, or guardianship of such things? In another word, what is the importance of human action? Now, what can there be more excellent, more lovely, more worthy of esteem and love, more to be admired, in human nature, than moral virtue? And is there no merit in it? Is there no reward? No good consequence catenated to it, that is paramount to the privations which attend the undertaking? If it is a cause of diffusion of happiness, it being voluntary why is it not meritorious? Let this question be answered. For what is merit? A worthiness to receive and enjoy the effect that is instituted by the supreme mover of all, to follow a good action, which effect is a reward.

A clear proficiency in true physiology, for a foundation; next to this a habit of free and open manners, with skill and aptness in the social virtues, such as integrity, gratitude, patriotism, hospitality, meekness, charity; must be the ultimate ingredients that go to make up a character pre-eminent in our race, as the race is above that of monkeys. Virtue should be commended and esteemed. Virtue should have the respect and good will of men. The rewards of virtue and the punishments of vice, which the law of nature annexes to our voluntary conduct, should be held up to the view of men's minds in their most exciting form; should be impressively inculcated; and the beauties and advantages of virtue, and the deformities and disadvantages of vice, should be thrown open in the way of men's notice, in their genial colouring, in order to incite them to pursue the one and to avoid the other. There is a reward of virtue that is simultaneous with

the exercise of it. The satisfaction that attends the consciousness of doing well, is the greatest reward of virtue ; for it brings in its train the idea of the happiness it communicates ; and sweetens all contemplation, recollection, and study. There is, furthermore, another idea, men get from their public teachers, which is mischievously depressive in its influence upon the cause of moral improvement, viz ; that there is superior will overruling *their* wills, to which superior will, however stupid or fanatic themselves may be, all their determinations together with the consequences of them, are attributable ; that all vice, as well as virtue, is previously plan'd out and foreordained by that superior Being in whom that will resides : and such sentiments as " it was to be so "—" it is so ordered "—" it was decreed, what can I avail "—" I have such a character as I was made to have," and, " whatever is, is right," come to be familiar common-place resorts for the weak and unwary mind. Now, all these things representing morality a rather inferior thing in itself ; or a matter of *fate* out of the province of men's immediate duty, tend to make people in general, neglectful of teaching it to their children : while, what is substituted for the public teaching of plain ethics, consisting principally of a mystical theology, staggers and confuses the tender mind of youth, and either makes it untractable to right tuition, or prejudices it against all public and private teaching whatever. This spoils a good Education begun, and pre-disposes the vacant mind for very bad qualities. Publicly teaching pure ethics, is a momentous desideratum, of most valuable efficiency in educating youth and in directing others to educate them. In fine, Education should be the main business of periodical preachers.

Fifthly Excessive storge. In other words, an intemperate attachment to, and dotage on, the persons of children ; which consists only with appropriating

them as instruments of pleasure, either fantastical or sensitive. So, those persons who affect to love their children most supremely, and appear most exquisitely sympathetic in their regard to their offspring, do in fact do them the most harm of all descriptions of people. This wanton humouring and extravagant indulgence given to infants, has not in view the good of the children themselves, but is done merely to promote the parent's or nurse's own personal selfish pleasure. Now, this storge is a conspicuous part of the animal constitution, but like all other parts, it was made to be controlled by reason. Like all other affections and passions pertaining to human nature, its operation is liable to run into a degrading extreme when not overruled and moderated into a subordinate temperament by the reasoning mind deliberating on the consistency of its several applications. The inconsiderate takes a method with infants, that is apt to give them the characters of the ape kind. This is conspicuous in teaching them to apply their organs of speech defectively and barbarously, when it were easier and more natural for them to learn to articulate correctly; in setting them mimic patterns of inordinate indulgence of passion; and in diverting them from one passion by gratifying another equally bad. Thus in this period of existence, when the mind of man is most susceptible and most ductile, the golden opportunity is passed by, of establishing a proportional subordination of the springs of action, and biassing the ruling passion to the sentiment and practice of virtue. These, I think are some of the principal causes that make people in general, careless about seeking sure means to substantiate good morals in those who depend on them, and to render their characters eminent for that which is the only excellence human nature is susceptible of.

This remissness at home, is the first and insurmountable bar to a good Education, by rendering children

unwelcome subjects of a tutor *abroad* ; whereupon they come into school with bad dispositions, or dull and unapt in their intellectual faculties, averse to study and books, by reason of having had no pleasure associated with their ideas of letters.

It being a thing which to persons of reflection, must appear somewhat surprizing, that parents and those who have the managery of ductile minds, should be thus particularly wanting and indifferent, regarding a point of so obvious moment as the forming of moral character ; it may not be impertinent to inquire a little more critically after the causes of this delinquency. It is not very difficult to account for this default in the laborious part of the commonalty, who being choaked with cares and coarse pleasures, attend to no delicate business : but why persons of great fortunes and proportionable leisure, with refined and cultivated intellects, which must admit clear notices of the remote consequences of early biasses, should be so far off their guard as to take the direct course to form bad characters in their children instead of good, seems almost unaccountable. A considerable reason is, in fact, this : they think that good morals will, in due time, come to them of course, by the maturity of those hereditary principles they draw from their progenitors. So high an opinion men have of themselves. Sensible that theirselves are respected ; that they entertain no socially bad principles ; that the family has been marked by the advantages and refining discriminations of a judicious Education ; they seem persuaded to trust that virtue will spring up spontaneously in their children when they shall come to discretion, as if the seeds of it were interfused in their *blood* altogether. Entertaining this fantastical position, they deem it needless to be at pains in applying artful means to radicate just principles of morals in their descendants. This accounts for so many arrant sons of persons no-

ted for piety. They fancy they may indulge themselves in that capricious pleasure their light thoughts have reckoned a dear inheritance; that pleasure which pertains to an uncontroull'd fondling of the persons of their children, with a notice of their career in the element of absolute liberty. It is an excessive attachment to their persons and peculiar relation, which they suffer to lead themselves into a thousand irregular flirts destructively pernicious with a view to morals: for it is not merely neglecting *good* morals; but it is planting the very seeds of *bad* principles and habits. Now they take up the persuasion that they may safely indulge a little in all this entertainment, in the gratification of their own childish humors themselves know to be unwise, and by and by the promising gentry will exhibit all the fruits of virtue from the real intrinsic principles of them, nature has preserved in their very being! Never was a more disastrous misconception than this, i. e. of more disastrous consequences. With regard to the more gay and licentious part of the quality, it cannot be expected that those who, themselves, despise the practice of virtue, shall feel obligation to inculcate the principles of it in their children. Folly has become fashionable. A degree of extravagance has become the decided associate of honor and the respect of the multitude. And this suggests to me another occasion which I think makes distinguished personages decline the teaching of morals; and that is this: they reckon it derogatory to the dignity of themselves and families. For it is even looked on by the commonalty as mark of superior ingenuity, in a young upstart, to act surprizing feats of petty villainy, and be (as they call it) 'a little knavish'; and to trainmel the young gentry to the demure livery of preceptive discipline, is thought superstitious: and the world esteems them not so sublime models of imitation, nor so fit objects of public remark.

CHAPTER II.

Of Prejudice.

By prejudice I mean a wrong association of ideas : that is, what is otherwise called an unnatural association of ideas. For example,—the idea of contempt is associated with that of any particular moral duty : the idea of misery with that of poverty, &c. In forming prejudices, we are somewhat voluntary : in some degree governed by certain desires and aversions. These wrong associations originate what are called erroneous judgments and false opinions. These wrong associations rise sometimes from chance, and sometimes from a remissness in infant Education. A scrupulous care of the latter, overrules the former. The ideas of certain passions associated with those of certain sounds, is a notorious instance of this anomalous association. The ideas of virtue, pleasure, ease, associated with the ideas of certain situations, or the configurations of certain places, is a great and injurious prejudice : for this tends to make the subjects of it miserable, and presumptuously remiss : for while there is nothing in these extraneous things to constitute, or virtually produce, either happiness or virtue, men still refer them hereto, and referring, prorogue them, which very proroguing is folly, and its adjunct misery. It is not in place or circumstance to inspire virtuous purposes, otherwise than by suggesting them, through the reminiscence of an adventitious concomitance of these in some former instance. But this is not strong enough to operate at all times. This association is not firmly enough established to hold a

operative continuance. We are apt to connect them in the roving of our imaginations, and propose that when we reach such a place or such circumstances, we will steadily pursue such a system of conduct, or such a theme of contemplation. Inducements vanish, at the conjuncture. It is not in the power of place or its incidents, to superinduce such purposes, or habits of mind. It is practice that alone can do it. So, neither can place give happiness. Contentment is the substance, and happiness its shadow. Contentation of mind, and satisfaction with the present experience, i. e. a reduction of desire, or uneasiness, is the substance of the thing itself of which we make an object when we seek happiness. To put off, therefore, the execution of virtuous purposes, till we may be qualified with certain topographical circumstances, is criminal in a great degree. The idea of infallibility strongly associated with that of a particular person, is a pernicious prejudice. Also the idea of truth connected with that of antiquity, is a remarkable instance of this wrong association, and one that tends very much to encumber the progress of science: for when men take there is nothing will serve for the test of truth but what is old, what advance will they make in any branch of knowledge, especially in those which are the gatherings of experiment and observation? A more common acceptance of the word prejudice, is what is by another word called pre-possession: that is, an attachment or aversion to any particular person, or to certain propositions, arguments, theories. This is called prejudice in favor of, and prejudice against, a given subject. This attachment and aversion are grounded on the beforementioned associations of ideas, which in a general philosophical sense, aptly enough take the name Prejudice. To guard effectually against these, in forming the young mind, is a matter of critical moment. This all belongs to the art of regulating

associations. These prejudices are of various descriptions. There are religious prejudices, literary prejudices, scientific prejudices, national prejudices, personal prejudices. Religious prejudices are the characteristics of superstition. Bigotry and superstition have done great mischief to the intelligent world. Many eastern nations have connected their idea of Almighty power, with that of a factitious image. Gross matter, with particular configurations, is considered by them the substratum of such existence. Common animals and vegetables are adored as gods,—inheritors of supreme wisdom and power; superintendents of the unsearchable and invincible operations of the material universe! The Egyptians worshipped onions; the Hindoos, a hawk; the Persians, fire: some, also under the form of a huge serpent, beheld by the eye of imagination, the governor of the world, and disposer of all events. A power of cleansing from moral turpitude, is attributed to water. Washing the external surface of the body, is thought to clear from guilt, and secure divine tutelage. The papist fancies he offends his God by eating with a knife which has touched flesh other than fish, on certain days: and, finally, the whole race of man is split into opinative sects, at daggers drawing with each other, in behalf of some theoretical quodlibets concerning existences beyond the perceptible sphere of natural realities. Now every speculative observer immediately perceives that such as the foregoing instances are of the most grossly jumbled combinations of ideas, joining together incoherent inconsistent things, such as do not co exist in nature. Those who are charged with educating others, taking such steps as tend to engender prejudice in the minds whereof they have the forming, is a deplorable abuse. This is a grossly abusive delinquency in Education. If it be from ignorance, it is an abuse in those who knowing the proper means and

methods, rashly select and instate such persons to do that business whereunto they are incompetent. If it be a parent forming the characters of his own children, it is a more criminal neglect of learning the proper rise of the happiness of his offspring, and the means to avoid entailing misery on them, as well as making them occasions of misery to others. If it be one who educates himself, it is both pitiable and criminal: he is sealing calamity to his fortune, and sowing the seeds of misery in the paths of others.

There are six ways whereby this thing is done. 1st, by the agency of nurses; 2d, by that of parents; 3d, by that of deputed tutors; 4th, by that of those neighbors and companions with whom the subjects communicate, whose views and modes of thinking they are apt unawares to imbibe, in that susceptible and ductile state of the mind that marks the period of adolescence; 5th, by that of public teachers; and 6th, by books.

First. By way of the agency of nurses. Nurses who have the handling of infant minds, often do considerable execution in this line. It is their masterpiece to associate terror with the ideas of those things which, from any sort of motive, they are used to desire the child to avoid. Hence horror is the immemorial adjunct of darkness, which is nothing more than the absence or privation of rays of the particles of light. Hence also spectres, hobgoblins, witches, omens. They have likewise a notorious trick of inspiring aversion to such particular objects as they would have them shun or hate: hence thousands of unreasonable antipathies; and sometime unaccountable contempt of certain individuals. In doing all this, the nurse uses art. She goes about the thing as a work of urgent importance. Afterwards, pursuing the advancing youth, to the threshold of manhood, she through the medium of familiarity and affection, transfuses in rational language into his ears, fantastical stories, silly traditional-

ry tales, that substantiate really injurious prejudice, with difficulty to be extirpated.

Secondly. By the agency of parents. These are often the nurses of their own children. Parents and fond relatives are accustomed to introduce much prejudice into the minds of the young offspring, by rashly extravagant applications to their capricious humors in behalf of an overfondness; as well as designedly, from prejudices of their own, and from interest. Prejudice and interest move them to cultivate certain biases in their children. They would have them averse to particular ways of living, and particular trades; and therefore would fix in them a contempt for the persons that follow them, and for other concomitants: the ideas of abjection and misery are yoked with the ideas of such objects; all being proposed as things that co-exist in nature. Sometimes it is for their interest, for their families to be averse to, avoid, and hold in contempt, certain individuals and certain ranks: so they work seduously from settl'd principle, to train their offspring accordingly. The people of one province sneer at those of another: there has, perhaps, existed a cause to shun and hate them: thence prevails a common prejudice in the unpolished mind, perpetually cherish'd by all discriminative references through the round of vulgar converse. Gentlemen of the northern states, would give their children and dependants, a contemptuous opinion of the people of the southern states; and gentlemen of the southern states would cherish in theirs a contemptuous view of those of the northern. People of one nation make it a point of fashion to speak contemptuously of another. England would hold Ireland in contempt; and Ireland, England. America would disfavor Germany, Spain, Persia, as well as also her red natives of the west; and vice versa. When I speak of nations, I mean the commonalty, in general. It is owing to this childish

aptitude to national prejudice, the concomitant and discrimination of barbarism, that one nation instead of seeking by amicable barter and the arts of philanthropy, to obtain inheritance and peaceful establishment in a country inhabited by another, resort to murder and ravage, to make room for themselves in the way of mechanical force; as if, forsooth, none but those of their one language, colour, and manners, were proper subjects to be computed in the rank of human beings. How deplorably this diverges from the cultivation of philanthropy! Thus the emigrants from England mowed down, or drove before them, the natives of this western hemisphere. Thus Britain has seized upon the pleasant parts of India and Africa; and, in reposing her formidable limbs, crushed myriads of the native tenants of the soil. And thus, several civilized nations have worked their way into the uncultivated regions of the earth.

Thirdly. By the agency of deputed tutors. Unskilful persons being deputed to act in the capacity of instructors, to whom the managery of adolescent understandings being entrusted, very innocently induce several prejudices: while there are some who would do the same thing out of *craft*, for the subservience of an aristoratical policy. An endeared school-master has great ascendancy in this respect. Those who have the forming of youth, being ignorant, fanatic, or corrupt, the latter are in critical hazard of being deluded and grossly principled. A common prejudice that comes from tutors, is the bias to a stiff coxcomical carriage. I say coxcomical, because all incidental and accessory movements are squared to fixed rules no how applicable to the principal; which, if they be not the ostensible discriminations of a fop's character, are the ultimate principles of it.

Fourthly. By efficiency of neighbors and pheers. Now, here is a great inlet of prejudice. The expand-

ing mind conversing with the world, is liable to admit some wrong combinations. The world is uncultivated, and harbors traditionary stuff, which is venerated for its antiquity. Tell the simplest fabrication that may be; let it be discredited and thought ever so nugatory; let it be recorded; the fourth generation shall swallow it; the fifth shall range it amongst their choice proverbs and adages; and the sixth shall metamorphose it into a maxim! Various fantastical ideas have been drawn into a complexure with real ones, from the Greek mythology down to the *history of Robinson Crusoe*. Children hearing their familiar bystanders speaking plausibly of a particular person, representing him as noble, magnanimous, pre eminently generous, and otherwise worthy of general respect, and this being a habitual topic among them, dignity is joined with the idea of that person. Just so the common goods and calamities of life, are magnified, and made to appear something more than what they are. The idea of misery is associated with the one, and of happiness with the possession of the other.

Fifthly. By public preachers. Here superstition and fanaticism open their floodgates of prejudice and hallucination. These are the artillery of mystical theology. Every nation has had some enthusiasts. A vivid inventive imagination joined with a melancholic temperament and confined understanding is the creature which has hatched into the world monstrous systems stuffed with chimeras. Look into India and China! into Spain, Italy, and Turkey! Look into Egypt and Arabia! Look into Lapland and Spitsbergen! What grotesque fashions human intelligences have submitted to be habited in! It is the practice there is with these public preachers to speak mystical things, and speak with utter contempt and sometimes denunciation of other writers and preachers of plain morality, who, they are assured hold different creeds

from theirs concerning such existence as is beyond the scrutiny of human faculties, that prejudices people against those moralists; placing the idea of virtue in concatenation with that of supernatural efficiency. But the worst prejudice of all, that they tend to induce, is the prejudicing of young vacant minds (who were else ingenuously open to truth and right reasoning) against all moral teaching whatever.

Sixthly. By books. Many are the books which contain prejudicate hypotheses: and these, the common people are most eager after. Indeed such structures seem most aptly fitted to minds little cultivated. The reading of some authors is apt to prejudice the mind against ancient moralists; of others, against the modern: while some reading tends to prejudice one against his own country. The reading of novels, prejudices people against nature itself. Their idea of happiness being associated with the ideas of *unreal beings*, or of such as do not at present exist, they cannot be pleased with the *real*: hence discontent and ambition. Furthermore, the habitual reading of novels, if it do not directly subvert moral principles, works an indifferency to all solid accessions of intellectual excellence, by accustoming the imagination to a flow of excitements that it does not find in the pursuit of real knowledge and metaphysical truth: whereby the mind becomes weak and indolent, from a deficiency of proper exercise: for those particular faculties that are developed and employed in investigating reality or acquiring actual improvement, are not, herein, called into much exertion, and voluntary thinking is almost totally disused; the main pursuit being that of certain emotions of pleasure and pain, which a particular train of incidents and images is wont to elicit. It is impossible for a young person who finds pleasure in novel reading, to find pleasure in the pursuit of solid science. The love of science is incompatible with the

love of romance. This frivolous chase after fantastical shapes and shadows, constitutes the whole speculation of numerous young people in civilized countries, who, from habit, can relish no other species of literature but fiction. With these, truth is a disparagement to all books. They become disgusted with the thought of truth and reality. This extravagance prevails in common custom, to the incumbrance, and often defeat, of new publications on science. Hence, nothing is easier than for a bookseller to get what is called a fortune by a new novel; and one who is fishing for an estate, can get hold of no better hook and line, nor find one so well baited. The most formidable of all literary prejudices, is that which parents give children, against letters. It is done, frequently, unawares. I mean the association of pain with their first notices of letters. Indeed it requires no more than the omitting to associate pleasure with them: for these are the reverse of entertainment; these are objects to which nature has given no charms. They are merely figures which men have invented, to put into combinations they design to stand as representatives of ideas in their minds, that they may be thereby denoted to others. These figures must be impressed upon the memory, and catenated with certain sounds, before there is any use to be had of them either in writing, reading, or speaking. The pleasure of learning these impressions must be purely adscititious. It is merely a mechanical combination. It rests altogether upon the artful managery of overlookers; the craft of those who superintend the subject. By omitting to associate pleasure with the ideas of letters and books, in the apprehensions of children, we do the same thing as associate pain with them. They are in effect, to *them*, privations of other objects more delightful. Attention to these, supersedes other sports, and other ideas, which are apt to delight. And for this bare reason, that letters preclude their enter-

tainment, the ideas of letters bring pain along with them. Till there be a total reversion of this state of things, there never can be any proficiency made by a child.

CHAPTER III.

Of Example.

HAVING spoken of a total neglect of morals, and of the engendering of prejudice in the minds of young, as abuses of the privileges and abilities civilized mankind inherit in respect to the matter of Education; I proceed to take a particular view of that, which, though it is little regarded by people in general, yet has great efficiency, being perhaps, that lurking enemy, of which men not being aware, are in more danger of suffering by, than by an obvious one. I mean the exhibition of improper examples to those whose Education we influence. Some moral writers have maintained that example is more forcible than precept; which is to say, in other words, example has greater effect than precept, in determining the will, and disposing the mind of man. There is in man a propensity to imitate or act over again, the movements he sees performed by others of his species. This propensity of imitation, is a part of his nature. Creatures made of similar materials, and organized upon a similar plan one with another, are susceptible of the same impressions and feelings, from the same objects. The same irritation introduces the same perception in all: and the same perception naturally has a tendency to excite the same passions, in a greater or less degree. Thus fire will excite such an irritation as produces the sensation pain. Frost causes the sensation cold, and consecutively pain. Again, a less degree of heat from the application of fire, produces pleasure. A repetition of fibrous movements by different parts of the same sys-

tem, or by correspondent parts of different individual systems, may be called sensitive imitation; and is no other than what is called sympathy, which is the true ground of all our moral obligation. Thus "the appearance of a cheerful countenance makes us cheerful, and of a dejected one, makes us sad." The notice of a person yawning, incites an appetency to act over the same movement; and one yawn in company, is used to propagate its like through the whole group. There are certain parts of the system, which aptly repeat each other's motions. The salivary glands run into a brisk movement in consecution to that of the stomach after a full meal which excites the latter to more than ordinary action. The pancreas, also, is excited to increased action, in consequence of extraordinary stimulus on the salivary glands. There is that which is called *reverse* sympathy; when one part is excited to increased action by the decreased action or quiescence of another, and vice versa. So when from any obstruction, exhaustion of power, or want of stimulus, the stomach is quiescent or retrograde, the nerves of the head are affected with pain, which is but undue motion in those parts. This is not repeating the movement of another part, though it is imitating or following it in its changing one condition for another: but there is supposed to be that affinity in the constitutions of those separate parts of the body, which makes the affection of the one follow the affection of the other. When we behold in a fellow being, any part of his body wounded or disordered by some violent application, we sustain a disagreeable feeling in the correspondent part of our own bodies. Nor is this altogether an imaginative idea: there is real motion in that correspondent part; motion of the same directions, more or less approximating an imitation of that which really exists in the limb that is actually affected. Something like this takes place also, when

we have barely a recollection of such an object, or even a thought that rises by our imagination. When the cause of such sensitive fibrous movements having subsided, the perception to which they give rise, being afterwards re-excited by the power of memory, or suggested by the trains of imagination, wherein we sympathize with reflected thoughts, and with those called passions, such as love, fear, anger, admiration, &c. the sympathy is of a more refined and elevated kind: when extended to the ideas of moral modes and relations, it may be called *moral* sympathy, and is what distinguishes the most sublime improved state of human nature. Sympathy is called a 'fellow feeling;' the same affection, feeling, movement, in one subject there is in another, taking place in consequence of its being in the other, excited by the perception, or thought that it exists in the other. This is the prime-general principle of society. This is the mystical thread designed by our Creator to hold individuals of species and kinds of percipient beings together, to preserve and reciprocate the enjoyment of existence; to bind them to mutual assistance, and to probity by making it impossible to be safe and tranquil without it. Without sympathy we should stand as friendless and defenceless as the scatter'd fern by the way side exposed to all the inclemencies of the elements. Without it, were no such thing as social happiness; and, in reference to our fellow creatures, no such thing as compunction. It is the soul of conscience. Without this, a sense of moral right and wrong, would have no influence. But the concern of my present purpose is with voluntary imitation; with such exertions as are consequent on volition. It plainly appears there is a genial aptitude in men, to imitate actions they see performed by their fellow creatures. The same aptness notoriously discriminates the ape kind: the Orang Outang is thought by naturalists to approach, in point

of intelligence, as well as form and moving, the nearest to the human species, of all other animals. It is thought that the fineness of their sense of touch, for which the structure of their hand similarly to the human hand, is admirably fitted, is the mean whereby they reach'd their pre-eminence; touch being, of all the senses, the avenue to the greatest variety of ideas: solidity, extension, heat and cold, all finding admittance exclusively hereby. Of course, a finely formed and tangible hand, 'has been the greatest instrument of knowledge.' Reasoning from this ground, a celebrated physiologist brings out a supposition that the human race sprang originally from a race of the Ape kind; which had made great improvement by this sense, being distinguished by a particular smoothness and delicacy in their hand. And pursuing much farther, a thought that has some affinity to this, he comes to the conjecture that all intelligence emerged, generatively, from one simple idea; and that through a long progression of undistinguishable gradations, advanced with successive experiments set out from an appetency to preserve existence, and continued by the perpetual impulsion of *desire* aiming at enlargement, accrue all the powers of the percipient world. But, however plausible such hypotheses may be rendered, they have little or no use in morality; and although they may furnish an idle hour with speculations that entertain philosophic minds, yet they are not all commendable to be foisted into the moral teachings of youth. A proneness to imitate others is greater and more alert in youth than in any other age. Consequently, to be cautious in the examples we exhibit to those of whose Education we have the charge, is a requisition of utmost importance. This is a delicate part, which men's loose habits (compatible with very great accomplishments) are apt to overrule, and frustrate the design of instruction. Seneca was persuad-

ed that youth is more apt to take good impressions than bad ones, when equally expos'd. I am inclined rather to believe this true, than the reverse proposition. But the opinion I before quoted, *example has greater efficiency than precept, to dispose the man*, is so concurrent with all right reasoning and observation, it seems none can harbor doubts of its truth. Every day's observation evinces that young persons are more prompt to copy examples which are put before them, than they are to put in practice precepts without example. They are rather inclined to follow living patterns of manners than didactic rules, let them run ever so much in competition with each other: and the reasons are obvious: they love *company*, and think it honorable rather than strike into a path that is not beaten. Again, it is naturally more easy to them to imitate what they see acted, than acquire a habit of such movements as they never saw:—besides, they apprehend there is more pleasure in it *too*; and the precedent has some authority to confirm them, in this particular: all this more especially, if their pattern comes from one whom they have been taught to respect and revere.

Secure the respect of a youth by connecting in his mind the idea of dignity or wisdom with your person; then set him patterns of such manners as you teach him to not follow, by ever so plausibly delivered and well supported precepts by reason; you will find it impracticable to give him virtue. You will find him copying your manners in spite of all your doctrine. You corrupt, by this very procedure. You tear down what you make pretence of building up. You go to blast the cause of morality. But if example concur with precept, it enforces it. Let example and precept coincide: these are the means which do execution. Let your doctrine explain, and your example corroborate. It is the pattern that young persons look to, ra-

ther than the direction. There are innocent people of discretion who admiring the doctrine, seek improvement thereby, not moved by any contrasted accompaniments: yet these, in time, are disgusted by the notice of such examples; and sometimes there grows up thereout, a prejudice against moral teaching. There are public preachers who are addicted to pageantry, to luxury: nay, even those who are given to excessive drinking, to avarice, to calumny. The depravity of the public mind runs so far that it is even somewhere a receptory maxim that these characters cannot maintain their dignity without splendor. But I cannot advert to an instance of this kind more to be deprecated, perhaps, than in the character of teachers of schools. Young, gay, giddy, loose characters are too often employed in conducting our common schools. This proves that universal derogation of morals, which characterizes the commonalty of parents, who rate it a matter of indifference whether their youth be strictly impressed with regular precept and example or not. If this were not to them indifferent, they certainly would exert themselves to select such persons for this office, as are disposed to cultivate *both*, not only; but would study to co-operate with these persons. Instead of this, we find them, in almost every neighborhood, setting examples of rebellion against the authority and precepts of their teachers, shewing their children specimens of contempt, indignation, and aspersion of them. The tyro returning from his daily restraint, informs his tender indulgent parent he has been abused, has been insulted; the *blockhead of a master struck him!* The parent flies in a rage; opens a torrent of execration against the teacher, of whom he says all manner of diminutive things in the ears of the child, who is now inspired with indignation at his instructor, for whom he shakes off all respect, and delights in pursuing retaliatory schemes of encroachment.

ment and insult. He comes to despise the man who teaches him useful arts; and this prepares his heart for the most malignant ingratitude. The parent, not constraining him to obedience of his moral commands at home, tears him from his fealty to a master; that there may be no shadow of authority over him!

From this moment the tyro is in a worse condition than if he had no master at all; for, having the appearance of two masters, he must naturally either hate the one and love the other, or cleave to the one and despise the other. This also is setting an example of condemning without examination, and of reproaching and traducing those whom we ought to respect and endear. A pupil ought to revere his instructor, for two reasons. One is, it is impossible for him to make proficiency in learning, by the lessons of one whom he hates; and another is, the instructor *deserves* the esteem and gratitude of those whom he initiates in the principles of useful knowledge.

After all, the world will be found full of bad examples. Coming into the world, the emerging tyro not judiciously fortified by well impressed principles and thorough habits in morality, inevitably meets with examples of all manner of vices, to whose pernicious influence he is artlessly open, to be blown up with pride, lust, ambition, revenge, profligacy. He meets with his coevals and his seniors on the one hand, and his juniors on the other, alluring him with patterns of profanity, intemperance, lasciviousness, contention, oppression, abuse. The examples exhibited by neighbors and companions, are at last, the great enemy to be guarded against, with alert scrupulosity. Their seducing insinuations are hardly to be resisted without preliminary habits of speculative virtue deeply established. From this very consideration, it behooves every parent to be specially attentive to the morals of his children. It behooves every one who has the care of young minds,

to maintain a serious vigilance over the progressive rise of habits of thinking and acting, which must discriminate their character: that, by early nurture, he may radicate such principles as will countermine all conspiracies against social happiness; and make them proof against the stratagems of such subtle and horrid adversaries. To be fortified against the delusive tendency of vicious example, by early insinuation of sound maxims, is the greatest blessing human society is heir to. This is the great point Education should labor at. Yet how deplorably short we fall of it! The burden of the account must fall upon parents, for the following reasons.

1. People having had the pleasures and pains of bringing upon the stage of life, children, to add to the community of civilized mankind, who are to sustain characters either good or bad, whom also they design to be actors on this stage in certain capacities, trades, and relations, where they shall be able to do good and hurt to their fellow creatures, are under a fourfold obligation to endue them with good social qualities: obligation to themselves, to their Maker, to their children, and to the community whereof they are members. The parent's own enjoyment of existence depends finally, in a great measure on this, and certainly he can never rationally expect to partake the fruits of filial gratitude unless he implants its principles in their breasts. Our Maker is not more honored and obeyed by any other conduct than by rearing and training children to virtuous manners, and by sedulously expanding and ennobling those faculties where-with he hath endued them. Surely our heavenly Father must take delight in seeing those whom he design'd for society and perpetual preservation, multiplying and progressing towards that point of perfection he had marked down for them to approximate. Again, their children's fate depends greatly hereon.

Their enjoyment as social rationals, depends upon a sedulous nurture, a careful discipline of their parts and powers, in the tenderness of their infancy. Impressions stamped then, will endure through life. Furthermore, the interest of the community, is very much concerned herewith. When men are governed as they ought to be, (by themselves) by persons of their own choice; the government takes its character from the general sense of the people; which is according to the degree of improvement their natural powers have got; the degree of civilization they have attain'd; the degree of light has been superinduced to their capacities: all which results as the event of early inculcation, which is in the hands of others. If Education be neglected, if Education be debased, the society gradually falls to a state of anarchy. Meanwhile evil disposed individuals are pests and torments, in a community, to others who are well disposed.

2d. It is in the power of parents to set examples which have great influence. Parents command great influence on their children. Their examples and treatment have insuperable efficiency. It is in the power of parents to bias their children to good morals with greater ease than any other party can do it. It requires but themselves to know and love good morals, and to search out the fit means to produce such an effect in the young.

3d. Children more readily learn of their parents and nurses than of any other party. They are wont to copy the manners, words, and ways of thinking, used by their parents. All the world refers the weak unadvised youth to his parents. If he mistep,—is *this your breeding?* *Is this what your parents inculcated?* Is the general cry.

Parents, study, then, your part. The weight of the obligation incumbent on you, is serious. You say it is a hard task. What makes it hard? Is it not want

of knowledge of natural causes, that makes it appear so? *A hard, a difficult task, you say, in a depraved world!* True, it is a difficult task, in a depraved world: but it is not less a duty for being difficult. Countermine this deprav'd world by speculation and art. The depravity of the world, necessitates a deeper plot. Even the corruption of the world, shall refine morality. The whole secret of the business you have to do, lies in association of ideas. Associate in these young minds, pleasure with what is good to be done; then, the remainder of your work is plain and easy. For if pleasure accompany the impression of the first notices hereof which you introduce to their apprehension, those ideas never will re occur but they bring that pleasure along with them, unless the connection be superseded by some superior and overbearing impression that substitutes a different association. Afterwards, as the faculties gradually advance to maturity, this should be follow'd with argumentative lectures, which disclose the tendency and consequences of moral actions, and the importance of the social virtues. But more of this hereafter. Suffer me to add a few words relative to some specimens of example. Without example of the use of books by the authors of their first pleasures, recommending it to children, they will not get an inclination to the use of books, and consequently, a love of letters. Nor will this important principle be likely to get its root without an exemplification of some delight and satisfaction found by the parent or nurse in the use of books, and of a choice estimate of them as if they were reckoned worth preserving with care. Obsequious to the alluring influence of such example, the supple observers become imitatively assimilated to such an auspicious model of manners. Also, if we would have children respect a teacher, we ourselves must, in our manner, exemplify a respectful estimate of his character and profession.

This respect must be exemplified by a co-operating with him in his adopted process of culture. It is first necessary to approve the system of discipline and instruction adopted by such one as we *do* employ to educate our children, and then to co-operate with him in the measures he uses. It is seldom possible for a tutor to form the moral character of a child without a co-operation of its parent or nurse, with him, in the means to that end. Their anterior, pre-established, and prevailing influence, will otherwise perpetually undo all that he can do ; and pull down as fast as he builds up. The parent must concur in enforcing the same precepts and doctrine ; or the tutor cannot succeed to form the character of the child, whether intellectual or moral. Whatever its teacher may say or do to a child, it never will respect that teacher, if its parent speaks diminutively of him. When the parent or nurse contemns the teacher, the child will not respect him. These are general truths of the ordinary course of things. People are not aware of the odious habits that have arisen out of those things which have been employed merely as expedients to pacify children ; such examples as crimination, reproach, partiality, revenge, and nugacity, often finding an effective presentment in this medium, beyond the observance of those who produce them : and we little think that, by imitating their parents to the utmost of children's perception of an imitable model presented them by those they are wont to look to as standards, these children are contracting those very habits that we insensibly are exercising in those communications we are making use of to destroy others in *them* : thus we are not apt to suspect they are acquiring a habit of *scolding*, from our rebuking them.

CHAPTER IV.

Of remissness in the impression and inculcation of principles.

I IMAGINE my reader will begin to suspect me to be one of those false lights that would lead him round in a perpetual circle; and be ready to infer from what I am proposing to go about, that instead of advancing him forward towards his journey's end, I am but now conducting him upon ground he has just before trodden, where I am bringing into view what has been repeatedly had under examination in some preceding chapters: but the main design in each of those, lying another way; what I have hinted concerning principles, I would improve by a more deliberate inspection of what they immediately depend on, and are constituted by. Having treated of the unreserved omission of an important business incumbent on men, through mere *indolence*, or other disparaging causes, I go to expatiate upon another fault somewhat diverse from this; which is when men having set professedly about the prosecution of a given design, wherein they instanced all genuine marks of *intention*, do the thing by halves: go over it with a *slightness*, from a feeling of indifferency with regard to the event. These, if they go through the exterior accessory ceremonials, cheerfully pass off with a persuasion that their task is done; never ascertaining the effect; which, in the matter of making impressions on the memory, or superinducing any habit or quality to any other faculty, is very essential. The application may be so slight as to not produce a sufficient impression to continue

perceptible. It may not be accompanied by such other ideas as fix it in the memory by making its recurrence incident. It may not be repeated sufficiently to rivet it strongly in the memory. Pleasure, pain, and repetition, are the most efficient aids to infix ideas in the memory. When we say in the memory (speaking of it as of a place) we mean only that they are made liable to re-appear; being fixed within the power of recollection, or within the possibility of being remembered: which is no other than joining them to other ideas, to a greater or less number and variety; and the business of repetition is to connect an idea with various others. Every time an idea is repeated, it is associated with a different idea, either discriminating the time or place or some other particular; so that there are so many chances, so many possibilities of a re-occurrence as each of those connections. Because each of these ideas wherewith the other was joined, may bring this with it whenever it occurs; and this, in fact, is a manner of committing an idea to so many keepers, which is almost always sure to be found with one or other of them. So wont are fibres to move together, which have once moved together. If I would make impression of the idea of a certain drawing, upon the mind of a painter, who is to limn it without the convenience of either original or visible pattern, I would give him a view of it in different places. I would repeat the impression of the thing upon his senses in several situations; that, taking a curious survey of every part at his leisure, the whole might be found to be (as it were) *woven in* with sometimes one prospect and sometimes another: I would particularly let it connect itself with several individual objects that are apt to excite surprise or admiration: sometimes, for example, let it be joined with the idea of a curious tree; sometimes with that of a rare fruit, a horse, a singular bird; again, with some antique appendage of the way; and, sometime s

with interesting ideas brought up in discourse ;—that, (in a retrospect,) whichever way he turns the eye of his mind, he can not fail of effecting a recollection of his model.

Pain has equal efficiency with pleasure, to fix ideas in the power of recollection. A great degree of pain catenated with any idea or scene of ideas, renders their reminiscence easily accessible. Likewise any novel affection, or perception, concomitating any idea, fixes it in memory. Attention is necessary, still, to facilitate recollection : the efficiency of this is done by producing a particular habitude with certain distinguished feelings which become associated with what is desired to be retained. Attention, repetition, pleasure, and pain, are our chief aids of memory. These are the grand instrumental means of strengthening the memory, and perpetuating a reserve of knowledge.

Without digressing any farther,—men, I say, are addicted to a slackness in impressing and inculcating principles. There are who go about it as a duty ; but they go not heartily : so that either through ignorance or disaffection, they make not the application with sufficient energy to make such a deep and affecting impression as will prevail over all succeeding engagements of attention. The word principle has various uses. In one sense it signifies an essential constituent of a thing, without which that thing could not be. So, the chymists make the principles of certain bodies (or of *all* bodies) to be several species of particles distinguished by their shape and motion. Sometimes it is taken for a determinate, prevailing, and steady cause : at other times, and perhaps very commonly it means the *final* cause. Again ; it signifies a proposition, whether self-evident or otherwise received to be true, by which several other propositions that are more particular, are proved. Such are the axioms of the mathematicians ; and the dogmas of the moralists.

But it is sometimes taken for such a persuasion or posture of mind as induces it to determine on such a course as it does pursue; whether it be opinion or what arises from any other affection. And it is in a sense very like this, that I here make use of the word. The result of sensation and reflection, is ideas. These are called ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection. When an impression comes immediately from an external object, it is an idea of sensation. When it is revived by remembrance or recollection, or formed by the relation or aspect of any of the other ideas that are or have been in the mind, considered comparatively, in any point of view, it is an idea of reflection. Now, what principles are, in infancy, if they be any thing, are such connections (called associations) of some particular ones with other of these ideas, whereby they are accustomed to obey one common exciting cause, or be suggested one by other, as give certain directions and degrees to the passions, and gradually tend to peculiar habits of thinking. The way that these operate as principles in the soul of man, is by involving in their connection, objects that move desire: whereby, the prevailing desire being wont to accompany or follow a certain appearance, this becomes a governing motive to the will, habitually determining it to pursue one thing or to avoid another; which when it does steadily as a settl'd cause, it is aptly enough called a principle. Now these sorts of principles may be either good or bad. When I say they may be either good or bad, I mean they may be so, only as causes. They may be causes of good or bad determinations: for it is as *motives*; as causes of different determinations i. e. determinations on good or bad actions, that these become good or bad principles, in the concern of morality. The wrong may be prevented, and the good can be promoted, in very early infancy. It is important to establish such as have a

direct tendency to favor the practice of benignant determinations.

Principles, then, so far as concerned in morality, are all those ideas, propositions, combinations of ideas, or relations of ideas, that in themselves become determinate causes of habitual courses of voluntary conduct whether in thinking or perceptible moving. Of the relations of ideas amongst themselves, one of which I have been speaking is *association* of them. Association of ideas, is one of the relations or habitudes they have among themselves one to other, that does the most execution in the province I am speaking of. These associations arise from various causes; the chief of which, are the following:

I. Mere chance may make two or more conceptions happen to immediately succeed each other, or be excited at the same moment of time, which thereupon are afterwards more incident; and more liable to appear together, than others which never had been observed so nearly assembled.

II. Co existence. Some ideas are naturally allied together; i. e. the causes that excite them, are united in one subject: as the whiteness and roundness of a snow ball, the heat and colour of flame, the weight, colour, and ductility of gold. Such are all those qualities of substance, that cohere in *rerum natura*: and not only these, but also other things, that are not thus constitutionally united, are yet eminently apt to appear or operate simultaneously, or else to follow one another as by causation.

III. Voluntary determination. Out of choice we institute the connection of two or more ideas, and for some known purpose determine them to be suggested, one by another, whether in our own minds or in those we instruct. Thus we endeavor to associate with the idea of the name 'God,' in the minds of children, the ideas of justice, goodness, wisdom, power, and infini-

ty. We endeavor also to associate the blandishments of address, with our admonitions and injunctions.

Principles, in their metaphysical and moral use, resolve themselves into four sorts. There are four sorts of principles used to be considered proper to be inculcated on the minds of those of whom we have the charge to form their characters; viz: literary, scientific, moral, and mechanical. By literary principles I mean those ideas, combinations of ideas, relations of ideas, and propositions, from which follow the propriety of language and reasoning, and which are the immediate instruments of all knowledge that is acquired by the use of books and characters; these are the rudiments of what is called rational philosophy.

Scientific principles are those self-evident axioms and intuitive views of reality by which the structures of the sciences are tested, and which are directories in the forming of theories. Upon these rest the mathematics, and whatsoever consists of demonstrative knowledge, whether it relate to number, extension, motion, or any other incident of substance. But the use of these supposing a mature state of the faculties, when, if the agent have been but set right in the impression of literary and moral principles, he is in little danger of being deluded by any obscurity about these, I shall leave aside the consideration of scientific principles any farther than they are essentially concerned in the other, since it is with literary, moral, and mechanical principles, which the common people have chiefly to do, and wherein they are mostly deficient. Moral principles are those combinations or relations of ideas, propositions, or persuasions of mind, which are entertained and admitted as governing motives to determine the general course of our voluntary conduct, as it respects other conscious beings to which we stand in a relation that makes us capable of affecting them. These are those persuasions and maxims, which con-

cern us in all times and places, as directories to conduct, in society and solitude, for the attainment of happiness. There is a sort of these moral principles, which may be called speculative, which consist of knowledge or persuasion of mind that such or such things ought to be done, and others ought not to be done, in consequence of certain tendencies, relations, or operations of things, known or believed to exist; which propositions, the truth of which is so known or believed, are, so far as they have influence over our choice and determination upon any sort of action, moral principles also. These speculative principles, though they are reasons of conduct, are not considered as operating causes, and are thus distinguished from active principles. A pure active principle of this kind, consists of

1. An idea of a certain action or sort of action in one's power to do.
2. Delight or pain associated with that idea.
3. An idea of the beneficent or hurtful tendency of that action.
4. A prevailing desire to practice that action, arising from the acknowledged excellence of that action; or, a prevailing aversion from the practice of that action, arising out the evident vileness or unfitness of it.

This is a moral principle in its utmost development. Any habitual course or mode of action, whether mental or corporeal, spoken of as a quality in the abstract, of which the principle is the constant motive, it is said to be the principle of; as the principle of integrity, and of constancy. And these settl'd habitual ways, in their turn, are in themselves considered as principles also; principles of active life, that are the modelling springs of general character. Thus we say, the principle of stability: but stability itself is a principle, in one view; i. e. it is a constant cause of a uniform and moderate course of action in public life.

Mechanical principles are those ideas, maxims, and deductions of reason, concerning the properties of bodies, from which are drawn the proper rules and prescripts of those mechanic arts and trades that we use for subsistence, and by which the secrets of them are explained.

I shall notice a remissness in respect to each of these.

I. Literary. Men are slack in impressing rudiments of literature. The first principle of this sort, is a *letter*. The forms and uses of letters or literal characters, are indispensable to be fix'd in the mind before there can be any use of such characters, as vehicles of other ideas. Effectual methods are not used to produce this. Pleasure is not attach'd to the first notices of these things. Nor is there sufficient vigilance extended over the treatment these ideas receive from the untutored understanding; the entertainment they get, whether attention or neglect; whether they are noticed cursorily and then passed by and avoided for a long interim wherein evolve more exciting objects; or made the chief entertainment of the understanding, by reason of the greatest proportion of the agent's enjoyment being associated herewith in the first interview. This is a delicate piece of business, which requires attention. It is not for a parent to consider his children, altogether as little amusing delighting gifts of Heaven, that will, by and by, spontaneously grow into discretion and virtue, as their bodies grow in bulk; but there is a task which is his serious duty to attend to, to modify these intelligences with certain principles which shall be motives to actions; before he can reasonably expect to realize the fruits of such qualities. More particular care is required in impressing the principles of literature because *letters*, *books*, and *grammar rules*, are such objects as to a child are void of all manner of charms. The incipient

exercise of the mind about these, brings nothing along with it, naturally, that delights. The consequences are greatly delightful; but the outset must be sooth'd with artful combinations which will bias. Instead of this, we frequently find the laboring parent (cherishing a most repressive contrast at his home) shifting this task upon a public tutor abroad. But a tutor can effectually do nothing to a child without the concurrence of the parent: if the child be at home with his nurses and parents eighteen hours in twenty-four; in the name of common sense, by what necromantic machinery shall a tutor in the remaining six hours learn him any thing contrary to what he is taught at home, or make pleasing to him the reverse of what he is made to find pleasure in there? The parent is prompt to give injunctions in form:—"you must learn your letters"—"you must learn those rules"—you shall learn: you must not fail to study—you must obey your teacher," &c. But all this is not sufficient. There must be the idea of reward; there must be example; and finally there must be a time (and if possible let this be the conjuncture of the first acquaintance with these objects) when the child's most pleasing prospect accompanies these ideas; when the scene of instruction is an affectingly or peculiarly pleasing scene. The intellectual faculties derive energy from the subject of entertainment. The energy of the soul of man faithfully bears upon any resource which yields entertainment. Without this, there can be no attachment to letters: no aptitude to fix attention on that sort of objects.

II. Men are no less slack about radicating moral principles. Obedience to parents, docility, gratitude, temperance, stability, and integrity, are the most important of the first moral principles fit to be established in the young. Instead of *obedience*, some seem to go about to teach *disobedience*: and they do this by

indulging their young in such courses as are directly repugnant to the parents' own desires and advice. What avails it to advise or enjoin my son one thing, when straightway I gratify him in a reverse inclination. It avails this, that he comes to slight my commands and my advice, and to view me as a subject of insignificance. After this, he is likely to become my master.

If you would have your son obey you, set him an example of a sort of *obedience to yourself*, by adhering to your own deliberate resolutions ; not pitching upon one course to day, reversing your plan to morrow, the third day taking into the very contrary course, and the next day into a different one still ; such veering makes him aptly conclude that you yourself not regarding your own counsel, is matter of little moment whether he follows it or not ; or rather, that it is no how eligible. This, again, sets you upon a foot of insignificance. If you would have your son grateful, set him an example of gratitude, by expression of a grateful sense, acknowledgement, and due return, of benefits received from your *own* patrons and benefactors. Neither is this all. Some pathetic lecturing is yet requisite to be administered, to confirm those who are any way exposed to the corruption of adverse example. The other virtues follow the same rule. All are more confirmed by example than by any other aid. If with the best instructions we continually join example of levity, we shall hardly fix any principle whatever, unless it be that of duplicity. An example of levity is the capital clog that encumbers the inculcation of virtuous principles in young minds : and herein it is, that men of the world fail : their own passions hold the ascendancy over the consideration they have of Education. The social virtues are of the greatest concernment. The social virtues are what finish human nature. The whole principle of these, is com-

prehended in the idea of philanthropy. Let the sentiment of philanthropy once get place in the growing mind, the whole circle of the social virtues obsequiously attends this resplendant emanation of the divinity. Philanthropy must need imply the true essential principles of all the social virtues, for it comprehends in the object it embraces, the whole scope of all good purposes, wishes, and thoughts, so far as they regard the human species. It is the vital primordial of benevolence, charity, hospitality, justice, gratitude, forgiveness, and patriotism. For it is but by dint of some degree of love or esteem, that we are ever impelled to do that good to our fellow creatures which we wish to have them do to us; unless we be under external constraint. This has for its end, the good of all mankind. Although we cannot expect to find or infix this sentiment of philanthropy, in its full amplitude and extent, in the infant breast, yet we may approximate it. The steps to be taken, most likely to make this approximation in the adolescent frame, are to repress emotions of anger, envy, hatred, &c.; and to repeat those of love, pity, remorse, serene pleasure, and complacency. In short, philanthropy is but an improvement of that *natural sympathy* which enters into the composition of all percipient beings. By docility is meant an ingenuous openness to conviction and a prompt auscultation to the directory communications of such as may afford instruction or improvement. This is promoted by what makes the temper mild, and represses all the harsh humors in the system: it is also subserved by associating serene pleasure with whatsoever is wont to fasten and engross the attention, or is capable of exciting intenseness of intellectual application. Gratitude is one of the loveliest traits the character of the adolescent mind, can exhibit. The elicitation of this, comprehends filial affection and obedience. When we once get this principle established,

filial obedience naturally follows it as a necessary effect. This principle is confirmed by reflection. Its perfection depends on cultivation of sympathy. Therefore the earlier we can inure the young to the practice of reflection, and reasoning on the feelings of their parents and other benefactors, with a notice of the relations they stand in, to them; the more we shall accelerate this qualification. Moreover, the same physical causes that subserve the other principles, are propitious to the grounding of this. But the greatest principle, the climax of all principles that can be introduced into the heart of childhood or youth, is integrity. This substantially dignifies human nature. It includes in it the essence of sincerity, equity, probity, punctuality, charity, and hospitality. The child that has this principle, will not disobey his parents' or teachers' reasonable commands; will not waste or misapply his time; will not deceive; will not disrespect his teachers, will not do irreverence to aged persons or strangers; will not turn averse from the relief of the indigent; will not insult or ridicule the deformed. Fortitude and patience also, are generally adjuncts of this;—which are of themselves two important principles, and are surprizingly generated by early denials, privations, and trials of hardship. Adversity is the school where these are nursed with peculiar effect; and herein indigent parents may improve their misfortunes into the greatest of blessings.

III. This slackness prevails, to a certain extent, in mechanical Education. The children of this world, terminating their views in immediate gain, are content to shirk along by *any* means, and execute their work by any rude measures that secure this object. It is a greater point with them to get the advantage of times and people than to adjust the application of their rules to their true principles, and finish their work accord-

ing to the original ends of these ; and what they deem most interesting to themselves, they are wont to teach to those of their apprentices and dependants, whose welfare they have at heart.

IV. People also are neglectful of implanting true principles of science. They deem it a matter of indifference whether they furnish the minds of their children with true determinate and distinct ideas of the qualities and powers of substances, or not. Sometimes these are shamefully deluded, when they are young about natural causes. From the age of five, to nine, children's curiosity is generally very alert ; and they eagerly seek after a train of causation. They importunately ask a multitude of questions concerning the beginnings and relations of natural beings that fall in their way ; to which the parent often gives evasive answers, and sometimes very fallacious ones. It is better to make no reply at all, than to imprint false ideas of qualities or causes : since, what impressions they take at this time of life, are to have great effect. As dilatorily and vaguely are the ideas of quantity usually infused, in their early years.

The reasons wherefore men are so generally remiss and lax in the matter of fixing in the minds of others, certain correct principles, I suppose to be the following :

1. *Discredit.* Theirselves not making any use of principles, people think these not of due consequence, to be worthy of their attention. This is a fault very much marks men of the world. They confine themselves to no certain prescripts of moral principles ; governed by selfish maxims, whatever happens at any time to be most conducive to the eclat, wealth, or pleasure, of each one's own self, they are used to practice ; and, not only to practice, but to recommend by their conversation, to those whom they regard with sympathetic concern. Now, what a man reckons of

no moment; what he conceives not essential to the support of his own enjoyment, cannot be reasonably expected he will consider necessary for him to inculcate in others, to perfect what he deems a good and sufficient Education. Hence, to substantiate a true directory principle is not, in their esteem sufficiently urgent and important to incite them to go about it in earnest. But this is not the worst: from the same cause, they come to hate such principles. They are averse to the incumbrance of exact principles. I am here speaking of moral and literary principles. These same people, I say, are inimical to good principles. A real hatred of what is good, is an alarming disorder in those who are influential in the Education of others. What may one expect of the Education of a drunkard's or gambler's children? What may one expect of a jockey's family? All those who labor under any flagrant disorder of mind; under the tyranny of any excessive passion or vice, are not in a fit plight to educate others in morals.

2. *Indolence.* Men are *too lazy* to emphatically inculcate principles. Men are too fond of ease to be given to that intenseness in voluntary thinking, requisite for the instillation of judicious principles. It happens that exercises of mind are more *against the grain* of slothful men than any other sort of exercise. We never find one who is alert in study, attention, reasoning, or composition, impatient of labor. People, therefore, although they are told it is their duty, and are sensible of it too, to attend to the establishment of clear influential principles, in the minds of their offspring at least, yet going about something may have the appearance of it, to bias their neighbours into a favorable estimate of their dispositions, cannot confine themselves to see the finishing of their work.

3. *Ignorance.* People are ignorant of the proper measures and methods to be pursued, to this end.

Some are ignorant both of the nature of the principles themselves, and of the fit ways to instil them. This ignorance is the case of thousands, of whom we are not aware: these are respected and popular. They are versed in the rules of decorum common in their society; and, being prompt in their practice and teaching of these, appear to be persuaded that this is the compass of what concerns them in morality, all other important matters being handed them by the priests, or public preachers.

This prevails in mechanic arts. Many a man has taught himself more in six months time than he had acquired by an apprenticeship of seven years.

4. *Craft.* Public preachers are shy of establishing the principles of *morals*, lest they should upset their machinery of *theology*. They are shy of instating the true principles of morality on the ground of physical knowledge, by calling into exertion in the young the faculty of reasoning, lest they sap the foundation of that system of faith and mystery by which they are accustomed to subsist. Monarchs lay plans to prevent the diffusion of knowledge. Their thrones are built upon ignorance and delusion: it therefore subserves their policy, to slight and to impede the inculcation of literary principles. One would think that a person who never got the rudiments of literature, could make no proficiency in other departments of knowledge and art. He, however, acquires knowledge, in proportion to the extent of his observation and experiments: and what little he does attain to, is substantial and lasting; for he is apt to retain it in his memory.

Professors of mechanic and other arts, avoid initiating their apprentices in the highest excellences of their trades, that they may not, when they set up business for themselves, encroach upon their influence. Artisans, apprehensive of their apprentices making encroachments upon their custom, are niggardly of in-

struction : from the same consideration they go to prevent their forming connections in their neighborhood. But one of the most odious and malignant forms this craft appears in, and where it has the least pretence to vindication, is that of a free enlightened republican bringing up a slave or drudge without principles. When people get to that height of pride, that they reckon it a reflection on them for their inferiors or servants to possess true moral principles, it is a conclusive argument that themselves have none. Yet this is a usual custom with private families, who to the disgrace of human nature, are tolerated in buying and selling human flesh. But these very rationally apprehend that true principles prevailing in these drudges, would, in progress, inevitably make their masters objects of indignation and contempt.

I shall close this chapter with a view of the consequences of this remissness. The consequences of this, I apprehend, are these :

First. If we consider principles as a sort of ballast to the soul, we shall find that without these, the mind being adrift, as it were, at random, liable at every moment to every degree of perturbation, confusion, suspense, and anxiety, gives us a notion not very unlike that of a ship on the sea without rudder or compass. The soul of man is in absolute need of something to rest upon and to steady her amidst diverse incitements and examples : something whereunto she can (in a manner) call up all her wandering wishes, festinate counsels, aims, plans, and multivious pursuits, and happily bring them to a test by which they may be conscientiously squared, and determined in a way that consists with permanent satisfaction. Let me have a final cause to my whole course. Why do I suffer myself to be actuated by such motives ? Why do I pursue such an object ? Why do I practice such means ? Why do I strike into such divers ways ? Let

me be able to account for all this on some clear, prevailing principle, that determines me herein. The earlier minds are qualified with these, the better. A youth may go wild to the sixteenth year, it is *then* more difficult to principle him aright, because you have at least to *unprinciple* him, that he be divested of those *false, corrupt, or immoral* principles, which may have become habitually operative in him; besides, he may have a principle of *levity* so deeply rooted as scarce to be eradicated.

Secondly. Youth not having been strictly principled, and restrained to the path of rectitude in the years of their ductility, become in general, slack in regard to principles, and teach the reverse of virtue. People are apt to copy after their progenitors with a degree of reverence, in some particular things which they either dont much value, or dont understand: so that one generation being remiss, the next is so with greater confidence and dignity.

Thirdly. It is injurious to the community. Unprincipled young men do more execution towards the aggravation and spread of vice, than all other means put together. There arises a general derogation and disregard of all moral maxims. Sincerity, probity, stability, become buts of ridicule. This is an evil that is alarming in a community, to all good men and defenders of the cause of morality, when the principles of the greatest excellences of human nature, are brought to be objects of burlesque. Not that mirth is incompatible with those: a good man, perchance, may be no less merry than virtuous; but it is dangerous working those into the subjects of our mirth. Stability, integrity, and sincerity, are fundamental principles essential to the subsistence of all other morals. For without those a man is an abandoned wretch, or a minister of vice. In whom we find no trace of either of

those, we find a specimen of a depraved creature indeed.

Fourthly. Education is harder and more difficult in consequence of a remissness in this particular. Education is impracticable to be completed without these. Not only in literature, lies great difficulty in the want of early principles; but all parts of the work, are doubly laborious. Whether I teach or learn, principles make my work easier. If I lay out a garden, and have on my mind an exact impression of the whole diagram of what I go about to produce, also of the particular steps and courses I am to take, one after another, to complete my process; and have a common post to which to return at every circuit, and from which to make all my emergences; my work is plain and easy: without these, my labor were, comparatively, without end; running into a maze of perplexity. The same thing holds good in the cultivation of human nature as in the cultivation of the earth. The forming of a good mind is analogous to the making and dressing of a garden; and it is a likeness in these ideas, which has given rise to the application of the words *cultivate, culture, cultivation*, to the idea of *teaching or inculcating*.

Fifthly. It destroys domestic happiness in families. It is laying a broad foundation of family brawls and disagreements. Whereas, if the members of a family while young, be carefully impressed with principles of filial obedience, gratitude, and fraternal affection, not all the powers of the world could draw them into a wrangling contention between themselves: they would sooner separate, at the peril of perishing. Such habits of thinking, such attachments, grow out of those established principles, as fail not to give peace and happiness to the circle. It is a subject of pity that we have not example more frequent, to corroborate this.

PART III.

Of remedies for the abuses and defects in Education.

CHAPTER I.

Of circumspection on the incipient progression of the understanding.

PHYSICIANS make use of two sorts of remedies : that which prevents disorders, and that which cures them. Some diseases, which cannot be cured when they have once got hold of the constitution, may yet be prevented by the seasonable application of some medicament or regimen before they come on. The same holds good in regard to disorders of the mind, as well as those of the body. Indeed the civil authority of a community, is sometimes requisite in cases of the former of these. I shall, on the present occasion exhibit a *preventative* : i. e. circumspection on the first proceeding of the understanding faculty ; which, as it leads to a detection of the original suggestion and emergence of whatever is morally evil, or incorrect, is the only rise whereby we can come at a prevention of this sort of disorders. It has been shown that there are several defects and abuses in mankind's course of Education : and that the principal of these are a dis-

count of the idea of morals, admission of prejudice, exhibition of bad and improper examples, and remissness about intilling principles. Now, all these things may be remedied : in other words, the common course of mankind in the business of Education, may be amended. The first step I propose, is circumspection ; the efficacy whereof, will pre-suppose the knowledge of what is good, and what is evil. I have formerly taken notice of a five fold process used in Education : the *first* step, of which was the forming and regulating of associate ideas ; the *second*, the unfolding of just views of nature to the understanding ; the *third*, the conducting of the organs of sound to proper articulation ; the *fourth*, forming habits of voluntary action conformably to maxims of prudence and purposes of social virtue, under a controuling discipline through means of practical repetition ; and the *fifth*, the establishing of such associate mechanical movements as are connected with or subserve the designed or most proper occupation or art of livelihood contemplated as a fixture of our existence on the stage of action. These were observed to comprehend the whole *modus operandi*, the subject matter of what is necessary to be done, in Education ; the same being repeated and each part being extended and diversified according to the gradual alteration and increase of the capacity, in each successive stage of human life. Which, if a man feel ever so confident at the age of fifty or seventy years, of the adequacy of his attainments, is a beneficial exercise of mind to take up a studious recapitulation of this round of recourses, according to the propriety of their process, not only because exercise strengthens intellectual as well as other powers, but as it serves to disclose any possible failure in faculty, or obliquity in habit, to which his own mind may have been subject. I shall refer a circumspection to the crisis of each of these stages, promiscuously. The

very first character the human mind appears in, is the *infant* beginning to entertain notices of things. The scope of our circumspection *here*, is the prevention of early prejudices. It is proper to anticipate the influence of a nurse, and see that no false, no chimerical combinations get footing here: that darkness be not associated with fear, blackness with sorrow or pain, magnitude with right to command, strong emotions of mind with certain shapes or configurations, or indeed any sort of colour strongly associated with a taste, or shape with a sound, &c. which latter, though in this place they may seem to be innocuous in themselves, yet, by the effect they have on the mind, by wrongly disposing it, and preparing it for a bias, are unfavorable to the purpose of intellectual and moral improvement; and it is best to keep out, as far as possible, all anomalous and hallucinating connection, that none get root before the discerning faculty is mature. The first inlet of knowledge, is by way of the senses. Our first ideas we get by sensation. The two sources by which we get all the ideas, images, notices of things, ever admitted to human apprehension, are sensation and reflection. Sensation is that motion that is given any part or parts of our sensitive organs by the impulse of external bodies, whereby we perceive ideas or images of external things. In fact, these ideas of sensation are whatever we perceive by the affection of any or all the properties of the sensorium exclusive of the voluntary power. Reflection is voluntary thinking: rather, it is that voluntary view the mind takes of those ideas it has received by sensation, and of its own operations about them; whereby it gets another set of ideas different and distinct from the impressions it has from external things. The ideas of all its own operations come in this way. These operations, or modes of thinking, are discerning, comparing, compounding, abstracting, recollection, attention, study,

contemplation, imagination, memory, and resverie. The progress of the understanding, I suppose to be simply this: the infant in the womb has no variety of ideas but that of pleasure and pain from different degrees of warmth or some other circumstance, and perhaps of solidity. On coming into the air, it is encountered by other stimulants which excite far different movements. It begins to have ideas of colours, light, variety of tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold in greater degrees, the pains of hunger and thirst, and the pleasures attending the proper means to remove those pains. For several days, more or less, the understanding is employed upon this variety of ideas, which are hourly increasing and diversifying to sufficiently excite by their novelty.

The pleasure it receives from its nurse, is so strongly associated with the idea of her person, that her absence withdraws from it its whole happiness. Herein mark the advantage may be made of this property of association, by afterwards making *letters* a scene of delightful entertainment, and also, *active virtue*, by placing it with the accompaniments of what its chief pleasure is associated with: for all such ideas may have a place in the same connection as with those first pleasures of existence. This by the bye. To proceed; the discerning faculty begins to discover itself in distinguishing and identifying objects. The business of this is to perceive the difference between two distinct ideas: only by this, we know one thing is not another, and the same thing, at different times to be the same with itself. The passions now begin to shew themselves, first joy and grief, next anger, love, hatred, &c. Such arrangements as tend to give them due bearings and connections, are incalculably important. It is possible to attach these to such sorts of objects as, in train, will lead to virtue. Physiologists say this; that which distinguishes animals from vegetables, is

sensorium. This sensorium is supposed to be the substance of the brain and nerves. A centre of the sensorium is reckoned to be in the central part of the brain. There are four faculties in the sensorium; in other words a capacity of four different modes of operation or action, which are called irritation, sensation, volition, and association, which are called sensorial motions; the powers or possibilities whereof, are called sensorial powers, and are termed irritability, sensibility, voluntariness, and associability. "Irritation is an exertion or change of some extreme part of the sensorium residing in the muscles, or organs of sense, in consequence of the appulses of external bodies. Sensation is an exertion or change of the central parts of the sensorium or of the whole of it, beginning in some of those extreme parts residing in the muscles or organs of sense. Volition is an exertion or change of the central parts of the sensorium or of the whole of it, beginning at the centre and terminating in some of those extreme parts residing in the muscles or organs of sense. Association is an exertion or change of some of the extreme parts of the sensorium residing in the muscles or organs of sense, in consequence of some antecedent or attendant fibrous contractions."* Irritation attends us in all our working moments, from the air we breathe, the ground we tread upon, and whatever matter supports our bodies. Irritation either simply subsides, or it produces sensation. Sensation usually includes pleasure or pain. When it extends to either or both of these, it is called perception. Some degree of pleasure or pain accompanies almost every one of those ideas of external objects, received by sensation. The distinction of pleasure and pain, is relative degree of motion. Pain is too violent or too slow movement in relation to habitual motion, or to the ge-

* Darwin.

neral motion of other parts of the system. Pleasure is due and equable motion, compared to the same standards. Sensation usually follows irritation. Exceptions take place only when its progress is wholly resisted by volition. In like manner, if sensation ever fails to produce some noticeable degree of pleasure or pain, it is owing to its being repressed and resisted by the contravenient force of volition. In both these cases, something frequently takes place like reverie, wherein the man being taken up with the contemplation of some particular idea or train of ideas, this sort of voluntary thinking carries such a full energy of volition, and so completely exercises the central parts of the sensorium, as to leave no room for the counter-pressure of sensation to produce any actual perception of pleasure or pain. Desire and aversion are incipient volition. Volition either terminates in desire and aversion, or it is propogated to the muscular organs, when it may be called determination. Ideas are by some metaphysicians supposed to be motions of sensitive parts, beginning in extreme fibres, produced immediately by appulses of other bodies, or re-excited afterwards without them, from volition, sensation, or association. Those reproduced by the two latter, are, by some, called ideas of sensation; and, by the former, ideas of reflection; as in recollection or imagination; those of the former of which, are introduced mainly by volition; and, of the latter, by sensation or association, or both. All manner of agitation or movement, as a consequence more or less immediate, of the action of external bodies upon ours, which produces ideas, whether it be irritation or sensation, the latter being but a continuation of that motion which the former begins, may be put under the general name sensation. This view of the subject, wherein association being considered as an affection of the sensorium, is the result of a natural property of man, may

lead us to an advantageous ascendancy upon *method*, in directing the infant passions and thoughts. For, in proportion as this fact is apparent, we have power to establish associations upon a solid foundation. The progression, now, is into a developement of the various modifications of the passions, and all the phenomena of their wild career. Desire, anger, love, hatred, hope, joy, fear, successively disclose themselves to view in some form or other, while yet the creature is not able to walk or to articulate. Here is critical work, that claims the attention of guardian, nurse, parent, tutor, attendant, or whatever character has the managery of or influence over, the infant subject. *Now* the world thinks there is nothing to do. The commonalty utterly neglects this stage of Education; thinking, at least, that it is impossible to effect any thing towards adjusting the principles of action, or grounding good habits, in so weak a state of intellectual power as is peculiar to infancy. Yet I think there is no reason to doubt that something may be effected in the following ways: viz. By taking care to let all allowable gratifications of the appetites, propensities and wants incident to this period of human existence, follow or concomitate serenity, or a quiescence of tumultuous emotions of mind; and to not admit their immediate consecution to anger, rage, grief, revenge, &c. lest there be a false causation establish'd in the trains of association; and, the child considering these bad passions and outrageous actions the price of the good things he enjoys, contract a habit of such a recourse: the natural result whereof is too mischievous not to be generally observed and deprecated. If you follow a child's importunity, violence, or resentment, with gratifications, it associates merit with it: it henceforth, becomes, in his esteem, the procuring cause of those gratifications. This is too much overlook'd. People think the young is not capable of any such sys-

tems of causation. But yet I think it is evident to every attentive observer of these appearances, who coolly sets about to trace causes from their effects, that it is susceptible of such connections, which in effect prove extremely tenacious too; as indeed is any sort of impression which takes effect by way of sensation and the intervention of any considerable degree of pleasure or pain, in this early ductile state of the frame of human animals: and however forward some are to contend that nothing can be done to children when they are very young, towards qualifying their minds with any species of principles, there evidently are *two* things which can be done, and which ought to be carefully avoided. Parents can *bring themselves into contempt*; and *bring morality into contempt*. These can be done pretty early. We know, by sad experience, that they *are* done, and things may be fairly disposed to these results, even in *infancy*. Parents and nurses may excite the contempt of children *against themselves* and *against morality*. A child may be (for a general pattern) reckoned an infant till the age of two years. What I am going to describe may, in parts, extend over this limit. These effects are liable to be brought about in the following ways:

People make themselves contemptible and make the maxims of pure morality contemptible in the views of children, in the following ways:

First. Parents and nurses make *themselves* contemptible to young children,—

First, by vain threatening; which is effectually a practice of slighting themselves: and when people barefacedly exemplify a derogation and setting at nought of their own counsels, what other can they expect but that bystanders, young or old, as quick as they come to notice and understand this, will follow their pattern so far as to entertain as trifling consideration of them and their conversation as *themselves*

do? And what do people other than bring themselves and their talk into contempt with their children, when they practically repeat threats of punishment, which they never execute? Punishment which were indeed *just* (and might appear so to *their* apprehensions if these parents did not exemplify the reverse persuasion by invariably shrinking from it) which is now rendered a mere jest, a sham, an empty sound, which by repetition, loses all its terrors. Furthermore, the reiteration of these harmless menaces growing disgusting, sets their authors in a contemptible light not only, but goes so far as to excite insolence. "You'll kill me, but you don't touch me" echos a pert booby of six years, to his fond but peevish mother (a vapouring shrew,) who uses no other weapon of chastisement but her tongue, and with *this* usually *over-reaches her victim*. When a roguish horse has once found a safe emergence over an enclosure, he no longer stands in awe of that mound, but feels himself at liberty: and you might as well talk to a horse of the magnitude and strength of such walls as he has repeatedly sent defiance at, from his heels, as to reiterate threats of punishments to a child, which never were and never are likely to be, put in execution. Now, such a course cannot excite love, veneration, gratitude, compassion, respect, filial obedience, in children, for it excites *contempt*: and contempt in a child, for superiors, excludes those emotions. The predisposition to this state of mind may be induced in infancy.

Secondly. People make themselves objects of contempt to adolescent minds, by their own nugacity;—as whining, inconstancy, fretfulness, capricious and childish sentences, &c. The sense of decorum, in advertance to the course of others, is more forward in the young than common people are aware.

Thirdly. By their immoral conduct. Parents, nurses, and guardians make themselves contemptible to their young, by immoral conduct. When people indulge themselves in gratifications which they preceptively disallow to those under them, and do not put in force their precepts (which yet would appear tyranny) they become contemptible to those whom they would govern. When people practice certain vices, and neglect to practice certain virtues, at the same time they are preaching to, and in a whining manner teasing and importuning them to avoid the one and to practice the other, they grow contemptible to their hearers and attendants.

Secondly. People bring *morality itself* into contempt: and the foundation of this contempt is laid in very early infancy. This is susceptible by several inroads—as

First, by gratifying bad passions and appetites in children. By that enlargement which the base appetites and propensities of animal nature acquire by inconsiderable indulgence, they gain an ascendancy which corrupts the whole heart, and makes it averse to the precepts of wisdom. In proportion as one's enjoyment is made up of such gratifications as are repugnant to, or incompatible with, moral virtue, he comes to look with indignant eyes upon serious teachings; till the cause of morality itself is, at length, a mark to his insolence. Little do people imagine while they are endowing their offspring with what they call *good things*, by way of pacification or reward, such as sweetmeats, sugar, cordials, toys, money, &c. that they flagrantly injure them by nursing those appetites and inclinations whose gratification directly countermines health and virtue. All those things are good things in certain points of view, but an erroneous use of them is very hurtful to body and soul. What signifies to wean from one vice, while the price of this

cure is the substantiation of a worse? and what do we get, when to dissuade or divert a child from one disallowable indulgence, we use him to another which is more hurtful? for intemperance, irascibility, and effrontery, are as dangerous as any, and often much more baleful vices than what to divert them from, we nourish these in children; which is done less in consideration of their comparative tendency to bad habits than with a view to the avoidance of those inconveniences attending irregularities of this kind: for people perceiving it expensive or painful or wearisome, in the present, to indulge certain appetites and passions of their children, do themselves the honor to say they break them of such or such vile habits they have got, and learn them better ones;—when at this very time they are training them to what is worse, and which not admitting the interposition of pure principles of true ethics or prudential precepts, as a succedaneum, balks every good design, and strengthening whatever is corrupt, disposes to all unrighteousness. Now, when people's hearts are fully set in them to do evil; when the energy of the will, passions, and affections, converges to the direct plan of the subversion of all moral prescripts and restrictions, they straightway condemn morality.

Secondly. By setting examples of immoral conduct simultaneously with moral teachings and advice. People are unaware how much they counterwork their wishes when they communicate their precepts in a whining peevish manner; a manner wherein querulousness is reckoned essential to their chief alleviation: *particular tones* by dint of custom catenated to anger, of course its appropriate index to observers, are bad things to exhibit to the apprehension of children. Whining, raging, &c.; shewing peevishness and irascibility and such mean disorderly qualities, set parents in a bad point of view; and likewise since children

are more prone to imitate patterns they *see*, than reduce to practice maxims they *hear* and have to comprehend, they do much more execution in support of vice than of virtue. Now, when children see their parents, from whom they receive all the notices they come at, of the principles and rules of prudence, exhibiting examples of manners which are palpably repugnant to their preaching; a concurrence that seems to evince almost demonstratively that they themselves think lightly of it;—they aptly run into a contemptuous estimate of morality itself: which estimate, the bad habits of thinking and acting they engender, confirm, to that settl'd aversion which marks an immoral character. There are other sorts of manners besides those of communicating prudent injunctions, whose exemplification operates perniciously on the young; wherein yet the commonalty of mankind are notoriously apt: luxury and pageantry in their several varieties, are bad things to familiarize to children; and nothing more common than for the thoughtless to take pride in their eminence in the means of excess, and is reckoned a criterion of value in rational beings to have the power of making themselves uneasy to themselves and others, and of consecrating folly at the shrine of vanity. So in proportion as one possesses abundance of the direct means and materials of intemperance, ostentation, cruelty, or oppression, he is estimated to be *worth such or such a sum*. 'Worth makes the man,' and this worth (think they) must consist in property. So they weigh rationals in scales like beef, poultry, and brass, or cast them up by dollars and cents, according to the price current of what they possess. For souls, an incalculably lighter sort of substances, as motes or dust, are left out of their computation. The silly world thinks it does something noble when it tricks out its children and itself in fine and costly apparel; making no secret of insinuating into the

heads of these children their pre-eminence above certain others; and people think they do but justice to tell their children how much more their family is *worth* than their neighbors; little thinking how surely they bring into contempt those important maxims of ethicks which evince the equality of all mankind, and enjoin us to be meek and humble. It is not explicit direction nor fallacious preaching, which determines this species of treatment, but practical insinuation; the effect whereof being more susceptible to infancy than to any other age, what I have before been noticing, more confirms it *then* than ever after it might be by any other means. Drunkenness, gluttony, coquetry, libidinousness, revenge, craft, foppery, partiality, niggardliness, insolence, which people too generally are prone one time or another to deform themselves with, are very dangerous to come into the notice of the young where no paramount impression has pre-established a serious principle, which can never be expected in the first, second or third year of childhood; and parents have no right to expect it from any other quarter than their own infusions, which if they defeat by their own practice, and pull down with one hand what they make pretence of building up with the other, they ultimately put good morals at open contempt.

Thirdly; in general by all those steps which tend to render parents, nurses, and guardians, *themselves* marks of contempt in the eyes of children, the subject of their teaching is also brought into the like contempt.

Fourthly: by playing with children. The practice of playing with and caressing children, tends to induce that state of mind that eventually brings on this contemptuous and indignant view of the principles and rules of good morals. People from want of thought incline to an excessive attachment to the persons of

their children, which leads them into a ridiculous course of caressing them, and teaching them to play nugatorily or injuriously ; which aptly leads to a habit of mischief ; for, to compass their ends they stop not at what may encroach upon the rights or convenience of bystanders ; wherein, the habit of tolerating their course, excludes shame and remorse. This is treating children like brute animals rather than as rational beings. This is a sort of treatment that evinces respect to mere animals. We shew respect to our favorite domestic animals by fondly caressing and coaxing them. A dog, a cat, a monkey, is honour'd and in some sort civiliz'd (being made intimate with our observance) by our caresses ; but human beings, wherein exist in embryo the faculties abstraction, discernment, conscience, with several distinguishing affections, and by and by to be trained into conduct good or bad, require different treatment. This strikes at the root of modesty. The foundation of good qualities is laid earlier than is generally imagined. The first bent of the affections is the surest. Age recurs to it. And when children are disciplined altogether to romantic play, and the cherishing of jestful turns of humour and thought, their whole entertainment being made to consist of unmeaning sports, wherein the idea of relation to the feelings of others is no way concerned as test or guide ; what other can we expect than that they come, of course, to condemn what makes mainly against the whole business of their happiness— which the precepts of morality imposing obligations of gratitude, temperance, industry, and beneficence, plainly do ? How far is the real tendency of this course of treatment from the apprehension of those whom it most concerns ! How little do they think while they are learning children to play, they are instilling into them an aversion to serious duty ! They seem to contemplate no scale of direct proficiency ascending upwards to

the excellences of the species, to which its capacity would naturally progress ; but a proficiency that verges to the emulation of brutes ; in which when all is done, they can never rival them : even the cat-kind (to say nothing of the ape-kind) exceedingly leave children behind, in play. Yet this is the first serious business children are set about after they come into this world. This is a no less reprehensible, than inveterate prostitution of human endowments : at least as universal as it is, it is a very injudicious treatment of the infant understanding.

People often appear to misconceive the powers of the young mind : they fancy not that what they say in jest, irony, burlesque, though understood by other bystanders, does not come so into the comprehensions of children (so short-sighted are the fond) ; but have the serious effect of the most positive allegations. "*Give me a blow and I will beat him,*" is often said by way of pacification, to the encouragement of a vindictive disposition : and how extravagantly we purchase the momentary quiet of children at the expense of their virtue, by infusing arrant qualities !

I have formerly spoken of an association of the idea of contempt with certain sorts of tones, phrases, modes of address, laughs, &c. ; concerning which, I would now take notice that it is sometimes brought about by the contrasts of an extravagant fashion, which I am going to speak of, that is too prevalent amongst the 'children of this world.' Besides going pointedly to reproach and rebuff children when they aspire to intrusive familiarity, people sometimes set about to please *themselves* by means of these : they design sometimes, by an odd way, to please and entertain *themselves* with them ; and this they do frequently at the expense of these children's morals. Treating the vagaries and nonsense of children as matter of arch buffoonery, and obsequiously exemplifying signs of

the entertainment properly produced by such when exhibited by adult persons, of discretion, if it do not fix this association of contempt whereby it abashes and depresses the child's confidence in others, and sours its temper, induces one equally disastrous, by connecting that respect with its own person, which is associated, in its mind, with the persons of its superiors in age and experience ; which inevitably tends into conceit, pride, and ambition. Nothing is more obviously apt than this tendency ;—for as it is out of a connection of the emotion of complacency with the idea of any person or character, that human estimation of such objects is originally and necessarily generated ; it is plain that when children have in themselves the very same emotion of regard connected with the idea of their own person as with that of those who having greater power, experience, and knowledge, are rationally estimated higher, or in reflecting minds excite a greater degree of that emotion by the medium of that incident, which being misapprehended, causes the other association in children, they esteem themselves too highly, and in the same degree as they do others on account of those things for which in reality themselves are not qualified : and this is *pride* ; which presently begets peevishness and insolence. Oft have I seen a whole room full of maids and dames in a roar of merriment, at the wit of a darling zany, which excited in him the idea of praise, but not the idea of its being misapplied ; and the tendency of which was too obvious not to have been seen that it encouraged and emboldened him to very disgusting essays at the imitation of those who had customarily within his observance, the happiness to be the instrument of just such mirth ; and naturally operated to nourish the worst principles, by inflaming the basest passions. By and by their glee takes a sarcastical turn, and, being wearied out with his irritations, they wish, all at once

to shame and dishearten him ; wherein if their reproach be perceived to be in earnest so very severe as to produce the association of contempt, the cause of it comes now from a quarter that is apt to give it a tendency to superinduce sullenness, suspicion, malice, and repress even natural affection. Sometimes this delectable farce is carried on so far as to involve the managers in deep shame and confusion by the exposure of the reproach it draws on them to the observance of their most considerate friends. Then it is that their chagrin turns the current of their wit to an unconcealed annoyance of the feelings of whom it has thus insidiously flattered. Thus arises a two-handed obstacle to the forming of moral character, of which the fathers of it are not aware : which generating either a haughty, pert, officious temper, or a dark sullen jealous one, encumbers the domestic scene with a train of contristating commotions. If then when children have the first bias of their thoughts and affections, which is always the strongest, fixed by this habit of jesting and farcical chase after entertainment where is no entertainment to be got for persons of reflection, the consequence is that they are either made hereby proud and domineering, or lowliv'd, sullen, and suspicious, in their dispositions, with a tenacity proportionate to the force of early impressions, it behooves such as have the care of them to be circumspect of what manner of addresses they make to their understandings and hearts.

Fifthly. The actions and conversation of servants, tend to set morality in a contemptuous point of view to the apprehension of children. The custom of keeping black slaves and drudges is used among civilized communities to the disgrace of humanity. A habit of treating with haughtiness and disrespectful or contemptuous language, those adult persons in our service, in the presence of children, works bad effects in them :

we cannot expect children to know any precedent for which they have more deference than the example of their parents. What people habitually indulge themselves in doing, they generally tolerate their children in. Now, when the aspiring tyro, *in coats*, is upheld in, and commended for, rallying and reproaching his superiors, how ill must the *gentleman in breeches*, brook any check upon the like insolence, which from the same proneness he has brought up with him from his cradle, of course rather increas'd than diminish'd? Another thing is this; these slaves, by the contempt they are chained to, are instigated to vile conversation; a habit of railing at things serious and sacred, which they see no where guarded but by their enemies; and, in fact, their condition, shaped by these tyrants, who have presumed to controul their natural rights, so circumscribes their intelligence that they have no pretence to correct principles or refined manners: and children communicating with these, get from them immoral ideas and profane dialect. This is a bad situation for children to be in; for they early get aristocratical principles, and habits of insolence, effrontery, pageantry, &c. All men are equal; it is an abuse to human nature to treat some grown people as inferior to others. Almost any man's observation may abundantly attest the haughtiness of those children of wealthy and pageant families, whose parents are in the habit of keeping slaves. Traffic in human flesh originated in cupidity of lucre; and this same cupidity being nursed on the lap of fortune till it creates the basest sort of pride, pride of superiority in enjoyment, or rather possession of this world's power and pelt, treats with inequality those under its gard. For these impious dealers and truckers in human flesh, entertaining the absurd persuasion of the inferiority of black and yellow complexions, to white, (a superficial estimate of human beings, like that of *birds or cloths*)

not only deny the former those particular immunities and advantages wherewith they favor the latter, but likewise even those privileges to which all mankind have naturally a common title. Now, if white people really think that black are not so good as themselves, and not naturally worthy of so great privileges; this very persuasion is such an argument against their meddling with those nations to whom nature has given that color, as makes it a glaringly impious usurpation that has no pretence but the basest worldliness, to bring them into civilized communities and convert them to their use and service like cattle. This by the bye. Those who by inheritance possess slaves or descendants of slaves, although they cannot answer for the injustice of their own ancestors, can yet give these drudges equal Education with their own children, and obviate all perversion of morals, by placing all colors on the same footing of privileges and powers.

Sixthly. Vociferation and clamor practic'd by a family, tend to bring morality into contempt. Many people give full vent to their wind, not considering that children try to emulate the force and extent of their sounds; whose voices being unmusical, make the house unpleasant by their scrannel noises. In some families is a continual clatter, from confusing sport and deafening sorts of gambolling, (from this humour of training infants to play instead of useful exercises) where a studious guest might fancy himself in a cotton mill; and could enjoy no more liberty (while silence and tranquillity being naturally adjunct to the purposes of meditation, are usually accustomed to a determinate association with them) than he could in the circle of an Indian powow. Now, the ways of virtue are peaceful, and wisdom delighteth in serenity. Ingenuous reflection must rise in the medium of tranquillity. Without serious reflection, there can never be substantiated the principles of moral vir-

tue, or good habits of thinking and acting. Therefore, if children be learnt a habit of obstreperousness, they acquire, in consequence of this, an aversion to correct principles of morals, and to the precepts and discipline which go to substantiate these. An aversion to reflection is the natural result of the habitual pursuit of those things which exclude reflection. For habit concentrates the chief enjoyment of life in that train of perceptions which includes the discriminations of the successive acts of those powers exerted in a course of repetition, and which comprehends the several connections of our ideas of pleasure. What communion has righteousness with unrighteousness? What intelligence can uproar hold with *serenity*, which is the condition of one disposed to reflection, contemplation, and abstraction? These are indispensable stepstones to perfect virtue. Vociferous talk, horse laugh, and boisterous behavior, should not be practiced by parents, nurses, and influential bystanders, within the notice of children. A habit of violence in any sort of movement, whether in speaking, walking, resolution, labor, or sport, is (to say the least) very unbecoming in the rising generation; and I think, in consequence of it children become averse to the rules and ways of prudence, and finally contemn those who presume to teach that which is good; holding modesty, meekness, temperance, caution, and deliberation, but so many tricks of sheepishness. Furthermore, it proves insupportably disgusting to studious minds, which are the most likely to be the best friends they can find in the world.

Seventhly. By an ungarded practice of speaking contemptuously of religion without reserve, morality is liable to be brought into contempt in the minds of observant innocents, who knowing of no morality in the world that is publicly taught, but what is one time or other inculcated or enjoined (in connection however

with some mystical things) by the official dispensers of societies of religious operators distinguished by particular tenets or instituted articles of faith; which if they be ever so superstitious, ought to have credit given them for whatever moral truths they do enjoin or exemplify, and for whatever benevolence pertains to their motives; otherwise we shake the foundation of society: for children hearing certain religious sects, and the theories, customs, and fashions by which they are known, indiscriminately satiriz'd, and burlesquely taken off without exception, by those who are these children's dearest patrons, and imbibing hereby a prejudice against these objects; when they come to hear these societies preach about moral obligations and the like, incline to hate and dispise *this* as much as any thing else that may distinguish them, inasmuch as they have no experience of it as a discrimination of any other sort of characters. Whereas when care is taken to keep up the inculcation of morals at home, separately from sophistication of any kind, more liberty may be taken to make free with systems which partake of fantastical ideas, with such modifications, still, as to avoid slander, which of itself goes into the counterview of beneficence. In speaking of the absurdities of religious systems and the folly of sectaries in presence of children, people would do well to consider two things; 1st. The motives which do or may operate in the minds of those sectaries, and which probably originated the establishment of those systems: 2d. The morals which they practically insist upon in their teachings, lives, and conversations, which they seem to aim at, by maintaining such practical truths as their books and discourse exhibit. We should separate the chaff from the grain: and when we go to animadvert upon a system or society which has the general credit of all the public morals in circulation, we should perspicuously designate the marks of our

satire as being those things which are (and may be made to appear such to the understandings of those who being our curious auditors, are competent to discern the purport of our discourse) delusive and corrupting. It behooves us to lay particular stress on what respect their modes *do* yield to the cause of morality. The parable of the tares and wheat may be very well applied to illustrate what I am here speaking of. The wheat may represent the useful and valuable truths in a system of doctrine and the tares the errors and immoment positions. A sanguine adviser suggests the pulling out the tares that the wheat may thrive without encroachment. The master says, nay:—lest, while you pull out the tares, you root out also the wheat with them: let both grow together till the harvest; and in the time of harvest I will say to the reapers, gather together first the tares and bind them in bundles to burn them; but gather the wheat into my barn.” In like manner, I fancy, good principles have many times been rooted out of the young by a too hasty extirpation of delusions, that coming from the same concurrence of accidents, are equally radicated amongst the first and most endeared acquaintances of the young intelligence. Therefore I think it better, when fantastical opinions and important truths have both got root together by process of an accustomed system, and are as it were growing together in the same soil, (for a child meets with fine strains of ethicks in the most mystical preachers’ sermons) to let both grow together till the maturity of judgment, which may be called the time of harvest, enables him to pick out and apply all truths of practical importance, while he rejects the errors, the delusive and immoment hypotheses, and discards them as chaff; than by tearing out errors and matters of inferiour consequence, to oblete what is valuable, when the former do not wholly choke and hinder the growth of what is good

and correct; unless there be an opening to substitute some better system instead of that which drags with it so many fantastical ideas as makes morality romantic instead of making it naturally pleasing and agreeable in the manner of the common routine of our perceptions of natural beings. When we *cannot*, or *determine to not*, substitute something else as a practical system to impress right principles, and bias the affections to propriety and justice, let *both grow together* until the harvest: then the reasoning mind is incited to select what useful dogmas may be reduced to practice in social life, and apply them as directories to its actions in reference to its fellow creatures or its own future experience. Let both grow together until the harvest; rather than by rooting out the worthless, to destroy also the good, which is connected in the same assemblage of associated movement. But this rule is recommendable to no other case except where is no measure intently pursued to lay a solid foundation of good qualities by a right training of all the faculties from the beginning. Children should be taught to reason early, and to deny themselves according to reason.

Eighthly. By a practice of stigmatizing and reviling others. Many heads of families blunder into a vile trick of speaking reproachfully to and of their neighbors, openly before their children. This speaks utter thoughtlessness of moral tendencies; for if these suffer'd reason a moment to controul their emotion and take the sway of their thoughts, they could scarcely avoid discovering the perniciousness of these lessons of insolence upon the minds of those whom they would consult their own dignity to conceal them from. But when men set out at the beck of their own unreined humour to satirize their fellow creatures sometimes in anger, sometimes for sport, in either of which cases it produces an impression which is the

counterview of benevolence, they so far loose sight of moral obligations that they do not perceive they have for their auditors those who are not so much as possessed of that power of judgement themselves abuse; and so one generation after another is corrupted, and the world filled with little bickering parties, and neighbors at sword's points with each other. Now such lessons of slander and abuse, dealt out by their parents and protectors, give a disparaging cast to children's estimate of whatever is seriously coercive. The very ideas of disallowable actions are dangerous to be exposed to young minds; for such consider the *practicability* of a thing, not its relation to a rule, nor its consequence; while, in the ardour of their voluntary energy, their affections are wont to embrace forbidden modes, through attraction of novelty: therefore previously to their being susceptible of a just estimate of actions, immoral principles and licentious pursuits (so far as it is feasible to conceal them) should not be exhibited to their apprehension, any further than they can contrast their tendencies with those of opposite modes, and adopt the one and discard the other, on account of their consequences.

With regard to that part of education whose immediate scope is to stock the mind with the several sorts of physical knowledge, and proofs that support opinions concerning several beings and operations that are apt variously to influence and affect mankind, there is one thing in common usage that is evidently encumbering to the advancement of the knowledge of substances: and that is the constraint put upon infants in the examination of things by their proper organs of sense. Children are early susceptible of very accurate ideas of substances by curiously exerting their senses about them. Their curiosity is strong; and they have great pleasure in their perceptions, by reason of novelty, which also helps to confirm impress-

ions on the memory. To tantalize children with the sight of things which they are not allowed to touch, is imprudent treatment of their faculties. The young gets true ideas of natural objects by a free handling and viewing of them on every side. Such an exercise of its powers is *improving* as well as *pleasing*, in addition to the pleasure accompanying every new perception; which different pleasures conspire to enliven and invigorate the pursuit of knowledge. Rousseau was of opinion that 'a child by applying and exercising his bodily organs (his hands, eyes, and feet) will acquire more real knowledge even in the period of infancy, than he would if we should dedicate nine tenths of his time to books, from the age of six to sixty."

To learn children to articulate correctly is but to give them precise and striking precedents to imitate, to warily note the progress of their attainments in such imitation, and the points wherein they fail in it, and assist them by impressive repetitions of these particulars, to come up to its perfection: and not (as is commonly done) to accommodate the standard to *their imperfections*, and let it descend to their defective and bungling ways of conforming to it.

With a reference to mechanic arts, it will not be lost labour to take notice of the modes of motion that are most habituated by children, and what aptness or expertness they have attained or are most likely to attain, in any of them.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Managery of the Imitative Faculty.

I have in a former chapter shown that there was a propensity in man to repeat and act over those movements he sees performed by others: and that this was a constitutional property of human nature. This propensity shews itself in early infancy. Before the vocal organs are turned to articulation, we may discover this aptitude: first in smiles; next in motion of the arms, &c. The origin of smile is the reaction of the muscles of the face, in an infant, upon those which having been in a particular manner extended in the act of drawing nourishment from the breast of its mother, are relaxed while the stomach is digesting the nutriment it is filled with, the pleasure whereof being the first in life, its ascendancy associates it so strongly with this posture of the muscles, that serene pleasure is always afterwards wont to excite the like. The sight of a smile in another's countenance, excites this by way of a proneness in those muscles to imitate correspondent ones in others. Afterwards the sympathy is enlarged by the connection of serene pleasure: and then the hypothetical idea that it exists in another party, introduces the same movements. This smile is a fibrous motion, and it is introduced by sensation; and also in its turn immediately produces pleasure by relieving an irksome posture of the fibres. This sort of connection of fibrous and sensorial motions, where one introduces the other, I think is, by the physiologists, called *catenation*.

The proper managery of this propensity, to ground a general conformity to the principles of virtue, in the progressive trains of voluntary actions that are to come up with the expansion of the animal frame, is a work of some nicety. In training this propensity and directing it towards the formation and pursuance of virtuous habits, the following particulars are necessary to be carefully observed.

I. Care must be taken to give early excitement to this propensity, by setting such patterns of actions and signs, to the infants notice, as it is capable of performing an imitation of; instead of such as it cannot imitate: since every faculty and part by exercise in infancy, acquires force and facility more rapidly than at any other period. And on the other hand, faculties that lie dormant in infancy, are seldom bright, in life; are seldom brought to operate with energy and facility without more pains in culture, than the others, which have been brought into early trials. It is a generally prevailing opinion that there is something hereditary in the passive qualities of human nature. There is something hereditary in the appetencies and propensities of the infant, which is whatever is transmitted in the texture and habits of *internal moving* of the animated mass; whereby it is predisposed for one appetite, faculty, or habit, more than for another: which devolving from generation to generation, appears in each with more or less conspicuity as it is more or less cherish'd, and meets with greater or less encouragement by concurrence in those who have influence on the early part of education. There is very little in all this that cannot be easily overrul'd. Yet there be many who see great things here. They fancy they see orators, musicians, divines, poets, mechanics &c, in children: so enthusiastic is their appreciation of these portents, which are merely signs of incident concurrences, in the age of adolescence. Now, there

be some motions which the infant is capable of imitating with effect ; and there be others of which it cannot possibly produce any thing like an imitation : and of both these descriptions, there are those which on being presented to its sense, it feels desire to imitate. The first we can recognize, must consist in motions of the hands, arms, feet, and motions with the eyes, face, and some of the organs of speech. I include some of those appearances that are significant with physiognomers. Let them concur according to nature, with their proper emotions. Such movements of the hands may be set them to copy, as are favourable to the practice of certain arts ; that, herein being led into a practical repetition that shall make those motions easy, incident, and pleasurable ; we half learn the infant a particular trade or profession we mean the *man* to follow. Mark this, artists, and such as have the finding of them ! I would not, by any means uphold the casting of occupations for persons while they are yet infants, any more than the odious tyranny of controuling marriages, at mature age : yet since those peculiar modes of honest employment whereby we are to get sustenance, are all equal and indifferent among themselves in relation to the standard of moral good, it cannot be improper to qualify persons for a facile and expeditious acquirement of any one of those, although such qualification may very aptly determinè the choice. Those modes of motion requisite in performing music of several sorts, may be most likely acquired now ; it being with the utmost advantage, with regard to habit, that they are set afoot at this period. Planing, sawing, turning, rolling, prying, may be taught exceeding cheaply, easily, and advantageously ; since such trials strengthen the muscles employed in those trades, and fit them to go through the performances without exhaustion. There be peculiar turns and movements of the eyes, lips, head, &c. which are indocratically

attached to certain emotions. Let such be put into examples, as seem connected with the *good* passions, and let them be urged upon the pupil's apprehension, preferably at those moments when the *good* passions have the chance to prevail. The subject is incited to imitate ; and this imitation is to a good effect, both with regard to degree, and form of connection. The result is a happy degree towards improvement of mind : regulation of the powers and affections of the human mind at their early developement. For there is something congenially concurrent in this species ; and if their significant movements and forms be once set agoing correctly when all the materials are ductile and yielding, (which yet is easy to bring about,) important effects are achieved : much painful calamity is averted, and much real enjoyment of existence secured : for a child in pursuing the imitation of the concomitant sign, habituates the reality of the archetype.

II. Not only should we scrupulously limit our patterns to those things of which the infant powers are capable of approximating an assimilation, in order to bring this faculty to early excitation and alertness ;—but be careful, no less, to exhibit the stimulus of patterns of such motions and signs as aptly lead into, or are substantially connected with, real virtue, in exclusion of such as appear at the age of discretion, to be any way joined to vice, either as *applicatives* of base or maleficient projects ; the usual *objects* of such projects ; or as being such things as by way of physical causation either induce, inflate, or in any manner adjuvate the *motives* thereof.

You may fancy, dear reader, I am extravagantly tasking your discernment. Let me give you a few plain samples. If I teach my son the motions of his fingers and arms requisite in *fiddling* ; when he gets sense and strength enough he will incline to *fiddle* :

and, since this business is intimately allied to vice, by being attended and accompanied with all manner of patterns of, and temptations to, profanity, intemperance, sensuality, pageantry &c. in *fiddling* he will be in imminent danger of being corrupted. Must we then never avail ourselves of such advantages? music itself is valuable; indeed cultivated minds do well to avail themselves of its use. This must be done by insisting particularly on this point, in our moral infusions. The child must not be suffer'd to go out of his leading strings to practice within the sphere of corrupting examples and incitements till he be fortified against them; but must be caused to practice separately from the coincidents which are usual; and in *him* the pleasures of music should be contrasted with the miseries of those fashionable concomitants of it. Therefore to superinduce such facilities, is a design that requires circumspection to discriminate moral evil, and avert the ascendancy of it over convenience. If I present to his notice, those airs, looks, gesticulations and expressions, which are the apt free adjuncts of excessive stimulus of wine or spirits, and he imitates them; I say when his powers mature and he comes to perceive the original cause of what he has a habit of, he will too fatally incline to resort to the source of all the intrinsical pleasure or enjoyment there was efficiently pertaining to that which he having been fascinated to imitate, now has a habit of exemplifying.

Furthermore; if he sees me constantly drink my beer out of wine glasses, such as are used in drinking spirits, afterwards having learnt the use, and associated it with all his governing pleasures, he is apt to apply it to what is more common, upon the same principle as he at first habituated the appropriation. The transition is shorter and more incident than if he had not only never seen me drink spirits, but had never

seen me make use of such vessels as people are seen commonly to drink spirits out of.

Again: suppose I am continually handling and shuffling about a parcel of those tablets called *playing cards*; the observer afterwards perceiving the use to which they are fashionably applied, being games of chance upon extravagant challenges and accompanied with profanity, is more readily inclined to copy that whereof he has a habit of imitating the manner of employing the instruments, than of what he has no ideas that have such familiar connections in his mind, and sooner becomes a gamester than if he had never seen my attention engaged by objects of that description.

III. We ought not to set children patterns of things which we do not wish to have them imitate. This is imbecility, and frustratory rashness. Yet this is very commonly, and inconsiderately done, both in words and actions.

IV. The next thing that we ought to be specially cautious of, is, the exciting their imitative faculty by such things as they ought not to imitate;—such things as it is not morally good for them to imitate, or not compatible with their own corporeal or intellectual health or the well being of the family of which they make a part, and consequently with that of the great community they are coming members of. This is immoral. People are unaware of the consequences of this sort of treatment, when they urge children to trials of profanity, insolence, revenge, excessive drinking &c. even before they can perfectly articulate.

V. Another thing we ought to be scrupulous about, in the department of our treatment, is, the allowing of children to imitate things they are not fit for; which their age, condition, and understanding powers, make them altogether incompetent to the practical pursuit of; which would be inconsistent with their interest and the good of those they live with, even if they can

at present with pleasure imitate them. An instance of what I am here guarding against, is parents suffering young children to attempt the emulation of their manners in eating, and other parts of their carriage: suffering them to sit at table with them as compeers and help and feed themselves after *their* pattern. There are some particular things that, under certain circumstances (however proper for adults) we ought not to permit children to attempt a habitual imitation of. To treat children as equals before they can reason, is odiously perverting. Accustoming them to eat from the same dish as their parents and superiors, has the effect of this; for it impresses these children with the persuasion that they are as worthy of reverence from *them* as the contrary, and as worthy of attention and submission from *others*. Besides, it is a disgusting spectacle to see children whose strength and size are not adequate to wielding decently the implements of feeding, dipping with grown men and women in the same dishes and cups, drizzling sauce and oil over the table, and justling those who sit next them. More than this, it leads to gluttony: and stuffing children, inevitably makes them averse to study.

To encourage children in loquacity by replying to all their capricious queries, and tempting to exemplify their odd expression by asking them questions, for the sake of entertainment, is also pernicious. This is actual imposture play'd on them. It is wheedling them into the office of a merryandrew, and at the same time concealing it altogether from their eyes; while henceforth their most serious thoughts are frustraneously employ'd. Children ought not to be suffered even to practice the *requesting* of things not proper for them to be indulged with. The very indulging of desire so far as to express it earnestly in words, increases it: this is a practice of a voluntary exertion, that generates a habit. So that we should not only strictly de-

ny children gratifications we know to be improper for them, but also interdict their importuning for them, which will effectually prevent their longing for those things, and, in the end, extinguish their desire.

Among other things, we should endeavor to suppress a desire of notice and applause. An extravagant wish of general notice and admiration from others around them, is very apt to get root in children in their ordinary way of being trained. It is corrupting to children's minds to take too much notice of them. What is baneful to children's morals and understanding powers, is taking too much notice of them. Nothing is more injurious that is so little suspected, as the taking notice of every thing they say or do, and thereupon indicating such emotions as admiration, wonder, reverence, &c. which are suffer'd to be follow'd by expressive exclamations. For when children find all their movements noticed, as of superiors, and causing such impressions, how is it to be otherwise than that they infer from this that they *are* superiors, to others, and have powers and qualities in them that make them more valu'd and worthy of remark, as being able to produce such effects on others' feelings, and therefore take to themselves praise? In short, nothing so directly blows them up with pride;—and perverts every principle of pure morals their hearts are susceptible of. It likewise contracts the flights of their intellectual powers, and confines their speculations in the base regions of self felicitation.

In expatiating upon the defects of moral education, I took notice of a notorious blunder which the commonalty of mankind are addicted to run into, and which remarkably characterizes the present times in this country, among all classes of society; when parents and nurses designedly egg the imitative faculty of children to immoral modes and improper use of the

organs of speech, to amuse themselves with the sight of their antique feats;— such as retaliatory striking, threatening, profane and blasphemous expressions, contradiction, reviling, lispings, and nicknaming: extravagantly fancying because themselves except from those modes the essential of intention, that therefore their *tyros* take such models in that abstracted state; whereas none goes about the practice of them with more exquisite earnestness of intention. Thus revenge and cruelty steal a march upon animal strength; and profanity and contumely are learn'd before the organs can perfectly articulate. It falls out that the proper articulation of the language of any nation, according to its true idiom, is congenial to the adaptation of the articulating organs of the people of that nation, and is the natural use of them. Therefore to learn children to articulate correctly, is easier than to learn them to articulate incorrectly. Children imitate their parents because they get from them their first pleasures. Imitation is wont to be excited by that which is apt to delight. Mankind more readily imitate those performances which directly or indirectly cause delight, than others, which do not cause any delight. The association of delight with any model, gives it the eligibility of a recourse to realize what they deem it the source of. Now the actions of their parents, delight children rather than those of other people, because they are associated with the ideas of their *persons*; and their persons are considered the causes of their chief pleasures; and thus, in the connection of *causation*, have a permanent union with their original ideas of pleasure.

Example being the only instrument that gives us any efficiency on this faculty in others, there being no way we can directly modify this propensity to the imitating of the exertions of others' systems without setting certain patterns before the subjects, to follow,

what further observations are pertinent to this topic, would seem to belong properly to that head;—and I shall therefore refer my reader to a peruspension of what has been heretofore said thereunder.

CHAPTER. III.

Of the Reversion of Habits.

I come now to speak of a thing which I have two classes of objectors ready to pronounce an impracticable revery,—the indolent and the voluptuous: that is, the total reversing or cancelling of certain settled habits; in consequence of which contrary ones are established in their stead.

There is in the human System, a constitutional property or quality, whereby we find pleasure in those actions which we have repeatedly performed, on that particular account their having been by us repeatedly performed; in preference to all other sorts of actions. The proximate cause wherefore this susceptibility is; why we have this pleasure in actions we have repeatedly performed rather than in any other actions we have *not* repeatedly performed, may seem at first view a little difficult to explain; and has been by some thought inexplicable.

I shall attempt to account for it in the following manner.

There is a continual accession and expenditure of sensorial power, or spirit of animation (by which all our exertions are carried on) in the human machine. The substratum of this power, is reckoned by some to be matter secreted from the atmosphere, and no other than that which is the medium of electricity. Others hold, it is secreted from the blood. Whatever be the peculiar form and consistence of the substance wherein this power immediately inheres; we know there is

such a power, and that it is liable to augmentation and diminution : and by this change it is evident there is a particular subject it resides in, or whose presence gives us this power. The existence of such things we know only by their effects. This being accepted, that this substance, or (at least) this power, is subject to alternate accumulation and diminution, by its supply and expenditure ; it follows, extraordinary quiescence produces accumulation, and extraordinary action produces diminution. In the one case, the supply transcends the expenditure ; in the other, the expenditure outgoes the supply. Now, when more is accumulated than is expended, there is a redundancy. A redundancy produces uneasiness. Therefore due expenditure has pleasure with it. The expenditure is by any or all of these modes of exertion ; volition, sensation, association, irritation. The powers of these, are called voluntary power, sensitive power, associative power, and irritative power. These conspire in almost every course we use to execute any of our purposes. Voluntary power and exertion are what I am altogether concerned with, in treating of the ascendancy of custom.

When one has been sitting at ease or sleeping for a long time, there is an accumulation of that particular variety of power which constitutes the voluntary impetus, the cause of volition. Due exertion, to a due expenditure of this, gives ease, by removing *desire*, which is incipient volition. The removal of any degree of uneasiness, operates as a pleasure, and vice versa. Now this natural enjoyment having had place in any given action, the reflecting agent is inclined to a repetition of the like sort of action, and supposes pleasure in it rather than in one not experienced before. This is the original of our being attached to and pleas'd with, actions we have performed. Yet this is not the only source of the pleasures of custom. Va-

rious pleasurable ideas are scattered along the whole appendage of our stage, and concomitate almost every transaction of our lives. Various notices occur, which excite or suggest pleasure of some species or degree in connection with every step of our walks in the subserviency of favorite purposes, in such a manner as does not fail to affix the idea of pleasure to the efficiency of the prevailing pursuit. This prevails in recollection; so that the mind chooses (has inevitably a prevailing desire) to resort back to the track where it has experienced pleasure, rather than rush into untrod ways. In the course of carrying into accomplishment my design, some objects present themselves to my apprehension, which induce pleasure: something appendant to the place, to the exercise, the company, or some suggestions made therein; which are but the index of so many relations of the project; which pleasurable ideas are in such a manner associated with the general notion of the action or duty itself that they are imputed to it as to a cause; and, in reflection allure me to repeat. Again; the action being repeated several times, is easier; because those pains and inconveniences which arise from a want of a ready ultroneous coincidence of desire, determination, muscular movement, imagination, and sensation, and from the interference of reverse wishes, desires, speculations, which denote ignorance of the happy effects and true ways of proceeding in *this*, are hereby superseded. This facility in the performance of any action, which arises from a particular repetition of it, is that which is called habit. Facility and readiness in performance acquired by successive repetition of any particular action, is call'd a *habit* of that action: as a habit of smoking, a habit of reading, a habit of writing, a habit of drinking, a habit of giving, a habit of studying, a habit of recollection, a habit of singing, a habit of walking, &c.

These habits may be distinguished into *abstract* and *incidental*; by which is meant little other than *general* and *particular*; according as the subjects to which they pertain are species or sorts of action, or particular actions determined to certain circumstantial concomitants, whereof the objects and the means have the designation of individuality. Abstract habits are habits of kinds or sorts of actions; as a habit of voluntary thinking, a habit of virtue, a habit of trade. Incidental habits are habits of particular acts or performances that go to accomplish individual designs, the facility whereof is not by the repetition of these, transferred to others differently circumstanced: as a habit of playing upon a violin, a habit of dancing, a habit of going to a particular house, a habit of going to a church, a habit of working a particular machine for a certain end. These actions, however, are convertible to species. The difference between abstract and incidental habits, is this, that those modes whereof the former are attributes, have an adaptation to a greater variety of individual motives, and a greater variety of apposite objects, being specific patterns which agree to a greater number of particulars, than those of which the latter are attributes, are supposed to do. These general habits are furthermore distinguishable by several degrees of those which are more or less comprehensive by classification of different particular actions to unity of motive and object: As 1st. a habit of motion; 2d. a habit of voluntary motion; 3d. a habit of muscular motion; 4th. a habit of a mechanic art. Or, 1st. a habit of thinking. 2d. a habit of voluntary thinking; 3d. a habit of contemplation: 4th. a habit of contemplating invisible objects; a habit of studying astronomy: again; a habit of virtue, a habit of beneficence, a habit of clemency, a habit of hospitality, a habit of almsgiving, a habit of forgiveness, a habit of friendship, &c.

Habits are very frequently discriminated by the epithets that express the relations and tendencies of the actions of which they are ; as a bad habit, a good habit, a virtuous habit, a vicious habit, licentious habits, industrious habits, studious habits, insolent habits, abstemious habits, a sedentary habit ; and we are capable of as many distinct habits, as of distinct actions. Habits elude reflection. We do not so much as perceive (during their operation) any distinct ideas of the performing of those actions, or receiving of those impressions, to which we are habitually accustomed ; as those living within the sound of a cataract, or the surf by the shore of an open sea, are not perceptibly irritated by either, when they are inured to it. Habits are strengthened by continuance. The oftener any action is repeated, the greater are the ease and promptness wherewith it is performed. The more any action is repeated, the greater proportion of our enjoyments depends upon it. Virtuous habits draw after them a train of good consequences, and vicious habits draw after them a train of evil consequences. To contract habits, is critically momentous ; to engender vicious habits is dangerous : since we are as sure of drawing nearer to one of two great and increasing evils, by every repetition of a sinister pursuit, as we are of performing any such action : i. e. either the pain and privation of destroying the habit, or the misery consequent to the indulgence of it. Now I say this : it is possible to reverse habits. It is justly thought very difficult ; and indeed there be some habits, which, after a certain length of continuance, at a certain age and condition of the agent, I do not deny impossible to supersede by substantiating contrary desire ; not to mention that those habits are suppos'd to be understood to be altogether excepted from my account, which make a part of the nature of any being, and are, is it were, woven into the constitution of the agent ; as

motion, to the sensorium ; *life and motion*, to any organized body ; *thinking* in an intelligent being, &c. Habits less general than these, I have to do with.

Since the greatest uneasiness of desire present, is what invariably determines the will upon action, the whole secret of this business (and where our efficiency must terminate) must consist in abating what is at present the usually prevailing one, and instating a reverse one in the same point, to prevail in its stead. The mechanical *modus operandi* to bring about this accomplishment, is what I have at present to consider. The first thing to be done, is to exercise our understandings concerning the natural tendency of moral actions, whereby we may come to know some actions to be good and others bad ; and, of course, some habits to be disallowable and others commendable. The moral sense within us, decides at once on some actions ; the exercise of the reasoning faculty, study, and contemplation, lay open the real nature and tendency of some ; while our senses satisfactorily disclose the decided beauties and deformities, advantages and disadvantages, of others. In every course of conduct to which we are habituated, there is a circle of action, divided by certain periodical points, whereat the desire to perform a given action, returns. v. g. If a man has repeatedly indulged himself to drink particular sort of stimulant drink at a certain hour of each day ; so constantly as that hour returns, returns his appetite for the like portion of stimulus ; returns his desire with inveterate vehemence ; for extraordinary stimulus in the stomach produces that elevated activity which embraces a great variety and degree of pleasure. The animal spirits having worked through a certain routine of manœuvres, limited variety of forms of action, as so many links of a chain, or catenary circle, come round with constancy to this *conspicuous* one distinguished by more effective indulgence, which be-

ing that which has carried some eminent degree of pleasure, *here* is evolved the grand impetus, *overbalancing desire*, the gratification whereof the more often and constantly is repeated, falls in with the greater ascendancy, the greater stress and urgency, to sustain the enjoyment of life. The same thing may be said of all sorts of accustomed actions. The same measure is applicable to the habits of all sorts of actions good and bad. Now, the only way to *reverse* a habit, is to break this circle of action. There are circles of every extent and description. In fact, there are biennial circles, annual circles, monthly circles, weekly circles, quotidian circles, quite down to horory circles, of action; which almost every one may find himself within a greater or less degree of constraint, under the influence of that tyrant, custom, to revolve in. By breaking the circles of action to cure moral disorders, we take the same method as physicians do to cure diseases of the body: it being *their* business to break the circles of diseased *physical* action in the animal system, that by cassating a critical paroxysm, they may prevent its recurrence, till the tendency be lost, and a healthy action be introduced to supersede it.

There are four ways of breaking circles of action. First. By breaking every part of the circle at once; directly seceding, and abstaining from every resemblance of the action: as when, having habitually practiced swallowing spirituous stimulus three times in a day, I disallow myself to taste any of the kind, at any time, and abstain from it altogether in every part of the day; nor indulge myself with any thing for a succedaneum,—i. e. I neither drink, eat, smoke, or snuff, at those times, nor any thing which operates to alleviate my uneasiness under the privation, except the exercise of my understanding. This is reckoned the best method in habits of drinking, using tobacco, and opium, and of gratifications of animal appetites;

except in the extreme ascendancy of a habit of drinking, when spirits have become the sole food of the system: here, the sudden privation of them takes away the support of life at once. In this solitary exceptionable case, it is best to break the circle by gradual inroads. The same strict mechanical constraint must be us'd with *children* as we use with *ourselves* to effectuate this abrupt overturn. It is obvious to reflection that this is the only effectual method of destroying such sort of habits; for a little indulgence is a little feeding of a fire that you thereby keep alive, ready (on emergencies) to break out with vehemence proportioned to the combustible materials lying thick in animal life; which fire you make more subtle. It is, in a word, refining depravity by artful recourses. It may be objected that, by precluding a succedaneum, I "*leave the house empty.*" Never, while I cultivate exercise of mind; which is the only track to true holiness. This entire decisive desistance from the accustomed resort, has the effect in a few days, to weaken the appetite. The circle is now broken; a chasm is made, wherein the mind is impell'd to seek some other resort to exhaust its voluntary power, and gratify itself with an accustomed exertion of its energies in employments less destructive.

Secondly, by breaking one link at a time: in other words, cassating one division of the circle at once, and proceeding gradually. Thus, if you are habituated to sleep a nap at eleven o'clock of each day; in the first place defer your sleep to a later hour, as that of two, or three. Now, you loosen the yoke at the first onset: for sleep being procrastinated by resolute voluntary thinking, (in the interim you have a struggle with contravening sensation) is fled, at that unusual hour; at least there is little tendency to sleep. Next day, put your sleep by still an hour later; and proceeding in this scale, by and by you have sound sleep at a

proper hour, and early waking, which is both healthful, and profitable for the purposes of industry. Furthermore; if having indulged myself in the daily practice of taking an airing in a carriage at nine o'clock in the morning, and also another at three o'clock in the afternoon, which have the knack of supplying me with a large variety of ideas of one sort or other, the perception whereof is generally attended with a considerable degree of pleasure; the return of those hours constantly brings with itself the inclination, and teasing urgency of pressing desire, to the same resort. From motives of study or virtue, or both, I have deliberately resolved to expunge my morning emergence out of my diary, and stint myself to but one exercise of this kind in a day. The cassation of all that copious and enlivening imagery appertinent to my early excursion impresses a strong proclivity to melancholy, or else continual agitation of restlessness. Allowing myself no recourse but reflection on the nature and tendency of actions and things, the mind uncontrollably seeks out some medium to get into its native element, of voluntary thinking and the pleasures of sense reflected by imagination, by finding a vent for its accumulated power, which shall produce an equilibrium of sensorial action. By and by, I discontinue my other flight after entertainment: and absteining from all vain digressions, utterly discard my old usage. In three or four days, my desire is less. In a few months, I have an aversion to that very thing, that was formerly so essential a part of my employment. Thus I compass a habit of the very reverse. This is the effectual reversion of habits, to fix a habit of the contrary in the place of another. So, out of a number of successive days usually given up to certain pleasures, to change the appropriation of *one*, is breaking a circle by the same way. These days may be annual: I will take away one by one these inured

dishes the mind has been feasted with, and, giving it to seek other food, it of course has other entertainment: 'for the mind of man cannot pass from one object, without passing to another.' Let these rules be applied to every sort of disallowable action. Let all unhealthful, unsocial, and degrading actions be tried by the same measures, and followed by the like treatment.

Thirdly. Another way is by diverting the man, in the first place, to different objects, to give him a habit opposite to, or incompatable with, the prevailing one. Thus, if being addicted to gaming, nightly, I force my attention aside upon books instead, and confining myself hereto, give each night to reading the works of others, or putting down remarks thereon, I get the habit of such exercises of mind as abstract reflection, contemplation, study: which being contravenient to gaming, and inconsistent with it, my desire of gaming fails; and by learning, and use, I have gotten so great a love for the former, that I have a greater desire to appropriate my nights to those than I have to appropriate them to the latter; discontinue gaming without inconvenience; and come to hate an extravagant and immoral practice. Here is one habit superseded by another, without any privation. This is one of the most valuable prerogatives of the true philosophy, to destroy habits without pain, and without interruption of enjoyment. By this diverting the sweep of the voluntary impetus, by envolving objects that are more attracting than what usually prevail'd, we entirely elude the privations of an unprovided breaking. Yet instances of this kind are very rare: indeed it is a rare chance: the reason is the deep hold habits get, on the affections; as has been said with much significancy, 'custom is a second nature.' Yet man, considered in his active character, is but a 'bundle of habits;' for it is impossible for one to

practice any thing constantly but he has a habit of it ; and when one habit is remov'd, another will necessarily take the place of it. A habit of change will interpose at the least. Some thoughts, some motions, must take place during the waking hours of man's life ; and something must be done every day for its sustenance. So that it cannot be otherwise than that one thing or another is made habitual, and continually liable to grow more and more so : and even in case one shall fix upon, and continue in, no one thing long enough to familiarize it, a habit of veering, and shifting from one thing to another, will effectually interpose, and take the place of all other habits. Locke suggested an opinion that the natural motion of the animal spirits, in their successive impulsions on our sensitive and muscular organs, is the physical support of all habit. This appears when after having spoken of the inveteracy of fortuitous associations when enforced by custom, he says, " all which seem to be but trains of motions in the animal spirits, which once set agoing, continue on in the same track they have been used to, which by often treading is worn into a smooth path, when the motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural." The animal spirits I conceive to imply no other than the spirit of animation, which, by some accustomed proportions and forms, continually actuates the sensorium, to the developement of the general course of our prevailing desires, thoughts, determinations, and actions. Yet, all this is evidently modified by the use of our natural liberty.

Fourthly. There is yet another *indirect* way of breaking a circle of action, by catenating pain to that point of the circle where the desire is habituated to centre. When the agent finds pain inseparably intervolv'd in that circumstantiality wherein he was wont to find the constant return of pleasure, he shrinks from the medium of *this*, and thence contracts an

aversion from the very resort he has been accustomed to tend into with all the energy of his affection, by being averse to that which his pleasure is apt to bring along with it. The instituting of pain to follow any particular sort of disallowable action in those we have the disposal of, is frequently us'd with the happiest effects: which, by interjoining an adverse part in the circle, at the same time abates the appetite, which constitutes the whole force that keeps together the concatenation in its original order; and interrupts and varies the course of the effects. This is the original of punishments. Of these there are as many varieties as there are varieties of pain; any sort of pain that can be annexed as a consequence of an action, serving for a punishment. Shame, disgrace, horror, contrition, hunger, thirst, confinement, as well as violent pains of body, come under this head. There be some cases which require force, and yield to none but violent pain. There is a fashionable way of applying force, to impress an idea of authority. Every thing in this world, is recognized by the law of fashion. Some are of opinion that procrastinating the correction of a child till his guilt has accumulated the weight of a challenge that drags upon him, through the festiness and indignation of a clamorously threatening yet pusillanimously forbearing parent, a severely painful chastisement, nurtures malice: bringing on a daring imperious sullenness, that yet covers subtle machinations. This opinion seems to be supported by visible facts. We may account for such a production, on the following principles:

I. In the first place, the child gets a perception of the parent's pusillanimity; and to this, a practice of abortive fulmination notic'd, is apt to superinduce some degree of indignation. The mind of the child being thus prepared, is ready, on the receipt of violence from its parent, to plot retaliation; no longer

reckoning as a superior instructor and guide, the person who gave him life and sustain'd it; but as an equal and an adversary.

2. The infant is become familiar with the ideas of vindictive violence, of painful punishments, of exasperating threats, of revilings; and in consecution, the ideas of means to elude, are made familiar to the child. This is a predisposition to subtilty.

3. The receipt of great violence, confirms his corrupt notions of causation, and of common custom in moral modes. He is persuaded that his chastisement accrued from violent anger and hate, and thus goes to estimate his parent inferior to himself in respect of *self-government*: whereupon he sets out to practice with him as with a junior adversary whom he despises while he hates, (yet fears, for his strength,) by opposing stratagem to violence, to accomplish purposes of revenge. The contrary extreme has similar effects, or more contracting. Too frequent chastisement is as wide from good discipline as that which being too *seldom*, falls in with the weight of cruelty; by too long procrastination the tutor's mind being soured and his affections estranged, through his own ridiculously imprudent managery. A constant repetition of mechanical correction, hardens the heart, benumbs generous feeling, and represses the seeds of delicate properties latent in humanity, which by the tutelage of wisdom, might be brought up to such splendid productions as embellish and glorify the human character. I have enlarged the more on this head, because the art of reversing habits, constitutes a momentous habilitation in the department of forming character: the greatest part of the business of education consisting in destroying habits, and introducing others to the places of these. For if man be necessarily about the repeating of some actions during his waking; it follows he necessarily has a number of ha-

bits. If man have habits, they are either good or bad. If bad, they must be destroyed in order to accomplish a correct education: if good, it was a part of that education to form them. Therefore the greatest part of the business of education, is the forming and un-forming of habits. There is a gradual formation of habits, from birth, without design; i. e. without the design of forming such habits: the most whereof either not coinciding with, or else directly counterplotting, the genuine scheme of social happiness, which is the greatest object the world admits of, have need to be reverted and destroyed, in order to finish education. By putting away one habit, we admit another. Either some other particular habit, a habit of reflection, or else a habit of levity, necessarily grows out of that cassation. What a copious field of study, then; what an important post of vigilance this! A habit of virtue is the grand object we labor at. This ought to be the universal goal of all who presume to adjuvate the design of education. This includes a perfect promptness to any and every action that is morally good; otherwise, that aptly subserves the finish'd purpose of social happiness. This habit rises on the habit of contemplating, and meditating the nature of things and actions, as its natural foundation. But it is brought up by mechanical compulsory manuduction into extrinsical subserviency; as children, before they are competent to such a purpose, must be constrained by discipline into such acts as the same modes which are used in the service of the purpose, till they are made habitual. This is tending into the thing from exterior beginnings. A habit of virtue is not so easy to attain as many imagine. It is very sublime and very multivious. Virtue is that sort of voluntary exertion that tends more or less directly to promote social happiness. Virtue is discriminated by its relation to this object. It is a tendency towards the accomplishment

of this object, that properly discriminates virtue : and the reason is, that, man is naturally a social being ; and his sympathy renders it impossible for him to be happy independently of the consideration of the feelings of others. The more direct and efficient the tendency, the greater is the degree of virtue. Obedience to the law of nature, promotes this object ; therefore virtue includes relation of our actions to the law of nature. A prescript or law in nature, commanding one action and forbidding another, with a reward and penalty annexed to the observance and infringement, may seem not so clear and consistent language as to be readily comprehended. But this is, in *fact*, what all other laws are by *assumption* and *secondary conformation* : for herein is solid authority and irresistible power to carry into effect these promises and threats to which language is so essential to give an air and figure in other laws. There is power in fire to decompose our bodies, and destroy life ; consequently it is against the law of nature to thrust any part of our bodies into the space occupied by burning bodies. We feel the pains of other beings of our kind by reflection and sympathy : consequently it is against the law of nature to injure our fellow creatures.

In fact, here is the *reality* ; the original of all laws : the primordial prototype of all rational prescripts. The tyrant depends on the eternal properties of matter, to be able to execute his threats. If steel had not the power to divide the fibres of living flesh when, under a due impulse, it is brought into contact with it, vain were his institutes of torture. This law of nature is nothing but relative properties of matter invariably radicated in all natural beings, and the established order of causes and effects, depending thereon. That part of this law, that relates to the causality and consequences of our voluntary free actions, may be called the *moral law* of nature. The relation of

our actions compared and refer'd to the law of nature, as they agree or disagree to it, is called virtue or vice, sin or holiness. Virtue is either *general* or *definite*.

General or *abstract* virtue is simply the kind or sort of action distinguished from all others only by this one discrimination, tendency to promote, directly or indirectly, social happiness, as an object to a motive : as virtue, virtuous conduct. *Definite* denotes all those

particular varieties of action which being comprehended in the import of the other, are distinguished from it by secondary criteria : as temperance, charity, meekness, industry, &c. In short, virtue in its abstract sense, means that kind or sort of moral action, or in other words, any free voluntary action, that tends directly or indirectly to promote social happiness considered as an object to a motive ; and which herein agrees to the law of nature. In its particular or definite sense, it designates particular deeds or varieties of such action, with discriminative names : thus any

such action or course of actions, as serves the purpose of social happiness, and tends any way to advance that end, is called a virtue. A certain sort of motion or thought marked by some good passion, or some good object had in view to which that action tends, is called a virtue. The virtues are distinguished into *private* and *social*. *Private virtue* is that which seems to have for its proximate end, the private advantage of ourselves, families, and connexions ; as the preservation and security of our life and comfort. The private virtues are temperance, continence, cleanliness, industry, frugality, fortitude, patience. Yet these have a more or less conspicuous bearing as remote applicatives to the object social happiness. *Social*

virtue is that whose primary and proximate end is the good of our fellow creatures. The final end may be our *own* happiness that necessarily depends on the promotion of that object. The social virtues are

philanthropy, hospitality, patriotism, justice, gratitude, charity, meekness. Virtue is furthermore distinguished into *speculative* and *active*. *Speculative virtue* is either contemplation of great and worthy pursuits and benignant schemes ; good desires, good wishes ; forming good purposes ; cultivation of sympathy by cherishing good passions and benignant emotions, as sorrow for past sins, condolence, joy in the good of others i. e. joy aptly accompanying the idea of others' good. *Active virtue* is the determination of the will upon the execution of those purposes and the mechanical application of the subordinate organs in the subserviency of this determination : As giving to the poor ; providing comfortable subsistence for strangers ; diligent improvement of time to secure means to communicate happiness or to procure leisure to carry on some good design ; volunteering in the service of one's country in the field of public defence. Some particular virtues are purely speculative ; some, purely active ; while some partake of both the one and the other of those characters. Philanthropy when simply speculative, is variously expressed by benevolence, and benignity ;—when it becomes an active virtue, it takes such names as beneficence, munificence, liberality, generosity, &c. Speculative virtue includes the idea of voluntary thinking. For without act of the will, which distinguishes free agents, there is no virtue : neither merit nor demerit, praise nor blame, penalty nor reward, being rationally applicable to actions altogether necessary, motions depending in no degree upon volition ; any more than honour or happiness is applicable to the drops of rain which fructify our fields ; which yet they are no way susceptible of. Voluntary exertion is essential to virtue and to vice. Some virtues are apparently negative : as omitting or refraining to do evil : and this is voluntary. Some indeed seem to be mere qualities or relations of

our actions; as fortitude. Yet there will ever be found voluntary act in them, from which they get all their merit. Some voluntary thought or motion, is essential in them. Even submission, forbearance, quickness in place of tardiness, contempt of obstacles, perseverance, resistance of inticements, are all voluntary acts. And upon the same principle it is said with truth, that 'omitting to do good, is committing evil.'

Now, such a thorough habit as makes all such sorts of actions easy and agreeable, and makes us find positive pleasure in them, is a great object to compass. This requires great energy of application, and critical vigilance. Such a habit as that whereby one should be prompt and ready at all times and places to perform every action of such sort as tends to social happiness and is conformable to the law of nature, is, an exalted point of refinement in art, for humanity to gain. It is the business of a well conducted education, by gradual discipline training and moulding the powers and affections of man into an apt complacent concord to the laws of nature in his own constitution, and that of neighbouring beings deliberately explored by the eye of unwarp'd sapience. I say *one general habit* of all these sorts of action, that should make easy and optable any and every thought and deed that is morally good (now good is positive, as production of pleasure; or negative, as diminution of pain) would seem to be a constitutional habit; and require a change of the very nature of the creature. And such is the peccancy of our race, that some have thought it impracticable for men of *themselves*, to acquire this habit: and that there must be a new creation of the man before such a thing can take place. Indeed our degeneracy, our universal apostacy from rectitude is such, that in moral education we have little else but clearing away our ground, of the rubbish of bad hab-

its: reversing habits already engendered, being that which takes up almost the whole attention and energy of those who are engaged in this department. And what makes these worse, i. e. more formidable, is the persuasion that they are part of nature. Such is the power of custom; such the fixedness of nature's prescripts. I trust there has been said heretofore sufficient to evince the practicability of reversing habits; which, if it be so, proves plainly that these bad habits are not a part of our nature. Man necessarily is equally susceptible of pleasure and pain, because both the one and the other are the same direction of motion in the sensorium; i. e. a sweep from the extreme parts towards the centre; they being, discriminatively, but relative degrees of this motion, referred to a distinct subject; which distinct subject must be either the immediately preceding general moving of the fluids of the system, or the present prevailing one. Men are equally liable to transgress, and conform to, the law of nature. For liberty being power to do what one will, he is no longer a free agent than he has this power of doing evil and good, in equal degree. It may be here asked, why has man the power to choose evil? Wherefore is man susceptible to desire and to will that which is evil? I answer, because he is susceptible of ignorance; he is not born with thorough skill in the physical and moral laws of nature; which is saying little more than that man is man; or that such a being as man, exists. For man is a progressive being: progressive in his capacity, and in the adscititious endowments of that capacity. Where there is maturity, there can be no progression. This profection or advancing forward in the accumulation of knowledge, is incompatible with the idea of mature knowledge and ability. Therefore because, being ignorant of some parts of the law of nature, he is by reason of this ignorance liable to mistake good for evil, he is liable to

incline to, and desire, that which being repugnant to the moral law of nature, works contrary to the conservation of his existence, and the consummation of its enjoyment.

Habits may be revers'd. The methods I have above mentioned, I think comprehend the chief of the most efficacious expedients for changing habits. If the practical repetition of action produces habit, why shall not the practical repetition of *one* sort of action produce habit, as well as that of another? If a bad habit can be attain'd, a good one can : and if *one* good habit can be acquir'd, a *thousand* can likewise be acquir'd. So, also, if *one* habit can be revers'd, *every* habit can be revers'd. Therefore it is practicable for man to attain a habit of virtue. For if repetition of action produces habit ; discontinuing to repeat action, prevents it, and since it is impossible for the intelligence of man to be idle in his waking hours but that it is still repeating some action ;—of course, by forcing the energy and of will and understanding to the voluntary repeating of good actions instead of bad ones, he forms good habits. *He has got such a trick; and he cant break himself, is a very common saying :—I have a habit by long use, and can't put it away,* is a sentiment too commonly entertain'd. This is the subterfuge which gives rest to those who are averse to adventuring on any enterprize for improvement, and to those whose hearts are fully set in them to do evil.

There are five habits particularly incident to be contracted by children, of which we ought to consider the importance of being on our guard against the ascendancy, on account of their ruinous consequences.

I. A habit of using violence on the receipt of an affront or disappointment ; as squealing, tearing, striking with the fist, crying, &c. The children of this world are so far from philosophizing on the rise and nature of this sort of facts, that they even set down conten-

ted in the persuasion of this vague opinion, that it is impossible to keep children quiet when they are very young. They persuade themselves of an impossibility of making children perfectly tranquil in their infancy. Instances make directly against them, however; but they attribute these instances to anomalous causes; not discerning the efficacy of method, in relation to so desirable a state of things. It has been with mixed sensations of regret and chagrin that I have often heard experienced dames confidently and seriously advance such erroneous doctrine, wherein they confessed their imbecility in concluding themselves unable to keep peace in their own households. For my own part, it has sometimes appeared very astonishing to me that it was possible for such, without scruple, to work practically against the law of nature, in suffering their hands to be (by mere storge) habitually stayed from that salutary correction on their children, which their insolence daily calls for: which what ever pretence to sanctity they may show, indubitably proves that they worship the beauty of their beloved favorites more than any thing else, and their fancies idly dote on the pleasures attending their production and nursing. A habit growing out of this, is that of speaking with admiration and making remarks on every thing the little ones say extempore; which blows up pride, and several inordinate calculations in the latter, from the aspiring pinnacle of which, by and by they are to fall, and have pity from none, but rather to grumble at providence because none cares for their rise. There be several methods may conduce to the tranquility of infancy; but when this habit of bawling and crying has got footing, it is necessary to proceed to punishment. Some make a feint of punishing, as others do of gifts. Punishment should be certain, invariably following the sentence: and seasonable, applied at the precise time when it is deserved. Punishment should

not be injurious ; as fractures, dislocations, bruises, superfaction ; yet sufficiently painful to make an affecting impression, and make the subject sensible of what it is done for ; to this end, it should appear, in some cases to be sensuously affecting to the punisher, and often accompanied with other exegetical signs.

This habit, I say may be revers'd by the superinduction of pain as a conspicuous adjunct, according to the fourth of the foregoing methods.

2. A habit of contradiction. This habit begins in the unlimited license of speaking, which is generally flattered rather than checked, and this for the mere sport the young articulators afford by their oddities ; and takes its first degree in disputes that take place among children one with another, where nothing is more easy and natural when they differ in their conceptions, than roundly to give the lie. It is presently considered a way of honouring *themselves* ; he that has the *last word*, pluming himself with the pre eminence of understanding or authority. The practice of this very thing, breeds the primordials of animosities ; nurses pride, irascibility, hatred, and envy. But the odium of this not being noticed nor exposed by affecting them (by method) with a sense of the folly and turpitude of such vile communication, this manner of replication by and by takes aim at parents and guardians themselves, which is less grateful to come in this direction, from the mouths of their darlings : by dint of custom, nevertheless, it becomes tolerable, and in process of time, grows even to be agreeable, as most other habitual things do. In societies where profanity and ribaldry prevail generally among the young, *this* being (to appearance) innocent in comparison with profane blasphemous expressions which are common, people are temper'd to connive at it. Thus thousands of families grow up with manners disgusting to all cultivated observers ; from habits of impertinent sa-

miliarities between offspring and stock, that trample the authority of the former, and eclipse their dignity in profound contempt. Clemency in the government of children, should be reserved. The considerate will be scrupulous of tolerating so glaring insolence as giving the lie to a parent or guardian. One connivance paves the way to a thousand aggressions. The perpetrators of the crime enlarge upon the species,—and extend their plan. Adolescence is the period when every degree of liberty is wont to be reckoned a guarantee from supervisors to follow the dictates of inclination, and obey the impulsion of natural emotions: for they not possessing the power of judging correctly of moral relations, what rational ground have we to expect them to observe any other rule of estimate in this respect, than the approbation of their superiors? Permission operates as approbation. Now, they love the approbation of those from whom they derive their sustenance and enjoyments. The way to convince children of the criminal unreasonableness of this odious practice of contradiction, is to exemplify our disapprobation, not by argumentation which they cannot comprehend, nor by asking *why do you thus? Why do you speak so?* but, while their apprehensions are incapable of taking in impressive views of remote consequences, by *instituting pain to follow as an immediate consequent*; which will have the knack of interrupting the wonted circle of action, and eventually destroy it. Thus *this* habit may be reversed.

3. A habit of torturing animals. I know not what cause the peculiar delightfulness of this employ first originates from, unless it be the idea of superior power (in the relation of acquisition, to the children's own pride) which the contrast of little weak creatures yielding to their touch, with their own size and abilities, affords. The love of power balefully gets rooted before sympathy assumes her full efficiency in moral

views; or else this propensity is hereditary. May not sympathy be made to keep pace with the love, of power, which is self-love and pride? Is it not possible to improve sympathy to an equal degree of influence with that of this festering propensity and attachment to pre-eminence? Sympathy, reflectively extended to the feelings of fellow beings, is *moral*. In case of cruelty in infants, this sympathy gets no prevalence at all, on voluntary actions, before this love of eminence in power, gets into that operation that makes the destruction of insects and other small animals, pleasing, by proving the comparative strength of their murderers. Carniverous beasts kill for sustenance. Man kills for amusement. Carniverous beasts kill their weaker fellows for sustenance. Man, for pastime. More savage than the lions' and leopards' whelps of the wilderness, he inflicts torture and death on inferior sorts of animals, without expectance of the least benefit. Flies, wasps, robins, wrens, rabbits, and green snakes promiscuously fall a sacrifice to his sanguine caprice, which makes him take an inhuman sort of delight in the downfall of unoffending inferiors. Cruelty to the brute creation, is akin to cruelty to human beings. Indulged in adolescence, it generates the principles of tyranny, extortion, oppression, and implacable pervivacity. The practice of this very indulgence, constitutes one formidable obstacle to the improvement of sympathy; and to this we owe the general hardness of mankind; the want of compassion and compunction, which makes them untractable to persuasory insinuations of moderate reasoners.

Example of parents not unfrequently insinuates this vile disposition into children, whom they suffer to witness the killing of innocent animals, while none informs them that those creatures have similar feelings with their own, and thus educes an exercise of their sympathy. Hence, we think of the killing of a lamb:

a calf, or a turkey, without any more emotion than of the cutting of a sallad, the felling of an oak, or the plucking of a melon. Thus, the habit is acquired by imitation and the most natural of all associations, that of their first and dearest attachments. Beware then parents how you principle your children with cruelty and hardness of heart. Fancy not it will simply make them confident and manly to open to their view scenes of slaughter before you teach them to reason. To me, it seems no very difficult operation to supersede this aptitude to treat with violence the bodies of weaker animals, by the intervention of the power of sympathy. Pathetic inculcation will do in many cases; but, on the accession of *inveteracy*, we must resort to retributive pain.

4. A habit of intemperance. The custom of stuffing children has three bad effects: it weakens the constitution; generates a habit of gluttony and drunkenness; while it gives ascendancy to the baser parts of animal nature over the ennobling operations of reflection. For what is a stuff'd child more than a beast? And is he not worse than a beast, in that having power to plot, by virtue of superior reason, he is master of more means of disturbance? "Lest I be full and deny thee," was an ingenuous concession of the liability of human nature to be corrupted by luxury and superfluous gratifications. Never to let children know hunger and thirst, is to prevent their sympathizing with distress of those kinds. Pampering and nursing unreasonable appetites, incurs clamour, and thoughtless expression; and a physical reason is obvious; a surcharge of the stomach and other organs, excites the recourse of voluntary energy to counteract a painful suppression, which, in some degree, never fails to attend plethora of the animal system. For all stuffing, crowding, or urging the vessels or organs of the body faster than they can convert aliment into blood, or

blood into other finer substances, directly induce obstruction, and retard that free gentle circulation of the fluids, propitious to serenity. Now, voluntary motion being contrary to sensation, tends to lessen pain, by interruption, and likewise by dividing the sensorial power of the system: hence loud and harsh speaking 'like the piercings of a sword,' hallooing, yelling, obstreperous conviviality, amongst children: it being *their labour*, that helps them to digest that load of aliments which crowds them as a sort of goads, to violent exertion. Also a stuff'd stomach presses the lungs so that it is impossible for them to speak audibly but by a strong impetus. One thing that encourages this habit, is the practice of rewarding children for their worthy acts, with sweetmeats, cakes, &c. instead of praise, friendship, books, and such things as would improve their minds and morals, at the same time that they would excite them to exercise themselves in the duties of their station.

5. A habit of lying. This odious habit subtly gets ground very early in those who are tolerated in much prattling; when, their first aberrations from strict verity not being impressively marked out as objects of abhorrence and scandal by their dearest patrons and admirers, they soon and easily come to reckon an indifferent thing, to speak contrary to what they think; which never being punished, how should the dear little chatterers know it to be a crime? Directly, it comes about to serve some desirable end of theirs, to represent to another party, ideas different from what they have in their minds, or put together their words and ideas different from the relation they perceive between them: then they have a *reason*; and this, even allowing they begin to feel some faint vellications of the moral sense, whispering them 'it is not perfectly equitable', is to them more satisfactory than *no reason at all*: now if they can get some favorite object by mis-

representing their thoughts and deluding their companions, escape some task, or screen themselves from some accusation or punishment, they begin to think the end justifies the means : Which manner of judging, determining, and speaking, soon grows habitual. Thus injustice gets a strong root very early in the season of life ; which if not checked, presently spreads into the most malevolent slanders, perfidious swindling, and deep plotted delusions of avaricious men. When the habit has got that pitch that shame, compunction, or a sense of honour, cannot be worked into an operation strong enough to revert the inclination, severe chastisement is necessary to be applied. A mark of disgrace or contempt, early set on it, would be very salutary. But so far are some parents from impressing their children with the real scandal of lying, that they set them a pattern of the very thing.

From what has been heretofore said, this further reflection arises. *Habit may be an attribute of every one of our trains of ideas.* From the fourfold operation of the sensorium, by its capacity of irritation, of sensation, of volition, and of association, arise certain trains of ideas, which are denominated by the modes and capacities from which they have their original excitation. An idea that takes place in consecution to that motion which is the consequence of the contrectation of external bodies on the extreme terminations of the sensory, is called an irritative idea. An idea that takes place in consecution to that mode of the sensorial motions that is called sensation, is called a sensitive idea. An idea that takes place in consecution to voluntary exertion, is called a voluntary idea. And an idea that takes place in consecution to that exertion that connects ideas, and connects other movements, in such sort that one follows or comcomitates another, is called an associative or associate idea.

Trains of these, are called irritative trains, sensitive trains, voluntary trains, and trains of association, or associative trains. These trains are reciprocally interrupted, and one, as it were, runs into another ; so that there are trains compounded of all these varieties of ideas. The predominance of either one or other of these in the usual tenour of our intellectual operations, is a general habit of a peculiar way of thinking ; a cast of mind. Within the significancy of this, are several particular habits ; as a habit of anticipation ; a habit of forgetting some sorts of ideas and of remembering others, &c. Here are circles of action. Those in whom the irritative trains prevail mostly, i. e. in whom ideas of this sort most take place and employ more of the sensorial energy than any other sorts, are such as are given to be fretful and snappish ; generally good mechanics, and men of nice observation.

Those in whom the sensitive trains prevail, are the sorrowful, the sensuous, the sensual, the melancholy, and the malicious.

Those in whom the voluntary trains take place most, afford us specimens of enterprize : such as have distinguished themselves by magnanimity ; among whom are some of the greatest philanthropists.

In whom the associative trains prevail, we find prompt memories. Of these are the orators and poets.

Hence the propriety of those descriptions which denominate one habit, a melancholy habit, another an indolent habit :—some, habits of gloomy reflection, habits of pertinancy, of change, a versatile habit, a habit of sullenness, a habit of constancy.

CHAPTER. IV.

Of Improvement of Institutes.

THE word institute I use to denote something fixed and established with general consent, whether a relation, mode, or substance, or a combination of any of these, used as a mean or medium for the promotion of education. As a system of geometry ; a school.

There are four kinds of institutes : I. Parental gard ; II. Books ; III. Seminaries ; and IV. Religious establishments.

I shall take notice of what particular ways each of these is manifestly abused, or evidently wanting, with reference to its object ; and mention some of those particulars wherein I think they may be amended, or more advantageously applied.

First, *parental gard*. This institute is partly from nature, and partly from human resolve and concurrence. The patriarchal government in China, from time immemorial, extends to the full controul of the child's temporal course, equally to any popular institution. Yet the father is a monarch over his family ; which is contrary to nature : it being repugnant to the *moral* law which contemplates the preservation of the species, and the extension of its enjoyment, not only for one man to tyrannize over any of his fellow creatures, by circumscribing in any degree their natural liberty of conscience which results to them from the possession of common properties radicated in their constitution by authority of the physical law, but, furthermore, is *manifest usurpation* for any parent to ex-

ercise juridical authority over his children after their arriving at the age of manhood, which in civilized communities is generally fixed at twenty-one years, and I think, with good reason; for it is just that the child before he encumbers himself with the cares and obligations of parentage, should stay to make some amends to his own parent for his sustenance and education, by the offices of filial gratitude, which in themselves concentrate a reciprocation of sublime happiness. Therefore this institute, placing children in the condition of dependance on their originals for sustenance and initiation in science, which is established partly by the law of nature, and partly by human laws, is perfectly apposite to implicit views in the general constitution of animated nature. For, in the first place, the offspring is not capable, for the want of knowledge and strength, to preserve its existence: and this institution well manag'd, secures the perfection of what appears to be universally design'd as the final goal of all constitutional modes and measures, which is the preservation of existence, and consummation of enjoyment. This is an important thing with parents. The obligation this brings parents, is critical. This thing is abus'd, to the daily depravation of human intelligences: a repression of their parts, and perversion of their endowments to base pursuits. This institute is abused several ways.

I. *By parents neglecting to use compulsion and restraint with infants.* Parents defer coercive measures to force their infant children into such modes of subsistence and action as are essentials in the ceremonial applicatives of virtuous purposes; but are inured to allow scope to their spontaneous advances, as if they would grow into virtue, as stature, the first light of nature guiding them to what is good, when it in fact directs them (at the present posture of human society) in the exactly reverse course: for how can it be ima-

gined that the infant, not knowing that it is just and reasonable that he should sit still and eat his meals in one place, go to his rest at regular hours, be inoffensive, submissive, and quiet, shall go ultroneously into the practice of such duties, which being repeated have an invincible tendency to habit? For there is scarce a mode of exerting our powers and parts, that is not to be made both easy, and in some degree agreeable, by custom. But in fact he is impulsed to clamour, to gluttony, to irregularity, to disobedience, to headiness, to violent motions. All these have their natural causes; but there is a train of causes and effects that reaches to the consummation of human enjoyment; and this is our moral law of nature. To address him with language, is trifling: and it is absolutely indispensable to confine him by unreserved constraint, to a mechanical compliance with such rules and prescripts as the parent and nurse knowing to be good, the child's apprehension is incapable of receiving and applying by means of their address. This mechanical conformity soon becomes habitual; and those manners which for the well being of the family and their own future enjoyment, are absolutely necessary for children to practice, are *now* learned at a much cheaper and more advantageous rate, than after other habits having taken place, must be pre-requisitely reversed, they would be compassed at the beck of deliberate reflection. If parents would compel their children to a regular course of action; and addict them at least to regularity in all those repeated resorts and exercises that pertain to their subsistence, a great deal would be done towards laying a solid foundation of active virtue. It is proper that pain should be instituted to invariably follow any capricious and useless violence, as crying, from trifling inconvenience (most especially when from the impulse of anger) that if the child cannot be made to apprehend any other thing that shall

persuade him that it is proper and necessary to be silent, he may be induc'd to consider the urgency of it as a *recourse* to avert his own sufferance, and, though he yet cannot know the *reason*, comply, at his peril : which silence when habituated, is propitious to domestic tranquillity not only, but eminently so to a purpose of contemplation, which is in future to adorn and exalt the mind of the child's self. Regularity in hours of eating, sleeping, shifting of clothes, washing, and in quantity and quality of diet, is a consideration of influential moment.

II. *By actually humouring them to the most depraving gratifications.* It is a subject of admiration to see those people who appear on several occasions to be affected with a deep sense of immortality and the eternal weal of spiritual things, treating their offspring daily as if they had no souls at all : for it is not easy to conceive what idea they have in their heads, of the intelligent part, the soul, the understanding, of any of their children, when they are habitually using them as play-things, gratifying all their irregular desires, nursing their worst passions by countenancing those violent sallies of volition wherein these are accustomed to find their exhaustion. One would think they were essaying to make dæmons of them in good earnest, or considered them as mere apes. Let not such people say much of the nature of the soul ; for it is in the nature of the soul to have bad passions, and the nature of these to grow by gratification. The fact is, the parent allows the ideas of that pleasure which attended the origin of them, and of the endeared scenes of courtship, too strongly to coalesce with the ideas of the persons of these children ; by which associations he is constantly impulsed to inticing caresses, the scope whereof being his own private sensitive pleasure, a serene sort of exhilaration of his own spirits, admits no scrutiny of the motives and emergence of moral

qualities they call forth or cherish. He considers not that love and joy should not be fixed to frivolous and evanescent things; that angry emotions should be repressed, instead of being cherish'd. He goes so far as to set them apish patterns, and drill them to such monkey tricks as can have no pretence to any other object than amusement; enters the lists among them in play, but considers not that though all these manœuvres are mere diversion to himself, they are important business to the children.

Men are too apt to make themselves the standards of all persons when considering their thoughts and feelings. I would not totally disuse this sort of applications: when considered with a view to ground some useful mechanical arts by familiarizing their proper movements when the parts are ductile, they are laudable. But when tending to excite extravagant laughter, or joy on immoment considerations, to foster resentment, countenance clamour, or to indulge children in such manœuvres and set them such patterns as attach the passions love, fear, hope, joy, anger, &c. to improper objects, they are imminently pernicious. This capricious playing with children has a tendency to these two capital effects, which are so universally to be deprecated: 1st. It gives them a playfulness, a *proneness to play*, in the privation of which they are encumbered with ennui and aversion to some objects inseparable from common life. 2d. It disqualifies them for, and gives them an almost unconquerable averseness to, exercises of reflection, such as contemplation, study, attention, &c. Now it is too well known what formidable impediments these throw in the way of their initiation in necessary knowledge and art; and in how many instances they forever block up their proficiency; wherefore they remain vulgar, and contract insolence and rudeness, consecrating all immorality! for vain are books, teachers, schools, and all manner of in-

stitutes, without willing application of mind. Several effects of these, might be traced to the moral sense, in the way of some habitudes of the passions and trains of thought. But what seems the most unaccountably ridiculous in this kind of treatment of children, is teaching them to articulate *incorrectly*, while it were easier in them to learn proper words, and give them the proper sound. This is giving them a different language; and may subtly insinuate into their minds a persuasion that they are a distinct class, and are to live differently from others around them; at least it helps among other odd things, to assemble in their heads *romantic ideas* to precede and confuse their *real* ones. But it unquestionably impedes their articulation. I know of no excuse has been made for this: it seems to be one of those fashions the world runs headlong into, they know not wherefore. A habit of levity sometimes comes from this playing discipline; since it gives a gadding turn to the spirits; and also the accumulation of that sort of power, in the recession, produces afterwards restlessness, and this is unsteadiness already. How little does the commonalty imagine that by this flightiness of the young, the extravagance of the world is to be traced very much to such a sort of treatment of children! Some are wearied out by importunity: so, from time to time gratify their children in their instinctive and puerile vagaries; which festers and strengthens bad passions. Teasing overpowers them. This is weakness of mind, from want of cultivation. Thus the world is corrupted, in one generation after another, for want of cultivation of mind! Of so great consequence is this cultivation! Indeed every degree of order and civilization, grows out of this. It is that whereby we come at a knowledge of the laws of nature. It is to this we owe the perfect distinction of what is right and wrong, in the delusive multiformity of our prospects. Would parents go about to collect

a philosophic view of this subject, they would so far induce improvement upon this institute. For hereby they would abide in such treatment as would use the faculties of their offspring in a manner propitious to their advancement towards the end propos'd by nature, consummation of enjoyment. Now, this consummation implies sublimation or refinement, as well as enlargement. This view requires cultivation of mind. More of this hereafter.

III. There is another class who repress that which would be a proper degree of ardour, and use of a due degree of freedom: who injure their children by *too much* constraint. This is a common case with masters, who exercise no feeling towards *foreign poor* in their gard. They rear them to ignorance and vulgarity, besides giving them a slavish spirit. It would reflect honour on human nature if governments would institute permanent provision for the employment, support, and instruction of all poor youth.

IV. By parents' neglecting to give their offspring an attachment to the means and processes of learning. For, by failing to associate pleasing ideas with the necessary preludes of knowledge and art, we preclude all inclination to sound voluntary thinking, and can never superinduce a propensity to study and contemplation.

V. By neglecting to give judicious precepts and examples to youth, and pursue them in such ways as to fix good principles. Many impart no precepts at all, but proceed as if they thought the children had mature reason and judgement:—when they have done any thing irregular, asking them the question, *why? wherefore?* referring to a proficiency equal to their own experience: which is a ridiculous specimen of that degree of assurance with which people set out upon the executing of *some* business. It is important to be acquainted with the subject of what one under-

takes to be master of. Again; having given good advice and wholesome precepts, some continue to exhibit adverse examples: examples, which, from habit, they find their enjoyment adjuvated by acting, without considering their influential character at all. Thus we see a universal disorder, from want of cultivation of mind, carrying on its baleful efficiency into all parts of the business of civil life. They are apt not to be considerate of power and manner, nor to be scrupulous of displaying any thing in their practice, repugnant to what they have, in words, enjoin'd. This is a subject that ought to be critically studied. The importance of this, is conspicuous in reflection. Under this head, is concinnous to mention a sort of example people shew in punishing or rewarding children. The inconsiderate is apt to imagine the impression of what is *design'd*, has the knack to supersede all *other* impressions. That which is most effective is seen in their punishments. Many of us, besides humouring our children inordinately, yet after having borne and borne, with a degree of pusillanimity, their impudence, till it is grown into a very exasperating effrontery, fly at them in a fit of anger like wild beasts of prey. This is abusively trifling with the rational intelligence; for the precedent of resentment is more efficient in the mind of the tyro than any thing else that is done. And indeed this is the essential mould of the onset; it being a retaliatory scheme to inflict pain, which if it be done, we feel gratified, and our plea is *the good of the child*: but the pleading is not sound. Much anger must not appear, in punishment, on account of the contagious fascination of example. It defeats the purpose of correction. Oftentimes the whole bluster is to no other execution at all than to exemplify resentment to the tender minds of the curious tyros: and the greater the degree of anger, generally the less efficacious in its designed effect; and the reason is, the

exhaustion of the spirit in voluntary thinking, cuts it short in the sequel. Rewards also are often unseasonably applied; and thereby fail of their desired effect. Some remember a child's desert at a time when they should think of punishing him; and give him a reward in such a conjuncture that it seems to be for his doggedness.

VI. *By denying them access to schools, or else impeding and perplexing that access in a manner that frustrates it.* The infant must needs be manag'd at home. But the bulk of mankind is under necessity of having their attention taken up by some objects that pertain to subsistence, while their children in their adolescent state needing the hand of a tutor when themselves cannot educate them, is requisite a hired teacher take charge of them. They need the constant oversight of *some* one, in all parts of their use of the day, till such time as good principles and habits shall have been fixed in a fair way of progressing towards perfection. Not only while the child remains within the pales of his seminary; but on his way, and in all interims, a controuling eye need pursue him with circumspection and concern. If it be reasonable that he idle away time in sauntering about his road to school; if it be reasonable that he enter the orchards and gardens of his neighbors, devour or carry off their fruit; if it be reasonable that he enter into bickerings with his pheers, or spend his time in prosecuting plots of imposture or mischief; he should be indulged with freedom to do these things: if not, either his teacher or his parent should decidedly hold jurisdiction over him in these intervals. Here originates great trouble. The parent will neither give up this jurisdiction, nor exercise it. The tutor, on the other hand, will not assume it to himself, on account of the variance about it. This dispute is carried farther. It is denied, in effect, that the tutor, with propriety has cognizance of

the child's moral conduct. Here is a childish falling out, and quarrelling among men, about trifles. If it be reasonable that the child be kept within the bounds of decorum, and also in the way of accustoming that which is good, in its remote bearings; then it is requisite that either the proprietor, or deputed instructor of the child, have cognizance of his course; that he hold and exercise authoritative jurisdiction of it. If it be more reasonable that the tutor have this controul of the scholar, in his appropriating all parts of the day, than that the parent or guardian should have it; let it be so; or if it be most reasonable that the latter should retain the jurisdiction so far as the child's absence from school, let him exercise it: but it ought to be decidedly awarded to one or the other, and exercis'd too, by whomsoever it does belong to; since "a child left to himself brings his parents to shame."

Mankind from want of knowledge, and due cultivation of natural faculties, are addicted to consider the modalities of a subject rather than the essence. Hence they contract aversion to teachers on account of their way of living, habits of regimen, their gait, their dialect, their air, and a thousand incidental circumstances; and under impression of this, retract their children from schools; or temporizing to their puerile caprice, indulge them alternately with a few days' absence, then a few days' attendance; wherein they can get no proficiency; what ideas and exercise intervene to the trains of their studies, utterly overpowering the associations and habits that were begun; and they are brought to more labour to recollect their little gatherings of learning, than was required at first to get them. For whatever sort of necessary knowledge or art they are put about requisitely acquiring the ideas of, arithmetic, reading, geography, or writing, things indispensable in common life, these other ideas suffer'd to supervene in the interims (of their re-

ession,) being what are associated with the prevailing ordinary pleasures of their stations, come in a more exciting form, and inevitably supersede if not obliterate the other. Any business must be pursued long enough to form a circle of action not only, but to also collect greater pleasure than another ready resort, before it can get the invariable bias of choice. Therefore this is the *key*; this is the secret with judicious teachers, of grounding a good education; to collect more pleasure in the view of their process, than what prevails in aversive views. And this, in the beginning, must be done by parents. A tutor can never do it without the concurrence of the parent, in some shape or other, for the following reasons, viz:

1. The child draws the first pleasures of its existence from his parent; and these first pleasures are of a nature to prevail in the substantiating of a temperament of passions, because, *first*, they are continued with constancy for a considerable time, and are connected with the means of his existence; and *secondly* because the system being more delicate than ever after, takes stronger impressions.

2. The pupil being at home in the company of his parents and nurses the greatest part of the day, is more naturally biassed by *their* agency than by that of a tutor; which, if their works be different, will impel him in as different a course, and will be found difficult to supersede strong by weak; to overcome the original by the secondary. The teacher needs to be respected by the parent, and treated as a brother; especially within the observance of *pupils* nothing should be said either derogatory or diminutive of him: the reverse is imminently pernicious. People are too apt, in presence of their children, to speak of their instructors as servants and drudges, from that common aptitude arising from ignorance and depravity, to underrate the business of instruction. They even with

open opprobrium represent the occupation as a low fawning capricious subsistence, while themselves are the cause of its being such. They go still farther: on the most frivolous pretexts of umbrage, the slightest misgoings of these instructors, they rush headlong into virulent phillipicks upon their characters, that reflect contemptuous ideas into all bystanders: Little do they think of the prejudicial effects this operates in their listening offspring; poorly do they conceive of the magnitude of the mischief; for it crosses the dearest wishes of their own hearts, since it tears away the foundation of deference to all supervizing authority. Vainly now may they anticipate reverence, obedience, and the fruits of filial gratitude. Such is the importance of respectful ideas of an instructor, in the mind of a pupil: but more of this hereafter.

VII. *By the general extravagance of the multitude exhibiting depraving examples and consecrating corrupt manners,* this institute is furthermore abus'd, and parents and children robbed of the blessings naturally affixed to an improvement of it. Reciprocal is the felicity of this condition, when improved according to the laws of nature: Children are most influenced by their parents, nurses, relations, companions, and neighbours: the examples these shew them, are apt to fix their characters. The epidemic corruption of the wide world pestilentially steals into their innocuous hearts, and by one insinuation or another, biasses them to arrant affections. All this may be circumscribed, and finally countermined, by a circumspection of parents, having at first the energy of their minds concentrated upon this subject. The improvement to be suggested in this part, is for parents to keep their children out of the thoroughfare of temptations. This is negative. There is a process of positive advances to the weal of moral good; which consists in studied insinuations, by pre-

cept and example, to counteract the influence of external excitements.

VIII. *By ingratitude of youth.* Children, by ungrateful perversion of the good things they receive from the authors of their being, with their eyes fairly open to right and wrong, cherishing a habit of disputing others' feelings, harden their necks, to the mutual deprivation of themselves and parents of the purest of earthly happiness; for what is more serenely charming than the domestic circle can be made? Yet these exclude domestic happiness; and afterwards treat with cold aversion and neglect, the source from which they emerged with all their supernumerary train of gratuitous and undeserved enjoyments. And in this they are almost unpardonable: for, the child, having become enlightened in the laws of nature, so as to know moral good and evil in the character of his condition, that is, knowing this institute and the use of it, if he falls away, he ensures to himself a horrific retrospect wherein he is annoyed by those emotions of compunctious anguish which are an effect entailed by the constitution of nature upon his conscious and confessed infringements; as has been intimated in elucidating the idea of sympathy. I here speak of children as acting for themselves, and being under obligations. It is the duty of children to be grateful to their parents. There is a duty for children to do; and they have power to do it: they know how to do it. Here we suppose their judgment to be mature; that they know their obligations, and the means to perform them. Both in youth and manhood they are indebted to those who gave them life and sustenance, so far as to cherish an affectionate regard for them; as well as purposes of restitution wherever there is scope and support herefor.

'He that's ungrateful (says the poet) has no fault but one; all other crimes may pass for virtues in him.'

How can human beings be unfeeling towards the authors of their being, sustenance and nurture? They *can* be so, as all human nature is susceptible of evil. Every event has a natural cause; an ascendancy, in moving or moved matter. The essence of ingratitude consists in a want of cultivation of natural affection: for what is more natural than for us to love our benefactors? and what greater benefactors can there be than those who gave us life and initiation? It seems like repressing the readiest emotions of sympathy. Were here place, I would point out some particular causes that lead up to this abuse. But it is here supposed the tyro has receiv'd good precepts, good examples, from his parent; that he is sensible of these, and sensible of a series of good endeavours therein, to conform him to virtue; that he has perceiv'd the solicitude of those who brought him upon the stage, concerning his moral character. Here is great burden on his own conscience;—for after having receiv'd the knowledge of the truth, *then* falling away by resistance or avoidance into the path of immorality, is, in a sense, unnatural. This demonstrates the ingratitude of the agent. How can the offspring be void of natural affection to the stock? Affection that is efficient to prompt to works of justice? Sympathy lessens in proportion to the unlikeness of its object in age, appearance, moving, and peculiarities of habits. It is very useful therefore in many cases, for the parent or instructor to exhibit the appearance of juvenile habits. This may awaken the strongest impulses of sympathy. After all has been said of ingratitude, children are not so heinously ungrateful as is generally imagined. Free rational agents, they frame schemes and views for themselves. They plot: peradventure, too early; Care should be taken that there be not admitted them large and splendid views of life; nor too rapid openings of science, which may carry their feelings above the comparatively little concerns of

their real condition. They view their parents as all other bystanders, equal agents capable of benefiting and of annoying their darling purposes. They cannot pointedly persecute, or feel indifferent to, those parents in the character of authors and preservers of their being. They are not ungrateful to them as *authors* and *preservers*. They have not in their minds the contemplation of those characters. Ingratitude in *them*, is neglect and avoidance of reflection on what they ought to be reflecting on. It is the character of that want of thoughtfulness and sedate observance of natural impressions, according to the design of nature : a want of thought ; a neglect of pursuing and cherishing certain sentiments. The whole may be generally traced to natural causes in the managery of their nurture : a pretermission of which, is calculating upon extraordinary force of sympathy and energy of virtue in youth. But when they get into years of manhood, there is little excuse for them if they will not cultivate a tender advertence to the weal of their parents ; for justice cannot grow on such soil. They can scarcely be disinterestedly just or honorable. A parent is cruelly contristated by the perception of the ingratitude of a child. The child is not sensible of this : nor is the parent sensible of this insensibility and ignorance of the child ; but feels a persuasion that he acts with absolute malignity. Perhaps this is one of the greatest evils under the sun. It is the most grievous calamity that betides human society. Reflect on this, children of all ages ! Consider this coincidence of circumstances, flowing out of the nature of things ! the source of the keenest, most inconsolable grief incident to humanity ! Consider the pains, the watchings, your parents have experienced for you in your helpless state ; the tender cares, the anxious solicitude they felt for your weal ; the griefs for your afflictions and dangers ; their complacent hopes, their enchanting

anticipations of your virtue, peace, and honorable enjoyment of the stage of social life; and how great a part of their own happiness hung upon the consideration of your future consequence and well being! Let it not have been altogether visionary. Poison not the haunts of serene pleasure by blasting such reasonable hopes, and wildly frustrating those pleasing schemes that grow out of natural affection. Let not the placid emotions nature has interlocked with the tender scene of the domestic relations, be harrowed up by the abrupt intervention of so contristating a disappointment: It casts a gloom over the whole face of the social stage! Look at the brute creation. Look at the stork of the wilderness! Look at the untutored savage! Is not this an institution of nature? That power that directs the organiz'd race to seek the continuation of their existence, institutes gratitude. It annexes the obligation of gratitude to the relation of offspring to stock.

Secondly. Books are another kind of institutes, I shall next notice. The world is overloaded with books of all descriptions; of which, few deserve the name of institutes by their serviceableness towards their proper end. Some are calculated to vitiate rather than improve education: to promote bad rather than good education. Romances, tales, polemic tracts of the ecclesiastics, rituals, and works treating of spiritual beings, are those which have the most flimsy pretences to the promotion of human improvement. The books which most concinnously wear the title of institutes, are systematical treatises of sciences and arts, containing maxims and rules to teach knowledge and method: such as systems of arithmetic, grammar, natural philosophy, morality, medicine, mechanics, &c. The greatest defect noticeable in these things, in general, is a want of natural order. Perhaps a reformation of language would go far towards remedying

this; since a diversity in the use of words, making the same word stand for various ideas, and again, on the other hand, the same idea to be denoted by various words, introduces great confusion, and seeming deviation from fixed principles in the constitution of nature whereon aspire the structures of human science. If men should be conducted by that gentle gradation wherewith the constituent ideas that make up any section of knowledge, are progressively engendered, under a due proportional, unbiassed appropriation of their natural powers (and afterwards arranged according to their use and bearings, into their specific departments of learning) they would be trained to the most apt and successful way of communicating. Men are not accomplished to teach, till they understand the very rise of their subject, and the trains whereby their own apprehension compassed an acquaintance with its bearings. Thus, if an institute of arithmetic should begin with the formation of the idea of number;—of grammar, with the origin of sound and its designation by visible objects, thence proceeding to the several ways of articulating, and the parts exerted, to produce each sound;—of astronomy, with the principles of the rules for deducing true quantities from assumed ones by way of a relation that objects magnified by glasses, have, to measured ones seen by the naked eye;—how much more agreeable to the gradation eminent throughout the works of nature! This, while it spreads the foundation of a particular science, beyond the exact limits of that science itself, gives an abstract view of the more general division it belongs to, and shews its connections; a repetition of which sort of views, increases the capacity of the understanding. Learners from institutes, must begin with the most simple. The most simple ideas, of a system, are the most abstracted ones;—as being, substance, manner, succession, whiteness, hardness, sound, motion, &c. The most natural

division of human science and art, I suppose to be that which under the term philosophy, disposes all the objects of our speculation into three branches, which are called natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and rational philosophy. Natural philosophy teaches the knowledge of substances, their relations, properties, powers, affections, and operations, as number, figure, motion, &c. Moral philosophy is the science of finding out such rules and measures to the voluntary actions of men as tend to happiness in general, and to the accomplishment of their desired ends in particular. Rational philosophy embraces the nature, use, and proper arrangement and modification, of those signs employed by intelligent creatures in getting the knowledge of things; forming opinions which may be influential on their moral conduct; and in communicating their thoughts one to another. Now the condition of men being such as to necessarily involve these several sorts of knowledge, it is indispensable that some institutes within the scope of any of these branches, participate of the principles essential to those belonging to another: as an institute of morality partakes of physic and metaphysic. And, again, one particular science, of those of another: as an institute of geography interferes with astronomy. Consequently sciences are classed according to their *drift*, as it comports with the general design of those departments whereunder they are ranked. But above all, natural philosophy contains the primordial ingredients of all other science and art whatever. It is immediately connected with the nature of man, a knowledge of the active and passive power of whose whole system, is indispensable to the finishing of this. So, a system of ethics, which being built on, requisitely includes, the several discriminative ideas of the constitution of human nature, falls under that distinct branch called moral philosophy; because the uniform

receptory aim, both in the case of the particular and the general instance of its appropriation, is the direction of mankind's voluntary actions by certain modifications towards the universal goal of all intelligent purposes; the subsidiary views of men, or the prime design of nature to preserve and happify the members of her family.

Now these heads are conspicuously distinct; and I know of no other predicamental distribution of these sorts of objects, that is perfectly so. 'For there is nothing that can employ our thoughts, or any way impress our mind, but 1st. Things as they are, metaphysically, in themselves; substances whether material or immaterial, with their properties, affections, and relations; 2d. That which dependant rational intelligences, like ourselves, may or ought to do, in order to obtain their ends; or 3d. The signs which they make use of, in both the one and the other of these, which are ideas, which are the signs of things;* and articulate sounds, figures, motions, and colours; which are the designed signs of ideas. Natural philosophy comprehends three general divisions, which may be called *metaphysic*, *physic*, and *history*. Metaphysic is the science of beings, abstract from the consideration of their efficient operation; realities as they stand in relation to our apprehensive capacity, and inactive. Physic is the science of causes and effects (instituted in the constitution of matter;) and proportional relation. History is that part of natural philosophy which embraces so much of the knowledge of things as that of their exterior modalities exclusive of the consideration of their relative powers and operations;—as their figure, dimensions, colour, and relative situations; and also the distinguishing points of fleeting existence, considered barely as evanescent appearances in rela-

* Locke.

tion to time and place ; as the actions of living beings, &c.

Metaphysic has been divided into six parts, called 1, *ontology*, or the doctrine of the general essence of all beings and their essential attributes considered a priori : 2, *cosmology*, the knowledge of the essence of the world and all it contains ; 3, *anthropology*, the knowledge of man, in his parts and properties, considered as a distinct species of being ; 4, *psycology* or knowledge of soul in general, and of the soul of man in particular ; 5, *pneumatology* the theory of separate spirits, as angels, &c ; and 6, *theodicy*, or the doctrine of the existence of God, his attributes and perfections. Physic is divided into chymistry, physiology, optics, medicine, music ; arithmetic, geometry, mechanics ; meteorology and astronomy. History may be divided into geography ; natural history ; biography ; general history or history of nations, communities, kingdoms, states, empires, ages ; and adventitious history, as history of wars, expeditions, &c., and this is mixed of the two former, implicating the actions of individuals and of collections. These three last are sometimes call'd moral history, in contradistinction to geography and natural history.

Moral philosophy is divided into ethics and handicraft. Ethics is either sublime or formulary. The former teaches the true metaphysical aspects of sympathy, obligation, passion, will, and voluntary movements, and their causes and effects founded in the constitution of nature : the latter, ceremonies and methods, that, applicatory of the science to the purpose of human happiness, constitute the duties of life. Handicraft comprises all the rules and designs of mechanic arts, to exercise and employ the organs and powers of men for the procurement of a livelihood, or promoting the improvement of parts.

Rational philosophy comprehends logic, grammar, and rhetoric. I do not conceive why music, which consisting altogether of ideas of sounds and their relations, all which sounds and relations are partly by nature and partly by general consent, made to stand for certain thoughts and feelings, the whole import of the science being involved in this same significancy, can mean little else than doctrine of signs, does not deserve to be ranked in this department of lore.

Chymistry discloses and distinguishes the elements of all material beings; the changes they are capable of; their relative properties and efficiency; and shews how one body may be changed into another species, by cassating some of its secondary qualities and supplying others.

Physiology investigates the constitutions of living organized beings, and explains their powers; and comprehends anatomy a description of the structure and parts of animal bodies; the skill of the several measures and principles whereby they perform their motions; and that metaphysic which treats of the operations of cogitative substances. Now, if ideas be motions of sensitive matter, and if the only thinking intelligent beings we have any real knowledge of, be animals, I see not why what science under the ancient predicament of metaphysic, had for its province mind, and whose scope was to illustrate the operations and affections of thinking beings, is not properly included in this branch. For all motion of sensitive matter as a part of an organiz'd system, falls of course within the province and scope of physiology. Since metaphysic seems to be nothing other, effectually, than what constitutes the proper, necessary objects of all and any sort of science, considered abstractedly from all peculiar application and operation; and in a word, the science of abstract ideas; metaphysic may be a part of every science; or rather it is but a form and cha-

racter into which every one may be thrown, a sublime view of being. Vegetable organization, also, as well as animal, comes under the consideration of physiology.

Optics is a science that discloses the nature and laws of vision; and partakes of meteorology and physiology, as light and the organ of seeing, are its primordial ideas.

Medicine explains the phenomena of diseases incident to the bodies of animals; and the powers and effects of several other bodies on these, in relation to such diseases, and applied as remedies,—this part is called *materia medica*. This science partakes of chymistry, natural history, and physiology.

Music considered as a physical science, is otherwise *harmonics*, the skill of harmony; shewing the relations of sounds, and the laws and measures whereby their combinations produce certain effects.

Arithmetic contemplates merely the nature and uses of number; and treats of the characters whereby its several variations are designated, and the ways for applying its diversification inductively, for the discovery of truth.

Geometry explains the phenomena and proportions of figure; its modes and relations.

Mechanics shews us the laws of communicated motion; the proportional mobility of bodies; and the measures and degrees whereby force may be convey'd and applied from one body to another. This includes statics. Meteorology is the science that explains the nature and causes of the several sorts of meteors that make their appearance about our globe; which are either aerial, aqueous, igneous, or mixed: the principal whereof are the atmosphere and the several sorts of air as far as electrical fluid, wind, or current of air, hurricanes, whirlwinds, thunder; exhalations, dew, fogs, mists, rain, waterspouts, frost, sleet, hail, snow; light, ignis-

fatuus, falling stars, lightning, earthquakes, aurora borealis ; clouds, rainbows, parhelions, halos.

Astronomy treats of the motions, magnitudes, distances, figures, relative operations and influences of the great bodies of the world ; as suns, planets, comets.

Geography describes the surface of the globe, its several natural and artificial divisions, its lakes, rivers, mountains, states, kingdoms, &c. ; and is distinguishable into three sorts, as it participates of astronomy, natural history, and moral history.

Natural history defines the several fixtures and dependencies of the earth we inhabit ; and is divided into zoology, a description of animals ; botany a description of vegetables ; and mineralogy a description of stones, fossils, minerals, metals, earths, &c.

Biography describes the trains of particular persons' actions, and the incidents immediately connected therewith.

General history describes those of communities of men ; tribes, nations, &c. Adventitious history is confined to the consideration of particular enterprizes or courses of events, which are determinate. As wars, voyages, journies, embassies, expeditions, plagues, fevers.

These varieties of history, although their ingredients may seem to be objects of assent rather than of knowledge, are class'd among the sciences because these things are supposed to be real, what others have actually known making up a great part of the stock. In short, moral history no farther belongs to the physical department of philosophy than its objects are considered matters of speculative truth ; which are events taken place, and their periods, and either the relative points of duration, which mark noticeable occurrences, the registry whereof is called chronology ; the actions of particular persons, called biography ; or the transactions of bodies of men, fortune of nations, &c. most

ly called general history. As a branch of rational philosophy, it is description; particular use of signs to display those objects; which itself being made an object of our speculation, falls under the consideration of rhetoric.

Ethics treats of will, volition and its motives, liberty, obligation; and explains the active and passive powers of man, as they concern the modification of his duties.

Sublime ethics is an abstract consideration of the active and passive powers of men, as free intelligent agents, and the physical tendency of their voluntary actions, from which it deduces their obligation. Formulaary ethics searches out the right modes of these actions as means to attain the greatest good; as virtuous habits: and to this scope, explains laws, precepts, and exercises to good measures. Out of these two, are framed the science and art of education.

Handicraft comprises the secrets of the measures of all those arts used for the subsistence and entertainment of mankind. Of these arts, are two kinds: sublime arts and mechanic arts. The sublime arts are alchymy, poetry, music, oratory, painting, sculpture, architecture, navigation, reasoning.

The mechanic arts, are hunting, clothing, husbandry, surveying, printing, smithery, engraving, building, cooking, penmanship, and innumerable others.

Logic teaches the art of reasoning, and rightly arranging ideas and words, so far as concerned in the establishment of truth. It comprehends description and arrangement of the materials of all our knowledge and opinion, which are ideas, the signs that to our understandings represent things; likewise several operations of the mind; and is, in institutes, generally divided into four parts, which are called "simple apprehension, judgment, reason, and method."

Grammar contemplates the nature of articulate

language, its progressive formation, its customary modes, and its propriety.

Rhetoric is the science of expression. It has two parts: expression of feeling and expression of thoughts. To this end, it considers the definition of words, and several modes of motion and sound fitted to display and excite certain sentiments and emotions.

Civilized nations are possessed of several valuable institutes in natural, moral, and rational philosophy. Some of the best whereof, under the first head, are Euclid's, elements of geometry, Newton's, Locke's, and Darwin's works. Under the second, Smith's theory of moral sentiments, Seneca's morals, Tully's offices, Hutchinson's system of morality, economy of human life, the proverbs of Solomon, and the preachings of Jesus Christ and the Apostles. And under the last, Tooke's diversions of Purley, Perry's and Murray's grammatical works and selections; Duncan's logic, Bailey's and Johnson's dictionaries.

Now since knowledge of these several sorts, is promiscuously induced; is impossible to be otherwise than that learners come at knowledge in either of these diverse predicaments with irregular alternations, because the scenes of this stage of our existence, are in perpetual fluctuation: but there is a train which instructors can maintain by skill and art; a train of means, and exercises of mind, may be kept up by skill and art, that substantiates a sort of uniform scale of education. Yet natural philosophy is the foundation of all other science. The knowledge of *things physically*, must constitute the basis of all digests of knowledge and art. All systems necessarily have such ideas and combinations of ideas as are essentially discriminative of our speculative knowledge of natural existence, for their fundamental maxims. Therefore an initiation in natural philosophy, is an indispensable prerequisite to the digesting of the materials of

any class, order, kind, or sort of knowledge, into institutes or scales of doctrine. Consequently although institutes of grammar are the first we make use of (of this kind) to teach children, yet this is not the first knowledge they get : much physical knowledge is previously stowed into their little heads. Yet the first literary institute required and properly employed about education, is that of language. One of the best of this sort Englishmen were acquainted with, was drawn up by one William Perry, who furnished a clear and easy method to initiate and train children in the use of the accustomed articulation of his countrymen's language. This system has been improved by Lindley Murray. The only perfect system would be none short of, that which should afford a distinct character to every distinct sound that is made by application of the organs of articulation. Thus, written words would have a regular formation, and a natural expression. Nothing more indubitably evinces the imbecile and childish manner men engendered knowledge and art, than their awkward shift of making one character do the office of a diverse representation, and another, that of one uniform sound. This shews how irregularly and slowly they blundered into what improvements they got ; and likewise how inveterately tenacious they are of inured manners. If men had made regular progress in improvement—i. e. in discovery and invention, by way of perseverance and forecast, they would certainly have form'd their expressions according to the natural powers of things. There is consideration of every particular sound produced by the articulating organs, as marking the difference of one word from another, and what is more rational than to denote this sound by a separate character? Darwin, an English philosopher, offered a scheme of natural representation : also, Kneeland, an American, a similar improvement : but such is the predominance of custom, and

such the inveterate fixure in the vulgar mind, of the association of the *form* with the *import* of so accumulated a body of literature as is infolded in a palliament which is spun out of that irregular stuff; that it is supposed to be impracticable to change the alphabet of any nation. As soon as the child is able to form syllables into words, give them their proper sound, and can understand some easy words, we put into his hands little moral institutes, contrived to insinuate by similitude and endearing description of example, the spirit of benignant principles. Care should be taken how these are written. A prevailing error is, the admitting of too many romantic images, which accustoming the understanding to fantastical ideas, carry the affections beyond realities of nature, in this chequer'd state of mediocrity. The next thing is an institute of arithmetic. But very little proficiency can be attain'd in this branch, before the mind of the tyro being capable of discerning and comparing the modes of articulate language as it is represented by printed or written characters, it is proper to initiate him in etymology and syntax. After this he should complete the circuit of arithmetic. Next, geography should be learn'd. Next to this, institutes of logic and rhetoric are appropriate. Note this; during the progress through all other sciences, ethics should be kept close and true to the understanding; it being that which applies its measures to all parts of the employment of our time. It is the science of sciences. It devises and directs the appropriation of all sciences and arts whatever. Morality, (says Mr. Locke,) is the great business of mankind. Moral philosophy undoubtedly comprehends the first essential concerns of education. Gradual institutes of this sort, must be successively applied, with scrupulous reference to the weal of the rational intelligence. Of so great importance is this, that if the spirit of morality be lost from the channel

of *physical* and *rational* lore, other science usually proves a curse instead of a blessing, to the social stage. It is medicine without skill, which cannot minister health, but destruction: machinery without motion, which only encumbers the domestic field, and precludes other advantages without superinducing any benefit.

I have noticed a defect in institutes in the want of natural order of system, which, by a predicamental arrangement of the several ideas that being progressively traced out by the inquiring mind, go to make up the body of a science, derives each from its genuine base and primordial; and elucidates the progressive steps of the intellect, in gathering its ascendant views of nature. I shall now take notice of two other defects conspicuous in several institutes extant;—1. A want of succinctness;—2. A want of uniformity of expression.

1. The excellent advantages coming from succinct and comprehensive presentments, are acknowledged on all hands. Not only can the maxims be the longer retained within the memory; but more can be at once comprehended *in memory*. In all practical systems especially, this ought to be studied, as being a thing indispensable. Less time is taken up in communication, and there is less diversion of attention from the subject belonging to the design: so that it gives life and force to all conveyances of thoughts. Many of our writers of practical tracts on the sciences, to whom the schools look as to standards of instruction, have been too circuitous and verbose; and interposing an amusing display of general knowledge or eminent genius, neglected the study of this inestimable art of representing much in small compass.

2. Uniformity in the use of words, in the several systems made use of either, successively by the same persons, or of the same kind in different parts of the

community, is of great consequence in the regulation of habits of thinking and arguing. Men are in the habits of using the same word in different places to signify different ideas; and also of denoting the same idea by various words. Sometimes this is done in one individual treatise, and then it is hardly tolerable unless the writer do therein explain the use of his word every time he applies it in a sense different from common usage or from what he had previously used it in. This is the only way men can be excused for using the words of their own country's language contrarily to common propriety, and the only way their writing can be made intelligible at all.

Thirdly. Another kind of institute is a seminary. A seminary is constituted of—1st. A determinate space that includes a commodious station for the assembling of a number of individual persons for the purpose of initiation in arts and sciences, by methodical exercises, and application of books; 2d, select persons, deputed as tutors, to explain the books and supervise those exercises; and 3d, certain laws which are of two sorts: 1, such as regulate the proceedings within the seminary and prescribe the conduct of the attendants: 2, such as stipulate the appointment and sustenance of the instructors and the location and furnishing of the school, instituted either by bodies politic or vicarious boards qualified for such institution. There are three sorts of seminaries. First, universities and incorporate schools; secondly, common public schools for the first principles of language, and accomplishments for ordinary life; thirdly, private schools kept by jobbers in the occupation. Seminaries of the first class, are either *colleges* designed for teaching the whole circle of human science; or what are called *academies* used to prepare students for the former. There are deficiencies in the constitutions and use of these institutes.

First; in those of universities may be observed considerable failings, as

1st. In the measures of the provision for supporting the establishments; which make the terms of individuals' instruction expensive; so that none but the favorites of fortune can have the benefit of college-education. This gives an aristocratical appearance to such institutions. "Full many a gem of purest ray serene, the dark unfathom'd caves of ocean bear," says the poet Gray; and there is little doubt that several bright and philanthropic genios are lost to the world, in obscurity, by penury. Many intelligences with excellent natural qualities and great capacities, are precluded from the pleasure of such communicative operations as would, haply, have enlightened and ameliorated societies of mankind, and adorn'd and charm'd the stage of civil life. Little does the commonalty imagine how this monopoly of the medium to general improvement in science by the wealthy, favors that spirit of aristocracy which so abusively prevails in governments. Men thinking that none can be possessed of the secrets of the sciences and arts but those who command great pecuniary resources, look for standards among the pageant inheritors of this world's pelf; and, from looking for standards, they come to look to the same quarter for rulers. This is a consequence that is natural, and very obviously susceptible to a course of reasoning from such principles, however fallacious. Millions of property lie dormant in the clutches of misers; and worse than dormant in the hands of the harlequins of pageantry, and the panders of destroying luxury, which, being appropriated to the support of seminaries, would yield a common benefit to republican communities, and advance the cause of philanthropy by making that to be the free and equal advantage of all the natural pre-eminentences in the constitution of humanity, whether found

among the poor or rich, instead of being monopolized by the favourites of fortune, which otherwise was the immunity of the latter. A trifling taxation would, methinks, in addition to the funds already engendered, with what of that kind would supervene, be sufficient to render all manner of seminaries free. The universal freedom of seminaries is a desideratum which would redound to the honor of human nature, in the melioration of civil society; and I believe it is a thing essential to the only medium wherein we are to rise to a spirit of universal peace, whereby the true design and principles of Jesus Christ's doctrine shall prevail over all corrupt systems; to the introduction of that halcyon period wherein all mankind shall live like brethren, and be linked together in the bonds of charity from one end of the world to the other.

2dly. In the laws and regulations which modify the operations of the school, the secret of keeping alive the spirit of moral principles is not critically improved, by a skilful adherence to all laudable mechanical measures and recourses that tend to impress the importance of, and habituate moral virtue. Too much libertinism is yet to be deprecated as being suffered to prevail among the members of our seminaries. Moral exercises should be attended daily, and that without their being marred by any taint of superstition. Again: in the timing and arrangement of studies which scholars are employed about in these seminaries, there is fault which has operated much against the interest of philanthropy in the fit habilitation of human intelligences. It is rational to conclude that a man's occupation which is to characterize his future condition or station in life, as matter of subsistence or eminence, ought to be decidedly pitched upon before he goes to college; and that the choice of the studies he goes there to spend his time about, should follow that choice: that those studies in which the vigour of

a man's thoughts is to be elicited, in the prime of the strength of his parts, should concern those departments of human science and art, of which he is to make practical application in his future part on the stage of active life, and other speculations which are not immediately connected with such, should only be taken up by the bye, as improvement of leisure, or in fact, as matter of entertainment or diversion, which may be done at any intervals after he has gone out of college. For example; if a man be designed for a mere metaphysician, a speculative philosopher (whose labors of mind may yet be very extensively serviceable to humankind by analysing the system of natural being, to the exposing of the true principles of social purposes;) his attention should be more particularly drawn to the compass of letter'd philosophy extant in that channel of human speculation; but separate systems handled only as subsidiary things to those views which may pertain to that capacity or office of his destined existence on the stage of life. Thus, if another design himself for the profession of a practical physician; his main business is with medical, chymical, meteorological books, and books in natural history, to become intimately acquainted with whatever lights have been elicited in the tracks of literature, upon the intricate concerns of that science which discovers diseases and their cures; and, to this end, with the several properties of the human body, as well as of other bodies, relative to this.

This is the subject which he should dwell on most intently, and make his chief theme of contemplation; and other systems which cannot subserve this scope, should not be pursued as matters of indispensable accomplishments to the man, any more than of any other private citizen without profession; all which common accomplishments he is supposed to be possess'd of anterior to, and independently of, his resort

to a public seminary; or which at least he can acquire at any interval of leisure so far as they depend on literature. Whereas on the contrary, we find certain set compasses of systems are used to be allotted as the stints of collegians, to which boundaries having advanced by an irksome round of constrained attention and repetition, they are considered worthy of what are called *degrees*, and are dubbed doctors of laws, masters of arts, &c. as if it were an ordinary thing for any one human creature to be capable of being master of *all* arts, or even of the whole of those which are commonly call'd *liberal* arts: Whereas the same person can scarcely be a finished adept in more than *one*, in this fleeting life! All these superfluous accomplishments in systems beside the main pursuit of his active life, are but the transient glitter of the butterfly's attire, that are to set him off in the short season of his college-career, for which he is never after distinguished in busy life; so that it is but stuffing his head with arts which he means to forget, or is at least necessary for him to forget if he be ever useful in any single department. It is making serious matter of acquiring such things as he is never to make use of; but, after the flitting shine of college parades, to be abandoned to the chaos of oblivion. Diversions of some sort, are necessary. The mind requires relaxation as well as the body. Diverse views rest and recruit the intellectual eye, as well as the animal organs of vision. But to give up whole days, whole weeks, nay whole months, to the intent pursuit of themes which are never to concern or interest (immediately) the essential business of life, pertaining to a man's station on the stage of society, is absolute perversion of power and privilege. For, what is more idle than to lavish so much time, to spend week after week of that portion of a man's life which he sets out to appropriate to the purpose of acquiring some valuable habilitation in

knowledge, aptness, or art, which may distinguish him with the privilege of some useful ascendancy in active life, to the setting himself out by a temporary distinction in those attainments which he is never after to make any practical use of? If all our scholars should go *seriously* to college, deliberately intent on some worthy pursuit, and when they got there should confine their attention to those departments of speculation which they went there to distinguish themselves in, and intended to put in practice in future life, so far as to make them their serious business from day to day, whereon the energy of their maturest thoughts was to be exerted, whereby every diverse view might be balanced in its proper point of subsidiary use; I am apt to imagine we should have more able and better accomplished statesmen, more skilful physicians, chymists, moralists, meteorologists, and in fact greater adepts in every liberal art, than we have. If seven years be reckoned hardly enough time to perfect a man in one of the mechanic arts, I see not why it should not be thought *little* enough to make him perfect master of one of the liberal arts and sciences, of so sublime a nature and extensive concern as that of medicine. Again: too much stress is laid on the study of the dead languages: which languages, in fact, it is impossible to attain a correct pronunciation of; and in the next place are no longer of any further use than to read and translate the most useful books written in those languages; the latter of which being already done, and the power of doing the former being to be acquired at the leisure which every prudent freeman's life affords, there is no need of spending so much time over them as there is spent in our colleges and academies. For I cannot conceive any other use to the learning of dead language than the gathering of what those extinct nations who us'd that language, discover'd in arts and sciences, beyond and above what

the moderns have discover'd : which being now no very enormous task, and the thinking part of the world not having been wholly idle for seven or eight hundred years past, and listless of such a research, the most of that kind of literal arcana is made pretty conspicuous to all polished civilized nations.

The same observations are in some proportion applicable to academies as to other universities; with this difference, that much about the whole time of the pupils in those schools, is taken up in speculation about language that never is to be used; and is thought essential to their "fitting for college" to be thoroughly versed in the grammars and idioms of those languages which have been out of use for ages; which now can be put to no other serious purpose than the ascertaining of the ideas the ancient speakers of those languages had, which we have not. It seems as if there were something more important to engage the thoughts of young persons than the peculiar forms of language which nations now dead, spoke a thousand years ago. Some knowledge of those languages indeed is very convenient, by the laying open of the roots of those foreign words which have been derived therefrom into ours, and thro' the successive vicissitudes of men's customs and habits, have received a variety of modification and meaning; to subserve a diversity and elegance of style, as well as to amuse. But a critical knowledge of their grammar rules, has no active application but the translating of them into living language: and I think that for a general maxim, we may admit that it is even eligible for a man to think for himself, rather than be at the pains to dig up the thoughts of those who are dead, out of the rubbish and ruins of ages, where mankind of every nation has progressively fluctuated from one use of words to another, and perhaps every language on earth ever did, and is ever likely to, undergo almost a total revolution in 300 years; not in the general

idioms and specific modes of framing propositions, but in the forms and powers of its individual elements whereof those propositions are made up. I am in a fairer way to get knowledge and art by applying my faculties of thinking to the meditation of things, than by moiling in translation to grub the thoughts of others out of a foreign language. Thoughts are not at so formidable a par : they may be commanded at a cheaper rate. It may be said that the Latin and Greek languages are exquisitely musical, and charm by their harmonious structure and the peculiarly expressive associations they bring into view. I grant they are particularly pleasing and entertaining, and they amuse by their ingenious frame, such as speculate in them : but, for combinations of sound, I am apt to think one can find full as much real musick in Handel's and Madan's harmony as in the Latin and Greek languages. Howbeit, I cannot conceive how the philological constructing of those dead languages can materially advance the knowledge of metaphysical truth, any otherwise than, as mere objects, the words they consist of, and their modes, may afford such knowledge. The like common neglect of morality prevails, as in other schools. I say neglect, as in effect it is a privation of perfect principles, by way of erroneous measures with the ostensible design of supporting and advancing good morals ; which fail of doing it by reason of the interference of superstition, hypocrisy, inconstancy, worldliness, vanity, or some other impediments, and the reverse character is interposed in its stead. To instil good moral principles into youth, and to accomplish them with good characters, is a secret which requires aptness and skill to put into effectual application. There is a settled course of means instituted in the very constitution of nature, leading to this important result.

Secondly. In the next place, our common public schools claim our notice ; wherein may be observed

many defects that make them imperfectly contributory to their contemplated end: as 1st. *In the very laws which institute and prescribe their support.* In those polished portions of civil society, which have attained to the projection of this advanced utility, those laws enjoining upon towns the maintainance of schools during given parts of the year, yet fall short of enforcing the appropriation of a certain amount of taxes to that purpose: which indeed were essential to the only effectual means of securing profitable schools; and were sufficient of itself, without prescribing *time*, since on the one hand it stands with the interest of societies to obtain for *this* as great a part of a year's teaching as they can get (if it be confined to this sort of appropriation,) and on the other, affords encouragement enough to worthy characters in the profession, i. e. skilful, stable, studious, well disposed instructors to give up their time and attention to this critical business, when they can have answerable wages for a considerable number of months together. Whereas *now* being enjoined on pain of forfeiture to keep seminaries open for and during certain number of months, and being left to *their* voice how much money they shall appropriate and set apart to pay the expense of *that*, their schools must of course follow this pattern left for them to be cut out of, and of necessity are liable to be very short or very cheap, either one or the other of which whether is more disgraceful or frustratory to the cause of education, may be questioned. For if societies and parts of towns have but little money allotted them to defray the incidental expenses of keeping their schools, they are yet prone to crave as many months' teaching as they can get for it, that their pupils may make some effectual progress in learning, and from this, run into parsimonious calculations about this delicate business of perpetual consequence to the human race, and exhibit this quality in a place where it is

most odious, nothing being more disgusting to cultivated minds (and such are requisite to educate youth correctly) than niggardliness; which in effect, in this plight, sets off school-societies with the most desparaging figure: Or else the result of their speculations, is a cheap teacher, of course a poor one; or one who being reduced to the alternative by misfortune, being gulled by these speculators in his destitution, never has the excitements of friendship, home, reward, or gratitude, to a full discharge of his duties. On the other hand, being constrained to afford generous pay, it can last but a short time; and, supporting a school but two or three months in a year [and why are not those scattered children who inhabit districts which afford a smaller number of pupils than others, and certainly they stand in need of as much tutoring to initiate and discipline them, worthy of as great a privilege in the access to schools, as those who happen to be born in more populous Districts? and by what system of economy can an instructor afford to spend his time over twenty pupils cheaper than he can over fifty?] the pupils make, in general, but small advancement, and directly forget what acquests they *had* compassed, before the year comes about, which the cares and pleasures where-with they are beset, suffer not to be resuscitated in their minds: and the consequence of the whole is, that in respect to literary accomplishments, they remain stationary. But perhaps we ought not to complain of the best things we have got:—it is but a small part of the civilized world, which has yet adventured to support free schools by equal taxation. But a small part of this republic has become so far the subject of liberal sentiments as to be induced to adopt this philanthropic measure, whereby education being pursued purely as an expedient belonging to the public interest, is made as freely accessible to the poor as to the rich members of the community; which in fact is as

consequential to the general weal ; for a poor man is capable of doing as much evil, and possibly, good, to society as the rich (if we look candidly into these relations ;) and is of equal importance to the general interest of a republic that the mind of every one of its members be improved. Yet I fancy there is no harm in mentioning those steps wherein mankind appear to have err'd, the respects and degrees in which they conspicuously fall short of perfection ; for it is the lamp of their own errors that must eventually conduct them into the right path : for till a man see that he has err'd, he cannot purpose rectification ; and till he know wherein he has err'd, he cannot correct his conduct. There is another thing men fall out in, with regard to extending the advantages of public schools, and that is their way of administering those laws and prescripts they have before them, for their guide in this behalf, in towns and corporations. These societies very generally do not appropriate money enough annually to afford a competent remuneration to instructors for giving their time and talents to the superintendence of their schools. Because, forsooth, the civil authorities of the commonwealth have not enjoin'd and bound them to lay out a certain sum each year for education of their children, they no longer incline to do what they are not compelled to do ; but cramp this part of their expenses, out of a base niggardliness to the cause of intellectual nurture, which fosters the best interest of all classes of men. They appropriate a sum that is not sufficient to reasonably compensate well qualified persons to tutor their youth for a sufficient number of months in the year, through all parts of their jurisdiction. The inhabitants of a town resolve upon laying out a certain sum to support a periodical teacher of piety, religion, and morality ; a certain sum to support the 'poor ;' other sums to repair public ways, buildings, &c. ; and give their voice to raise a certain

sum to maintain schools; and *this* they are apt to cut short: surely they do not contemplate a very liberal subsistence to their agents in the business carried on in those schools. In the next place, when they have set out this fund, they are used to distribute it rather unequally among the several districts which for the purpose of disseminating the means of instruction, they divide their town or plantation into. They have a custom of giving the greatest share to the central part of their town, as if youth ought to be more learned in the centre or most public part of a town than in the skirts. They likewise use to proportion this distribution among the others according to the numbers of children or of inhabitants in the respective districts, as if a small number of children did not need as skilful and capable an instructor and as many months' teaching, as a large number. Perhaps a little less time will serve, when things are manag'd aright; yet what teacher can afford to spend a month in attendance upon twenty pupils for a less compensation than he can upon sixty? It is true a few children in collection, can learn more in a given time, than a large number, by the intervention of the concurrence of these circumstances following:—studiousness in the children, faithfulness in the teacher, and, what originates the former and supports the latter of these, judiciousness in the parents. This concurrence is precarious; and is seldom recognized by any effectual influence on the proportion the time a small number requires to progress to the same degree of proficiency in the arts and sciences of life, bears to that which is required by a more numerous body. Again; it is a notorious fact, if young learners gather much in a short time, they are liable to lose it in a short interval while they recede totally from the scene of mental discipline: so that upon the whole, it is evident that if one collection of

youth needs a constant school, *another* does, without any regard to their numbers.

Such a distribution as I have above noticed, which will be found to be pretty generally accustomed thro' those parts of civil society which are so far civilized as to make a public concern of education, has aristocracy upon the very face of it. But it is said, those neighborhoods who possessing the greatest share of wealth in the jurisdiction, contribute the bulk of the taxes wherefrom the maintainance of schools is drawn, ought to have the benefit of the greatest share, in the distribution: that having *paid* the most, they ought to *receive* the most. This reasoning is purely aristocratical: being no less than saying the rich ought to have more privilege of the public resources than the poor; or, that they ought to have privileges which the poor have not. For it being the popular authority which originated both this *contribution* and *distribution*, and they being an expedient adopted to promote the general good with what pretence to consistency can it be reckoned (as matter of advantage) the property of one individual or of one class of individuals, more than another? for, it is either public advantage or private advantage; and, if the one, cannot be the other. If therefore one man because he is rich, have a title to a greater share of the means of education than another who is poor, those means are no longer public, but partial and conditional, and a man shares the privileges at the disposal of the public authority in proportion as he inherits *private property*: which is repressive of the design of all true morality; since, to aid the cause and scheme of philanthropy, is what essentially discriminates all just administration. The primary end of government being to improve the condition of the human family, by rendering them more secure and comfortable; and this in a general view, unexceptionably, of the *whole*.

There is a man who possesses a million, who pays a tax which goes to the support of the school of his precinct, to the amount of forty-five dollars, and has no child to educate. Also, one mile distant from him, within the same district, is another, who possessing not the means of life, pays no tax at all, that has six children in want of a constant instructor, who actually share the use and benefit of the other's money so far as it is appropriated to the medium of their education. I contend that this is perfectly just, and that the poor man rightfully participates the use of the rich man's money without rendering any thing in direct remuneration for it, while the rich man himself does not: for what signifies public money designed for the benefit of the community, that is to come back to those who have contributed it, and a man in proportion as he is rich in *private* possessions, share the benefit of the appropriation of *this*?

A good thing would be to limit the number of pupils in each school. For a small collection, such as from eighteen to twenty-five, is quite a sufficient number to divide that degree of attention which this subject claims from one man: for there is usually a sufficient variety of temper to be found within these limits, to competently exercise the faculties of a supervisor in discerning and arranging apt means to qualify the inexperienced with good morals and literary accomplishments. Again: in providing situations for these initiating exercises, men have too usually acted upon contracted plans. Their school houses are too small for the purpose. No pain or expense is spared to fit up a palace and to render a parlour where a man of quality and his wife, with occasionally a few intimate favorites and neighbours, are to sit and chat about forms and shadows, not only commodious in every respect, but superlatively elegant. But when a house is to be built and furnished for the entertainment of the children of

all who inhabit a certain district, and all who ever shall inhabit it, who are to attend there yearly and daily for the purpose of being habilitated with the rudiments of the arts of life, very nice calculations are made about the expense. It would seem conclusive, to a strange spectator, that they design'd these huts for some diminutive race of inferior animals, as hens, cats, pigs, or rabbits; instead of abodes for rational beings, where they were to get those knacks and maxims which were indispensable to their well-being in civil life. Indeed we shall find many of this kind, which are not so comfortable as hermits' cells. I have often been pleased with the ingenuity of several societies I have convers'd with, who, apologizing for the scantiness of their school rooms said, that when they first set up buildings of this sort, their children were very small, and there were but few of them. These are the types of men's ideas of education.

A building designed for a seminary ought to be spacious, because persons who crowd, cannot make progress in learning. This is a thing to which tranquillity is absolutely necessary, even independently of the consideration of tempering the mind. Therefore every thing which either directly or indirectly conduces to insure this incident, ought to be added, so far as it can be consistently with the relative condition of the project. Silence, tranquillity, regularity, and harmony, are admirably propitious to study and contemplation. A school house ought to be comfortable to that degree which affords all innocent enjoyments whereby home is made dear. To render books, school exercises, and the situations of them pleasant to children, is a thing more efficient to the interest of mankind in the concern of education, than men are apt generally to think. To this end, a nursery of children and youth, ought to be made as agreeable at least, as their homes are: yet to make them still more agreeable than their homes,

would operate very advantageously as an incitement, on them, to attend punctually and pursue faithfully the means of learning. Consequently, whatever the carpenter, the joiner, or the mason can contribute, that is propitious to the promotion of this desideratum, considerate men will avail themselves of, without grudging. The same partiality we find exhibited in laying out that part of the public resources which is used to defray the expenses of building, as in procuring the *other* means of carrying on the operation of accomplishing youth. Central parts of towns and the most wealthy portions of a society, are thought worthy of the largest, and most commodious and agreeable school-rooms. Another thing wherein the commonality in these sorts of societies, very naturally blunder into some troublesome conjunctures, is their choosing of men for their committees to keep in repair and furnish their school-houses, employ and sustain teachers, &c. by means of the appropriation of the public property assigned for such use, who through either incapacity, ignorance, indifference, or selfishness, abuse or neglect their trust, to the disgrace of communities, and to the injury of children and parents. A method with enlightened folks, is to choose one man in each district to lay out its quota of money for such purposes: and one is enough (in the name of common sense;) for to what good end should such little services be divided among three or four persons, who dwelling at a distance from each other, might only encumber, if not utterly discourage valuable applicants (by referring to and depending on each other to do what belongs to the duty of all;) or, disagreeing among themselves, breed quarrels and animosities between themselves and their neighbours, about the forms and fashions of the means used for so important an object as forming the characters of youth? For the human race is made up of youth, learnt good or evil,

and habitually exhibiting influential specimens of that wherewith they were early impressed. Now what can be more imminently perplexing to this business than deputing agents who are either incapable, or indifferent with regard to direct and efficient methods to effectuate the receptory and ultimate scope of social rationals herein? And what is the difference between an ignorant person, and one indifferent, who without compunction neglects that which all sober persons depend on him to perform? Since a man who knows not what to do, (yet being excuseable) no more disappoints or vacates, than one who knowing what is pertinent, what is best to be done, being capable of bringing all correctly about, out of an overweening regard to his private good, or out of laziness, pride, or spite, utterly neglects it? And what is more natural than that ignorant people should adopt either the one or the other of these sorts of characters, unaware of the consequences? Thus, is owing to the body of the people being ignorant of, and indifferent to, correct means of education, that we experience such disorders in the social world resulting from bad principles and habits engendered in young persons. The mischief which this does, is this: such agents neglect to keep in repair a school-house such as they have; in consequence of which, their school is confused, uncomfortable, of course unprofitable; or else vacant. Also from the same principle of neglect, they employ (very aptly), unfit persons to teach. Hence we observe young, gay, giddy, and coxcomical persons occupying the stations of teachers to our youth;—who by a display of some fashionable foolery or other, as gaming, drinking, dancing, fiddling, gallanting, jesting, profanity, if they avail to teach *some* valuable arts, generally do more hurt than good, by distorting their morals with bad principles. But many others are promoted to this trust for their cheapness, who have

little pretension to skill in any part of what belongs to their office ; novices in arithmetic, in grammar, and such things as are most thought of as the *proposita* of this business. They are chosen out of economy of the people's expense, in the presumptuous calculation on their gathering skill by the way of their exercise in teaching, which sometimes proves to be matter of fact : yet if they be skilful to infuse morals, all other accomplishments might be dispensed with (which yet is the farthest from *their* thoughts whose choicest interest is the most concerned in such a supervision;) but it falls out that those who have taken the steps fit to be good teachers of morality, have not failed of the other accomplishments required in the management of common schools : hence we shall find these ignorant teachers commonly falling as short in *this* as in *other* respects. Others again, although they may possess the requisite habilitation adequate to conducting the business of tuition, are too lazy to put their talents into use ; who, suffering indolency to prevail over their deference to the object of education, feel no concern for the furtherance of the public interest in this particular behalf. Yet *such* agents get such characters into these places as they happen to have the opportunity or the humour to make bargains with. All these things may fall out by mere chance ; since it is not possible that they discern the qualities or foresee the managery of whom they employ, unless they happen to be neighbours or particular acquaintances of them, which is not a case that is universally incident. But, one thing is clear ; if agents be not competent to the examination of teachers, judges of the fit accomplishments of instructors ; it is of little import how the latter sort of characters beat their heads about getting very nice qualifications : at least, if these deputed inspectors be such as have not the art of reading, I see not to what end candidates for this kind of business

carry with them letters of recommendation, in travelling among such societies; as in the round of my observation might be noticed instances of a total aspersion and disuse of this sort of documents, which one might as well be altogether destitute of, were it not for the name of them; which indeed answers more than the substance to those who could not comprehend their purport, even if they could read them. After all, there is not so much to be feared from ignorant committees as depraved ones. Yet, if a fitly qualified person be employed in the department of instruction, a society, frequently, gets quite a circumscribed benefit from his labours. The common people are whimsical in this respect. Therefore the advantage of public instruction is contracted, and schools made trifling, by the following circumstances.

I. In consequence of some economical contrivance or some other occurrence, the teacher is fain to depend for his daily sustenance upon some family with whom his genius does not perfectly accord. It is a subject of regret that professional teachers are not (what were for the honor and advantage of human societies) so far independent as to possess the means of living comfortably out of the reach of the capricious humours of such as they by chance depend on for employment. It falls out, moreover, to be a very usual case that those who being competently endued, habitually inquire for this business, are *poor* and have not established well-furnished homes. I think it some reflection upon societies of civilized men, that this important profession is not so far respected as to yield a competence to a studious life, without the interference of anxious plottings for sustenance.

The worst of it is, it is unavoidably incident that the teacher, especially if unsettled, contracts some tincture of *their* turn of character with whom he lives; which, among the children of this world, being devious

from the genuine views of true philosophy, is apt to carry his thoughts aside from such a track of speculation as is fit to arrange with equanimity and manage with a steady hand the business of his station.

II. Sojourning amongst his employers, his hosts are sometimes inclined to quarrel with him about his habits of regimen, diet, dress, or some trivial incident or other. The children of this world want gain. They grow weary of the trouble and expense of feeding, washing, and the like services they feel chained to, which wear hard on them in the want of that sympathy they have not, with studious persons. From these things come a strong prejudice against such persons: when the subjects of it seek by indirect means to exemplify their aversion;—whence evil minded persons are stirred up to pick flaws in their business, and make disturbance in schools. The students get into their heads, as quick as lightning, a hint of any sort of party, and take active parts, in very insolent forms. So their schools are often made matter of contention between suspicious neighbours, and the channels of useful lore poisoned by babyish antipathies. Besides; a boarding promiscuously with pupils is sometimes unpropitious to education by giving every one a familiarity with its teachers. This familiarity with the person and movement of their teacher, is used differently by different scholars; and though some will not turn it against the account of their proficiency, yet some have their deference intirely overcome by it, and from *not fearing*, come to despise their instructor.

III. People being tenacious of little whimsical peculiarities of methods for managing children, all different in almost every family from those of another, so that an instructor finding it difficult to use a distinct system of treatment with each pupil, and keep a regular school, at the same time entertaining a predilection for a favorite system of his own; eventually

none is well pleased with his manners. From an inordinate attachment to the persons of offspring, too prevalent, people are so imprudently tender of their bodies as to be cruelly suspicious of the means of constraint used by tutors. Some squeamish woman, or uxorious tool of a petticoated tyrant, is generally ready to clapperclaw an austere tutor for striking some favourite pug, and, pestiferously breaking in upon this critical and vexing employ, with indiscriminate slander against a sort of form in punishing (to which is super-added every circumstance of reproachful contumely that may aggravate,) sets the prerogative of the profession at open contempt. These things being suffered to be, discourages the best instructors from persevering in a good system of managery.

IV. The parents in general neglecting to cultivate the art of education at home, and not concurring with good practitioners of the art in those measures they deliberately adopt for the training of their children to knowledge and virtue; which uninterruptedly carried into operation, would not fail to effectuate the desired habilitation. But a variance between tutors and parents, tends to make void the benevolent purposes of public teaching, because it *vitiates* children by cherishing the seeds of insolence, ingratitude, disobedience, &c. That part of education which people are the most universally delinquent in endeavoring to bring forward in their offspring, by their early treatment, is *moral* education. To discern the right methods to radicate true moral principles, and to begin habits of amiable action in adolescent minds, is a delicate piece of work; to apply them aright, a critical duty which implies integrity. We find this wofully shunned. The children of this world are averse to what is serious, if it partake not of mystery. Romance and mystery have the knack to awaken admiration, fear, horror, astonishment, and seem to excite a train of solemn re-

flections: but any thing whose prime and immediate use is the application of their powers to some business which may be necessary to be repeated, they have a fixed antipathy to. Therefore our children grow into youth without being tutored to those amiable duties which would make them a source of comfort and delight to all around them. To improve constraint, and make it effectual by repetition and attention, fences with their love of the children's persons, and their love of ease. And now this gentry of ten or twelve years' standing, are troublesome scholars; for, not accustomed to restraint, they ill brook the trammels of such rules as are proper for the regulation of a school. To reduce such to peaceful subordination, is out of the question without the concurrence of their parents; and even *with* it, is generally an almost insurmountable task to reverse, at this period, all the bad habits which have got footing in the reign of licentiousness; to effectuate restraint; and at the same time to make study so pleasing as to insure proficiency: yet it is never too late to set about the pursuit of rectitude. The greater the difficulty arising from inveteracy, the greater the urgency of reformation. This humoursome dotage on the bodies of children, which makes people irreconcilable to coercive correction, is that which strikes at the essential roots of rectification. And this it is which makes the occupation of a public tutor to a common school, the most capricious, perplexing, and unthankful office in the world. For the common people's children are trained in such a careless manner that there is no living with them in any peace without correcting them; and the parents are so whimsically suspicious of the oppression of their darlings under the hands of those of whom they use themselves to entertain diminutive ideas, that there is no living in comfort if they *do* correct them. Therefore education should begin at home. Those principles which we

conscientiously wish other public tutors to cultivate, we ought carefully to plant as soon as the soil is fit to receive them. The earlier this is done, the easier and more prosperous the cultivation is. Whereas when this soil is left to engender all manner of noisome and worthless weeds, merely for the want of turning our thoughts to the planting, dressing, and tending of what is valuable, to expect instructors to raise good characters upon this foundation at the age of twelve years, till which time we have remained indifferent to our own obligations, is imposing much what as reasonable a task as the Egyptians did upon the children of Israel. To kill all that has taken root, is laborious; and painful to the subjects too, whom it must reduce (in regard to self-government) to the condition of *infants* again. A dallying nugacity seems very prevalently to take the place of a serious estimate of this business.

2dly. Those laws which prescribe the measures of proceeding in the business of the school itself, are often found defective, and unpropitious to the interest of the society for whose benefit the seminary is instituted. These must vary with the tutors. Of unskillful professors we are not to expect good regulations. Partiality is a thing which is very apt to worm itself into the systems of those who depend on particular households of those who employ them, for their daily sustenance. So, it often happens that a teacher being young and dependant, let him be ever so well qualified in talent and erudition, and even if he be disposed to put into operation the best moral systems, tends to conform a little to the inclinations of such as he depends on, having something of a predilection to please (by way of treatment of their children) those who serve him most. Being destitute of the possession of substance, one must have great temptation, in such plight, to let a scrupulous regard of morality yield to the preservation of existence. In consequence of this concurrence of circumstances, some irregularities take place in the

business of a school when it happens one scholar suffers punishment while another has impunity for the same transgression; which has a demoralizing effect upon a collection of young. Some teachers are in the practice of maintaining *one* system of government during *one* day, and substituting another the next: it being no other thing in effect, when we put laws in force at one time, and by and by suffer them to be trampled down without reserve; as it is little other than holding different individuals under separate systems of government, to punish *one* and connive at *another* for the same sort of action. Different sorts of punishment, adapted to the dispositions of the offenders, according to the motives that respectively operate in their minds, which constitute the measure of their turpitude, are the peculiarity of school government, which ought to distinguish it from what is usually operable in governments of commonwealths. 'Punishment should be mild but certain,' has been advanced for a general maxim of school government, and is one which, I fancy, few rational observers can frame any plausible objections to. There be, however, as to all general rules, exceptions to its applicability. We shall find some young persons with such tempers, and habits of such sort and inveteracy as nothing short of severity avails to reverse. This custom of putting laws strictly into force *one* day or *one* week, and slackening the reins of coercion the *next*, grows into a habitual circle of action, which affects both master and pupils; when correspondent feelings in both the one and the other, recur with the return of the alternate periods discriminated by these different ways of passing the time. Such a managery is notoriously inauspicious; and on no account perhaps more than on *this*; it is impossible for scholars to get stability by such treatment. For children to get the habit of constancy, they must needs have the example of it set be-

fore them in some form or other, at least so far as to keep them in uniform subordination to fixed prescripts by awe of penal sufferance if no other considerations be made to operate such a condition; so that they shall feel themselves as accountable for the same conduct one day as another.

The ill effects of this sort of proceeding are in a great measure reduced when the teacher to shuffle off the burden of adjudication from day to day, calls his subjects to account for the misgoings of a preceding day, or of two or three preceding days: which method I think in some situations is commendable; although its advantage depends much on continuance; and continuance is necessary to get the benefit of all moral things, which nothing but repetition can improve. For I must confess that in addition to simplyfyng the business of the teacher, it affords these good effects.

1. It tends to strengthen the memory. Pain, disgrace, sorrow, have the knack of fixing ideas on the memory, as well as pleasure, joy, commendation. Certain circumstances may attend these painful emotions; certain ideas may concomitate them, which tend to heighten their effects and deepen the impressions made by them. And when a scholar is called to account for faults he has committed on two or three preceding days while he had no apprehension of their bringing any disaster on himself, and punished for them in an impressive manner; he, after that, when he thinks of those sorts of action which he feels an inclination to do on the presumption of escaping the notice or retribution of a supervisor, is apt to remember the trouble they once brought on him as an instituted consequence when he had entertained no suspicion of it, and of course gets a habit of remembering from day to day and from week to week, the tendency and effects of certain manners of conduct. Now punishments may be too frequent; when by immediately following every

transgression they grow familiar, and either begin to assume a disgusting appearance that makes a bad impression; harden the heart as well as the hide, or else repress the ardour of intellectual liberty, and make the sufferers, as irretrievable outcasts, defy good authorities. Some certain degree of novelty is requisite to attract notice to an object.

2. It improves the moral sense. When the attention of a child is seriously drawn to past actions, for which he is to account when all incitements and temptations have receded, and fixed to them by some affecting punishment whereby he is made sensible they were unreasonably offensive to his superiors, this power of distinguishing right and wrong of his voluntary actions, is brought into exertion, and gets ascendancy by use. The moral sense is called also the moral faculty. Every faculty is strengthened by employment. The exercise of any faculty or part of the human system, strengthens it. The exercise of the memory produces a retentive mind, and makes a good historian. Habitual exercise of the arms, makes one strong in the labors of art. And the exercise of the moral faculty by the occasions of discriminating the good and evil of one's own conduct, begets a habit of nicely distinguishing right and wrong.

3. It gives rise to a habit of reflection. When a child is punished for and seriously put in mind of, actions which are gone by, and the occasions of them succeeded by diverse trains of perception, the ideas of which actions being impressively associated with the existing circumstantiality of his retribution; when the latter recurs to remembrance it brings the other along with it: which together with some degree of solemnity impressed on his thoughts by the occasion, tends to accustom him to take a retrospective view of his past conduct. Thus by being forc'd upon a review of what they have done from day to day, children

get a habit of this sort of reflection, which otherwise were superseded by a heedless frivolity, wherein the the trains of volition that make up their usual conduct, were as so many traces on loose sand, whereof there can be no collected ectype ever to serve a faithful representation. The same thing cultivates sympathy. And the contemplative frame it leads to, favours the improvement of all the faculties.

4 It forms a great circle of action, that is happily subversive of many bad habits, and propitious to moral improvement. When children are inured to the recurrence of periods of retribution at every two or three days, when all their little aberrations from rectitude are to be eventilated, search'd out, and weigh'd in the scales of justice, the very sensibility of such a plight keeps them from several arrant pursuits which might engender pernicious associations. And the very habit is an important one; and admirably advances moral rectification. But the chief advantage of this way, is its conducement to a habit of steadiness in thought and action. The larger any circle of action is, i. e. the more distant its periodical points of recurrence, the more (if I mistake not) it opposes levity: for I fancy I discover in this, some analogy to slow motion of the spirits. Therefore, this promotes stability.

There are those employed in this department, who feel above their business: with whom the concerns of their charge have so little attraction, that they conceive it a burden to take cognizance of all the faults of their pupils. To such is dangerous to trust education. Others again, through mere laziness, having begun a good course of discipline, neglect to go through with it. The business of conducting a public school, in the present state of human society, is unquestionably irksome; therefore it requires one who not only is capable of, but delights in, vigorous exercises of mind; and one who, having a capacity

of extensive speculation, can make himself happy with diverse trains of thought, which have ascendancy over the concerns of his station without interrupting his punctual attendance to them. Minds of this cast not being every day met with among the common people, methinks since this sort of characters is somewhat rare, it behooves social men to make the occupation of a teacher a respectable one, both by endowing it with encouraging salaries, that those who being well qualified every way for that sort of service have different resources of comfortable sustenance, may be induced to engage their talents in it; and by a suitable deference to the character of tutors, regarding them (as some other mechanic adepts) as being persons possessed of some accomplishments ourselves have not. But what from niggardliness, ignorance, aversion to the signs of studiousness, excessive storge, pride, depravity of morals in the generality of people or particularly in those in whom they repose agency, or poverty in those who offer to teach; it falls out that a great part of the civilized world are from time to time served with such characters to fill this department, as they can make nothing but eye servants: it seeming necessary to dictate and criticize such as having not the respect some mechanics get, feel not the stimulus of a sense of honor, in the want of a pecuniary remuneration, to excite them to emulation or eminence in the duties of their calling.

The first thing taught from books, is the alphabet, or set of rudimental characters that are the ingredients of written language. Inconsiderate persons were us'd to teach these in the order they found them set down in a row, without varying it. When a child has learn'd to apply the true sound to each of these characters as they are ranged in a train either perpendicular or horizontal, he no more knows, in consequence of that acquirement, how to apply them to the same objects

standing in different positions and habitudes, than the musical tyro, who has simply got the names of his notes in one succession as they stand in the order of the gamut, knows how to perform a piece of harmony; or a sawyer, who has been constantly accustomed to a vibration of his arms up and down or horizontally, knows, merely by dint of *that*, to exactly hand and reef the cordage of a vessel. For this connecting of certain sounds with the impression of certain figures, is a sort of mechanical association, that with those who do not extensively reason, as strongly implicates the *situation* of those figures as the figures themselves: and the way to catenate the articulation with the figure and determine the name to *that*, separately from all other circumstances, is to practice the connection (by shewing, &c.) in all possible situations and habitudes they can be placed in, whether by retrograding or alternating the order in which they are usually arrang'd. Associations are either in trains or tribes. A train of sounds or movements may be learned by what is called *rote*, when one suggests or introduces the succeeding. — So there is no more ado than to say A, and the whole English alphabet comes into the imagination of a child. But it is necessary to discipline children to a more studied association, wherein all incidents not essential to the concernment of the designed habilitation, are disconsidered. It is impossible for a child to get a perfect knowledge of an alphabet, by repeating it only in one order of succession.

Next: the next literary thing we are used to inculcate on young minds, is the putting the names of characters together, into syllables; which operation must be so nicely attached to, as to be suggested by, the ideas of the figures of those characters which answer to those sounds which in another view are called names of the characters, the nature of which is merely to represent those sounds or tones; which are but a

part of the multiform machinery made use of to represent ideas in *one* man's mind, to *others*' who have not the same scene of perception and imagination. To frame words with these, is vain to attempt before there is a determinate and certain knowledge and full distinction of all the characters here used to form words. Some of the common people imagine if a pupil has gone over a certain tract of pages by putting together the sounds of the letters, of which he has made syllables, and of these given utterance to words, he is just so far advanced in the art of reading. But proficiency is not to be measured by pages; it being discriminated by aptness and retentiveness: to acquire which, we continue the operation of regular repetition, with all manner of entertaining accompaniments that are compatible. Every simple sound used in a language, should be represented by a distinct character. Most cultivated languages being made up by the lingo's of different nations, are notably erroneous in this respect. The english language is greatly encumber'd and perplex'd by silent characters, put into some words, which having a capacity of representation of sound in other words, illude learners. Upon the numerous cases, of silent h in bright, silent t's, o's, e's, and w's in some words and audible in others, would be tiresome to expatiate. Yet such is the inveteracy of these forms, we cannot expect a reformation of language. Pupils should be taught the proper meanings of words and exercised in the means of retaining those meanings as soon as they come to be capable of reading correctly. Whenever they have the habit of justly modulating their sound, and giving to every letter, syllable, word, and sentence, its proper utterance, the true signification of every word, (or at least every one it is important to exercise their retention about) should be associated with it. To this end, it is propitious to get into their heads as soon as possi-

ble, such abstract ideas as sorts of signs: and to teach sorts and tribes of words by proceeding from the primary stock, or principal, to all the gradual variations which by various terminations or inceptions distinguish the particulars one from another, whereof those bundles or tribes are constituted. In so doing we introduce a strong and extensive association which subserves excellent purposes in the way of their gathering knowledge, both of language and things themselves: wherein are involved the ideas of different words connected by resemblance, the ideas of their several meanings in the same connection of resemblance, the ideas of the particular variations by which they are distinguished, the ideas of their proper sounds, and the idea of the dependance of one word upon another by its relation of derivation. Thus those which are called inseparable prepositions, such as *un, re, dis, di, sub, pre, trans, super, en, per*, have their determinate original meaning, which being superadded to, modify, those of the words to which they are joined. Also, the terminations *tial, cial, ciate, ion, ate, tiate, ion, sion, ing, fy, ly*, and the like, have their significancy, by which the words to which they are affixed are qualified and made to be of a different class, in the respect of signification, from what they were without them. The meaning of each of these should be noted; and the effect it has upon the word it is united to. This proceeding exercises them in abstraction as well as attention, while it extends their knowledge of language. It is frivolous to enter upon arithmetic and syntax before the faculty of judging has some aptness. There be means which may advance the discerning faculty; which, without dignity and importance be annexed to the duties and rules of a school, fail of that degree of stability, gravity, and pertinency, indispensable to a successful pursuit of truth and excellence. For if a scholar considers the laws of his school of no impor-

tance ; and the feelings of his instructor, no concernment of his conduct ; and consequently feels no weight of obligation to obey and reverence that instructor ; what improvement can we expect him to get from the privileges of public tuition ? What application of mind to the instituted business of the school ? What concern for his advancement, in one who rates his station a frivolously complimentary tribute to some nugatory or malevolent project of aristocracy ? For some have reason to think their confinement in school is a recourse to answer some bye-end of their parents or teachers : to keep them out of the way, or make the vulgar world think they have a 'good education' or that their parents have a concern for seriously improving their children in good accomplishments ; or else, the emolument of the teacher : the latter has place when the tuition of each scholar is done for a stated premium per day, week, month, quarter, or year : which arrangement, generally is not without perniciousness enough ; for it puts in the power of every child, and every pettish old woman to injure the teacher, by encroaching on his subsistence, in a way of circumscription.

It is necessary that one understand what he reads, before he advance in grammar. No proficiency can be made in etymology and syntax, before the meanings of the words used in common discourse not only, but of those used in the plainest of elegant writing, are comprehended and made familiar to the understanding. For while one is ignorant of the signification of the words made use of to describe the elements of those parts of grammar, in vain may we hope to infix the ideas of those elements in his memory by the futile ceremony of iterating set tasks or lessons of those descriptive discourses to *learn them by heart*, which leave, in effect, nothing there but those empty sounds and figures without any determinate impression of significancy, or else an erroneous one.

For the whole substance of these departments of science is little else but a string of definitions; and a definition supposes the person to whom it is given, to have previous knowledge of the meanings of the words of which it is composed; which since those young persons have not who read grammars having not been otherwise task'd to commit them to memory, they cannot get the ideas grammar writers would convey them.

There is an inured extravagance in many of our seminaries, of pushing pupils forward, as if their proficiency were to be determined by the place or book they had reach'd in the course of their reading. Hence some we find are hurried into the study of grammar before they understand any thing that is written about it. This has injurious effects on many; for in the first place, by what they are accustomed to recite without understanding it, they contract a habit of inattention to books: since a continual reiteration of sensitive ideas, such as meaningless sounds or motions, where the attention is not attracted and fixed to any serious notices, is but an irksome piece of drudgery: so that the attention (if I may so speak) is wearied away from every thing that relates to the subjects those sounds are designed to express. Wherefore I think cultivating the memory by charging it with unmeaning sounds which are no way pleasing or interesting to their minds, is apt to make dull scholars. I incline to think that for this purpose of improving the memory, it is best to exercise the young with tasks which contain valuable moral sentiments expressed in agreeable language with some degree of wit; or else, pleasing descriptions of natural things. In the next place, the form or shadow passing for the substance, with their preceptor, their parents, friends and neighbours, scholars having regularly traversed by recitation certain chapters, books, tracts of science or art for the second, third, and perhaps fourth time, are

apt to be proud of their knowledge before they have got it; and make their boast that they have been entirely *through* such or such institutes at such an age; when upon a critical exploration of their real erudition; it will be found like a grain of wheat in a bushel of chaff; their heads being stuff'd with the ideas of sounds and figures without the ideas of their determinate significancy and use. As little ground have we to expect a child to make any progress in arithmetic before the judgment has a habit of being exercis'd in serious concerns. Such a habilitation (respecting the judgment) belongs to the *moral* part of the business of education, which, as I think has been sufficiently evinced, depends mostly on parents. There be, nevertheless, means, whereby the radication of moral principles may be advanced in public schools; and common sense teaches that this ought to be the foremost concern in such institutions. Literary and scientific principles require much repetition, to make a deep impression. To effect a permanent fixure in the young mind, of any thing that is not apt to please at first, or any thing that does not bring along with itself in some firm intervolution either as cause or effect or some anterior association to any other that prevails, some eminent degree of pleasure, delight, satisfaction, or else pain, is not fixed so surely in the power of memory without *more repetition* whereby it gets a connection with some very common and influential perceptions than that which coming in with strong sensation either of pleasure or pain, is thereby durably imprinted. The common objects of perception exciting some degree of pleasure or pain, and their novelty invariably carrying pleasure, make lasting impressions upon the unpractis'd sensorium, and are long retained, even during life. But whatever implicates the application of the reasoning faculty, requires the notice of it to be many times repeated, to be familiarly

incident to recollection. Therefore systems of grammar, logic, or arithmetic, cannot be thoroughly learned by young children till, by a course of exercises repeated, their judgement, with regard to such objects, is mature; not even by any contrivance that shall make them perceive all the parts of the system, and their connexion; and this for the following reasons.

1st. There is not pleasure enough attends the perception of such an object to make an effecting impression, with influence to continue its efficiency. For there is no great pleasure nor pain in the perception of a set of grammar rules or of problems in arithmetic, nor in that of the signs that represent them, as there is in the sight of the rainbow, a watch, a beautiful bird, a cascade, or any thing sublime, surprizing, or so pathetic or exultating as to make irresistible way into all the ties of retention.

2dly. It is too complex an object to make such an impression immediately; for it requires an exertion of the understanding energies to apprehend its parts clearly. By the young it cannot be instantaneously comprehended; and, of course, what is retained, is not the ascendant power to apply it in all its parts and relations, to its appropriate ends, but is partial, being some accidental glimpse of a part, that has been circumstantially affecting.

3dly. It involves the use of the faculty of reasoning, which must be trained by gradations of essays, and in the nature of its business implies the frequent repetition of notices, to examine things whereof they are, on all sides, and compare them together;—a great part of the business of reasoning consisting in the comparing of ideas. Of consequence, machines for teaching grammar, whereby the sorts of words, and rules for their arrangement and constructure into sentences, with their several classes and connections delineated on conspicuous surfaces, are successively dis-

closed by revolution of mechanical forces, although they may make effectual impressions on adults whose discursive powers are practised to an ascendant expertness, are not very serviceable to the young, in whom although all the parts of that art or science are here made sufficiently clear to their senses, yet their intellectual powers are not trained to discern the true application and references of these parts without a more deliberate and repetitious process than the motions and figures of these machines admit of.

4thly. Another reason why machines for teaching any such sciences as grammar, arithmetic, logic, are not perfectly answerable to their end, is this:—In order to render the maxims that make up those systems so familiar as to be readily applicable on all occasions in common life, their connection must be diffused by associations with a large number of different perceptions that take place in the course of it; and this requires time. Whereas when by one of these machines the several parts of a system are obtruded rapidly upon the sense, although the impression may be striking, yet its effects are not thereby so interfused with the parts of the ordinary tenour of our perceptions as to make it sufficiently permanent or familiar: for the depth of an impression does not depend more upon the emotion that attends it than upon the variety of its associations.

There is a certain temperament of intellectual operations, opposed to all violent movement as serene weather to a storm, wherein the understanding being susceptible of clear and adequate ideas, and the moral faculty of *energy* while no corrupt bias is derived from inordinate passion, the human soul may be turned to the most noble aims, by the medium of the contemplation of that which is seriously useful, good and consequential; even till it attain to very abstract views. This condition of mind and temper is I think the

same the latins called *placida et quieta constantia*: which being peculiarly propitious to the superinduction of all valuable principles, moral, literary, scientific, or mechanical, admirably serving as an inlet for every durable accomplishment desirable for rational beings in a state of society to possess, methinks we ought to labour to establish, as a fundamental principle whereon to superstruct the main works of education. Whereupon, I fancy it will not be a miss here to take a stand to make some remarks upon this thing, and endeavour to find out some means which may contribute to the production of this desirable frame. And first, it is evident this is an habilitation which concerns not only the current of our thoughts; but also the relative energy and the degrees of the passions. Our perceptions are more clear herein, than when disturbed by a confusing supervention, from levity and giddiness, that hurries the intellectual eye from one divergent view to another, without the satisfaction of *use*, resulting from attention and contemplation. This is a hastiness of animal spirits, peculiar to passionateness and opposed to tranquility. Reflection and its several operations combine more sublime pleasure there: even in the case of an obtrusion of real resources of sorrow, contemplation has the knack to find out a degree of satisfaction, which casual remembrance barbers for horror. But the pass being habituated to a state of due subordination to the ascendant operation of the faculty of reasoning; *this* power being directed by the moral faculty to speculative virtue, regulates the man into a course of prudence; and upon private, depends public, tranquillity. The contemperation of the passions is the greatest benefit we immediately get from this frame. Now when the trains of our ideas which succeed one another in every part of our waking existence, move calmly and clearly, and seem to flow in a regular untruffled stream, the will has greater ascen-

dancy over them in the several forms of voluntary thinking, as attention, contemplation, composition or compounding, study, abstraction, recollection, comparing, discerning, &c, than when by too quick motion of the spirits and ungovern'd state of the passions, they are incessantly interrupted. These things are essential to the influence of reason over moral conduct. Secondly : tranquillity concerns not only the course of thought and the energy of passions, but also the moral faculty. There is in man a power or attribute that is by some called the moral faculty ; sometimes it is called the moral power, sometimes the moral sense, sometimes the moral principle ; (while the same thing passes, with some, under the name conscience ;) which is the faculty of distinguishing moral good and evil, accompanied in its act of discerning, with the approbation of one kind of actions, and disapprobation of another, according to their general tendency. This seems to be merely a modification of the primary faculty of discerning, being distinguished from it only by the designation of its objects being voluntary actions, and the accompaniment of delight and pain with that discernment of those objects. From which some may infer that the developement of this trait of the human character, must wait on the advancement of judgment : yet we find this appears very early in life ; and infants of a year or two seem to discover, on several occasions, exquisite conceptions of right and wrong ; which yet cannot be supposed to have very accurate discernment of things ; much less, mature judgment. Besides, a man who discerns ever so exquisitely the nice diversities of all other things, yet, never the more feels those peculiar emotions of pleasure and pain which accompany the ideas of good and bad actions. Excellence in *this*, does not follow perspicacity in *other* respects. The most perspicacious persons are not always the most sympathetic or the most compunctious. Therefore this faculty has by

some philosophers been reckoned a distinct part of human nature, and I think for the purposes of morality, very aptly. Brutes are not supposed to possess it: yet if I mistake not, some brutes have indicated compunction; and compunction cannot be without it, in some shape or degree. Finally it seems unquestionably evident that this peculiarity accrues from the combined causation of sympathy and rationality. The degree of force with which this sort of distinguishing faculty acts, and the emotions that accompany the act, are clearly affected by placida et quieta constantia. In the bustle of inordinate and irregular gratifications, in the eager career of curiosity and ambition, we cannot pathetically recognize the discernment of moral relations because our passions are moved by other objects; and things are used to be estimated good and evil as they are causes of other sorts of pleasures and pains than those which pertain to the perception of such relations. Silence and solitude promote true comparisons of moral things; and silence and solitude are the sensible types of tranquillity.

I proceed to point out some of the most likely means which may contribute to substantiate this desirable frame of mind. I think this auspicious trim of the intelligent system is capable of being accelerated by the following measures.

1. *By mild nutriment.* High stimula habitually used, have a tendency to irritate and inflame the stronger passions, as desire, anger, jealousy, hatred, &c.; and they manifestly counterwork thorough reflection in several ways: for in the first place, if the stimulus be in any degree inebriating, the intervention of vertigo immediately deranges the faculties and confuses the conceptions of the understanding by hallucinating the medium of perception. Or if otherwise, as food,—excessive meals directly bring on heaviness, since they crowd the vessels, overwear the secretory

organs, and obviate celerity in the internal revolutions of the animal machinery. A certain degree of stimulus invigorates all powers. Excessive stimulus iterated, weakens the system. Plethory, and certain sorts of aliments and drinks, introduce morbid qualities into the blood: and viscid humours getting head, incur irregularity in sensorial movement;—and this is in a great measure the standard of *reflective* movement. Now a course of mild diet, by repressing all violent motion in the body, makes the operations of the mind calm and regular. Intestine violence in the animal machinery, from gluttony, drunkenness, or the use of that which abounds with unwholesome particles or with such as have a corrosive action, necessitates the recourse of irregular voluntary motions to mitigate the pain by diversion or interruption. Thus in the painful sensations attending pressure from flatulency or hard substances in the stomach, some relief is accustomed by a constant struggle of voluntary exertion. As has been heretofore observed, voluntary counteract sensitive motions: which yet when assumed by starts with repulsive view, are incompatible with the prosecution of regular speculation. Now multitudes of the commonalty think there is nothing that they can do to infants to make them quiet, i. e. habitually mild. Yet I presume to assert this,—if parents would merely inure their offspring to a course of mild stimulus, such as milk, (which is intirely nutritive,) and neither allow them to taste strong or harsh matters as spirits, fermented liquors, spices, and the like, in any other form than that of necessary medicine, they would exhibit softer tempers, more obsequious passions, and be more ductile and tractable to all the purposes of intellectual and moral improvement. By this process I fancy it is easy to prevent that peevishness and squalling so incident to infants. This expedient, that places the foundation of intellectual serenity in the constitution

of the body, has an efficiency which is more extensive than many are aware of.

2. *By early exercise of reason.* The powers employed in reasoning, are as susceptible of amplification and refinement by use, as any other faculties. Early trials of reason if they be about moral modes and relations, are remarkably propitious to the cause of human education. There are other ways of exercising reason than by the rules of logic. The reason of infants must be trained by odd methods: by verbal and moral exemplification. There is a pathetic way of exciting the use of reason: a way to *allure* the tyro to use reason. By moving the passions on certain occasions we *allure* the young to the resort of the exercise of this faculty. For if the passions be, as has been often asserted, the "springs of action," I see not but they must sometimes operate as springs to this mode of voluntary thinking as well as any other sort of action. A habit of reasoning about causes and effects, approximates placidity; for it prevents surprise, and improves sympathy by the use it makes of the experience of others.

3. *By regularity in arrangement of business.* Regularity contributes to the facility of business; and facility supersedes that perplexity which makes business a source of misery. Regularity in the arrangement of the several parts of the employment and use of time, whether in schools or in other stations, gradually introduces a general habit of regularity in thinking: and this supersedes the confusion and irregularity that come from the inordinate violence of habitually excessive passion.

4. *By soft and gentle speaking.* A soft answer turneth away wrath, says the proverb; and we have no conception of the charming effect this has upon the temper, any farther than we notice a regular experiment of it. Look into the domestic circle. See

whether you often find calm contemplation and tender dispositions in those whose parents and guides are habitually vociferous.

5. *By example of signs of the thing itself, we would promote.* People contract yawning from the impulsion of others setting a pattern of it. The percipient frame is incited to imitate all imitable movements it observes in correspondent systems: and from the same principle as by what hyatus and yawning, and certain smiles and scowls, are propagated from one person to another, this placidity of mind and temper we are now alluding to, is in a greater or less degree transfused. Very fine fibres in one system, move in imitation of other. A habit of moderate and gentle ways of communication, scrupulous moving, and in general, benignant conduct as social beings, if constancy concentre with them, are effectively impressive upon the minds of the rising generation when the latter have not received any adverse bias. If a parent or a constant tutor be mild and inoffensive in his words and actions (and a person may possess wit, jocularity, humour, without obstreperousness) it is delightful to see how wonderfully apt children are to copy the temper whereof these manners are the ectypes. For if the stock is apt to reason, the offspring we usually find is so likewise, very early: If apt to consider, and exercise prudence in his proceedings, the offspring is used to pause, to deliberate, to be calm, and hush, as if to give place to reflection. A vociferous nettlesome child generally descends from such as are tintured with some degree of those qualities, in some form or other. A moderate way of speaking to children, is equally impressive from the beginning, as any more rousing noises, to convey either commands, threats, caution, or advice. And slow deliberate motions are more solemnly impressive than rash unplodded onsets: and what has the essence of dignity in-

spires dignity in inferior intelligences. We have extraregular appearances among the productions of nature ; and very young minds are sometimes irreproachfully biassed by external influences ; which happens when their infant faculties are unguardedly abandoned to the perverting corruption of foreign example and the managery of disinterested servants, companions, neighbours, and strangers, which carries them aside the channel of reciprocation with the stock. But that there is something hereditary in the configuration and arrangement of the primordial particles of the animal fabric, a something which disposes to certain appetites, desires, habits of thinking, rather than to others, which original is the same in respect to the diseases of the mind, as the predisposing cause among physicians is to those of the body, is a general truth. I maintain nevertheless that there is nothing of this sort which it is not possible to overrule. In reference to this predisposing aptitude, we observe *one* has a strong mind ; which we should be cautious of setting into a wrong course, as it is not easily turned back. Another has a weak, susceptible and pliant mind, in whom we need be scrupulous of inducing a habit of levity. Another seems prone to particular sorts of extravagance in passion, or to excess of pleasure :—and these we must be cautious of exposing to what nourishes the seeds of their disorders, and keep a guard over these weak parts of the soul.

6. *By pathetic communication.* Discourses which awaken the tender passions, pity, love, sorrow, compunction, are powerfully adapted to calm the minds of the young. These should be of proper length ; not so short as not to fix the attention, nor so long as to tire it out : and the subjects should conspicuously concern the actions of free agents. These things improve sympathy. The mind listens calmly to what interests its feelings. Parents would do well to talk patheti-

cally to their children about the cares and pains themselves have undergone in sustaining them, and point out the only things which can afford them a satisfactory reward ; to exhibit in affecting colours the many heartaches, fears, sorrows, restless nights and laborious days, in which nothing stayed them but the hope of seeing their children one day virtuous and honorable members of society, fixes deep the principle of gratitude, and by accustoming compunctious emotions, exalts, refines and ennobles sympathy with them, while it lulls the festering passions into peace, and opens trains of serene reflection. The violent passions, anger, hatred, desire, pride, ambition, &c. we should meddle as little as possible with, and no farther move them than by evolving the contrasts of their proper objects they may be useful towards resolving the energy of the system to the principles of active virtue. The same thing is done by exciting admiration, astonishment, and their kindred emotions. Hence those orations and poems which exhibit sublime objects, such as the great works of nature and the aspiring operations of heroes, hold the hearer in profound auscultation. And such a posture of mind can be made habitual by repetition, as well as any posture or action of the body. Books serve the same end, to those who can read and understand elevated themes. This induces a habit of reflection.

7. *Silence* is very useful towards the end I am speaking of. Silence, by which I mean the privation of hard unnecessary sounds, has a natural tendency to compose the mind, by precluding all those vagaries of passion and imagination, which owe their rise to the continual irritation from those things which in the tumult of corrupt usages convey the ideas of provocation. There is no where any thing that affords a more amiable example of this mean than what we observe in the religious meetings of the friends or quakers, and with

very happy effects too, although these may in some instances be defeated by carelessness at home; for dwellings should be kept calm and regular as well as churches. A man's family is his school, and a tutor's school is his family: and both the one and the other should be tranquil, in order to take full impressions from the application of what is designed to promote the end of all good seminaries.

8. *Frequenting assemblies of strangers.* The next thing to the recess of violent noises, one of those things that operate very favourably towards the end we are here speaking of advancing, (especially in young people) is the changing of the scene of perceptions by a transition from the company of intimates to companies of strangers: which induces a degree of awe to the young; forcing the mind sometimes to intentional reflection; which were otherwise the sport of incidents by the ascendancy of common associations. This is approximated by the usage of the quakers, who bring their children into all their public meetings; which, in *this* view, is the most judicious measure in their discipline; for it tends to acquaint them with the established ways and habits of their parents, their carriage in public life, and the laws that govern their society, at the same time that it takes their minds from the common work-day round of vanity, while it calms and awes with the prospect of things serious. Mature persons feel these effects in *travelling* whereby they are brought into assemblies of strangers and into plights they are unused to. To investigate the particular causation of this whether the absence of the constant accompaniments of their boldness in the usual acts of their power, deprives them of the power itself to act and think as in familiarity they are wont, or the novelty of the objects of perception attracts and confines their attention more than any other, and so absorbs the energy of the voluntary power, I shall not

say; it sufficing we at least perceive that it is so; and there is scarcely any body who has not observed this effect in himself, or who when he comes into large assemblies of worshippers or others, or indeed into the company of any number of strangers in a novel place, does not feel somewhat of awe or impression of the idea of some manner of ascendant power over him, which is greater in proportion as these strangers' manners and discourse deviate from his own, or those of his intimates. Now this impression secondarily promotes placida et quieta constantia. And here I would take occasion to recommend the discipline of young persons to frequenting assemblies of strangers who are their superiors, in such instances as are governed by strict order, still being so far kept within their leading strings as not to run under the controul of corrupting appearances; and with the like qualification, early excursions into distinct neighborhoods.

9. *Some sorts of music* are propitious to the furtherance of this design. Music which is pathetic, is remarkable, in several instances, for a composing tendency. The mood best adapted is to be determined by the sort of passion that prevails, to the want of tranquility. The lydian mood is best in some cases, and the ionion serves the purpose in others. The case wherein the lydian mood prevails, is that of animosity and rage that revert the course of sympathy; -- which, evolving ideas of distress, excites pity, and pity being adverse to those emotions of hatred and antipathy in which are grounded the purposes of revenge and cruelty, subdues them. The doric mood serves in the case of a festinate motion of the spirits, when an undue degree of voluntary energy is collected in the system, producing restlessness and rashness. It likewise serves sometimes to tune the thoughts to abstract reflection. Ionion is favorable only in cases where grief, sorrow, regret, or compunction, is in the excess

that verges to the irregularities of atrabilariousness : where on the one hand is no danger of incurring greater irregularity than what does prevail, and on the other, no hope of inducing perfect serenity ; but, by a chime to superinduce a measure of uniformity, to which end the pleasure that attends the melody serves sometimes to allure, is the most we can calculate upon in this resort, where if we can only produce a fixed circle of action and intercept the progress to derangement, we need expect no better achievements. Even the phrygian mood is serviceable in this way sometimes in case of that agitation which arises from the doubtfulness or difficulty of any subject the mind has been exercised about, or from a lack of confidence as in the presence or approach of others with whom there is no intimacy, or equality of conversation. There are several sorts of sound which nature herself seems to have accorded to certain emotions and certain degrees of movement in the human system, and given them a tranquillizing quality : such as the hum of bees, the purling of brooks, distant fall of waters, murmur of winds in a forest, dashing of waves upon a shore, which have naturally a soothing power and accelerate sleep. These, independently of custom, seem to have such a composing effect. Whether it be that the sensorium is fitted to imitate the motions of inanimate beings, which in these instances being equable and even, produce the like in ourselves by a kind of physical sympathy, or that the perceptions of these monotonies supersede the agitations arising from excessive passions, is a question in physiology which of however curious matter of speculation, I shall not here meddle with. The effects however being acknowledged on all hands, suggest the propriety of situating a seminary in a rural retreat where such sorts of sounds (if any) commonly prevail.

10 *Serious reflection : abstract speculation.* By voluntarily fixing the energy of their mind upon the

consideration of momentous concerns, men make themselves tranquil ; especially if these concerns be made of abstract ideas. This is a thing by which mature persons bring about this frame (which in another view is the cause of it,) when we consider habits of contemplation and meditation with their eventual preeminences, as results of the proper uses of such a posture of the soul, which thus can be recovered and *quiet* temporarily induced upon the tumult of undue agitations of mind by men making use of their voluntary ascendancy they have got by habit, in resolutely turning their thoughts to deliberate and abstract trains in spite of the obtrusive interference of inticing or commoving irritation. I have hitherto considered this placid temperament as a medium in and by which we were to rise to habits of voluntary thinking, and accumulation of knowledge, with the advantages they bring us ; and as a sort of stage on which only we could act advantageously in such expeditions. And in *this* view it is necessary to superinduce it to the young by mechanical helps ; it being accessible to them no other way. It being a mean to the advantages of mental ascendancy and assecution, it is evident these cannot reach it by means of that which they have not got. For it is considered the groundwork of all solid attainments and all improvements that depend on voluntary thinking : as an institutionary preliminary, and preparatory requisite indispensable to proficiency in intellectual excellence : without some degree of this there being no such thing as fixed attention to any one serious design, sufficient to imprint any valuable maxim in the memory. This, in fact, I think constitutes great part of the essence of the highest degree of liberty we are competent to, freedom of intellectual operations. But I am now considering it as a desideratum valu'd in rapport to another end, to be pursued by the intermediacy of that which was (at first) its object ; to which,

intent reflection gives cultivated intelligences a direct pass. And here it is principally valued as an essential of the greatest good. For I think it is necessary to the greatest happiness we are capable of; for if our greatest happiness consisted of nothing more than what brutes are susceptible of and makes their chief enjoyment, our superior faculties were a disadvantage to us instead of an advantage; for those faculties certainly interfere with that sort of happiness.

Now no body I presume will deny that men have so far a voluntary ascendancy over their thoughts that they can select certain ideas or sorts of ideas which they will examine on all sides, and consider in all their relations, which out of choice pursuing in train, exclude all others from their particular attention, and hold these in view for a considerable time together. And abstract speculation tends to make permanent and habitual this calm; this tempered movement of the system: one obvious reason whereof is, abstract ideas imply a slower movement than particular ones.

These are some of the principal causes of placida et quieta constantia, and the most likely measures I can think of, to accelerate this auspicious state of the human system. To work these expedients into the regulation of a school so far as they are applicable, is an advantage obvious to all judicious supervisors. From what has been said it is evident that to approximate the substantiation of the principle we have been speaking of, should be the immediate design of all school government. In the present state of human manners, in the ordinary course of things teachers can do little more than approximate towards it, and anything that serves best to do this, and carries us the nearest to this point, is accordingly estimable as an expedient of school government. Quiet is at least necessary: in order to this, silence; to this, regularity; and to the whole, proper situation and structure of the

material part of the seminary, are of invariable consequence.

Writing, or penmanship, is a mechanic art which is taught in this sort of seminaries; the principal secret whereof consists in the association of a certain posture and pressure of the fingers and thumb (in grasping a pen or pencil) with a certain motion of the muscles of those fingers and of the arm. The primordials of this may be secured in infancy.

Thirdly. Private schools kept by jobbers in the occupation whether at their own dwellings or those of others, or situated upon the tenancy of buildings designed for such institutes, wherein the pupils are taught for a stated price per head, the greater number whereof the instructor can get, the more permanent is the institution of this sort and the more excitement he has to enter heartily into the study of the means of improvement, altho' in the laws that provide for their maintenance they are not subject to the capricious distributions of public funds, yet in their internal regulations have many abuses, and the same remarks may be applied to them, in general, as other schools. There can be no permanency to this sort of schools but in an estate belonging to the teacher. If the teacher have an independent fortune, and is disposed to maintain and keep open a seminary of this sort under some favorite arrangements, it is a permanent and a valuable school so long as he lives and keeps in the same mind; and whenever it does take place, has utility too; for no one would have pleasure in keeping a seminary open upon such grounds, but one who understood education, and being skilled in the means to make his work agreeable, and effectual, could render it also a public benefit to the society he was connected with. Otherwise, the existence of the school (of this sort) depends so immediately upon the variable humours, whims, and conceits of the participators of it, that it must be very precarious; and there is less dependance on it than

(if possible) on public schools. Yet some prefer this sort of schools to other, upon the assumption that the teacher is more 'faithful' where he is paid according to his number: but there is little hope of faithfulness where it has no determinate character; where faithfulness, being but temporizing to customers' liking, each of whom has a separate theory, may be every thing and nothing, and in propriety can scarcely be any thing more than faithfulness to *one*.

Fourthly. I come now to consider another kind of institute, called a religious establishment; which implies all those modes, substances, relations, and combinations of them, which are fixed by the concurrent consent of collections of mankind to be the direct medium for expressing the persuasion of supernatural efficiency, and for exemplifying those modes which come under the terms worship and devotion. A religious establishment is a sort of institute which was originally applied simply to a purpose of devotion; but which has, in process of the corrupt operations of ill-formed characters and misguided societies, been worked into a very different appropriation, to promote the ends of ambition, such as monopoly, usurpation, dominion, eclat, and the like; and is now very commonly reckoned an expedient of great subservience to education. In this I comprehend all the means and modes of those exercises called devotional, and used in address and reference to the consciousness of invisible agents. Some reflecting men consider this thing a recourse of important instrumentality to right education; and deem it a potent auxiliary to the melioration of the moral characters of men. In religious establishments are these four things to be considered; *creed, apparatus, ceremony and discipline*. The whole subject of a religious establishment is constituted of these elements;—things to believe; things to do; things to do with; and things to define and determine.

what is to do, which are those rules, orders, and pre-scrip-ts to which what is done is to be conformed, and by which all the regulations of an establishment are to be governed. Every religious establishment, then, is reducible to four parts:

I. Creed, or things to be believed; which are either hypothetical propositions, that are objects of supernatural faith; or mere historical matters of probability: since science belongs to what results from the regular application of our natural faculties, and is common to all societies, and the resort of all establishments without discrimination. This part governs the others. Their creed modifies the ceremony, apparatus, and discipline, of all sects.

II. Apparatus: such as churches, chapels, tabernacles, synagogues, altars, organs, hymns, music-books, service books, oracles, symbols, idols, &c. Every establishment has some house or station, to perform its instituted operations in; and use is made of a great variety of implements, of artificial modification, to execute the purposes of ceremony and discipline.

III. Ceremony: which is any manner of acting, or sort of action, which is reckoned essential to fulfil the design of the institute, and complete the characters of members.

IV. Discipline; or the rules and measures of the internal regulations, by which the conduct of each member of a society of such sort is guided, officers and ranks appointed, and the business of the society squared; as the conditions and preliminaries to admission of members, installation and expulsion of ministers, and whatever else governs and limits the ceremonies used by the society.

Every one of these parts is varied in different establishments according to the creed of each corporation and each sect.

The original of this institute I suppose to be the idea of supernatural efficiency: while the rude children of nature, anterior to civilization, I imagine derived their first notions of worship from awe of powerful men who held in their disposal the prevailing goods and evils of their inferiors. It seems probable that their first devices of penance and homage were suggested by their dread of superior beings who were known or believed to be volitive causes of sufferance to them.

Men not comprehending the beginning and operations of causes, were persuaded that sundry phenomena they did not understand, were produced by invisible beings which (they considering intelligence which they found in human adversaries to be the inseparable concomitant of superior causes which predominated in their fate) being supposed intelligent and volitive, were thought to understand their requests not only, but to be susceptible of persuasion, and apprized of desires, fears, aversions, and pains, in their petitions, of being moved like human tyrants. Whence they fancied because enraged tyrants could be pacified and determined by flatteries, gifts, prayers, &c. that those powerful beings who directed the secret operations of the universe, were susceptible of like impressions. Hence the ancients had their Jupiter the thunderer; and several operations of nature, as well as material elements, had their supervising divinities,—as Eolus the God of wind, Neptune the God of the sea, Vertumnus the God of spring, Eos the God of the morning. Thus several visible objects which were used to excite fear or admiration they came to worship, as thinking because infuriate tyrants were sometimes appeased and wrought into clemency by adulation and entreaty, that therefore all other superior agents might also be affected by like applications. Crafty men made a matter of questuary speculation of the imbe-

cility and credulity of their fellow mortals: kings saw in it a great adminicle to their views of dominion and aggrandizement. Afterwards they found it necessary, in order to support their pre-eminence, to keep the common people in ignorance and delusion; and these are the ostriches which have hatch'd superstition and fanaticism into the world. For, to make people submit tamely to the terms of slavery, and have what nature has endowed all rational creatures with, trampled over or made matter of trade to upstarts, it is necessary to manacle their intellectual parts, as wagoners are fain to blindfold their horses in harvest.

Several sober men in all ages and nations, have been seriously impressed with an opinion that this kind of institute is calculated to make men better: and others have considered it an indispensable part of those *deliberatia oportare*, in a well-order'd community, whose scope is the acceleration of the end of human education; which is the consummation of enjoyment. In proportion as any instituted mode points more or less directly towards this great end, it is to be estimated important or unimportant for mankind to accustom. This consummation of enjoyment, which is the last end of education, being the finishing of human nature in this sense that it is that in which all its perfections terminate, what tends to the advancement of this, must be something that improves human nature. Therefore education is an amelioration of human nature. Now God having designed man for a social being, endued him with sympathy, whereby it becomes impossible for him to be perfectly happy in the presence of those he makes miserable. On the improvement of sympathy, rests social happiness. To improve sympathy, is to reflect on the feelings of others and to practically associate the consideration of those feelings with that of every part of our conduct by which those feelings are probably affected. Sympathy improved, tends into

all those forms of moral good that under the general term social virtue, are called justice, charity, hospitality, meekness, gratitude, &c. wherein regarding the feelings of others as our own, we interestedly go to promote the good of others, which in effect becomes the general good; which when sincerely advanced from natural principles, must approximate the highest degree of perfection the enjoyment of human beings is susceptible of. For sociality being a radical part of human nature, such enjoyment must partake of reciprocity. The utmost degree of improvement the powers and parts of the human system are capable of, seems to me to be the perfection of social virtue. Social virtue is the chief end of man in this state of existence. That for which any system was made, its greatest improvement must consist in what tends to bring forward; and vice versa. Whatever process tends to bring forward this state of improvement of the moral and intellectual powers of man, i. e. the greatest sublimity and facility of operation in the pursuit of that which is the ultimatum of all improvements, perfection of enjoyment, is essential to true education. In proportion as any mean adjuvates the purpose of education by subserving the acceleration of its goal or ultimate object, the same is estimable as a mean: consequently, that which by an interrupted or indirect aid contributes to moral improvement, is better than what affords no influence at all, favorable towards this end. And therefore those corrupt systems which in their projection having had prevailing reference to this end, are in their operations adventitiously propitious to the suppression of vice and to the inuring of reflection, and, by dint of prescription, work as indispensable to the keeping of good order in a community, are better to be retained, than exploded without substitutes that are better fitted to promote the same good. And upon this principle I think it is that the

rash plan of subverting the authority of venerated pandects of religious tenets, has been universally discommended by the stable and considerate. Hence Paine, Hume, Hobbs, Spinoza, and others, have been regarded as common enemies of mankind, because in their running down and bringing into contempt injured systems, they seem'd not to have principally in view to substitute any thing better in the room of them. Which, since many of those who disapprove *these*, were sensible of great errors in those systems they attacked, seems to me a proof that they are generally valu'd for their indirect aid to the cause of virtue; which is injured in the want of something more direct. Which to me evinces that moral goodness is that which all men are prone to value mankind by, finally; and to rate all moral institutes by their subserviency to it; which subserviency is their conscientious criterion of such institutes. And I think it is a very considerable argument for the existence of a principle of goodness in human nature, when we find the common people (when pressed) pin their whole estimate of every system of faith and ceremony, upon that which they are persuaded has a greater or less bearing towards beneficence, and that the most zealous sticklers for such system, have at last no other argument they presume to place reliance upon in their vindication, than that it is favorable some way or other to the cause of virtue; which argument they have, in extremity, full confidence in.

I think it affords a pleasing reflection on human nature, to perceive that it has, originally, more satisfaction in a conformity, in action, to the design of nature, and in what produces that conformity, than in any adverse view. For what is it but that men generally are in heart attached to the cause of moral virtue, when the subserviency to this, is the last refuge that any system of religion can find, when examined in

the scales of ratiocination? No sentiment is more receptory than that any thing is valuable in proportion to its use or serviceableness to any end. This measure of estimation obtains the controul of our opinions of all other things, and ought to prevail equally in matters of religion. Yet the arts of tyranny circumscribe the rigid adherence to this measure of estimation among the common people, so that it takes place only of the debates of prejudiced adversaries: when a sect or thesis being attacked argumentatively it presently comes into vogue because no other test will hold way with ratiocination. Shakespeare says there is some soul of goodness in things evil, would men observingly distil it out: and there is scarce any thing in the world that may not, in some point of view, be traced into an efficient connection with good as well as evil. There is scarcely a conditional scheme of moral modes in the civilized world that is not in some place or condition, time or relation, resolved into a cause of good, and even of moral good. In man himself is some soul of goodness, whereby any system of faith and worship ever comes to be rated by its conduciveness to real virtue: and this is conscience, or the 'moral sense.' And there is not a more ingenuous exemplification of this 'soul of goodness' than in the upholding of an antiquated and burdensome ritual, for no other reason but a persuasion of its aptness to serve the end of moral instruction, either positively, as conveying such instruction, or negatively by standing in the way of its opposite and keeping people out of evil;—which has place when a custom cannot be at once exploded by *one man* which is common to *many*, and when the cassation of it would be the ascendancy of depravity because there supervenes no feasible substitute more directly subsidiary to the value'd end. A blind cripple being suddenly restored, requires direction and discipline, to acquire the art of

walking: and if the cause of morality has ever so blind and blundering guides, they are better than no guides at all (if we suppose these to be its whole visible support and all it has to keep it from subsiding into insignificance or finally verging to utter ruin;) and if we bluntly take away such things as men use to approximate an end, without instating in their room something else which answers the purpose better than these which derive much of their prevailing influence from their associations with the common pleasures of life, we straightly put the attainment of that end at utter hazard. For whatever in the human system embraces the most extensive sphere of ideal connection, is most efficient as a principle of action. What is associated with the greatest number of different ideas and movements, must have a chance to operate most frequently as an incitement or discouragement in respect to certain actions in our power, which tend to secure certain goods or avert certain evils. I would not be understood to speak exclusively of that which ought to be reputed real good or evil, but of that, generally, which is made so by habit. And the greater variety of points of connection I say, of this sort, any system has acquired, the greater prevalence it has, and the higher estimate.

This kind of institute seems to be of a nature that is not adapted to facilitate the extension of knowledge; and its operation to induce, refine, and appropriate habits of virtuous speculations and actions, is not the most direct and expeditious that may be. That it does operate somewhere towards the desired end, is not denied;—all we can say is, the use of it is not immediate, but catachrestical, by remote causes and fortuitous associations. Yet it is thought by many serious and well meaning persons, to be essential to the means of finishing education. Now education being but to form and adjust associations of ideas in the infant

mind ; to open physical knowledge of things ; to conduct the tonic organs to proper articulation ; to establish such associate movements of the muscular organs by habit as are necessary to subsistence ; and to form habits of voluntary action conformable to purposes of social virtue ; it will be no frivolous consideration to inquire how far this institute will naturally serve to advance either of these parts of the work : in doing which, it will be most convenient to examine every part of an establishment separately, in this respect ; and consider each of these in application to the several stages of education. After which it will be proper to inquire whether there be any way to render this thing more beneficial, by any improvements upon the common ways of employing it.

First, then, how far does that part of religious establishment I have called creed, operate towards the furtherance of human education ? Or in other words, what improvement comes from this quarter, that tends to insure or accelerate the true end of this business ? 1st. With regard to the fashioning of associations in the system, which is the first step of the process of forming character, I don't see that we can come at any important bearing of this hereon, unless we consider opinions in a different point of view than merely as objects of assent, and, unravelling the relations of the ideas whereof the opinions consist, examine the habits these have with progressive association, and of course the share of efficiency the one may have over the other. Now the creeds of various sects are so divers and complicate that to recapitulate ever so briefly what history exemplifies of this sort of description, would be to make a volume ; wherefore it is necessary in this place to concentrate our investigation in those specimens, of most influence and notoriety. Some associations are arbitrary ; and some natural. Some things are found to co-exist in rerum natura, and

others casually coalesce in the flow of our imaginations; while there are others which we voluntarily put together, and institute their connection for certain purposes. And the forming of associations, susceptible to the province of education, is nothing more nor less than making *some* ideas and movements apt to appear together or follow one another rather than *others*. The influence the subjects of opinions concerning foreign existences, are capable to command, in direct causality, on this part of the work of education, does not take place very early in life. A bias from this quarter does not take place very early on the associations of children, any otherwise than by secondary occasion, in the manner supervisors are hereby used to manage them. Whenever children understanding the terms used to represent the subjects of those opinions, are capable of comprehending them, which may yet be before they have the knack of investigating their grounds, weighing probabilities, and judging of truth and falsehood, their practical associations (I mean such as are likely to give effect to motives, and turn to actions) are obviously liable to be biassed by them. e. g. What effect shall we expect the opinion of the Mahometan "that the prophet in a nocturnal visit to the Empyrean, and subsequent communications of the angel Gabriel, collected the alcoran," or of the papist "that the uttering of certain words and acting of certain motions, by a priest, has the effect to change the very nature of a substance and convert bread into flesh, wine into blood, &c." to have upon the associations of a young mind, but, superinducing ideas that are aside from the natural course and consistency of things, to nonplus the efficiency of its best principles of action, such as sympathy and reason, which they controul, much to the prejudice of philanthropy? And herein we see what makes mystical opinions pernicious is *romantic ideas*, which have been heretofore noticed

to have a depraving tendency upon the understandings of social agents, by bearing aside the energy of the moral powers from the natural establishment of human enjoyment. For if happiness be associated with things which we see no where connected in nature, and the means of it placed without the compass of human possibility, how shall we form upon *this* principle a system of moral conduct adapted to our real condition? Chimerical ideas are baneful to the morals of youth. And for this reason I think that of those opinions of foreign existence which *may* be reckoned true, the abstruse part should not be let into the notice of the young. Those opinions which contain mystical and incomprehensible things, should not be let into the notice of the young very early. To accustom the understanding to fantastical ideas, is to pervert the understanding. Understanding being given man to preserve him and direct him to happiness, should evidently, for the advancement of these purposes, be concern'd with the ideas of those things which are capacitated to comfort or trouble, preserve or destroy him, rather than with what has no discoverable connection with those causes adapted to effect us in these ways. Now to use the understanding to ideas different from what it was designed for, is perverting it: and to connect supernatural ideas (if there be any such) with natural ones; to introduce supernatural ideas into the scene of natural connections with what we by sensation and reflection find ourselves here environed by, and subject to the operation of, with the presumption to form any system of conduct thereby, is like putting an institute of geometry into the hands of a child who yet has learn'd no more of mathematics than to name and count the nine elementary numbers. Supernatural will no more consist with natural ideas, to constitute the same system for the guide of a finite being, than a crane will serve for a pilot to a fleet.

The world abounds with absurd opinions ; and upon the whole matter I think that theological, and hypothetical opinions in pneumatology, in general, however seriously we may be persuaded of their reality, were to all intents and purposes of advancing the interest of morality (since no man is under any obligation to disclose his opinion to another, and men might live much more harmoniously and believe that all had the same opinions of such things if one did not voluntarily blurt to another his secret and impracticable notions) better kept in the heads of those to whom they belong than industriously propagated to others ; because they invariably tend to associate fantastical ideas with real : and to this end, the mind is prepared by the placing of frivolous ideas in the condition of motives, instead of such as have a conspicuous practical consequence : for principles of action are wont to be refer'd to something *real*. He that shall examine the creeds of the several sects in India, China, Africa, Norway, and some other countries, and observe what influence they have or are likely to have on the early associations of ideas in the mind of man, which every day's experience shews to engender connexions that have a very conspicuous ascendancy in the direction of his will and the fashioning of character, will have reason to conclude that the impression of these on young minds, has no very auspicious tendency in respect to the end of moral principles.

Secondly. To initiating the mind in the knowledge of things, these can scarce be conceived to contribute any aid at all ; since opinion falling short of knowledge, and being something less clear and satisfactory, can no more produce the latter, than the light of a taper can increase that of the sun. But yet I think, on the other hand, the persistive inculcation of fantastical creeds, tends to retard and obscure the knowledge of realities. For the persuasion of things un-

real, so far as they are contradictory of what is real, completely shuts out real knowledge. Indeed they furnish the mind with some perceptions; but these are no longer of any import if the matter of the opinions be unreal; or they are of a delusive import. Delusion may sometimes conduce to temporary good. But the general good of the whole race, or of any community, requires the extent of knowledge, and real knowledge too, so far as our faculties are fitted to reach. And now these *things to be believed*, are not things that are known, nor the proper objects of knowledge;—if they were, they were no longer to be believed. We were no longer required to believe that which we were to know. Belief is an operation of the mind very different from knowledge, and falls much short of it, in respect of assurance. What a man knows, he is past believing; he does more than believe it, he has certainty of it. He clearly perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas; whereof belief is but the assumption;—a taking it to be, without perceiving it. We may be called to believe, in these creeds, propositions that are no way mystical nor romantic; but historical matters of fact: propositions that carry such a weight of probability with them that when presented to our understandings we cannot choose but believe them. For the act whereby the understanding assents to and acquiesces in a proposition, is a necessary act determined by the preponderancy of the probability perceived. Yet of these, some may have practical import, fit to be observed in our necessary business as social rational agents; and some may be such as have no practical import at all; and which however easily they are believed, have no consequence in our conduct, to make one single duty or default of a duty, and have no effect in or upon actions that come after it, that has any constant or necessary connection with the belief of them; any more than the persuasion, upon report, of the flying of a crow or the falling of a tree

in a southern or northern direction. Finally no one is likely to become much more knowing by being appriz'd of a variety of opinions and articles of faith; or much better stocked with means and devices to adjust or execute the purposes of life.

Thirdly. What good can we expect these creeds to do towards the arts of speech? This might be naturally enough supposed a point quite out of the verge of their operation; yet will be found upon examination to throw several obstacles in the way of the finishing of this habilitation; and this, without taking into account that some of these creeds themselves dictate imprudent methods of serving this accomplishment; there being among the jumble of absurdities which confuse and debase mankind, the incidence of erroneous ways of representing ideas by speech, which accustom the use of odd circumlocutory phrases, or confine and cramp the dialect to ungrammatical and defective application of language. The quakers think they must speak in a fashion that is ungrammatical: I mean the rudest part of the society. About two in a thousand of them, speak more grammatically than other sects. The catholic creed precludes the laity from acquaintance with the bible: therefore they cannot so much as come at a habit of speaking in the style of that book which they are taught to believe their final salvation rests upon. Several blundering ways of talking come from the fantastical creeds of several sects; which so far as they bring up their children in earnest constraint to their favorite modes, trammel their initiation in language with the incumbrances of error and imperfection. There is a number of words and phrases, of great currency among the professors of belief in some of these creeds, to which it is difficult to discover any determinate meaning—such as 'effectual calling,' 'sanctification,' 'regeneration of the spirit,' 'special grace,' 'sufficient grace,' 'effectual

grace,' 'spirit of grace,' 'spirit of faith,' 'trinity;' experience of religion in the soul, and sundry others, which many of those who use them I imagine have no clear determined ideas in their minds, to which as common standards they uniformly apply them; but that every one has peculiar notions in his own mind, which he has annexed to them, and intends them to signify, or else the sounds themselves are thought to carry some certain meanings invariably, and to have an uncontrollable power of significancy, so that there is no concern of explaining them, one to another of those who use them.

Fourthly. To morals I cannot discern that these are often very propitious: for most religious creeds ascribe to supernatural beings the dispositions of men. So, those things they revere as gods, are made revengeful, cruel, proud, versatile, and ambitious;—and these bad qualities being associated with an object of veneration, perverts every principle of moral estimation; since it confounds moral good and evil; and God being at first imaginatively fashioned in the likeness of man, man is apt to esteem man in proportion as he emulates that model. Thus by being strongly catenated to the emotions of esteem and admiration as being the characteristic appendications of their objects, the excessive passions, ambition, pride, revenge, cruelty, &c. are too apt to become objects of those emotions: and *this* is the actual subversion of morality. Creeds may in some cases, by occasion of the disciplinary influence of those passions, *fear* and *hope*, which they stir up to a remarkable degree sometimes where ardently receiv'd and not doubted, cause some courses of decent moral conduct which otherwise would not be. And yet at the same time we find some of the most selfish, sordid, unsocial, as well as also profligate persons in civil communities, to be of those who profess to believe strictly in these creeds. Other me-

thods are necessary, to instil moral principles, than the inculcation of creeds. Philanthropy will hardly get root by such culture. A slavish fear of superior beings, can never produce benignity; and the exertions that are excited by ardent hope with assurance of reward, are of a venal nature; not terminating in those large and diffusive views which distinguish true virtue.

Fifthly. What can these creeds do towards the perfecting of those arts and trades that serve men's livelihood? To which I cannot imagine they can do any thing, any more than smoking tobacco. As they fill the trains of imagination with a succession of fantastical creatures, and forms, of unnatural combinations, instead of real beings, I suppose they give occasion to those odd fashions of architecture, painting, and clothing, used by different sects in various parts of the world. They may likewise be observed to give rise to several peculiar occupations, which otherwise had no use. The Mahometans have *one* fashion of building their houses of public worship; the Pagans of India, *another*; and among the christian sects, the quakers have *one* fashion and the episcopalians *another*. Yet though they give occasion to trades, no one learns any mechanic art more expeditiously for firmly believing in these. So that it does not appear that this part of religious establishments called creed, is indispensably necessary to the finishing of right education, or has any necessary connection as a cause, with either of the essential parts of the work.

II. Let us inquire into the influence of the second part of a religious establishment, which is *apparatus*, upon the advance of education. All the improvement education gets either directly or indirectly from the apparatus employed in plans of this sort, must be purely accidental. For what do altars, lavers, tankards, vases, beads, churches, prayer-books, music-books, hymn-books, organs, images, bells, towards ad-

justing those associations which form the primordial principles of moral character, the operative motives of our actions; more than any natural objects, as rocks or trees, which is no otherwise than as they stand within the same possibility of being associated with other ideas, as any objects of our undersanding? They operate only as secondary prompture, if we except books (at least what are contained within the books;) and their music books serve as vehicles to an initiation in vocal music. These materials, however, by their grotesque fashions intruding themselves among the accustomed perceptions and fantazies of the young, have an influence that is of little or no utility, or is pernicious. But when to these supervenes the consideration of their divine tutelage and appropriation ascending hereon, they become the ties of very delusive and cramping associations, making fantastical distinctions among common things, whereby the young mind attaches certain degress of importance in estimate, and solemnity in aspection, to pieces of matter which mere chance and the humours of men have given a peculiar modality. To adjust associations, is to fix things in their true natural ranks, as organized or unorganized, remote or proximate causes or effects. But when a piece of matter is supposed to be the receptacle of an invisible almighty being, or one particular shape of it more pleasing to that being than another; an altar the peculiar fireplace the deity chooses to have for the roasting of animals, or the water of a certain river that which he makes his favorite vehicle for washing away the depravity of sinners; then these things are thought to be better than others of their kind; and an unnatural system of estimate prevails, when connections are assumed, that have no existence in nature. But,—

Secondly. If it be of little service in the adjustment of associations of ideas, it may contribute something

to the second stage of education, in furnishing the mind with real knowledge and correct opinions: and to this, I think the apparatus of this institute adds as much physical knowledge as that of the particular existence of the materials whereof it is, with their varieties and instituted uses, which being allusive, traditional, or peculiariz'd, cannot afford knowledge that has much practical import to social beings at large. As much valuable knowledge may be infused and as sublime and important truths deliver'd in a hovel as in the most superb dome. The same things may be done in the open air. And men by applying their natural powers to such operations as they are fitted for, in any place and condition whatever, attain useful knowledge, and opinions that are fit to direct their conduct. And although these materials serve the purpose of accommodation, are used as means for the diffusion of that which is deemed important moral instruction, and are the *occasions* to the impression of some individuals with peculiar associate emotions, which still may be of no general consequence; yet there is no causality inseparably and naturally inherent in these particulars, connected with such effects as they are thought indispensable to the insurance of. The books, in this part, convey the materials of opinions, of greater or less weight. Demonstrative knowledge they seldom exhibit. The worst of it is, they contain specimens of mystical opinions; reports of supernatural and incomprehensible things that are wont to engender romantic ideas in the minds of those who acquiesce in them. There are also many historical matters that are doubtful because they are obscure; and their obscurity is a necessary consequence of their antiquity, which places their original beyond our exploration; insomuch that it is difficult to satisfactorily determine what particular things the writers of them had before their minds, that they applied their words to represent. There is some moral knowledge very

handsomely displayed in these books ; but they are not the only resource of it.

Thirdly. What assistance are we to expect from the natural tendency and invariable efficacy of this in the third process of education, viz. the training of the powers to the proper use of articulate signs? This we must seek altogether in the books employed in this department ; for the other articles can afford nothing of the kind but their names. The directory codes, pandects, magazines, or histories, that societies are guided by in their opinions and operations, being mostly ancient, and the nature of human language being to fluctuate and change with the succession of generations of men, and the variation of their accustomed manners, do not always afford standards of propriety. For, if words there used are now applied to different ideas from what they stood for at the time they were written, in the same language, or (the people being extinct that used that language) at the time they were translated ; or else not being used at all to signify any thing in common communication ; it is plain that to inculcate upon the young the use of these is different from training them to exact propriety of speech. Some sects undoubtedly have standard books very correctly written. But to come at propriety in the use of words, we look to the common most usual ways of a community or nation in the matter of communicating their thoughts, or those of the prevailing part of it. The adjustment of articulation is out of the province of religious establishments.

Fourthly. If we can get any instrumentality to moral education from this part, it will be an important argument for the institute : since this being the sublimest and most momentous part of education, whatever remarkable service recommends this kind of institute, must be in advancement of *this* ; and in fact, as it falls out, it has most pretence to serve this, of all parts of

education. The houses dedicated to the services of these establishments, are generally adapted to accommodate a purpose of moral teaching. There is one thing (which however takes effect only in cold climates) that is incident to these stations, restrictive of their advantageous instrumentality, and that is an exposure to cold, from a custom of disusing chimneys or stoves in this sort of buildings in country places; which, in those nations who accustom themselves to a high temperature at their dwellings constantly, induces too great a contrast in the sensory for the purpose of calm contemplation, which is *first* necessary when any moral or intellectual excellence is to be cultivated. But although these may be made very serviceable to the purpose of assembling several people together, and disseminating valuable instruction; yet what very much intercepts their utility, in this branch, is their pageantry. This takes place in most civilized nations. Men make the apparatus of their religious establishments, the vehicle of pageantry. The pride of appearance, and the ostentation of sensible pre-eminences, nowhere displays itself more than in the buildings and furniture of some of these establishments. Their churches are exemplars of gaudery. This splendor, that they are used to envelope the apparatus of their institutions in, has bad effects. In the associations of ideas it has an operation rather frustratory of the end men seem generally to propose to themselves in these establishments, by strongly associating with the most serious things the vain ostents of human rivalry: and that can hardly be esteemed a pure philanthropic work, the elaboration of which is the consecration of human pride, and that the very meanest of pride too, pride of distinctions in appearance. Now this association of the appearance of vanity with what is designed to induce the most solemn conceptions men are supposed capable of, brings on a frivolity of thought, and a habit

of superficial views of natural beings, that precludes deliberation, sound reasonings, and thorough reflection. Hence those the most intimately connected with this apparatus, by instituted attendance or otherwise, are not the most considerate people in the world. It is said the pandects of religious sects are useful to moral education by affording valuable prudentials, and substantial doctrine of that sort that directs to the greatest good. It is difficult to do justice to this subject, by reason of the multiformity of sects and establishments, and of their standard theories. The Mahometan ethics contain undoubtedly some good dogmas; and the Christian, more philanthropical ones. Several other sects may possess true moral directories, mixed with mystical things. The consequence is, in proportion as their books contain these, they are estimable. But to prove they are indispensable to the purpose of completing this part of education, it is necessary to shew that the like moral truths are not discoverable by any other source than by an acquaintance with the creeds and standard data of these sects. Of all others, the Christian sect possesses the truest ethics. The most rational chain of moral doctrine is found in the Christian books. Such should be the whole guide of this sort: but fact is lamentably otherwise; and the reason is, men, being degenerate by bad practices, hate the restraints of moral virtue. The ethics of the Mahometans, the Hindoos, the Persians, and the Chinese, so far as involved in their religions establishments, are not such as are directly deduced from physiological realities, and so interpretations of the law of nature; but the result and dependence of their instituted creeds, discipline, and ceremonies; being fashioned according to the accommodation of worldly views in such establishments. There may be excellent ethics in the books of all those sects, but they are intertwined with mysteries, and mixed up with such proposi-

tions as counteract philanthropy. In our Christian gospels, and in writings connected with them, we find the most benign and universal dogmas of ethics, the most liberal and enlightening apothegms, that strike at the roots of aristocracy, of usurpation, of tyranny, and of every fashion of human pride.

Fifthly. In advance of those trades and associate motions that are the mechanic means of life, I conceive this does little, except by affording patterns of various workmanship. These give rise to some occupations, and furnish some persons with work which otherwise they had not. Besides this, I cannot see that it affects arts and trades in any other way; and I do not conceive how these materials can serve as aids to accelerate the acquisition of any degree of skill or aptness in any of the mechanic arts, or the sublime arts, or in fact, any fashion of useful associate movement, unless it be singing and praying, which the music books, hymn books, and prayer books may subserve.

III. We will next examine what influence that constituent of a religious establishment which is called ceremony, has upon the advance of education. First. Upon the association of ideas; I apprehend this many times has a bad effect. Ceremony, considered as a thing instituted by a tutelary power, to accompany the exercise of devotional emotions, is not reckoned a cause so much as a sign; an expedient to represent something to human observers; in which capacity, since it is not an indispensable mean, exclusively expressive, it implicates a diminutive estimate of Deity; it seeming little other than trifling to annex to certain sentiments a set form of moving, and make it essential to whatever is intended to be advanced by the expression of them, while there are various ways (perhaps others much apter) whereby men can come at the assurance of one another's emotions and persuasions of mind. It serves to exercise the body rather than the mind, which it tends to

paralyze and constrict by its unavoidable irksomeness. To the Deity they can express nothing: therefore to suppose the Deity to institute such ceremonies, is to suppose him frivolously employed. The principal ceremonies used by the Christians are the washings and plungings of the baptists; the groanings, shriekings, screamings, shoutings, kneelings, tumblings, &c. of the methodists; singing, which is used by all except the quakers; eating and drinking what is called sacrament, a symbolical meal, which most of the sects use; also preaching and praying, common to all.

Now these formalities in general when strongly associated with the idea of moral good in the minds of the young, have an effect that rather debases than elevates human excellence. For vague unaffecting irritation is likely to be taken for the substance of a thing of which it is only a catachrestical concomitant. And if children be taught that religion is the only good thing, and that religion consists in these ceremonies, or that it is a thing to which these are essential, what becomes of meditation, contemplation, benevolence, charity, hospitality, gratitude, and patriotism? The ceremony preaching, is of itself a good institute. This commands real utility. Yet none is more abused. Nothing is more important in the whole circle of the means of education, than the access of communicating orally from the treasures of experience, erudition, and wisdom, the directories of prudence, the precepts of morality, the knowledge of the sublime parts of nature. This sort of communication is more pathetic to young minds than reading. Nothing is more conducive to the improvement of the mind and forming the heart to virtue, than the public dispensation of moral teaching on stated days set apart for that purpose. But the way in which this is generally used, is rather corrupting than improving to morals. Stuff is dealt through this channel, that does no good. Much that goes in at

one ear and out at the other, of very intelligent persons; and much of that which really deludes, and sets awry the thoughts and affections of ingenuous listeners. The quakers have a ceremony that is happily adapted to settle a good association in the minds of the young; and that is their instituting stillness, and natural easy posture of body, maintained in their meetings: to which may be added, the audience of their young to their public transactions.

Secondly. In the second part of education, wherein we are engaged in enlarging the human mind with real knowledge, and notices of real existence, ceremony has very little efficiency, any farther than the bare perception of that ceremony itself, in its varieties. For its origin, its design and ends, are mostly very obscure and afford no knowledge at all, being little other than conjectured. The knowledge of a system of ceremonies and their order, holds no very high rank in the scale of human accomplishments. The bare knowledge of a ritual I consider as much worth as that of a picture. It is imagined these have efficacy to induce stability. Truly, where is constancy, certain systematic forms are adopted; but rather gathered from prescription than speculation. There must be some forms accustomed; and who is constant, who is stable, has a stated form, and uniform circle of action, in his course. But this is the effect, not the cause, of stability. It is not in *form*, to substantiate the principle of stability. Charity, hospitality, patriotism, gratitude, punctuality, are the ceremonies which have real value. The knowledge of these is a good thing; and the habit of acting them, a better. But these are generally left out of church formularies. There is however an excellent practice still kept up in some churches, of periodical contributions to the poor. This is the best ceremony extant in the whole round of religious institutions.

Thirdly. That the appropriate rites of worshipping societies, serve to facilitate the assecution of expertness or propriety in the use of the articulatory organs, or association of certain exertions of them with the perception of certain figures conditionarily representative of the sounds made by those exertions, I presume none will contend. There are habits of dialect, there are ways of talking, peculiar to every club or knot of social mankind consociating for some particular reason, or promotion of some favorite view: ways of applying words that discriminate them from others. The chymists have *one* way of talking; the Martinists and Illuminatists have *their* peculiar ways. In our Christian churches, there is often a whining or singing way of reading the hymns, praying, &c. which displays no very eligible example of speech to young who attend. The quakers make it a point to speak ungrammatically. Bating this, I don't know of any thing in ceremony that hinders training young, in the societies of Christian establishments, to a proper and correct use of the powers of communicating. But the same may be done out of the pale of those establishments. If we have any ceremonies fit to forward this part of education, they are preaching, praying, and reading; which, if they be philologically done, set forth good examples to young who listen hereto, of propriety of sound and application, worthy for them to imitate.

Fourthly. To that part of education whose immediate drift is to ground, habituate, and establish, such associate motions of the parts of the human system as are applicative of, and comport with, the abstract purpose of social virtue issuing in the greatest good of the circle of percipient beings susceptible to the sphere of our reflective reciprocity, I fancy the ceremonies in most common use are not conspicuously desirable for their serviceableness by way of inuring to operative measures of moral good; because they have no deter-

minate or efficient connection with benevolent purposes. They seem generally to have a symbolical reference to something that does not come within the fetch of our projection as finite intelligent agents ; and so falls not within the province of our speculative virtue ; and a mechanical conforming of the body to such measures, has not the knack to infix moral principles, or habituate good purposes. Preaching, however, is a ceremony that, judiciously employed, might be a vehicle of very excellent impressions : but the vague manner in which it is used, incurs pernicious results. If pure moral science were invariably conveyed by this, instead of peculiar opinions and disputable hypotheses, it were a blessing to the human race. The formal preaching of traditionary and cabalistical discourses on things confessedly mysterious, contracts, in the minds of youth, habits of inattention. It makes them habitually inattentive to solemn discourses on morals or religion ; and entirely disaffects their minds from them ; but generates a general habit of inattention, and quiescence of the reflective energies. And the reasons I have for this opinion are these : 1st. Whatever nonplusses the understanding of man and mocks his powers of judgment, being repeated several times in the perception, counterbuffs the advances of curiosity as directed to the subjects of such discourses ; the soul seeks for something to entertain it in other directions of its thoughts. Here (when young) not rightly conducted, it is dissipated, and fixes upon nothing. Here then is a privative of the exercise of attention, at a period of life when that exercise is of the utmost consequence, and of indispensable requisition. The whole circle of reflective energies depends on the exercise of attention in early life. Whereas any thing that is understood more or less interests the feelings, and confines attention ; to preach to a young man about the ‘ three persons in one God,’ ‘ the miraculous

conception,' 'the foreknowledge and pre-determination of all events,' 'eternal fire,' 'regeneration of the spirit,' 'sanctification,' 'crown of glory,' 'breast-plate of righteousness,' &c. is to make him dull and inattentive to preaching.

2dly. Any thing too often and too constantly repeated, becomes irksome. This is the case with mystical discourses that are periodically reiterated; which, were they ever so true, would make them unaffecting, and the mind less and less attentive to them, without some new accompaniments or improvement. Therefore these things lose their power of excitement; people are no longer irritable to them: and as the clatter of a market is not heeded by its inhabitants, and those sleep soundly who live by a cataract; so *these* sleep in the midst of the discourses with which they are addressed.

3dly. Even allowing it all to be true and clearly understood, as clearly as human capacity allows most communications to be comprehended, yet such as they are constantly accustomed to hear, will not interest and concern the mind of those who listen to them. They will not chain down the attention. We will take for a sample, a discourse that on a particular day of the week is delivered out of several thousand pulpits. What is the whole compass and burden of it? There is a sort of affected, catachrestical invocation to gratitude for something that is done that is above our comprehension. All is done that can be done; it is said to be a sin to think we can do any thing ourselves that is meritorious; nothing for us to do, a spirit of meditation and prayer being to be given us from above by a vouchsafement of special grace: so that in effect we are merely told to sit still, as supine and listless as the hounds in our kennel, (with respect to any sublime duties :) this is the apparent drift of the whole. Now what ardour can be excited by such an object? Can

such an object excite any degree of ardour, either of attention, hope, or desire of action? It presents not the eligibility of any action; for it condemns it. What concern can the mind feel about such an object? Now I declare that this fills the mouths of the young with jests and reflections on religion. This, in the first place, by making the mind habitually inattentive, pre-disposes them to licentiousness and all extravagance. Ridiculously shall divines complain of the ridicule of religion; themselves the original fomenters of it. For their own measures and operations, the absurdities in their own schemes, make them the remote causes of the disgust and contempt that, in the minds of the young, are attached to the religions of the world: and induce all that sorry scoffing and sneering at things sacred, that without reasoning the multitude runs headlong into. Some sects have ceremonies that have an auspicious aspect towards moral improvement. But these are isolated, and few in comparison of the whole. Of this kind, among the Christian sects I fancy the quakers have two of the most eligible; their training youth to an acquaintance with the transactions of the community; and their silent meetings, which, accustoming each member to absolute liberty in pursuing his own trains of thought, give place to originary and conscientious reflection. The system of ceremonies used by the English episcopal church, is the dullest and vainest, perhaps, except the Roman catholic, of all the formularies of the civilized world. The catholics exceed the extravagance of this, in some particulars, and in others they fall short of it. The end of a sign is to denote something to some other. By these formal manners and recitations so far as they are used for signs, (and they can have no pretence to any considerable end in any other capacity, because they produce no effect that is conspicuously beneficial) men seem to aim to signify, either to God or to men, that they have certain sen-

timents, opinions, wishes, and desires, within them. Now with respect to the first of these, this representation is frivolous and presumptuous, and cannot be a part of good moral manners, nor a valuable expedient to promote the design of moral improvement (and the means are so repetitious, and the variety so small, that they cannot obviously serve intellectual improvement) for the Almighty possesses a direct aspection of all the most secret thoughts of our hearts, and the beginnings of all our volitions and aims, independently of any of our twistings and turnings; and to use these formal expressions under the pretence of any such view as denoting to the Deity that we possess particular opinions, emotions, wishes, or desires, whether with regard to His existence or attributes, or to our own duties or destinies, is manifest nugacity, if it deserve no worse name: for I am apt to think, if men can insult the Deity, it may be in the way of this parade to affect to persuade him of the existence of things whereof they must be sensible He has perfect knowledge: and this is treating like a man a being of infinite sapience and power. To signify to their fellow men these things, this seems to be a roundabout and idle recourse. For in the name of common sense let me ask, were it not much more expeditiously efficient towards all the ends of communication, to succinctly tell them in plain expressive words, that they (the communicators) had in them such opinions, passions, wishes, &c. than to moil through such an uncouth tissue of vain repetitions of words and gesticulations, of obscure reference, for the sake of a common-plac'd parade, that can have no pretence to utility but as it draws in an aping passive multitude to be fit tools to some aristocratical project? Indeed it serves to obscure, rather than display, any thing that is really felt or opined; and is at best as a shroud to the want of thought.

So rotten must be the support of those arguments that pretend to hold up this system as an efficacious expedient to promote moral education. As little can be pretended of the usefulness of these forms towards intellectual improvement. For what can it do towards the clearness and regularity of our conceptions, or the propriety of our sentiments and emotions, to have others insinuating to us, by allegorical ways, that they have certain persuasions on their minds, and that they deem it a duty to express them publicly? The ways to improve the understanding are by knowledge, proofs, distinct ideas, habit, and correct associations; and whether this repetitious system of ceremony and allegorical allusion to things obscurely symbolized, can forward any of these, may confidently be questioned: and I think those who lend their service to lead or supervise this farce, drudge for subsistence set off with a fantastical dignity, whose chief worth is yet in security of ease from more masculine labors. For my own part I have found it an insipid treat, when, coot-like, I have danced attendance at the chapel, and awkwardly passive to the harness of fashion, waited like an ape, the moving of each diversifying feat.

Some ingenious man has held that, to discipline children to bowing, kneeling, leaning, and the accustomed postures at church, in conjunction with their perception of the sounds of words used in service, while yet they understand them not, accelerates the impression of a true idea of God, by associating with the signs used to express it, certain feelings and emotions: and for what reason? Because men are used to cringe and kneel to tyrants and nobles? Thus a sort of reverence directed to whatever object, may always be induced by one mechanical process, by way of the same set of associations. But the question arises whether these associations themselves are right? To ask whether they are right, is, in regard to morals, to

ask whether they are (according to the law of nature) conducive to a due contemperation of passions? For it is worthy of remark, the way in which men view a man in great power; as a king, a duke, an emperor, is not the true conception of the Deity.

Fifthly. All other arts besides those of performing the ceremonies themselves, these conduce to the furtherance of, I fancy get their help by way of the wants these generate, of certain materials mechanically modified, and customary attendance, whereby occasions are brought about for work, and of course rise given to habit in that work: which is not saying that we can either teach or learn the principles of any other occupation or trade with any greater facility within the scene of ceremonial parades, or within the knowledge of them, than in any other condition.

IV. In the next place, what is the tendency of that part of religious institutes which is called discipline? Every church has a form of government. There are distinct duties, pertaining to the members, supervisors, and servants. These, fashioned according to various systems, obviously incline to influence several parts of the progressive education of those who live in the habitual observance of them.

First, then, what bearing has this species on the first part of education? That it must naturally tend to fashion the early associations to the sentiment of aristocracy, is very evident in a general view of this subject. For what else can we expect of the unpracticed intelligence, when a priest is reckoned superior (by some inseparable attribute) to other members of the society; that it is his duty to visit and console the dying; that his communications *there* have peculiar efficacy, paramount to those of other ranks; that it is his province and function to preside at communions, and the duty of lay members to pay some formal reverence to that personage, and submit to certain forms laid

down, (sometimes perhaps capriciously) by him ; that certain other officers and heads of departments, as clerks, criers, wardens, elders, curates, rectors, bishops, archbishops, popes, cardinals, prebendaries, deans, prelates, confessors, chaplains, dignitaries, friars, Dominicans, Jesuits, Carmelites, Benedictines, bramins, bonzes, muftis, imans, vicars, have their institution and authority from the special delegation of the powers above, or have something paramount to human appointment for the reason of their precedency and dictation, but to imbibe a monarchical or aristocratical turn of mind that discountenances the genuine sentiment of natural equality belonging to all the individuals of a species ? And the powers of understanding are more kindly distributed than to circumscribe their excellence to the circuit of collegial advantages. Society must have some distinctions. The simplest and best contrived democracy that can be, requires some distinctions in a community ; but they are all subsidiary, and are controllable by the idea of universal equality. Whatever tends to multiply these distinctions beyond what is necessary to the subservience of the public good, verges to aristocracy. The distinctions which the disciplines of many sects disclose, have such a bearing ; and tend to interfuse among our associations commentitious ideas of merit and demerit, virtue and vice. They impress no mechanical art ; they evidently do nothing towards the improvement of speech ; and the duties they impose are not moral duties ; and all other duties are to be known without the knowledge of such an existence as church discipline.

Those peculiar modes of motion which they make incumbent on the members of religious societies, are but ceremonial services whose use is barely symbolical, or else expedients to an aristocratical scheme. The whole is but as the drilling of a company of soldiers to a purpose of conquest or defence. For what

is the issue of the whole matter? A community is kept established in certain general habits of moving, i. e. certain great circles of action are kept up; and what are these great circles made up of? Not charity, hospitality, return of benefactions, oblivion of grudges; no. The best of it is (generally) the hearing of public harangues! This community hereby held up to the world in certain ranks, orders, divisions, that mark several degrees of respect and influence, exemplifies a distinction that is incipient aristocracy. For when men are used better by, and get more favors of, this select society by belonging to it, and being in uniform with the rest; what is the tendency but to set one portion of human society above another, or to give it some pre eminence and ascendancy, by awarding it a confessed preference in esteem?

Secondly. How shall we convert this to the enlargement of real knowledge of things? The internal regulations of churches, whereby certain offices and ranks are substantiated, are, in general, not adapted to enlarge the views of the human mind; but seem, on the contrary, to cramp them. Discipline that enforces certain creeds, and the revolving of emblematical applicatives, cannot give freedom to thought. Without freedom of thought, knowledge cannot be extended. When the mind is stopped at a certain creed; when the career of investigation is stop'd at a settled creed, and a conformity to certain formal measures imposed by authority; the understanding, especially if it be young or unaccustomed to enterprize, seems fettered, and is apt to become stationary in respect to improvement. For any establishment whose scope is to bound the view of mind, to set land-marks to its free inquiry, and to hamper its flight with the vindication of assumed principles taken to be pre-established without knowledge of their being so, in order to support which all other knowledge must be kept in check, especially all

lights that counterview such vindication must be industriously shut out, and whose whole business is a fixed circle of repetition, it is evident tends to make mind stationary, rather than to carry it continually forward towards its perfection.

The moral efficacy of this by way of preserving settled order and regularity, to dispose and incline the mental powers to scientific accessions, must be adventitiously instrumental if it be any thing; and in proportion to the constancy of this instrumentality, is the true estimate of this mean in relation to this part of our business. To get physical knowledge it is necessary that we examine the material world by our perceptive faculties, and the aid of various experiments. To get moral knowledge we must exert our reflective powers in observance of the causes, nature, tendency, and effects, of voluntary actions. To get logical knowledge, and knowledge of signs, we are to carefully note the several signs made use of, and the reasons and measures of their application. But emblematical signs are not of great importance when better ones have got into extensive use. And to *confer* the reality of all these sorts of knowledge, we have no way but to teach the *young* to approximate an imitation of what we ourselves do to get this knowledge, i. e. such exercises of the faculties.

Thirdly. If this be useful in perfecting the art of communication, it must be by inuring a body of men to a certain dialect, the habitual exemplification whereof, influences all young observers. But this influence is not likely to be very extensive, nor permanently predominant. The people that venerate this kind of government, and live in a kind of drudging conformity to it, are not such as are scrutinously observant of causes and effects; and, entertaining imperfect notions of morals while they neglect education in general, are not prone to strictly pursue properly adapted

methods to accelerate perfect articulation and propriety of language in those of whom they have the bringing up. If it be so, that this thing diverts from true physiology (skill in which is necessary to the purpose of education) it may be so far considered a hindrance to the success of that process we are here seeking the advance of. How far certain forms of speech instituted to be statedly used, contribute to produce a confinement of the skill of language, and inure a dull repetitious way of talking, every one's observation must determine.

Fourthly. In the conforming of the powers and parts of the human system to moral purposes, I fancy the discipline of church politics is not able to afford us any indispensable service. For whoever shall warily look after the *partiality*, and sometimes encroachment on natural liberty, that are frequently put into effect by such as have any degrees of instituted ascendancy assigned them by the accustomed institutions of this department; also the pride, jealousy, fear, envy, and other bad passions that are exercised by it; together with the cramping and prejudicate views of things, devolving to selfishness and brutality; will have reason to believe it tends to throw embarrassments in the way of moral advancement. Witness the brawls, the schisms, the private and public church quarrels, on history. Witness the crusades. Witness the Jews' treatment of Jesus Christ and his disciples. Witness the inquisition in Spain. I presume to assert that this discipline, in its usual fashion, is not inseparably connected with moral skill and aptness. For there does not seem to be a conspicuous institution of reward to virtue or disgrace to vice.

Certain public discipline, establishing a true estimate of actions by fixing to each its proper consequent in praise or blame, to be displayed by some affecting way, is an important desideratum in formulary ethics.

Rare specimens of this are accustomed in some clubs ; — but it is very little known.

There is one tendency in this part of our religious establishments, I fancy, that militates against good moral instruction ; and that is auspices of a spirit of aristocracy. For any one that considers these church governments as distributing out several distinct privileges of jurisdiction, in consequence whereof the communications of priests are thought to be efficacious, and a priest is thought to be better than a layman ; whereby bishops, curates, chaplains, vicars, rectors, archbishops, deans, prebendaries ; pontiffs, popes, cardinals, prelates, dominicans, confessors, censors ; imans, bonzes, bramins, &c. have several powers and degrees of excellence, and their peculiar ministration is conceived higher in influence, and preclusive of that of other ranks ; will perceive that these things directly opposing the equality of man, so far oppose democracy ; and therefore will have rational ground to conclude that they cherish the principles of aristocracy, in opposition to universal philanthropy. This is rather stiff sort of machinery to bring forward a profection in morality, in point either of skill or art. For any thing that intimates fortuitous or elective superiority of some individual rationals above others, in respect of audience with the Divinity, or dispensation of his effluences, or that others cannot come at the same degree of intuitive knowledge or demonstrative, by exercise of like powers themselves have, has an aspect of repressing those liberal emotions and speculations that universally announce true philanthropy. Periodical assembly for the purposes of meditating, and hearing didactic and persuasory discourses on morals and the laws of nature, is a good thing ; a desideratum really important, and publicly beneficial. Periodical lectures of ethics are of great utility to a republic. Agents to conduct these operations are collaterally necessary.

Fifthly. Those establishments whose discipline necessitates the use of service manuels—particularly hymn-books and music books, furnish some versifiers, musicians, and printers, with work, thereby adjuvating their temporal weal; but they form and substantiate no trade, any farther than they use peculiarly modified implements, of exclusive adaptation to their particular designs characteristic of such establishments. That this any other way secures the instillation of the principles of the arts of life, seems very doubtful to me. Moreover, by dint of example itself it may favor the establishment of several knacks and arts in those who live within the irritation of such example. The arts of singing and dancing, one would think might be learnt with particular facility and advantage where such ceremonies are carried on in these establishments, when the example is regularly bolting upon the apprehension of bystanders, and also by pleasurable suggestions egging the imitative faculty. The shakers have a ceremony of dancing, in connection with singing wherein they use much of the doric mood, which (of itself, independently of the subjects its accompaniments may be designed to express) suggesting to the minds of observers trains of ideas that have a cast of the sublime, either in the movement of their succession, or of the ideas themselves, may remotely subserve good morals by inducing magnanimous emotions, and, therefore, is no trivial spectacle.

So then it seems on this cursory survey, that no part of a religious establishment [such as the present state of human society affords] is a necessary cause or instrument of the right finishing of any part of education; and that its utility is not very extensively conspicuous by its adventitious subservience. This thing being granted, the next and last question that arises on this head, is, whether this same institute can be possibly fashioned and applied in a manner that

would be productive of good impressions, and directly contributive to the design it is valued by. That the recourse is susceptible of amendment, is obvious to common notice. Among all the divers species' of religious sects, I know of none that is possessed of a collection of lore capable of being elevated to such an improvement except that which has obtained the appellation, christian. The doctrine and history of this species are really abused. Nothing is more evident than that the founder of this religion singly intended, in all the course of his communications and operations, the refinement and elevation of the moral part of man. Leaving aside therefore for the present moment the consideration of the *other* species', such as those of India, China, Turkey, Persia, &c. as they are generally granted by studious philanthropists and moral philosophers at large who have taken notice of them, to be mere tissues of absurd and monstrous chimeras forever irreconcilable to the true and most natural appropriation of our intellectual and moral powers, and to the economy of practical benignity, we will particularly adapt our observations to *this*, which, for its universal dogmas of sublime ethics, that are to be found amongst the originals of its creeds, transcends all others. I know of no religious system whose archives possess such treasures of ethical lore as are to be found in the discourses of Jesus Christ as represented in our language in the gospels; in some of those of the apostles who taught after him; in the proverbs of Solomon; and in other writings connected with these. Since then all other species' are generally admitted by the enlightened part of the world to be inferior to this, I shall not now rummage history for particular details of the peculiarities of other systems, but shall proceed to point out some of those particulars wherein this sort of establishment (particularly exemplified in that of the Christians) considered as an institute, is misapplied,

wrongly fashioned, or deficient in regard to the promotion of the end universally desired to be advanced by it: which, by the way, will suggest the means and measures whereby it may be improved to a more direct and successful use. And these particulars are the reasons why the moral world is not more refined under a prevalence of religion; why those communities which are distinguished for their punctilious attendance on religious operations, are not distinguished by hospitality, charity, munificence, meekness, &c.; and likewise why the children of persons noted for sanctimony and professional conformity to religious discipline, are not remarkable for stability, sobriety, nor integrity, in their active characters. The same things, furthermore, may satisfactorily account for the growing contempt of religion so common among all ranks of laymen.

I say, the scope of the first preacher of the doctrines men built this establishment on, was the melioration of the moral character of man. If his design was any thing, it was this. This design seems evident from those parts of his communications which we can indubitably comprehend, and are evidently not ambiguous. Now either the preaching of Jesus Christ had some fixed design to it, whereon it proceeded to some determinate end; or it had no fixed design. It seems unquestionable from the evidence of several circumstances, that the communication of Jesus Christ was something designedly. This received, it follows that it must be either good or bad; for what is purely indifferent, supposes no design, no determinate purpose. Either the design of Jesus Christ's preaching was good, or it was bad. It seems more evident to be the former than the latter; i. e. it seems satisfactorily so, if there is any reliance on the authenticity of its representation in our language. Now, if either good or bad, it must be either morally good or bad, or physically

(i. e. sensitively) good or bad : I am now speaking of efficiency. It appears to be, mostly, the former of these, inasmuch as he was daily delivering out moral instruction to the people he was amongst ; and although many cures were done, and the bodies of persons delivered from torments and restored from diseases and infirmities, yet the main design seems to be moral improvement. That this is so, appears reasonably conclusive to me, from those parts of his ministration wherein he enunciated these beautiful and sublime precepts : " Whatsoever ye would have others do unto you, do unto them : " " Forgive your brother not only seven times, but seventy times seven : " " Go ye and learn what this meaneth, I will have mercy and not sacrifice : " And his illustration to the lawyer, of the proper objects of benevolence, when the propriety of the answer to the question ' who is my neighbor ? ' being defined by the relation of a being with like wants and feelings, a due exercise of that benign and godlike affection being exemplified in the character of the Samaritan, closing with a pathetic inversion of the lawyer's last question, which being satisfactorily solved, the reply to his introductory question resolves itself by way of inference, into this sententious exhortation, " Go thou and do likewise. " Also in his reply to the rich young man who inquired of him the way to complete his moral character, " Go and sell what thou hast, and give to the poor. " These and several other passages of his doctrine, together with the tenor of his practical life, shew that his prevailing scope was to exalt the morals of human society ; and that in whatever point of duration or of space his mission originated, it intentionally tended to make men better, and more directly progressive to their greatest good. This is all the determinate aim we can gather from those parts of his preaching we can clearly understand ; and if it was not this, we may conclude

there was none ; i. e. if the determinate aim of it was not this, that there was no determinate aim in it. The same conclusion we collect from his life as from his preaching. If it was this utility that stood as a motive to the project of this communication to, and treatment of, mankind, that the gospel exhibits, it behooves mankind to carefully attend to the good things he taught and ensampled, and endeavor to walk in his steps so far as his character is imitable, when they presume to take on themselves the denomination of discipleship to the author of the Christian religion. For, these premises admitted, the immediate purpose of it is, undeniably, social virtue. Christ inculcated the social virtues ; the social virtues he transcendantly ensampled. He went about doing good, though suffering privations, and in continual danger of the violence of his enemies. To be a disciple of one, is to follow. To follow, is to imitate and obey. Therefore one who practices the social virtues, is a Christian ; and one who does not practice the social virtues, is not a Christian. Indeed he made use of parable ; but he used it to be explained, and in order to *apply*, not to *lock* useful truths from the scrutiny of human reason. He gave it to be explained to those to whom it was given to understand the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven : such as in sincerity sought to know pure truth. The life and conversation of the author of christianity, comport with the apparent purport of what we understand of his doctrine. It is from what we understand that we are rationally to form our judgment of the main design and original intent. It behooves men when they find any thing that is morally enlightening, or consolatory, to sincerely appreciate and apply it, ensuring the advantage of its inherent excellence, and not beat their heads about inquiring where he who said it, came from, or whether it first originated in his own mind or in that of a superior Being, who transfused it

to the other ; but, if they find a good moral maxim, to value it principally for its being such, to be eager to make good use of it and improve it according to what it is capable of doing and appears originally designed to serve, let the first starter of it have come from whence he would : and not let the benefit of it be wholly rejected and lost, by idle seeking to know demonstratively, or carry irresistibly the persuasion to others, where he came from, to what destined, how, with what, and by whom commissioned, who kindly divulges to them such truth. For the natural and unavoidable conclusion from the whole of this piece of history, is, Jesus Christ was a universal philanthropist, who had in view the elevation of the moral character of social mankind, and designed the amelioration of the real condition of men, by guiding and habituating an access to the consummation of their greatest good ; which lying by the way of social virtue, he inculcated and practiced the social virtues in their perfection. He illustrated the moral law of nature ; he taught the universal equality of men in natural right. And now what greater, more noble, more benignant scheme, can we enter into a clear and adequate conception of, than that of the amelioration of a whole species ? What sublimer effort of philanthropy can we ascribe to any being in the range of our sensitive or speculative knowledge, than this, the design to elevate the moral character of man, when this elevation is considered the exclusive access to the consummation and perpetuation of his greatest enjoyment ? I presume none can demonstratively make out and attribute a more munificent one : for the creation of millions of worlds, and of as many species' of intelligent beings, is not an act of philanthropy done to percipient beings which before that act was exerted existed not, and could not be objects of any act, nor feel either pleasure or pain in consequence of any intention in the universe. Yet if any

one has a larger idea of benignity, to which this does not agree; and can frame to himself a different plan (a more extensively beneficent) to agree thereto, he is welcome to enjoy it; only he ought, as a friend to mankind, at least to *disclose* it for their edification. But, as it may be presumed to be of the same species, varying merely in degree, if there be any safe reliance on the established significancy of our words; if the reality of the actual design of Jesus Christ, in reference to the experience of mankind, as purported by his converse and actions, have been any thing that is repugnant to, or incompatible with, what is above represented, the question must arise, was it good? Was the design good? For cultivated communities have certain fixed ideas of modes which by general consent they customarily denote by certain representative words, and one thing is called benignity, another malignity, another munificence, another utility; in the use of which there is a general coincidence of the greatest part of those in a community, who use them the most frequently: and the idea of infinity, which is merely an endless addibility of successive acts of philanthropy or benignity, or of individual objects of *one* such act, joined to this idea that is signified by the word benignity, is all that can be meant by infinite goodness. This respects the number of the acts and of their objects: but in the strength of the emotion and the directness of the intent, that go into that idea, we have certain bounds which our conception cannot transcend. Now, if that benignity which moves to promote the greatest good we can conceive men to be the subject of, and to promote it in the most direct way or in the only way we can rationally assign, be not the greatest degree of benignity men can form any clear, distinct, precise notion of, I desire to know what that is. But if these things be so, as the above statement gathers them from the plainest parts of the

gospels (and no one will pretend that it is a revealed duty to learn a foreign language, especially the language of a nation that is dead, to come at the significance in which an ancient book was written,) it follows we are to look upon Jesus Christ to have been a universal republican and philanthropist, a practical moral teacher, whose express scope was to advance the grand design of moral philosophy, the business of civilization, by the developement of all those moral excellencies human nature is heir to, which is the fixed track the universal forming principle has assigned for the greatest enjoyment of the species. To be a Christian, is to be his disciple. To be his disciple, is to follow him. To follow him, is to imitate his imitable manners, and put into practice his practicable precepts. In order to this, it is requisite and incumbent to search out the purport of his lessons, to attend to his words, to meditate on his doctrine and the tendency of his manners in social life. The form of churches, of service-books, of ceremonies, is indifferent. True religion is true morality. True christianity consists in social virtue. The head and founder of this order of religion, sought to do good to men of all ranks, under all conditions, in all times, on all days, equally: not excepting his bitterest enemies. If any thing of his meaning be lost by the obscurity, imperfection, transference, or change of language, or by the disparity of the manners of remote times and nations, we are not to account for it. We are to judge of, and infer from, what we see and comprehend; and if we have not a test within us of what is morally good, we are no longer the subjects of virtue or vice, praise or blame. Religion is good in those parts wherein all rational mankind can conscientiously acquiesce.

Apologues and parables that, being interpreted, serve to insinuate the spirit of valuable moral truth, are good things. Those which, imperfectly apprehended, pleas-

ing while they teach, avail to incite to the application of important maxims, allure to the auscultation of any teacher or leader ; and we are to consider them additions, not disparagements, to a course of preaching. Many reasons may be assigned for this cabalistical way of communicating ; among which none perhaps are more probably adequate than the jealousy of the Jewish people concerning innovations, and their tenacity of their creed and discipline on account of the intervolution these had with their civil polity.

It seems upon the whole matter, then, that these establishments stand deficient in adaptation to the desired end which they ought to be and generally are valued for subserving, by reason of the following circumstances :

First. The creeds, I say, contain mystical postulata, enigmas, romantic ideas. The matters of opiniative speculation that make the objects of faith, supposed essential to true worship, exhibit many romantic and enigmatical ideas. Of all the rhapsodies of reveries ever urged upon the assent of human understanding, the *heathen mythology* presents the most monstrous spectacle. But this is not now in credit. The professors of it are dead. Of the creeds of existing nations, those of the Persians, the Hindoos, the Arabians, and the Chinese, I suppose are the most replete with chimeras ; although numerous other nations fall little short of them in this respect. Now these romantic ideas are of two sorts ; either representing such things whereof there is no human possibility of existing in *rerum natura*, or such things as are not conceivably probable to exist. These, when put into propositions, with other ideas, can only make irreconcilably contradictory postulata and inexplicable solecisms, and put mankind at sword-points upon that which is not reducible to any moral use. These make the inconsistencies that disfigure so many systems of faith.

These fantastical ideas have a perverting influence upon the understanding, very unpropitious to morals; and the greater the persuasion of their reality, the more prejudicial their effect. For my part I don't see the necessity of any historical fact being put into a creed. All we want in a creed, is, certain things believed to be reasonable to do, in consequence of certain substances having certain powers and tendencies. And this I conceive, is all of a creed that can practically direct our purposes and actions as social agents. Facts and incidents indeed may have weighed in the mind, to produce an assent to a proposition, and made us have such an opinion, which, when the acquiescence of the mind has taken place, the subject matter of the opinion that operates as a motive, reason, or modifier of our conduct, is all that ought to appear in a creed.

Secondly. The belief of them is reckoned a moral duty. Belief of these creeds is represented to be a moral duty. It is customary for the supporters of a particular system to urge upon others the belief of their articles, not only as an advantage, but an important moral duty which they owe to their maker and to their own souls, and of serious consequence to their eternal weal. Now to tell men that it is their duty to believe a proposition, is to tell them something that insults the cultivated and sagacious, misguides the enthusiastic, staggers the ignorant, and distresses the weak. And that which does these things, cannot be very conducive to the end of moral education. Obligation can extend no farther than power. Where is no power to do, is no duty. The act of assent which is called belief, is a necessary act. We have a moral duty to cultivate our understandings, to improve the faculties and talents we are endowed with as rational intelligent beings: it is our duty to inquire after truth, to collect proofs, and to weigh probabilities; for all these things, to a greater or less extent, we have power to do or

forbear to do. We have the same power to forbear to do them as to do them; as we will. But when at any moment a proposition is proposed to the understanding, the understanding necessarily assents to it, or does not assent to it, according to the preponderancy of the evidence at that moment present to the view of the understanding, on the one side or the other of the question whether it has a foundation in *rerum natura*, or has not a foundation in *rerum natura*, or whether it is or is not veritable: and this as fixedly as one body gravitates towards another, and as the heavier bodies attract the lighter, in the mundane system: it being as impossible to believe that which appears not probable, or less probable than the contrary, as for a river to ascend a mountain. This therefore being a point out of the verge of human liberty, cannot be a duty. It is reasonable to tell mankind it is their duty to study; to satisfy their minds of things they cannot have intuitive certainty of, and discover the probability of important questions that may have great influence on their condition.

Thirdly. The establishment is made a matter of contention, and a nursery of parties. The managers disagree among themselves, and aspire at predomination. The spread of these sectaries called baptists, methodists, presbyterians, universalists, quakers, congregationalists, episcopalians, and the like distinguished bands of opiniative speculators, has a bad effect upon the condition of human society, by the following modes of operation:—

1st. By cramping the minds of men in their speculative views of moral and natural relations, wherein their sentiments are contracted, and the development of philanthropic designs and sympathetic emotions is circumscribed or utterly blocked up. The prevalence of these sectarian doctrines to engross the speculations of the commonalty, is attendant upon the

multiplication of their meetings and the strife which they generate. Now their doctrines are generally of a nature to cramp the estimate of men's worth by conditioning their desert and imputed excellence upon mystical things beyond the grasp of natural power, and which are objects even transcendant to human comprehension : wherefore no worth and real excellence are to be discerned in their fellow creatures but what *they* are pleased to honor with that estimate, which are no other than what, passing with *them* as the only allowable signs of them, are their external conformity to the distinguishing ceremonies and discipline of the respective clubs or lodges, which they accept as a pledge of their fealty and effectual devotion to *their* aggrandising views. For when one is told that true christianity consists in a "new heart," and not told where-in this altogether differs from a disposition which arises from a desertion of bad principles and habits, and a pursuance of good ones—since the latter is competent to our apprehension, and the other is not ; it follows that moral excellence is resolved into a subtlety that is inconceivable by the human understanding, and the adjudication of merit involved in utter darkness and incertitude, wherefrom it becomes suspended upon caprice, and determined to arbitrary signs that sensibly mark *their inclination* with respect to the mechanical prevalence of particular bodies of men with such fashions and theories as they are upholding.

2. By infusing party spirit ; which is but a habit of distinguishing and contesting parties. Such a habit is strengthened by the influence of these sectarian operations ; consequently party spirit is strengthened by it, if not originated. This clashing of one party with another, and the aspiring ambition which attends it of excelling in strength and influence, the means to which are numbers, wealth, and show, effectually preclude social happiness in those communities where they are

operating. For their impressions are the very reverse of those feelings which constitute social happiness, therefore they are absolutely incompatible with it. Bickering and contumely rise out of these; and neighbors are unsocial and disobliging: their interests become in their view separated, by being associated with this fanatic extravagance which, at the beck of humor, diverges into different courses, the whole being established by tradition, and senseless apish *custom*, which, without perpension, travels in a beaten road.

3. It introduces aristocratical distinctions among the parts of civilized society. It leads up an aristocratical distinction of the qualities of different members of civil society at large, and breeds secret jealousies and unaccountable antipathies between different persons. For a professed adherent of one of these parties is hardly admitted to a free intercourse with the domestic society of another. A strict baptist shall not be thought competent to marry a methodist, nor a presbyterian a quaker: and a person of a liberal turn of mind, in the balance of whose estimate whatever distinguishes them is vanity or political artifice, shall be denounced by all as a cause of alarm: so that he must either be a downright hypocrite, or be scouted as a brutish, lowliv'd, thoughtless ninny, below the medium rank of quality, or else a dangerous character; in either case, thought unworthy of their intimacy. If he speak sincerely, he gives the preference to neither party, and condemns what constitutes their distinctions; and if he give the preference to none, he is thought to be of neither, and not to value what constitutes them: thence, he is excluded from very great privileges merely for his sincerity. Whereupon, if the principles of human estimation are resolved either into frivolous and fantastical things, or into inconceptible ones, it is plain that men are liable to be perversely estimated one by another. Their estimate must be

vague, defective, and erroneous ; for mankind must be esteemed for that which they do not possess or cannot achieve, or else disreputed for that which they cannot avoid.

Fourthly. The preaching that is accustomed, is not strictly steady to the dispensation of pure ethics or the impression of practical principles. To preach doctrines which are distinct from, especially if they militate against, true ethics, is obviously unfavorable to moral education, which immediately depends on the application of the principles of ethics. Instead of this, *mystery* is often preached. Contradictions are often held forth. Paradoxes and enigmatical subtleties abound in the preaching of the day. If there be any thing more eligible than ethics to be preached in order to promote moral education, it is that which goes directly to confirm or elucidate its dogmas : which may be any part of the physical world which shews the connection of causes and effects, and their permanent adaptation. Use is also had of these things to produce train and habit in thinking ; which are apt to conduce to stability. But our preachers customarily go beyond nature, and build up theories that baffle human comprehension. To preach mystery does at best but set the human understanding to conjecturing, instead of deducing useful truths, or purposing beneficent pursuits. And where this mystical preaching is, nothing more useful can occupy the thoughts of those whose attention is engrossed by it : so that if it does no *other* harm, it precludes that which would set the thoughts upon the contemplation and pursuit of good purposes and benignant views.

Fifthly. Most of the other ceremonies in use, have no conceivable utility ; and if they shew any thing they are designed to shew, more than that those who act them see fit to act them, it is by strained symbolizing : e. g. ablution, circumcision, genuflections, sacri-

fices, sprinkling, change of dress, &c. Now what natural connection have good thoughts with these things? What original affinity, or aptness to combine, have those ideas and feelings which constitute the excellences of our nature, and the ideas of these modes? Moral virtue certainly gets no advancement by the practice of these. Meekness, charity, gratitude, and hospitality, are not made habitual by the repetition of such sort of actions as these ceremonies. They divert from, and being put in the place of, effectually intercept the perfecting of the social virtues. Any ceremony that recommends or habituates any of these, as a contribution for the poor, for strangers, or for the promotion of any great and good work, is commendable, and worthy of rational beings.

Sixthly. Too much show and splendor are attached to the churches and other materials of an establishment. When we accustom ourselves to pageantry, and make the most alluring fascinating examples of it, to what amounts our preaching against vanity? How can we lift up our voice in indignant declamation against the pride of appearance, when we openly exemplify the very thing, and the churches over our heads, wherein we are denouncing vanity, are specimens of it? By what subtle knack in the art of oratory can we put on the aspect of sincerity when we are declaiming against that of which we indulge ourselves in the practice, for no other than that very reason by which we expose the imbecility of others, viz. because the multitude uses it? But this is not very often made the object of censure in pulpits, any more than any other vice: The main drift of public preaching, is theology. This magnificence is so strongly united to religion that it is thought to be a part of it.

Seventhly. A vile habit of prostituting the privileges of the sanctuary to occasions of personal ostentation and eclat, is tolerated; whereby young people come to

make the institution a mere hobby of vanity, and attend church constantly for the express purpose of shewing themselves, and curiously surveying others, with no other speculation in their heads but that which concerns the color, figure, and texture, of the stuffs and trappings that envelope their bodies, or their features, their sound, and motion, where the highest pleasure they aspire to, arises from the novel, pretty, and enamouring appearances hereby elicited, which making up the whole of their entertainment there, is all that moves them to attend.

Eighthly. The establishment is of such a nature, and is so estimated that an adherence to the exteriors of ceremony and discipline, and a professional acquiescence in the matters of belief, become a cloak of hypocrisy. The superficial gear of sanctimony is used as a cloak of hypocrisy. Whereas a scale of plain ethics, with instituted attendance on stated lectures, in plain easy habiliments, where extravagance is disallowed, would not be liable to be perverted into so base an appropriation. But *now* men can turn their religion into such a cloak because the essence of it is taken indefinitely to be *something besides mere beneficence*, and not clearly understood *what*. The children of this world, perceiving that moral virtue is universally admired, desire to get the honor of christianity without the trouble of it. Hence comes a counterfeit christianity. They patch up a sort of religion to serve their turn; it being their interest to make the rest of the world believe that christianity, which common sense teaches consists in the practice of those things which Christ taught and set patterns of, is essentially constituted of something very distinct from what we can come to a notice of by our senses, that is not vouchsafed even to the purest morality. It would cost too much to be real Christians. To be in fact grateful, charitable, hospitable, meek, or scrupulously just, would in-

cur too great an expenditure of this world's goods, too much circumspection, too much serious thought; and in earnest to act out the philanthropist in all his venturous mazes, would subject them to too much privation of selfish enjoyment. Therefore to cut a shorter and cheaper way to their end, they substitute long prayers, washings, groanings, punctilious sanctimony of port, attendance of church, &c.; thinking hereby to make their fellow mortals believe that they are Christians, and give them the honor of that which they don't have the trouble to practice. And in this way they ultimately aim to insinuate into those mortal observers the persuasion that they possess benignity, when in matter of fact they are void of it, and basely substitute this vile counterfeit for *true religion*.

Ninthly. The establishment is made a refuge of impiety. Just so far as any thing aids vice, it disserves virtue. Persons who have notoriously bad characters, get favor of the world by belonging to an establishment of this sort. Some, on the commission of sin, fly to penance as a screen from due punishment; as something that atones for their excesses, their oppressions, or their worldliness; so that being steady and true to this exterior tackling of religion, becomes a sort of sanctuary to wickedness; and as long as men can persuade themselves that there is in this, that which gives them the tutelage of heaven in spite of vice, we can hardly bound the mischief it does the cause of morality in *this* line, where its operation is rather underground. Not that every thing is evil in itself, that by being abused becomes the accidental cause of evil: but the wrong estimate, the wrong appropriation of things, are moral evil.

Tenthly. Those delegated to preach to and lead communities, are not, themselves, remarkable for exhibiting good examples; but often are what they ought with utmost zeal to preach against, examples of pa-

geantry, luxury, sullenness, worldliness, inhospitality, and sometimes superciliousness.

Eleventhly. The preaching is not designated, and limited in its kind by the popular authority of a community; insomuch that all preachers have the latitude of their imagination and caprice, to display their gifts, and proselyte knots of sticklers to a favorite scheme, by preaching theology, history, ethics, astrology, pneumatology, witchcraft, or conjuration. If it were made lawful *only* to preach *ethics* in their meetings, that is, in the religious meetings of all societies in a nation, the establishment would be better adapted to the right direction of our education. In this case a religious establishment would be a school of moral science; which it in fact ought to be, and which rightly conducted would redound to the honor of human nature. Whereas now our preaching is mostly of a sort that goes in at one ear and out at the other, (as the common phrase is,) not being correctly aimed at the objects it should properly influence; that is to say, the moving principles of moral life: and all this not solely on account of its irksomeness and repetitious way, but as much on account of the catachrestical and mystical nature of its matter. And this is one predominant cause of the trifling amongst young people and others, in their notice and use of religious ordinances. While serious and pathetic addresses on the nature, tendency, and consequences, of their voluntary actions, would insuperably seize their attention, which being continually chained to such objects, must habituate such a state of mind as would effectually rescue the faculties from the pursuit of vain or more pernicious themes. For the mind of man, particularly when in its vigor, must have some object to concentrate its energy: and that which is most exciting, will engross this energy, to the preclusion of others. This excitement works by way of the ruling passion; and *hereby* reason itself is called into activity, and gets improvement.

These are some of the most conspicuous circumstances that obviate the utility of religious establishments ; and the principal reasons why these establishments, as they are at present usually modified and managed amongst mankind at large, do no more conduce to the finishing of the moral part of human education. An improved establishment, I think would be one which should consist of the following primordial articles.

1. A spacious, commodious, though plain building, adapted to the comfort of people in general, for the use of the assembling of several persons together on stated days, to hear and inquire into important truths.

2. A speaker attending this building periodically, as one day in seven, to deliver discourses in ethics, on those things that are first and most essentially important for mankind to do, in the use of their faculties and government of their lives ; and who should be superior to all craft.

3. A habitual though not constrained attendance of the people of the country on those stated days, for the purposes above mentioned, and without pageantry.

4. Certain distinguishing permanent marks or pledges of the commendation of virtue and disfavor of vice, instituted to be awarded to certain courses of conduct ; which, in favor of virtue, should be proportioned to the general tenor of *their* carriage who by a given continuance in exemplification of the principles drawn from the ethical lectures they hear, evince such habits of mind, and such modes of the social affections as constitute certain degrees of the real excellence of rational mankind.

5. Select persons deputed to keep order, and apply those marks and pledges according to the sense of the society ; as well as to distribute and appropriate the funds appertaining to such society.

6. An institution of periodical collections by contributions of money or other means, for the relief of strangers, of poor, and for the promotion of other benevolent works.

Such an establishment I think would be useful to mankind in general, in all countries; and signally subserve moral education.

In this brief view of religious establishments I have not dwelt with particular scrutiny upon the tenets and manners that distinguish the pagan and other foreign establishments; but have in the main, centered my observations in those which are accustomed in the parts of civilized society where the sciences and arts at present stand at the greatest degree of advancement is extant; and that, for several reasons, whereof perhaps none is better than that it is proper for such to whose notice what I say may come, to study the improvement of the religion of their own country, and that, in the matter of their design, these establishments represent most other.

And thus I have taken a general, however imperfect, survey of the chief institutes used by mankind in education, and some of their most prominent defects; and hinted at some means by which I think they may be remedied: wherein, if I have suggested any thing that may be of use to excite any new train of thought in such as having superior genius and the means to carry their plans into execution, have power and inclination to pursue such sort of improvements to a beneficial result, I shall have the satisfaction of believing myself to have been a remote instrument of the happiness of some of my fellow creatures.

PART IV.

Draught of a practical scheme of Education.

CHAPTER I.

Of gradation in steps and forms of instruction, applied to the different stages of life.

All things have gradation. The universe is replete with marks of this mode. Every system of substance and mode is marked with this character ; and temporary works are not without it. All complex productions necessarily suppose gradation. All organized bodies have their growth, prime, senescence, and dissolution. There is not in the round of animated matter, such a thing as a system coming into light in a state of maturity. No animal, no vegetable, is known instantaneously to emerge to a state of absolute perfection in all its parts and powers. Not only the operations of nature, but all intricate works of art require gradation to effectuate their accomplishment. Every great accomplishment is constituted of accessory advances from small beginnings. No complicate machine that men contrive, is finished without deliberate comparisons, deductions, and progressively regular classification of thoughts, by the confirmations of experiment. All systematized things have their gradual and processional development. The vegetable principle re-

quires the successive application of several varieties of nutriment according to the progressive variation of its texture and appetencies, in order to advance to germination. The animal requires milk at first, before it is capable of converting harder matters to nourishment. And afterwards when the parts are extended and strengthened by consolidation of texture as well as by exercise, it is able to digest bread, and sooner or later, meat also. The capacity of intelligence likewise is gradually enlarged : and that which at first comprehends and can detain but one simple idea, comes to be competent to the intricate operation of abstraction, which comprises a variety of acts of the thinking agent, whereby at first comparing each of a large number of complex ideas with other, and considering them to coincide and agree in one of their simple components, though differing in all other parts, it makes this the representative of all those different ones, and keeping under its view this single idea not only, but also the idea of its representing all those and making a part of every one of them (in which it takes in at once obscure impression of each) and furthermore the idea of its relation to a determinate mark or articulate sign which it affixes to it as its constant representative, with an implicated reference to all those diverse particular beings the ideas whereof *this* collectively represents by a common property or ingredient, it frames to itself that sort of simplified complex ideas which is called an abstract idea, and comes at what is called *genera* or *kind* ; as *universe, animal, man*. Every important enterprise requires gradation to accomplish and bring about the end projected in it : as a war, an expedition, an embassy, a journey, a revolution of government ; the parts whereof successively coming into being, one cannot exist before the preceding one has existed, except the very first step in the undertaking, which as a link in the chain of causes (each part being

by reciprocal reference a cause and an effect of the preceding and succeeding one) may be the first impulsion of the principle of animation that awakens a motive to the purpose of that undertaking. Again; one part cannot take place before the other has prepared the way for it; and each is considered the cause of the possibility of the other.

Education likewise requires gradation. This is immediately deducible from the progressive nature of the human system itself, and of all its powers. The animal system progresses to a certain point, and then declines; successively loses what it had successively gained; and falls back to its original state. The powers of mind may still continue to progress and to increase in the proportion of its enlargements, when the body has past the climax of its maturity, and begins to decay. Nay even while it verges to the threshold of dissolution, the soul may reach accessions of knowledge and habit. Education as well as any other deliberate work, requires gradation. The compass of knowledge and habits the system can imbibe, cannot be superinduced at once, but must be done in gradual succession, and progresses even to the remotest day of life. This gradation is twofold; as it respects arrangement or train of subjects fit to be understood, to form a compass of knowledge and aptness; and as it respects the exercises appropriate and competent to be used in order to attain that. The adaptation of *both* is to peculiarities of constitution and condition. I have heretofore distributed the work of education into five stages of operation, each distinguished in some measure by the process fit to be pursued in it, but not bearing any invariable adaptation to the successive parts of the subjects' existence; since on the one hand the adaptation of each of these designs, i. e. inducing right associations; art of communication; correct impression of realities, mechanical movements in association,

and habits of virtuous movements, must be most properly to the exigency of those subjects, since it is not every one that comes at the perfection of either in the early part of life, some neglecting to acquire the reading and even the speaking of their own language correctly till years of maturity, and many, nay even the greatest part of the race fall short of a habit of virtue till the remote part of their lives, and too many, alas, never reach any thing that bears a close resemblance of it: and on the other hand, the man, in every part of his course, is susceptible of impression by each of these parts, in kind, (although he is less so of that of the second after the age of youth) if we except some mechanic associate motions; and indeed some of these may be induced in infancy. But to learn the art of rudimental articulation, no time is fitter than the early part of life, when the parts of the frame are pliant. Yet there are not any of these complicate sets of associations that make up the *arts*, to be perfected in infancy; but merely the primordials, the rudimental grounds of some distinguished ones to be introduced. Yet generally speaking, mankind may be advanced in knowledge and conceptions of realities (and indeed are so, insuperably to the concern of supervisors;) in determined combinations of ideas and emotions; in the art of using articulate signs with propriety; in moving several parts of their body voluntarily in conjunctive motion, as in trades and in formulary morality, in some degree or other, in all parts of their life after they begin to have distinct perception: at least the advance of these several parts of the work is alternate and confusedly promiscuous. I shall therefore, upon this occasion, make use of another division of the subject matter of the work of education, conformably to the conspicuous varieties of the successive periods of man's life; in doing which I shall consider three ~~ages~~ in that life as comprehending the scene of every part of this

business, which therefore I set under the denominations, education of infants, education of youth, and education of persons farther advanced in life ; of which I shall speak in their order. These ages, infancy, youth, and manhood, I shall consider under different measures than what for the purposes of other speculations are usually employed ; and extend them from birth to the tenth or eleventh year ; from that to the twenty-second ; and thence through the remainder of life. That portion of this business which I shall put under the appellation of infant education, is diversified by the several degrees of intellective capacity that intervene birth and the age of ten years. These degrees are various in different individuals. This variety depends on several causes, among which even the peculiarity of the animal constitution has some participation. This compass contains the most critical variations of treatment. The greatest and most effective modifications fall within the limits of this first period or stage of human life. It is a general truth, that within this small part of the natural extent of human existence, from birth to the eleventh year, the intellectual part undergoes more revolutions and diversifying impressions than have place in any other stage or stages of life. To this may happen exceptions, but it is what is most generally found to exist. The phenomena of these, give the strongest casts and most lasting discriminations to the first and chief faculties : and this is the reason why infant education is so much more nice than any other. Puberty puts a new aspect upon the system, and seems to renovate all its functions, as well mental as animal ; but it will generally be found upon examination, that indelible impressions are made anterior to that, upon the percipient frame, that generally determine the predominating temper and turn of the thinking powers that prevails in all succeeding parts of education. The education of

youth I consider to be that portion of our work which properly is commenced at this termination of infancy, and extended to the period when people are of fit age to provide, and wholly govern themselves. And after that, takes place the last part of education, wherein we are always our own tutors, whatever assistants we may have at our service.

The propriety of a practical scheme of education consists in common utility. For this end, the fittest *form* is that of a series of succinct rules which should exhibit a synoptical view of what is essentially necessary to apply, and that in the gradual order in which it is practically appropriate. To lay down unexceptionable rules for the conduct of education, is difficult. The difficulty arises from these three causes. 1. Diversity of constitutions. 2. Diversity of conditions. 3. Diversity of customs, habits, and degrees of intellectual improvement in those people that have the superintendence of the education of the young. These diversities have brought about such a modification of this business, that an unexceptionable system of practicable precepts for the thorough education of *one* human creature, dated from its condition in respect to those causes, shall be as different from a system equally adapted to finish the education of *another* human creature, as almost any two arts whatsoever, differ one from another. The truth is, in improving this art we must quit *circumstance*, and consider the human system as a blank unimpressed, and detached from all such influence. We are to consider human nature as a *unit*; and in the modifying of *this*, we shall find there are certain invariable prescripts to be drawn from the laws of nature, which are uniformly applicable in this behalf on all parts of the globe; to which even people of various manners may be allured, to the gradual countermining of the eccentric influence of their peculiarities of habit. For there are certain particulars wherein all

human beings are one and the same thing : and therefore are equal with one another. To have common utility, then, rules of this sort must be applicable to various cases. To be applicable to various cases, they must be universal. And if universal, they must be short. And this last requisite were a great excellence in any thing whatsoever to be put to practice ; since the less the memory is encumbered with particulars, the more ready is an aptness in conformable movements. But one inconvenience that may be incident to this method, is that many of the steps as important as any in the course of our work, may be overlooked and left without any particular directory, and certain gaps, as it were, left in our strict train of operations and measures, wherein the pupil being without guide suffered to ramble at the beck of his natural impulses, may engender bad qualities and habits, unchecked and unobserved. In reference to *this*, the possibilities of these are properly from time to time taken into account, and conformable provision of treatment collected into the precepts that are given. Nothing however is more evident than that mankind must necessarily be advanced gradually in their education : that they must know *some* truths before they can know some *other* truths ; that they must go through *some* exercises before they are competent to *others*. In fact, many repetitions of the same motion are required to have place, before such a thing as habit can exist : and the main part of our acquests is made up of habits. It being little else at last but some habit, facility, aptness, of either thinking or motion, that all we labor at to qualify ourselves or others with, finally resolves itself into. For it is the habit of placing two or more ideas together and taking a view of them in comparison as they relate one to another, that gives us that knowledge that is constantly useful to us. It is a habit of thinking that puts us in possession of most of our *opinions* and per-

suasions of mind, consolatory or directing. Habit makes the essential part of the arts. Art itself is but a habit of the mind prescribing rules for the production of effects according to nicely observed tendencies and powers of things. And virtue is very essentially dependant on habit, if it does not principally consist in it. So that finally it is little more than a bundle of habits we are contending for, in all our scrabble of education. Now, habit has a gradual rise. One degree of facility is produced by the first repetition of an action; another degree by the second repetition; and finally, the oftener it is repeated (within certain limits) the easier becomes the performance. Habit also is the main support of knowledge itself; for that which breaks out as in the the transient corruscation of a meteor, or like a flash of light, is of little use if it leave no trace of incidence or aptitude in the faculties by which it is realized, to disclose the like perception. A habit of comparing ideas together comes before extensive knowledge in any branch or branches whatsoever.

So then education, rightly conducted, progresses gradually from the beginning to the finishing of it; by a regular gradation in the steps by which it is conducted, and in the forms of the measures used in superinducing impressions and principles. What we can impress by elegant articulate language at the age of twenty, we are fain to make use of a very different vehicle to express at the age of two years. The latter indeed is not competent to apprehend the same extent of by any medium of communication whatever, and the former is capable of comprehending: yet the ideas of some things equally admissible to the understanding of both, though not by the same means of communication, a simpler process must be used upon the train of articulate determinate signs, whether learned to distinguish, nor to apply to the ideas.

they are usually made to stand for. Certain figures, colors, and proportions, may be conveyed to the minds of infants with as clear and strong impressions as those of adults are capable of, by shewing the perceptible subjects wherein these qualities are; but not by description made up of words. Also certain passions and emotions of mind can be represented very effectually by exhibiting the connected visible associate motions that seem originally to accompany them, while yet artificial language is not comprehended: and thus moral ideas can be adumbrated gradually to the infant mind. But artificial language, besides being an instrument of the conveyance of instruction, is of itself a great pursuit of education, and an important degree in our acquisitions; which requires a considerable amplification of the capacity of infants, to compass.

CHAPTER II,

Education of Infants.

SINCE the mind is continually liable to receive ideas by impressions on its several senses by exterior things, and has the power within itself to continue or stop any action of its own about these ideas, whereby other ideas are framed out of these ; it falls out that the infant gets a variety of ideas, and in fact almost of every sort except the most abstract, in spite of any confinement we can put upon the body. If this be so, the first thing that can be done to infants towards education, is not to supply them with original ideas, but to regulate the association of such as they have, and such as they have got independently of our interposition. This is that which takes place *first* in our processes of education: the first recourse there is occasion to apply. Infancy is from birth to the age of ten years. This is the part of life I have hitherto called adolescence. Within this it is plain, no part of education can be completed: yet something may be done in advance of each, particularly the three first parts. The most may be effected in the regulating of associations. In regulating these associations we cast the radicals of moral principles. For, as some of the first of these associations are framed, the affections are cast for life, in a general or sortal bias regarding some sorts of objects,—and that which is called the ‘ruling passion’ is constituted. One person is prevalently attached to fame; has greater desire of fame than of any other object. Some are governed by the desire of

riches: some, by that of dominion and ascendancy over others; some by that of sensual delights.

It has been said to be a "delightful task to rear the tender thought;" "to teach the young idea how to shoot;" "to pour the fresh instruction o'er the mind;" and indeed *is* pleasant to such as have first found or made their greatest happiness to consist in exercise of mind. To such as have, *themselves*, no pleasure in study, it is not pleasant; for it requires intentional application of mind first to know, and then to apply the principles upon which this art turns: and without a certain degree of improvement of mind, which depends on exercise of this sort, no such regulation can have place; that is, no competent superintendence of the subject, and no pleasure in the contemplation of such end. Yet the multitude reverses this rule of estimation. Training their infants conformably to their vague ideas of education, or rather (to no ideas of it at all) to personal biases to their offspring's feelings, and to their own averseness to close voluntary thinking, they disrepute studious persons for teachers of their children, and the more airish and vacant-minded any one appears to be habitually, the better he is likely to succeed in getting a livelihood by such an occupation; and *respect* too; for they reckon a sedate speculative person, one who being exercis'd in voluntary thinking whereby he is made competent to the very work that is important for him to attend in education, is not so communicative as many *triflers* who please more by their sound than any thing they signify by it, to be a kind of satire on themselves, who shun such speculations and despise such habits: at least, as they take no delight in his society, they cannot be expected to be very easy in a yoke that binds them to any permanent service. Therefore a person who loves learning and is given to much thinking, need not expect to get a very pleasant sustenance by

teaching children, either publicly or privately, for the bulk of civilized mankind: for they are the frolicksome, the loquacious, the versatile and the gay, who will constantly bear away the standard from him. Such being most *like* the multitude, the multitude will needs *like* them the best. There is too much fear of learning. I once heard an observing man seriously hold forth that 'a man of learning,' above all others, ought never to be employed in a school." Yet these things are the very reverse of what ought to be. This is a critical piece of work, that requires skill and meditation; and cannot be put in a sure train without cultivation of mind. Therefore study and learning are absolutely indispensable in the managery of the education of infants. Indeed the business itself, of teaching, is delightful. The forming of the mind, is pleasant. The inceptive treatment of the infant pupil, is of more consequence than people in general are apt to imagine. The first associations formed in the system, whether of ideas or muscular movement, in regard of their effect are the most tenacious, and hard to be superseded by others, for two reasons.

The reasons of the tenacity and firmness of these first associations, are two:—First, because the parts are delicate, tender, susceptible, and in a state of growing harder; so that when they become harder, retaining the same posture and movement they have been set agoing in, they are not so easily bent into any other sweep or mode. When once you get an associate movement establish'd in the delicate fibres of an infant, it is very hard to be superseded. Secondly, because there are no antecedent associations to alternate them, and by interposing an equal or ascendant aptitude, divert them in the way, from this one track they are trained to. The first motion any subject learns, is most natural to it, i. e. it has the most pure and perfect habit of, and is always most prone to. For, any

that is attempted to learn to it afterwards, will always be a possibility of its sliding out of, into that original one of which it once had a habit. So that it will be difficult to supersede it by *others* of so perfect a habit as this. Whereas it is not so incident, and scarcely feasible for this subject to lapse, in its course, into other sorts of movements it never learned; others which may exist in future, but never yet existed. Now this movement or mode is, in the system, nothing but certain fibres moving together; one fibre moving simultaneously with certain other fibres, or in a catenary consecution, one depending upon the other; and that whether sensitive fibres or muscular fibres, i. e. whether ideas be associated or muscular motions be associated. Now upon this principle, which I think is pretty generally granted, that the first associations are the strongest and of greatest effect, I think we may assert that upon this part of education depend all other. This is the foundation of the succeeding parts, from which they necessarily take their whole essential character, and are fashioned according as *this* is finish'd. So far from being no part of education at all, as too many of the multitude have persuaded themselves who deemed it impracticable to give a decided turn to the infant intellect, it is the most important part, of all the three. The whole substance of what this part includes, is 1, conducting the first associations, as those of certain substances and powers, causes and effects; and in fact we can go great lengths in moral ideas before the eleventh year: by maintaining devout attention and care, on this work, we may establish some most important and sublime moral principles within this period. This is not expected in the ordinary course of things, however: 2. Increasing knowledge and its materials: 3, training the vocal organs to articulation, and connecting certain ideas with such articulation that it may constitute determinate signs of

inward conceptions and feelings: 4, establishing habits of ceremonial virtue, in inuring such motions as conform to beneficent purposes: and 5, the introducing of some of the principles of mechanic arts into the system, by practice of some essential parts of an associate movement used in them;— as the motion of the fingers, fit for a musician; motion of the arms and hands fit for a shoemaker; motions of the arms and body fit for a carpenter; following designs, and tracing out objects of sight with the finger, chalk, pencil, fit for a painter. These things however trivial they may seem to be, are as sure to make those arts peculiarly pleasing to those who go afterwards to practice them, and therefore to facilitate the mastery of them, as any cause is sure to produce its natural effect. And this, not merely because the practice of the motions begets facility in them, but also because of the pleasure that is in their connection. Their association is with the first pleasures of life. They are not associated with the ideas of pain, labour, compulsion, resistance, servitude; but are, in the first place, set out with the apparant view of recreation only. They stand in the first rank; they have the first and therefore the strongest connection with our ideas of pleasure. It is but a comparatively little way that we can go in either of these parts, towards their perfection, in this part of life; yet the magnitude of what we can effect therein, is inversely proportionate. What little we can advance to do, has great consequence. It is the work of a foundation, on which a vast fabric is to rest. Those incidents and co-incidents that we slight, prove to be foundation-stones on which are to stand great pillars in the superstructure of active and social life. Their efficiency carries its influence far beyond the recollection of them. The most of what we can do is in the first and third parts: Here we can work clearly, and finish some work as we go; and enough to do *too*, that

is fitter for this season than any other. I shall throw down a few concise rules for the guide of such as undertake this business. I am not insensible of the difficulty that attends determining upon such practical directions as are unexceptionably applicable to all cases that occur in education. I attempt nothing but what is most general; that which, being what the laws of nature suggest as the fit treatment of a human creature according to the graduation pointed out by those laws, ought to be universal. The method I shall pursue is to set down a scale of short precepts or rules, upon the application and tendency of which, I shall interject some exegetical notes. Those of this kind which follow, I intend shall comprehend in close order, the essentials of what is necessary to do in the treatment of the human powers in this period.

RULE I. *Restrict the subject to simple and mild nutriment.*

This and some of the succeeding rules immediately concern health and animal constitution; and belong to that part which is call'd 'physical education' in distinction from 'intellectual and moral.' But all these parts have a mutual and several concern with the common end of education in general. One of the moral precautions of this rule, is, that by too great stimulus the sensorium may not be overcharg'd with the violence of sensation, and the intenseness of its pleasure turn into pain and produce irregular and impetuous volitions. The application of this rule has place whenever the child is sustained without the breast; which in some instances is even from birth. It is applicable in all parts of this age.

RULE II. *Give the body a due temperature, in regard to heat.*

In the application of this rule are two things to which we should specially consider ourselves directed, as implicated in it ; i. e. to keep the head cool, and the feet and other extremities moderately warm ; which may be done by the effect of assuetude from the beginning, tempering the former to the ordinary vicissitudes of the atmosphere, and wrapping the latter in warm enclosures. This hinders not but that the feet may, by being accustomed to an equal exposure with the face and hands, from their earliest infancy, (but the other parts of the body should be proportionally exposed) come to retain an equal temperature with the face and hands without breaking the constitution. Some of our northwestern tribes walk the snows with their naked feet. To keep the head cool, is more urgent. To do this, is to moderate the temperature of the blood by regulating the stomachic stimulus, and also to disuse warm wrappers, caps, napkins, &c. that confine and unduly warm the head and neck.

RULE III. *Use the body to exhilarating voluntary exertion, with due limitation.*

The uses of this rule are to strengthen the frame, to facilitate motion by habit, to promote cheerfulness by dispending the accumulated power of volition, and to promote nutrition by assisting the natural motion of the animal machinery. Here we may very aptly begin those motions that are propitious to some of the arts ; if there be any particular trades we have a predilection for the pupil to become master of in future, whereof he is capable of imitating any of the movements, it is obvious they

can never be more advantageously set out than now.

RULE IV. *Let the exercises be accompanied with clearness of perception, and freedom of thought.*

Hereby you lead the moral and mechanical associations into a proper train. An assemblage of applications, and desultory address, induce confusion and retard improvement. Observe also in applying these, to give the subject freedom of examining variety of substances by his senses.

RULE V. *Accustom all parts of the frame to those postures nature put them in.*

Keep the back straight: this has great effect. Our western Indians lash their infants upon boards, and carry them on their backs, from birth, so fast bound that they cannot put their spine nor shoulders out of that posture. This they do for the beauty or dignity that belongs to the appearance of such a straight posture, which is always easy for them to preserve afterwards. Yet this violence never appears to injure their constitutions. The natural position of the back, is straight; yet none is more apt to sway from that and settle in a bend, when accustomed thereto ever so little. The custom of the first stage of life, in this respect, is of irreversible consequence. I should recommend, by gentle confinement, to accustom the body to such a straight posture when young. It is agreeable to a healthy action of all parts of the system; preserving them in their natural places. Tight bandages are ruinous to the constitution.

RULE VI. *Expose to fresh air, and habituate to cold.*

The Indians plunge their infants into cold water each morning after birth. These two rules immediately concern health of body. But there is this connection between the body and mind, that by rendering the former hale, we make the other strong and vigorous.

RULE VII. *Restrict the stomach to a regular limitation of the quantity of alimantal stimulus.*

This is founding spontaneous temperance, and a healthful constitution.

RULE VIII. *Keep the body clean, and the cloth that enwraps it regularly purified.*

RULE IX. *Let the hours of refreshment, shifting of dress, sleeping, waking, rising, and exposure to fresh air, be constant and regular as far as is practicable.*

RULE X. *Accompany gratifications with smiles in your countenance.*

RULE XI. *Let all gratifications follow quiet, suppleness, and signs of reverence in the subject.*

Seize those opportunities when it is quiet and free from impassioned agitations, to produce all its allowed gratifications, and fill it with pleasurable emotions; that they may not be catenated, in its ideas of causation, with malignant applications. The reverse practice inclines it to a habit of expressing anger and grief on its natural infirmities, and on every pain and offence.

RULE XII. *Never let gratifications follow expressions of anger, rage, impassioned agitations of mind, in the subject.*

This rule is applicable both early and late in infancy. The reverse of this, obviously tends to the encouragement of a malignant disposition. Never give a child any gratification that it cries for, till such time as it is perfectly quiet.

RULE XIII. *Let few or no sounds that are signs or expressions of anger, go into its ears.*

Let all be regular, tranquil, and serene, around it. Set before it specimens of the usual accompaniments of cheerfulness, placidity, constancy, integrity.

RULE XIV. *Let pain follow every vindictive exertion, such as squalling by virtue of resentful emotions, or even from slight pain.*

RULE XV. *Rightly connect the ideas of effects and results, with those of their proper substantive causes, by shewing.*

This is a great part of the business that concerns and regulates early associations.

RULE XVI. *Be cautious of fixedly associating the ideas of pleasure or pain with those of objects whose degrees change the effects, and operate contrary ones.*

Fire, in one degree of its efficiency, produces pleasure by way of its warmth and lustre: in another degree of it, it produces pain by its heat and daze.

RULE XVII. *Accompany your commands with an aspect that by way of usual association, is indicative of the idea of dignity.*

RULE XVIII. *Accompany your advice, counsel, exhortation, with the indexes of affection.*

RULE XIX. *Let your approbation and what follows your acquiescence, be attended with the indication of serene pleasure.*

This insinuates a persuasion in the child, that your happiness stands connected with its own welfare.

RULE XX. *Never threaten cruelty nor severity of punishment where any other expedient is better adapted to the end.*

RULE XXI. *Let punishment strictly follow what deserves it, when it is threatened.*

RULE XXII. *Make one corporeal punishment suffice for the breaking up of one bad habit, so far as that sort of punishment will serve.*

RULE XXIII. *Put the child to trials of attention, by urging repetition of ideas, or staking some optable desideratum with some one particular attainment of that sort.*

As counting out a thousand needles or wafers, and assorting them according to each distinguished variety.

RULE XXIV. *Never give it any thing it importunes for.*

Short-sighted indeed is that person who does not perceive that it is learning children to importune, to grant them gratifications for importunity ; and that repeatedly granting them with reluctance what they have a while importuned for, is actually alluring and training them to the business of teasing.

RULE XXV. *Exercise it in comparing, compounding, and other operations of intellect.*

RULE XXVI. *In order to this, train appropriately the imitative faculty, and that by the alluring recourse of such accompaniments as are universally indicative of pleasurable emotions, and complacent views of an intent mind.*

RULE XXVII. *Let the first specimens of articulation you exhibit for its imitation, be distinct and proper.*

Children whose organs are not defective or impeded, will as soon habituate the imitation of such, so far as it is voluntary, as of corrupt ones.

RULE XXVIII. *Effectually interdict its requesting that which it is not fit or feasible to grant.*

Asking for any thing, increases the desire of it : and this as naturally as the repeating of any action produces habit. For the request is a voluntary action, of which the desire makes a part, which by being made habitual, is more incident ; and the repeated perception of the want of the desired object and of the possibility of attaining to it, (which involve the repetition of the idea of that object itself or thing requested) naturally making the subject more sensible to the privation, increases the desire.

RULE XXIX. *To imprint the names of things, and rightly connect them, present and exhibit to their proper senses the beings they are put for.*

This is useful, not only to associate the names with the distinct archetypes, but to supply clear and distinct ideas of the beings. In the want of the substances themselves, or when they are not so easily accessible to perception, we advantageously use miniature prints of them for this purpose.

RULE XXX. *Accompany the names of things with shewing true prints or models of them, when they*

are to be had ; in other cases with sembling or shewing the uses of them.

RULE XXXI. *Impress upon its sense and memory the elementary characters of your native language.*

RULE XXXII. *Join the precise sound of every letter to the figure of it, in the perception of the pupil.*

Several repetitions of an alphabet are generally necessary, with this simultaneous pronunciation very clear and emphatical, of the appropriate sound of each letter as it is shewn for the child's imitation, before any permanency can be given to such connection.

RULE XXXIII. *Lead the discerning power to the peculiar discrimination of every letter whereby it varies from others ; and associate this discrimination with that application of sound.*

The application of this rule is not without embarrassment. The power of discernment has very different degrees in different subjects. For a general method, I know of none better than to variously repeat these ideas, i. e. preserve the uniformity of sound and figure, with a change of all other accompaniments in their assemblage of associations,—when the characters shall be exhibited and named in all consistent variety of positions, trains, and tribes.

RULE XXXIV. *Give the subject tasks of drawing, from natural and artificial models as soon as it can work its fingers to the grasp and carriage of a pencil.*

It is recommendable, as soon as it can retain in memory the distinct forms of the letters, with their names, to task it to draw these forms with a pencil or otherwise, to their names : nothing tends

more to rivet their distinctions in the memory, and the association of the names *with* them.

RULE XXXV. *Teach it to read.*

In this is comprised the spelling of words, and giving them their proper enunciation and arrangement; and they both should be united in a task; as spelling a sentence and then giving it its regular utterance without spelling.

RULE XXXVI. *Teach it to write.*

In this is essentially included the proper grasp and wielding of a pen. To teach to draw characters with a pencil or finger, is inadequate to this.

RULE XXXVII. *Teach it the fundamental rules of arithmetic; and give it time to comprehend the reason of them.*

The chief utility of this at this period, is to call into exercise the faculty of reasoning.

RULE XXXVIII. *In application of the three preceding rules, send the subject to a public school, if such be established upon pure republican principles and judiciously conducted; otherwise let its education be conducted at home. But whether you send it from home to a public or private school, or carry on the work altogether at home, fail not to watch with scrupulous supervision the progress of the work; encourage and stimulate to apply its powers and thoughts a proper and successful way, according to a judicious plan of your own; and co operate with good teachers in their management of this business.*

RULE XXXIX. *Never speak contemptuously or diminutively of a teacher, before a child; nor of the profession in general.*

RULE XL. *Never speak sarcastically of any neighbor or stranger, in presence of a child.*

RULE XLI. *Impress the meanings of abstract words, by simpler words previously understood.*

RULE XLII. *Teach the abstract meaning of those general marks and appendages by which words are diversified.*

RULE XLIII. *As soon as the child can understand common language, accustom it to a due freedom of converse intercourse with yourself: let this intercourse be characteris'd by decency, truth, liberality, candour, and moderation.*

RULE XLIV. *Talk pathetically to it of the powers and moral relations of its actions: disclose your feelings in the consequence of them.*

RULE XLV. *Teach it moral reasoning; excite reasoning in moral ideas.*

This rule may be effectually applicable after the ninth year.

RULE XLVI. *Indulge no unreasonable appetite or habit, within its notice.*

RULE XLVII. *Never chastise a child for what it does by mishap or compulsion: although you may chastise it for its heedlessness, yet let it be known that it is merely for its heedlessness and not for what falls out by it.*

RULE XLVIII. *Let the pupil fully into the reasons wherefore his constraint to conform to certain measures is, as soon as he is capable of moral reasoning; but do not relax this constraint in the least, on this account.*

RULE XLIX. *Be cautious of positively accusing a child of any thing you abhor, without having knowledge of its guilt; and never peremptorily charge it with a fault it denies, without conclusive evidence that it is guilty of it: othe wise, if it be in fact clear, you prejudice the child against yourself, and bring on in it a slight of verity.*

RULE L. *Never promise a child any thing which you do not seriously intend punctually to perform.*

RULE LI. *Never flatter it with the expectation of things not in the highest degree probable.*

For want of observance of these two foregoing rules, many pupils are injured by tantalizing. They get a habit of cherishing vain hopes of vile goods of fortune; which drags down the mind to a very scanty circuit of speculation, and prepares it for base pursuits.

RULE LII. *Open not upon its mind any splendid views of future life that seem to evolve very desirable improvements of condition, even if they appear to yourself ever so probable.*

Futurity exists not. Many young persons from the age of nine to twelve, are led into very delusive reveries that involve them in distracting and ruinous speculations, the issue whereof is but to sour their tempers and blast the genial germs of gratitude and benevolence in their hearts; which even sometimes suppresses natural affection itself. Never raise any expectation of this kind, otherwise than as a regular consequence of diligence and temperance: such illusions seldom fail to bring about disastrous reverses in their trains of reflection.

RULE LIII. *Cordially acquiesce with the tyro in any recourse of its own original invention, if it tend to more usefulness than waste.*

Hereby you encourage in the most endearing and at the same time innocent manner, the liveliest and noblest exertions of intellect.

RULE LIV. *Be cautious of exemplifying the association of the pleasures of wit with slander, within the notice of the pupil.*

RULE LV. *Keep the subject clear and aloof from the extravagances of fashionable companies herding together upon the celebration of nugatory or baleful manners, till long after the termination of infancy.*

RULE LVI. *In application of those rules that immediately regard the perfecting of the particular faculties and functions of intellect, pursue the same course as in giving habit to any mechanic function; i. e. practical repetition of exertions, which is the universal access to all ascendancy that comes by habit.*

RULE LVII. *In order to associate pleasure with the pursuits of intellectual improvement, keep up an example of the use of books, and accustom yourself to speak of their entertainment.*

RULE LVIII. *Insinuate a proper estimate of books, by example of a choicè regard and careful use of them.*

CHAPTER III.

Education of youth.

The age of youth I call that season of life which, commencing after the tenth year, supposes some of the governing associations in the system, whether of ideas or other movements, to be formed ; and some little advance made by the child in the other parts of education, especially in articulation, in the knowledge of things, and in ceremonial morality. This is a general account of civilized society's proceeding ;—what takes place in the greatest number of individual instances. I extend the age of youth to the twenty-second year of life, being that which civilized communities have fixed as the bound of minority, whereat their laws set their members free from the control of parents and guardians, as the most agreeable to nature. From the age of 10 years, then, to the age of 21, takes place the scene of that stage of education which is called the education of youth. Truly some attain discretion sooner than others, and seem to be entirely fit to govern themselves long before that period ; but this limit is that which has the most general adaptation to reality. The education of youth may be as laborious and trying in some parts, as the education of infants ; but not so consequential ; for it is easier for manhood to supercede the impressions of youth, than youth those of infancy. It is easier in men's education of themselves to correct the errors of the education of youth, than in the education of youth to correct those of the first stage of education ; for there be those impressions

incident to and inseparable from infant education, that seem to be insuperable and carry their effects to the last of our existence, though we can in no wise recollect the impressions themselves. Many of the same precepts are appropriate *here* as are fit for the preceding part, though applied in a different extent. We tread the same round, in part; but finish some of that work whereof the capacity of infants admits only of a partial advance. In this period takes place the propriety of some variation in the treatment of the two sexes, in the carrying on of this work. But this is not of that measure that some would have it. The education of the female and male must in some degree vary, of course, in conformity to the different parts they are to act in life; but in the absolute extent of erudition, and quantity of accessions in acquired excellence, I think they should not stand materially apart. Some have maintained an opinion, that '*girls ought not to have so learned an education as boys.*' Upon what principle they ground this persuasion I know not unless it be the supposition that girls are prone to make a dangerous use of learning: for otherwise why this premonition against giving girls as much help of erudition to enlarge and enrich their understandings, as boys? Or do they mean by *learning*, or *learned education*, the extent and number of those particular arts and sciences that are practically employed in subsistence, and make professional characters? For it is admitted girls have no need to learn, and ought not to spend their time (which might be employed upon something more elevating and improving) to learn geometry, surveying, and navigation; because these arts and sciences are opposite to their commonly design'd ways of living, in the civilized world at large: and since they are not what they are usually called to practice, to confine their thoughts to them were keeping them out of that which might more

profitably elevate and liberally replenish their minds with such things as are a source of comfort and delight, as well as practical utility in social life. But the female is not to be idle, nor employed about meaner themes than those.

They are indeed during their lives to be employed mostly in household affairs, but it is not only fit that they be possessed of such intellectual goods as afford as high entertainment as the opposite sex attain to, and the highest enjoyment any of us is capable of, but particularly that they have the skill of educating children correctly. In the name of common sense, is not the female soul of as much value as that of the male? Indeed there is no need of girls' being punctiliously proficient in several practical portions of science which none but males are wont to put into use, such as those of surveying, navigation, practical astronomy, mechanics, &c.; but their faculties are worthy of as high cultivation as those of the male. It is from the improvement of the faculties of the soul, that our greatest happiness, our chief good, results. All cultivation of mind subserves the advance of our perfection as intelligent and passive beings. To improve these faculties, as well as to store with what may be serviceable to entertainment or action we keep the girl in exercises of grammar, arithmetic, geography, logic, or whatever other useful sorts of knowledge we happen to have the opportunity and materials to draw her notice to: for by exercise, the faculties are improv'd. It is use and application that strengthens them. Hereby the capacity is enlarged, and the agent made susceptible of that pleasure that pertains to contemplation, meditation, and abstraction. Study exalts the human mind to this point, whether in the female sex or male. What time the boy takes up in perfecting himself in certain arts and sciences that are of a masculine appropriation, the girl is consistently put to needlework, sewing, or to studies of a more

general and entertaining nature than the boy is pursuing, that embellish the mind with more engaging endowments which tend to diffuse animating charms over the scene of social intercourse. And here, although women cannot be so great mathematicians and artists, yet they have a chance to be greater moralists, if their thoughts be conducted into this track early, while the opposite sex is taken up with different views. And if there be many arts and many compasses of science which men ought properly to be more thoroughly versed in than women, to whom they are not necessary as lying out of the way of the concernment of their destined conditions in life; it does not follow that therefore 'girls ought not to have so learned an education as boys;' that they ought not to have so much learning, so great a quantity of learning as boys;—for the extent of erudition I don't conceive is any where dangerous to them, nor with them, more than the other. The study of solid science humanizes, while it not only liberalizes their views, but sets them above vanity. The study of solid science is equally important to establish *their* worth; and perhaps *here*, it is more influential abroad. I don't think it would injure a female to be possessed of the whole circle of sciences.

The first years of this age are the most critical part of it. A peculiar susceptibility of moral and intellectual biases, is assignable to this conjuncture. This seems to be a time of life when the power of voluntary thinking having got the start of the animal powers, a trifle is able to turn the superflux into a particular course. This, I say, is accumulation of a particular variety of sensorial power, whose force like the momentum of an overswelling body of waters, carries it irresistibly forward into the first furrow into which it finds a vent. Hence the *taste* is wont to be fixed at this juncture, and tracks of genius struck out, that are kept in eye through life. All this depends very much

on what has taken effect in infancy. From the accumulation of power of voluntary thinking, and also sensitive, when there not having existed any accountability for any plans of active life, nor any great cares nor pleasures, the energy hereof has not had its recourse of exhaustion, it is *here* liable to take a long and weighty sweep. And this portentous calm in life, this spell, this boding intemperature in the intellectual region, is the original of incalculable variagations in the scenes of moral and sensitive life, both painful and pleasurable; and is of great moment to be husbanded in the most careful manner, and filled up with judicious inculcations. All the processes of education can be advanced in this age of life. All manner of association, knowledge and opinion, language, and almost every art, may get an important degree. The first and chief ideas we ought to impress by strong association, are implied in these three abstracted ones, causality, obligation, and progression. These are what we should labour to establish *first*, in this stage, in the department of associations. The following rules comprise the principal of what is necessary to do in education of youth.

RULE I. *Teach the youth penmanship, grammar, arithmetic, and geography.*

In application of this rule, follow rule thirty-eighth in education of infants; and observe the general recourse of repetition of impressions, and association of due pleasure with them. Teach universal grammar as soon as the subject is able to apprehend its maxims.

RULE II. *Having in infancy impressed it with a reverential regard of your own person, shew the youth by exemplification that you respect its tutor as a brother, and persuade it that you reckon it as*

important to enforce obedience, respect, and submission, to one as to the other.

RULE III. *Never put a young scholar immediately upon a task which he has been repeatedly baffled in attempting to get the mastery of ; since every new trial adds a disagreeable association that, being painful, proves a clog that impedes not only this particular undertaking, but casts a disparagement upon study in general.*

RULE IV. *Let the pupil carefully and legibly write down what it is to commit to memory.*

One such exercise is equivalent to a dozen recitations, in efficacy of making the matter of the theme familiar.

RULE V. *Freely answer all its serious inquiries, whether in natural, moral, or rational philosophy. Answer it sincerely and candidly too, in such words as it can understand, giving it all the satisfaction it is able to receive by such communication ; for curiosity ought not by any means to be repressed, but under proper direction stimulated, it being the vital principle of all scientific proficiency.*

The application of this rule must have this qualification,—that it be protracted till such age as seems to indicate capacity to apprehend their simplest and most expressive answers ; till which time the loquacity of youth's inquisitiveness should be circumscribed, and they taught silent musing. This will have good fruits in them.

RULE VI. *Set an example of constancy : let this be impressive : there is no other way to substantiate the principle of stability but to exhibit an evenness of conduct to the tyro's sensitive observation, that, acting on the imitative faculty in association*

with the pleasurable ideas of natural affection, favoritism, and recollected beneficence, forces itself to his approbation.

RULE VII. *Give it rousing representations of what it is progressing to, in a course of nature modified by its voluntary actions.*

RULE VIII. *Let one corporeal chastisement be sufficient and effectual, so far as any thing of that kind serves the turn to dissuade from a bad course : in order to this, it must be distinguished by the following circumstances : 1. That it be sufficiently painful ; 2. That it be applied at the proper conjuncture, and the sufferer made to perceive that it is done for that which deserved it ; 3. That it be attended by solemnity of preliminary examination, and ceremonials that favor reflection.*

RULE IX. *Teach it sorts of signs ; and the classification, derivation, and declining of words.*

RULE X. *Store it with abstract ideas in moral modes and relations.*

This enables to reason on such themes ; dignifies, and substantially entertains.

RULE XI. *In training the reasoning power, give the pupil time and scope to open its views, and rather allure than compel.*

RULE XII. *Give the youth opportunity to freely gratify its curiosity by examining the usual ways of society abroad, where it is not exposed to ruinous temptations ; and afterwards faithfully explain to it the novel appearances that have come under its view.*

These things associate pleasure with knowledge ; make the pupil have pleasure in knowledge, and

pleasure in the society of yourself in the character of its teacher.

RULE XIII. *Teach it natural history.*

RULE XIV. *In teaching the sublime arts, as poetry or oratory, let the pupil, on committing models to his memory, throw off the expression and clothe the ideas in his own; and registering these, recite them afterwards in answer to a suggestion of each clause of the propounded task.*

RULE XV. *Give the girl equal improvement of mind with the boy.*

RULE XVI. *Teach them the elements of astronomy, logic, and geometry.*

Apply rule xxxviii of the education of infants.

RULE XVII. *Fix the boy's animal love to a single object, and convert it to sentimental love.*

Represent the object in an attracting light. No matter if the object be hypothetical, so that he be persuaded it is real, and it be so conformed to nature that it be constituted of nothing over and above what he can some future day easily find in real existence; its attributes no way transcending what is frequent in reality. Rousseau remarked that 'a young man is either in love or is a debauchee:' and indeed we shall do better to direct, qualify, improve, and facilitate, the course of nature than attempt to repress it. But the predominating attractions of this object are to be moral and intellectual.

RULE XVIII. *Transfer the energy of the girl's animal love to moral and sentimental beauty.*

In order to effectuate this, we must endeavor to associate more pleasure, i. e. the idea of more prevailing pleasure, with such beauty, than is

joined to other, sensible objects that act as excitements to animal love, make such beauty more pleasing than sensible beauty, which can only be done by its having a stronger and wider intervolution with pleasurable ideas.

RULE XIX. *Talk pathetically and argumentatively to the girl of the danger, the fatal consequences of unguarded and promiscuous conjunctions ; and of the advantages, the happiness, the safety, the utility, of an instituted union with an individual.*

RULE XX. *Describe and point out to her contemplation an attracting and virtuous individual ; (not a real one who is a neighbor, lest it encumber with solicitude and subject to disappointments.)*

It will not frustrate this design for *them* to be sensible in the advance of it, that this object, as such particularly denominated and circumstanced one, is fictitious instead of being real ; so that this energy is collected and habituated to act on a determinate point, directed by proper qualifications of such object.

RULE XXI. *In application of the three preceding rules, avoid repressing sympathy, but deduce to her the duty of a candid, pacific, honorable, free, liberal, reasonable procedure, towards those of the opposite sex ; justly disclose the malignity of tantalism, and lay open the odious nature of coquetry. Let sympathy (by refining reason) be cultivated, not repressed.*

RULE XXII *Talk persuasively to both the boy and the girl, of the fitness, the importance, the urgency, and the agreeableness to the moral and physical laws of nature, of the connubial compact, a faithful and permanent concentration of the affection in an individual.*

RULE XXIII. *Collaterally herewith, argue the preliminaries of securing a station commanding the means of comfortable living.*

These things allure them to industry and diligence; keep their thoughts from dissipation, and from extravagant flights of vague concupiscence.

RULE XXIV. *Teach them the foundation of morality; the reason of all duties: explain apologues, inuendoes, parables, and fables, to insinuate the spirit of valuable dogmas, and practical maxims important to put into use.*

RULE XXV. *Open to the aspiring mind the most engaging traits of scientific structures; lead it to the most attractive beauties of the moral world.*

RULE XXVI. *Talk to them of what their train of voluntary conduct is carrying them to, and how your own experience stands related to it.*

RULE XXXVII. *Speak pathetically of what their parents have undergone on their account, and with what views; and what objects of hope sustained them therein.*

RULE XXVIII. *Regularly appropriate their time to properly distributed employments diversified with intervals of meditation; and let them be constantly and usefully busy.*

RULE XXIX. *Disallow their close pursuit of tracts of speculation their condition does not admit them to put into actual use.*

RULE XXX. *Cordially befriend them in such themes of their choice as be allowable.*

RULE XXXI. *Give the boy one useful mechanic art at least, be his external condition what it may; and give the girl the complex art of housewifery.*

This hinders not giving them sublime arts, and science that is to form what are called professions in life, when your condition admits of it.

RULE XXXII. *Talk of your genuine sentiments on morals to others in their presence.*

RULE XXXIII. *Express to them personally those same sentiments at some other opportunity.*

Hereby they will be likely to be confirmed.

RULE XXXIV. *Keep them in their leading strings till twenty-one years of age; yet through the four last of those years, let them be rather friends and companions to you than servants: and let them be so well habitated to compliance that it is pleasure to comply, and having their work set out and the day properly divided, that they go without the least compulsion or direction, to finish it faithfully. In the meanwhile talk familiarly and instructively to them on topics important for them to contemplate, with the same freedom as to any equal.*

RULE XXXV. *Set before them an example of all the virtues.*

The best way to keep them clear of the influence of bad example without depriving them of an accurate knowledge of the world, is to counteract foreign example by your own.

RULE XXXVI. *Practice wary admonition to direct them in the forming of friendship and other weighty connections in civil intercourse, and to shape their habitual plans to rectitude.*

In a strict adherence to the foregoing rules I think we shall find a very sure way to bring forward the young to a maturity of discretion, and prepare them for usefulness, honor, virtue. It may be objected the

diversity of the human character frustrates their use ; since one is capable at the age of ten, of what another is to be initiated in at eighteen.

Answer :—These rules are not conformed to the results of custom and prescription : let children in general be trained precisely under all these rules of treatment, according to the exact extent of their import, from birth to the age of twenty-one years ; and I presume that at the latter period, their diversity in temper and active powers, will not be great.

CHAPTER IV.

Education of people more advanced in life.

THERE is a time when youth is swallowed up in the prime of men's parts and the climax of their age. There is a time of life when youth and childhood being left behind, all their privileges and prospects being cassated, a different state of things supervenes. There comes a day in the progress of man's life, when all the scenes of infancy and youth having successively vanished and gone by, he shakes off all yokes and restraints of parents, tutors, nurses, guardians, and sets up for his own guide. There is a season of life which is called manhood : but this word has been applied by some, to that which by another word is puberty, and virility, the period when the species is capable of generation, commonly limited at the fourteenth year. The consideration I have had of this matter, has superseded this arrangement for *another* wherein I had only in view the adaptation of the several stages of education, which depends on the graduation, not of the animal powers, but of the intellectual. And of this we can come at no perfect unexceptionable standard, because nature seems to have made some little diversity in that department of the human constitution whereon the intellectual capacity depends, whereby we come into the world with different powers of mind (in the passive sense of the word) which the same proceeding will carry to different and unequal acquests in the same times. We can approximate it by some general measure of distribution, to which

none seems to have a more conspicuous propinquity than that which the most refined governments have bounded by the termination of pupillage and minority. This part of education, that is, of such as having advanced beyond this point, are properly men and women, or the consistent depositaries and suscipients of self-government, is usually conducted by the persons themselves who are the subjects of its effects,—who are in some sense both agents and objects: since persons having no visible superior to controul their private conduct, must in propriety have the charge of the arrangement of those measures and processes whereby they are advanced in knowledge, aptness, and art. The capital desiderata the scope of this part temporally terminates in, i. e. the things men generally seek to promote themselves in by education, are a livelihood independent of charity; knowledge of the world; ease from laborious exertions of invention and bodily strength to accomplish the necessary purposes of life; and extension and refinement of their absolute enjoyment. To live independently of the charity of others; to live easy; to be acquainted with the world; and to live happy;—these four pursuits are those which comprehend whatsoever men reckon upon as being their desired investiture, in the immediate aim of their enterprize of education.

I. To live independently of charity, the main chance is to establish and habituate some sure expedients to compass the materials of sustenance; as a mechanic art, or something else that can bestead them in this behalf. To settle themselves into fixed stations is a great adminicle, in this way, which very few decry. A fixed tenable station securing opportunity to carry on the business of life, is an important desideratum with all who set out to live honestly and honourably without having recourse to solicitations of alms or favor. Education discovers these expedients, and

gives the power to use them successfully : and this is no mean pursuit neither ; for he that depends on the charity of mankind, is in danger of falling short of the means of life, if not of life itself.

2. Another thing men drive at, is knowledge of the world ; by which is intended knowledge of *things* that are *in* the world ; whether it be of the actions of men, and the operations and revolutions in general that are going forward there ;—or the knowledge of the make and powers of animals, vegetables, and minerals, that make a part of it ; or that of the affections of substances in general. There is a knowledge of the world that is not commendable to be advanced in the young : and is no way delectable to the considerate, even though it may be useful : and that is a knowledge of its vanities and vices ; the inventions of the malignant, the voluptuous and the idle. Yet to know even the corruptions of the world, their rise and ends, is necessary in order to avoid them, to such as have the direction of their own course through life. But a general indubious acquaintance with the realities around us, is obviously useful in every point of our agency, and has a utility that is acknowledg'd on all hands.

3. In the third place men think by education to get ease from laborious and racking efforts of mind and body to bring about those effects that are indispensable in the preservation of life. In this view all those machines that are used about the arts, and various subtly contrived methods of bringing about what required much labour of body or casting about of mind, have their origin. Which though requiring extraordinary exertions of mind, and perhaps body too, to complete them, yet being done to get rid of the necessity of them, this labour is lightened by that consideration : men being content to go through great hardships in the present moment, for the sake of being entirely at

ease from labour in future. Fame, however, the idea of applause, is a great stimulant to inventions. Moreover, this pursuit may be carried to excess. These easing arts may be carried to excess; so far to excess as to shorten our usual length of life;—for stong voluntary exertion prolongs life.

4. With regard to the extension and refinement of real enjoyment, although it properly expresses the approximation to the true end of education, and is in fact the natural tendency of it when rightly plotted and conducted; yet the multitude have an imaginative idea of this refinement and extension.

Many possess not a true idea of what it really consists in, nor of what the true means to it really consist in: still such as are governed by such an object to education, are actuated by a correct motive, however they may be deluded about the medium.

That men agree in what they conceive to constitute their chief good, is not to be expected. It requires a sublimely abstract view, to come at the indubitable perspective of that which is the greatest happiness of the whole race, which every individual must agree in and find his chief enjoyment consists in.

To these, men are wont to make education an access, or general applicative or mean. Which are in fact but intermediate objects, none being perfectly satisfied short of the ultimate end, consummate enjoyment, of which hope supplies them with the substitute.

“Hope springs eternal in the human breast,
Man never is, but always to be blest.”

Yet these answer to make up men's common happiness in this world. The idea of increasing good or advantage, implies a reference to things future; and this hope is essential to their enjoyment in life. All the passions are (in nature) necessary to our enjoy-

ment, such as we are; their contemperation necessary to the security and increase of that enjoyment. The want of such contemperation necessarily brings degeneracy of it, and in procession, complete misery. Whatever exceptions may be made of several of those sagacious and imitative brutes which are brought to acquire several simple arts, and discover progressive improvement under a careful culture; it is obviously a general truth that in the ordinary course of things a brute arrives, in a very short time after coming into the world, at a point of perfection which he cannot exceed, in amplitude of his capacity: although he may have a succession of novel appearances on his sensory, and continue to perceive variety of ideas; yet his memory does not seem to be strengthened hereby unless practice be joined, as in the case of hounds tutored to the chace. A repetition of voluntary exertions consecutive to the impression of those repeated perceptions, is necessary to be connected therewith, to produce a habit of remembrance and strengthen the memory in these species. Brutes, from their want of abstraction, and their paucity of memory as well as of other powers, are incapable of advancing in intellectual improvement; incapable of enlarging their views and carrying on a train of successive acquirements of ascendancy and expedients; and are in these respects, in a sort stationary. But man seems to be placed at the head of this terrestrial race, the lord of all the animal world, and may innovate improvements indefinitely; his intelligence, as if a growing principle, still increasing in its possessions even whether he will or no.

The happiness of an active being, is not wholly separable from action. The highest happiness must pertain to the action of the highest faculties. Therefore our greatest enjoyment lies in the operations of our minds. Large comprehensive views contribute to

the perfection of human happiness. In particular ones, brutes have their highest enjoyments. As we approach to such conception as depends upon gross visible contact of matter, we recede from the eminences of intellect, and verge to the regions of insensibility. The subject matter, then, of man's chief happiness, consists in the operations of the mind; and more perhaps in contemplation than in any other particular one of those operations. Contemplation and abstraction are those which combine more enjoyment than any other. Each operation of mind, draws pleasure with it. Abstraction being the peculiar privilege of the human intellect, whereby it is wholly distinguish'd from brutes, must have a peculiar pleasure which inferior intelligences never attain to. There is more pleasure in contemplating abstract ideas than particular ones, for these following reasons, viz:

First. The pleasure is more lasting. The movement of the spirits, to be sure, in a nice collecting of these views is more slow than in observance of particulars of real existence the effect of impulses on our senses: yet there is more pleasure, because more permanent and constant. These objects preserve their conspicuity and impressiveness in spite of the failings of the objects of sense, for they depend not on the fluctuating powers of our flimsy tabernacle. Neither do they depend on the existence of those varying and shortliv'd objects which are the efficient causes of particular ideas; it being all one whether there be now extant any such thing as *hospitality* in the world or no, my idea of that sort or kind of action remains still tenable, equally without the existence of the particular actions that are called hospitable and go to constitute that virtue in the actual instance, as *with it*: the idea in my head, of such a mode, no more depending on the existence of, or ceasing to be, with, the particular archetype in *rerum natura*, than the idea of a

mammouth ceases to be and is annihilated with that race of animals; which is supposed to be now extinct. The variety which is implicitly involved in the capacity of these ideas, whereby they have a greater fund of novelties upon which a continued examination can draw, unquestionably contributes to the durability of this pleasure.

Secondly. These abstract ideas are (to use a coarse expression) 'our own property.' Abstract ideas are of our own forming. For particular ideas, i. e. of particular things, such as are those of a horse, a deed of charity, a basket of fruit, a pig; an elephant, a journey to Mexico, an epileptic fit, we are indebted to nature, chance, or whatever plastic or ascendant power there is in the great substantial world above us or about us, that we cannot reach. But abstract ideas are what we ourselves frame: are essentially the workmanship of our own minds. True, we depend upon other powers for the materials of their composition, and in fact we make them up from our notices of those particular things that have affected our senses. But then, we see, these ideas, when once framed, don't depend upon the actual existence of these particular beings the ideas of which they are made out of. So they seem to be something we have got (from whatever originals their elementary ingredients) and made up for ourselves, of which they seem to be a part, and appear to be as lasting as any part of our frame, especially as those parts upon which our memory depends: and there is more pleasure in contemplating this sort of ideas, than those giblets (if I may say) of the universe, that are as it were blown to us by the four winds of heaven; and they get an additional pleasure from the consideration of *property* derived from *making*.

Thirdly. They comprise a greater quantity of pleasure under the same compass of simple ideas. For in representing a large number of particular beings, they

contain a secret reference to other simple ideas they do not in their own composition exhibit, whose existence they implicate; so that by a refinement of the operative faculties, a greater extent and variety of subsistent objects are actually drawn under observance of the intellectual eye in the same moment, than the detail of particulars can yield.

Fourthly. They yield a more sublime sort of pleasure; and therefore in this sense the pleasure is greater. This perhaps is little other than a consequence of the preceding reasons. Abstract ideas being the synoptical ectypes of widely scattered and diversified originals in *rerum natura*, which represent in *one*, many individuals, afford a more magnificent view of nature than particular ones; and the pleasure of contemplating them is greater, and more elevated. This pleasure is of a higher and more refined nature; because abstraction is the highest operation of the mind, which sets men altogether above brutes, wherein the latter have no participation at all.

These are some of the principal reasons wherefore there is more pleasure in contemplating abstract ideas than particular ones, and effectually why our greatest enjoyment consists in operations of mind rather than those of the organs of sense. The powers of the understanding, such as those of discernment, attention, recollection, study, contemplation, abstraction, reasoning, are more durable than those of the senses, whose organs are fragile, and their very existence precarious, being continually obnoxious to ruinous accidents. He that sets up his rest in his own mind, treads a perpetual circle of delightful business, and movements vividly varying: here is all the variety in nature. Here is a place where all the variety in nature may be represented. The understanding has all the ideas which are induced through the sensitive organs, and likewise those of the peculiar powers, acts, and

operations of itself, for the groundwork of its speculations. Hereon, also, the phantom fancy paints with endless variegation; and when worlds are exhausted of their novelties, sketches new ones.

Truth sits serene at a sublime elevation above the storms of human controversy: her halcyon retreat is unannoyed by the perturbation that agitates the perplexed, the doubtful, and the dictatorial; inflexibly fixed in one eternal attitude that bids defiance to all external influence. All other things change, but truth never changes. Mortals reach adumbrant glimpses of the reality; but to dwell in her presence, and enjoy the full effulgence of her unfolded glories, is the consummation of our felicity as rational intelligences. The more we approximate metaphysical truth, the more we enjoy of that serenely sublime happiness 'whose very rapture is tranquility.' We have a continual appetite for a sight of reality (which we effectually *have* when we perceive the actual conformity of our ideas to real existence,) and this is called curiosity, which is commensurate in its energy with hope itself. If we are always *hoping* some improvement of our condition, we are always *desiring to know* the strength of the probability on which our hope rests. Truth sits, I say, divinely aloof above the storms of human folly and the capricious courants of imagination; and, as with an eternal sunshine, displays all things. Truth, then, is above all other definite things as a fit object of the adoration of human intelligences; for it is a natural incentive to our purest and sublimest desire, and contains in itself the subject matter of its natural gratification. It shews all things; it lays open the secrets of the substantial universe, and of the movements of its parts: it furthermore consoles the gloomiest moments of our existence, enlivens the dejected, and spreads a sumptuous feast of intellectual food productive of true happiness. How precarious then and

how imperfect must be their enjoyment who make a study of falsehood ! Falsehood is as unnatural to the understanding, as to the body is to walk backward. Falsehood is opposed to moral truth in an active sense, and means the practical joining or separating of signs contrary to their agreement or disagreement ; or the joining of the reciprocal relations of signs, and of the things signified by them, when they have no conformity.

Mankind at large worship property, fashion, and fame. These are the three deities that men from their hearts adore. Whatsoever other worship they do, is too generally but empty sound, or formal moving. The devotion of their hearts is directed to these three superlative divinities. Truth is that which they ought rather to worship than these. Truth, considered in its metaphysical and moral characters, is a being which ought to attract the highest adoration, and call forth the most devout ardor of the soul of man. If devotion in the heart of man be directed to any definite object within his comprehension, it should be most intently to truth. It is this that gives both its strength and happiness to human society. Without it were neither enjoyment, permanence, nor safety in the society of mankind. It is this also that universally gives delight to the understanding, whether solitary or social. This is its metaphysical character. It is so charming that the very resemblance of it pleases and charms. But if its semblance is endearing, the original is more so. Truth, in the sense wherein it is called metaphysical truth, is little else but the real existence of things portrayed on our understanding ; it being the perfect agreement and conformity of our ideas to what exists beyond them. This delights the soul, as nourishment does the body. It is, in short, the natural food of the soul. In the human mind is fixed the principle of curiosity ; whose inquisitive and restless energy perpe-

tually impels to the search of reality. The finding of truth is its sole and constant gratification. But the bulk of mankind, deluded and vitiated by inveterate errors, instead of worshipping this, worship *property, fashion, and fame*. They speak of other deities they do not know, but what they say of them is but compliment to these three deities, which ultimately engross the devotion of their hearts. The great business of man in this world is improvement of mind. The progress of mind towards perfection, is in a great measure spontaneous. It is the duty of man to facilitate it.

The main business of mankind properly is to contribute to the enlargement and facility of intellectual power and operation. The reasons are these : 1st. He is capable of greater increase of mental power by culture than is any other species of animal with which we are acquainted ; 2d. He is capable of greater increase of enjoyment, from such increase. The principle of action which impels mind to enlarge its capacity, extend the sphere of its apprehension, multiply its discoveries, and facilitate its operations, is curiosity. Curiosity is stronger in man than in other species of animals. The desire of knowledge, and consequently the pleasure of receiving new knowledge, are greater in mankind than in any other species of animals with which we are acquainted. Tranquillity or a due temperament of sensorial motion, is the great foundation of all intellectual and moral improvement. On this the structure naturally rises. In such a medium mind progresses towards perfection. Next to this, an essential qualification that becomes an indispensable instrument to the acquiring of knowledge, is a habit of attention. A habit of attention attained in early life, distinguishes the progress of those who excel in genius, and marks an eminence in talent and erudition. Without a habit of attention, no remarkable accumulation of knowledge can take place. Voluntary application

of the understanding energy, must *first* direct and advance the progress of mind towards perfection. To exceed the measure of what is familiarly known to the bulk of mankind, and has been handed down a series of ages by the tradition and common sense of successive generations, close voluntary thinking only can avail. Voluntary thinking is that which leads the way to improvement of mind. Attention is a mode of voluntary thinking; and without attention no proficiency can be gained. Therefore if men *will not* progress in improvement of mind, they *cannot*. If they *will*, they do progress. It requires the energy of voluntary exertion directing their thoughts in train to this very object. It requires a perception of something representing the object to the understanding, by means of which it prevails to produce the greatest *desire*, of which it becomes the *end*, and ultimately determines the will. This energy, I say, is required to direct the operating faculties into a train of actions which eventually produce a habit of attention. This train of actions is a continued course of voluntary thought, wherein the same acts are repeated, and which includes in it that which is called attention. Truth should be the immediate scope of all our inquiries. Truth is the proper and natural object of pursuit, to intelligent creatures that seek improvement. Truth is the conformity of the reciprocal relations of signs, joined or disjoined, with the reciprocal relations of the things signified by those signs, to be properly considered as represented to be joined or disjoined. Thus if the idea of existence and the idea of a piece of gold are joined together in our mind, this junction and consistence of them there, is a relation, i. e. the reciprocal relation of them one to another; and if the piece of gold itself is joined with existence, that is, if it really exists in nature, this coincidence is a relation; the conformity of these two relations is truth. If, furthermore, to the idea of a

piece of gold, i. e. of a body yellow, hard, and heavy, is joined the idea of ductility, this state of connection includes the reciprocal relation of these two ideas; if at the same time in real existence this ductility has a place among the qualities of the piece of gold itself, their co-existence is the reciprocal relation of ductility and the other constituents of gold: and the conformity of these two relations, to wit, of our ideas and of the things which they represent in real existence, is truth. And if also we affirm of the piece of gold, it is ductile, we join the expression of ductility and the expression of gold, and there is a relation of these two words one to another; and if in our minds gold and ductility stand thus related one to another as they are expressed, i. e. have agreement or coalescence as they are joined in the affirmation; this aspect is a reciprocal relation; and this conformity of these reciprocal relations, is truth. Words are the signs of ideas, and ideas are the signs of things separate from our ideas. Truth is of two sorts;— metaphysical truth and moral truth. Metaphysical truth is the conformity of the reciprocal relations of ideas as representing things, with the reciprocal relations of things, or with the relations of things to our own conscious existence. Moral truth is the conformity of the reciprocal relations of signs voluntary joined or disjoined in affirmation or negation, to the reciprocal relations of the things those signs represent. There is that which may be called historical truth, which though it has no visible certainty about it, has the same effect in the purposes to which it is applied, as absolute, certain truth; which is when we put together ideas in an *assumed* conformity to the relations of the things they represent, without any actual perception of such conformity, which thus is taken to be, without perceiving it to be; as when we believe a proposition, having no actual knowledge of its verity. And such is the truth of most of our opinions. Thus

if a neighbor tells me that one hundred and fifty wild geese having journeyed from a southwestern compass, are refreshing themselves in a certain pool seventy rods from the spot where I abide, I am satisfied of a conformity existing between the relations of these words and those of the ideas which are in the mind of the speaker, although I do not perceive it : and not only so, but I consider these ideas which are conveyed into my mind by those words, as having a correspondence, in their reciprocal relations, with the scene of real existence they are representative of : that is, putting the ideas together in affirmation, conformably to what is supposed to be in reality of things, I *assume* this conformity to exist, without actual knowledge that it does so ; and therefore I *believe* the proposition.

What I shall offer, by way of particular direction to the managery of the remaining part of the business I have been discoursing of, I shall address to those grown men and women who are the objects of it, as being supposed to be both preceptors and pupils of themselves. The following rules therefore are adapted to the condition of mature persons governing themselves, for their guide in such government, to the finishing of their education ; and are accordingly addressed to such, in the form of directory precepts and injunctions ; those who superintend the education of others in this condition (being supposed to have the same care for their weal as they have for their own, to propose the same ends and be disposed to prescribe the like measures and trains of exercises as they would to themselves in the same pursuits,) standing in the same habitude as the others to these prescripts. You who are the proper objects of the appropriation of these rules (persons over the age of twenty-one years) are supposed, whatever counsellors or preceptors you may have beside, to be the directors of your own conduct, and depend on your own will what measures it shall be effectually

modified by, to what ends directed, and to what habits it shall lead.

Now men can teach themselves the sciences as well as the mechanic arts. Instances of the latter are too frequent to admit of a question. What I mean here by teaching themselves, is in effect, *acquiring*, by their own resolute pursuit and voluntary application, independent of direction and patterns put them by living guides.

RULE I. *Make your first study to make all feasible returns to your parents and other early benefactors, for your preservation and nurture.*

Indeed such debts are best discharged by upright and amiable deport, and perhaps cannot be effectually done in any other way, without this. But where parents are in need, it is the invariable indication of a good heart to be alert in relieving and protecting them.

RULE II. *Pitch upon an honorable course of life, and abide in it steadily.*

This rule is equally appropriate within the limits of several years. In studying the application of this rule, consider that fortune may call you to various occupations and your career may be diversified by many different recourses for a livelihood.

RULE III. *The regularity and equanimity of your life consists not in, nor depends on, the uniformity of your corporeal actions that make your external occupations, so much as the general track, and habits, of your trains of thought: and an abstracted arrangement is the best.*

RULE IV. *If you have not had opportunity, or have neglected, in your minority, to acquire sufficient skill in arithmetic, grammar of your language*

penmanship, and geography, scruple not to set diligently about to compass it at this present period. And to this end appropriate all your leisure till you have gained the desired proficiency.

RULE V. *In pursuing these sciences and arts, keep their utility in view, and deduce from it all your urgency in this pursuit. Let this single consideration, its usefulness, impel you to a careful improvement of every opportunity, and undivided application to the quest of any particular desideratum.*

RULE VI. *Read books of metaphysics, physiology, astronomy, chemistry, medicine, geography, and natural history, as you are able to procure them.*

Where your condition admits of a choice, procure a few of the most valuable in these sorts, and abide by them as your principal standards so far as reconcileable to your reasoning, in preference to a fluctuation in compliance to dogmatic pretenders or new-fangled theories. Some of the best authors in those departments were Locke, Darwin, Sir Isaac Newton, Chaptal, Cullen, and Linnæus. For a general exploration of speculative knowledge, no helps of this kind are so admirably adapted to common life as encyclopedias, of which the French and British nations have given some of the best specimens now extant. In a thorough course of studies, the several branches of the mathematics would have their place prior to physiology,

RULE VII. *In devoting time to the pursuit of art or science, keep a single eye to utility, as your final goal.*

RULE VIII. *Avoid novel reading, except in burlesque.*

RULE IX. *Read history,—especially travels and voyages.*

RULE X. *Above all others, fail not to read the best books of ethics.*

There is a variety of excellent books of this sort ; among which I think that work of Mr. Adam Smith, entitled a 'Theory of Moral Sentiments,' is as good as any I know of, in the form of a system. Hutchinson's 'System of Moral Philosophy' also is a valuable book of this sort. But 'Tully's Offices,' I take, holds the first rank as a practical work in this department. 'Seneca's Morals' is a book of this sort, which no young person ought to be without an acquaintance with. A book called the 'Economy of Human Life ;' also the Proverbs of Solomon ; but above all the doctrinal parts of the gospels, the teachings of Jesus Christ, ought not to be omitted.

RULE XI. *Let morals be your chief study and concern ; and study them as a system of science the foundation of which is sympathy, wherefrom is demonstratively deduced all our social obligation.*

This is the most natural rise of the duties of life, and the most satisfactory to account for them ; and thence is calculated to make them more easy and agreeable.

RULE XII. *Let the timing and arrangement of your studies be gradual and lucid.*

In order to put into effect what is purported in this rule, let the day (or week) before you, be deliberately distributed to appropriations distinct as the particular themes, circuits of speculation, or sorts of exercise you have to pursue therein ; and learn

one thing thoroughly before you venture upon the entangling of your thoughts with the next.

RULE XIII *In the advancing of your knowledge from one subject to another, make as small removes as it is possible to make and get distinct knowledge.*

The object of this rule is thorough improvement of the capacity of the mind ; to which end learn perfectly a little new knowledge at a time, and let that little recede in as small degree from the preceding accession as it can and be a distinct compass of knowledge. Regular and slow gradation of new knowledge, is most propitious to improvement of mind, because each of these several pieces of knowledge (if I may so speak) has by its affinity and other lines of association, more or less to do with the other, which accustoms them to a frequent concomitance whereby they gain a sort of topical propinquity and a strong association with one another ; whence they run as it were into one body and enlighten the whole soul, when one part is as intimate and ready to recollection as the other.

RULE XIV. *Indirectly inquire of artists (with an interspersion of entertaining remarks) for the rules of their operations.*

This practice contributes to induce cultivation of sympathy, at the same time it extends useful knowledge, and exercises the understanding.

RULE XV. *To preserve what useful things you get in this way and by observation, accustom yourself to register, in words and abbreviations, the particular curiosities you discover.*

RULE XVI. *In the estimate of any new course of action proposed to yourself to enter upon, consider*

the tendency and effects of the habit to which the repetition of that action would lead, and let your estimate of the habit be that of the action, and accordingly determine its eligibility.

The due adjustment of our estimate of the right and wrong of our actions depends in great measure on the consideration of the incidence of habit, which is the inseparable consequent of their repetition. In proportion as we become accustomed to any posture of mind, or habituated to any particular course of whatever sort of thought or motion, their reverse becomes repugnant to our satisfaction : therefore we proportionably become averse to a contrary course. and to whatever suggests it. If we accustom ourselves to passing our evenings in conversation with our neighbors or strangers, we recede from a habit of *reading* in those intervals of our occupation. The question of the propriety of repeating any action, should be determined by the tendency of a habit of that action.

RULE XVII. *In deliberating upon any action in your power, to which you are unpracticed, consider yourself to have been the actor of it, and the consequences regularly following from it.*

The best way one can employ his vacant moments must be in those actions which he can reflect upon with complacency or delight when he recollects them : for it is evidently true of most of our actions that they are longer time objects of our memory and recollection, than they are *presently passing* as objects of our perception. Therefore it is unquestionably as objects of retrospective reflection that they are chiefly to recommend themselves to our estimate. This is the respect in which they are perfected. If this be so, it is

plain that to make our actions subservient to our utmost good, it is necessary to imaginatively set them in this same habitude as past existences, and consider ourselves as beings that are noticed and experienced to have acted those particular deeds of which we anticipate and purpose the real agency.

RULE XVIII. *Travel.*

The application of this rule is very casually modified; and indeed it has no business in this series in any other sense than the most general, whence its intentional import is to collect by actual observation, real knowledge of the beings and modes around us in the world, whereby our experience and habits are more or less directly influenced. This is modified, I say, by the diverse conditions and fates of different individuals. Some persons are so poor they cannot reasonably attempt to change their place very widely; others so sickly. In some instances poverty and a weakly constitution combined, form an insuperable barrier to extensive travelling. In fact I prescribe in this only to make such surveys of the neighboring societies, territories, and countries where one lives, as are compatible with his abilities and obligations. One person gets more knowledge by travelling through an adjoining town, than others in strolling over an empire. Nay, a person may perambulate this whole terrestrial stage, not being intent upon any improvement, any increase of his stock of knowledge, or rectification of his opinions, and get very little advancement of his education. Therefore travel with your eyes open. Some small excursions at least are necessary. A very general custom strikes out travel from female education. Yet, in some extent, it is necessary even

for women to travel. To a too contracted sphere of life, as well as the want of curious observation, we owe abundance of prejudices that prevail.

RULE XIX. *Avoiding all excesses of indulgence, study that regular course to supply all the exigencies of your nature, which best comports and consists with the common good of the republic ; the true interest and weal of the majority of the people you live amongst.*

RULE XX. *In this view, marry a companion for life, if it may be such an one as is reconcilable to a concurrence of sentiments and plans : not otherwise.*

For jangling combinations (of this sort) are pests to a community, both by dint of their own example, and by setting on the stage children who being bred within the turmoils of domestic dissention, multiply specimens of degenerate morals. Diverse opinions have prevailed concerning the propriety of marriage. Philosophers have disagreed on this subject. Here appears, however, very little ground of disputation. A state of society is the state of nature : why ? Because we are suited to such a condition by nature. Mankind are fitted for such a state in their constructure, their capacity, their faculties. A conventional and permanent union of individuals of different sexes, is conformable to every law of nature ; to every principle of natural benignity ; to every principle of the preservation and improvement of human nature. Therefore marriage is agreeable to the moral law of nature. Some situations make it improper, and inconsistent with great purposes of philanthropy. Some particular persons probably could never have brought about those weighty

works of genius, those vast achievements of intellectual might that have enlightened the world, if their thoughts had been liable to be taken up with the concerns of this consociation. And we find that some of our greatest philosophers never married, although they lived to advanced age. There be sects, however, who denounce it. The absurdity of such a tenet is obvious.

RULE XXI. *In reference to the application of these rules, leisurely inquire into the nature of the female character as distinguished from the male; and study the peculiarities hereof without a particular pursuit of personal interest.*

Several evils have crept in with the prevailing fashions of the civilized world, in the matter of the intercourse that is used as the medium of personal acquaintance between young people of opposite sexes. There be those who reckon violent motions indispensable to accomplish great ends. In proportion to the intensity of the desire moving any design, it becomes fashionable to attach swiftness or suddenness of movement to the plan of its execution, as if it could no way have place without it. This is a sort of natural association of resemblance. Mankind has the knack of engendering associations of ideas resembling one another. The mind of man is prone to assembling together similar ideas, which by frequent occurrence, one being suggested by the other, and an aptitude to repeat attention to them in this connection, acquire an almost indissoluble union, so that one cannot be brought into the understanding without the other appears likewise, either in immediate and consecutive succession, or in simultaneous concurrence. An instance of erroneous judgment arising out of this sort of association, is conspicuous in mankind's customary language for denoting particular attachments of the passion, love; and

planning those permanent consociations of the sexes whereby the species is perpetuated, and the comfort of subsistence refined and diffused. Because the passion is violent, the uncultivated imagine there can be no true sign of it but violent motion, with such discriminating phenomena as jumping, racing, scuffling, grinning, loud laughter, springing, extraordinary sallies of imagination exemplified in hyperbole and rant, more than common exertion of the inventive powers to misrepresent reality, &c. ; and that so much as it lacks of these palpable criteria, it lacks of genuineness, and ought to be reckoned a feigned emotion pretended only or the purpose of illusion. This way is extended to a very predominant fashion, by mankind's unaptness in reasoning ; wherein they are too commonly averse to the use of that noble faculty whereby they are so eminently distinguished from other beings in this part of the universe. This abusive fashion, since, like all other fashions when by general practice become settled into a governing rule, it austere overrules the modification of sentiments, is on several occasions pathetically inauspicious to studious persons, who cultivate the best of social plans, perhaps, while it is as unnatural for them to act rudely or indecently ; as unnatural for them to express their genuine emotions and denote their honest purposes by boisterous movement or perverse use of their faculties, as it is to walk backward, or with the hands to saw the air horizontally and perpendicularly at the same time. For violent motion of every kind, is counter to reasoning ; for reasoning is a slow deliberate movement of the sensorial machinery, implying a casting about and examining the respects of one idea with another ; in which must be repetition of the same steps, &c. which renders the progression incompatible with violent and swift motion. Now, the best schemes of social life are plotted with the aid of reason. The happiest plans of subsistence and enjoy-

ment owe their constructure to a judicious use of the faculty reason. A habit of reasoning correctly of the nature and consequences of actions, which is the main support of propriety in social conduct, is a great excellence in human improvement. Therefore this counterbuff and disparaging of reason at the very threshold of human society, making the indispensable condition to the greatest comfort of the species, which is a state of society, to be the abnegation of all those cool and gentle methods concinnous to reflecting minds, is that which constitutes one great source of the degeneracy of mankind in those communities where this fashion reigns. For when it is made necessary for young people to be unreasonable in order to be social, and every one has an invincible propensity to society; what is more obviously conclusive than that this very fashion of making vehement motions the usual signs of the sexual affection, and boisterous, nugatory, and wicked behavior, the exclusive passport to the advantages of the social state, is a direct efficient cause of that common depravity and licentiousness which encumber the morals of very polished nations? For herein gentleness and sobriety of deport are condemned, and mulcted with a surrender of what nature gave to all mankind, and their opposites promoted.

Whereas if the solemnity usual in the executing of testaments called wills, and the taking of oaths, were made the popular character of all courtships and private contracts of marriage, wherein a habit of reflection should take the lead in the common estimate of those who set out with these plans, it seems unquestionable that *virtue* being the invariable price of those goods which irresistibly attract all, would become a more general resort among the commonalty of the young, and in course proceed to give a prevailing character of affability to civilized communities. For what distinguishing habits people have at the age of eighteen

or nineteen, usually carry great influence on their whole succeeding lives ; and that is a time of life when those manners and methods are adopted which seem most aptly to serve the turn of accommodating those very strong and vigorous desires and other emotions which in them prevail. And what is adopted is soon habituated by a constant correspondence of the same objects and recourses. There are certain extrinsical things which are mere ceremonials, taken as exclusive vehicles of this affection. The vulgar take what is common and most general, the same as universal ; and affect to deduce universal truths from partial premises. Consequently we are not to wonder that those are not thought to possess any operative attachment of this kind, who do not precipitately sally into certain ceremonious indications of an animal attachment expressed in fact little otherwise than brutes express themselves under the same emotions. But these are not all the evils that pervert judgment and repress sympathy, in mankind's fashioning this intercourse. There is another usage, which is probably even more pernicious still ; and that is the connecting of pageantry with the promotion of the design of this intercourse : and so inveterate, that such as is either not disposed or not able to appear in a splendid or foppish habiliment and with a certain customary parade, is reckoned unworthy to succeed to any advantageous place in the circle of the social state, and considered an outcast in respect to so exalted an intercourse, among the polished tribes of aristocracy. Whence there are those who think themselves insulted by an offer of society.

This may arise from several considerations : but it very often arises from an idea of their superiority over their proponent, and this superiority is usually commentitious and lies altogether in wealth or some adventitious adjunct or other. And thus a poor person insults a rich by proposing marriage to her. And this

sort of cupidity, this reverence of mammon, which prevails to match rich with rich, and makes what is called good fortune an indispensable condition to the enjoyment of society, is another obstacle that embarrasses the pursuit of this intercourse by many worthy persons. Thus rich are associated with rich, and poor with poor, as aptly as one blade of a pair of shears with another; and it becomes as prevailing a fashion as the matching of cattle or horses by their color and size; there being supposed to be nothing in human nature itself alone, adapting one individual to another; but only in some exterior connection, as the possession of money, cattle, lands, houses, or something of those kinds: and an intermarriage of rich with poor, — of one who has an estate with one who has no estate at all, is considered as anomalous as that of two distinct species of animals, as a rabbit and a wild goose. There be some who even are persuaded it is matter of generosity to keep one in a temporary delusion that merely screens him from the perspective of what they are sensible would momentarily grieve or frustrate, so far as it is a state of things diametrically the reverse of that which he propends to anticipate; not considering that the greater this delusion or the longer it is kept up, the more exquisite must be the pain which arises from its dissipation. For however pleasing it be to a person to be deluded, it is disagreeable to find himself to have been deluded, and this in exact proportion to the agreeableness of the delusion. A delusion may be pleasing, and the more so as it is of long continuance and eludes reality; but in the same proportion likewise the discovery of it is displeasing. The agreeableness of delusion is proportionate to its continuance and speciousness: and the pain of discovering it is proportionate to its agreeableness. Therefore it is much kinder to make a prompt unequivocal disclosure of the state of things under question, however adverse to the

inclination of the adventurer who pursues an attractive object of hope, than to tantalize him with dallying delays under pretence of gradually mollifying the shock of disappointment, which however to the unreflecting seems sometimes the most humane procedure. There are others, again, who take delight in tantalizing and keeping in suspense those who depend on their determinations to inquiries their deepest wishes are concerned with. This is an inhuman satisfaction. When this goes to persuade one of an opposite sex, of love and attachment which do not exist, to which the pride of having apparent admirers or the pursuit of some meaner end may greatly help forward the motive, it has the name coquetry ; which is a base species of chicane. Various characters there be to which the name villain is appropriate, and amongst them is the coquette. A coquette, male or female, is, properly speaking, a villain : and a most disinterested one too ; for there is finally no visible gain to any party by such a practice, except it be a satisfaction in the reflection of unhappy feelings brought about in others by one's own agency. We can scarcely conceive a greater degree of malignity than that which makes one take delight in the bare contemplation of the idea of inflicting pain upon others without pretension to any good resulting to him or herself therefrom. And yet there be women, and also men, who exhibit great satisfaction in this sort of proceeding, for which they rarely ever betray any signs of compunction. Others, again, out of an undue timorousness and irregular modesty, withhold from their suitors the resolutions of their own minds respecting the others' proposed views. I say irregular, for true modesty does not conceal what is of importance to the feelings of others, on account of any selfish consideration aside hereof. A bashful shyness may suppress a direct answer to some very civil questions, or to a simple request of an interview, but true modesty will

not. To apply this to the former, is to attach it to a bad character; whereas modesty belongs to a good character. It is called a good quality; since its rise implies some improvement of sympathy. The improvement of sympathy is but extending the view of the understanding. It seems but a continuation of those comparisons of ideas which constitute the relation between our feelings and others'. Thus, "perceiving another to grieve exquisitely (without considering any definite cause) we have some degree of this emotion raised in our own selves." But to consider that he grieves for the loss of a son, and feel a correspondent grief, requires a little farther-extended view. Another thing that is encumbering to the true interest of philanthropy in the pursuits of this intercourse, is a tyrannical custom with some parents, of controuling the marriage of their offspring against the course of nature.

That parents exercise their authority to prevent their marriage within the age of their minority, i. e. before the age of twenty-one years, is undeniably equitable in civilized communities: but aside of this limit and qualification, for a parent or any other to control and dictatorially modify the marriage of any, is unnatural tyranny. Many, however, make this a matter of principle, and think they do but their duty when of their own accord they choose a partner for a descendant, and fix upon irreversible plans for their conjugation. To this we may add a disgusting and injurious trick multitudes of people blunder into, of interfering about other individuals' plans of this sort, wherein that which practically concerns the thoughts of but two or three persons, they make a subject of much talk and speculation; and delight to throw contempt on those individuals. These are some of the lets that lie in their way, who from a philosophic train of speculation, pursue this important connection with society. But these

are not all. There is another, which most of these may originate from ; and that is a defect of female education.

Cultivation of the female mind is shamefully neglected. The boys get more knowledge and improvement by running about the world, even if they have no more tuition than the girls ; or sometimes by emulation in some particular art, such as arithmetic, penmanship, grammar, geometry, or the like ; but more rarely is any incitement given to girls to cultivate learning. The female mind is suffered to go wild (in a great measure) in this economical age. It is thought prudent to circumscribe the improvement of females rather more than that of males. It seems to be thought they would make a dangerous use of intellectual refinement and liberal science. There is *craft* in keeping the female mind fallow. The leaders of the " children of this world " have a policy in it, to keep up the distinction of the two great divisions of the world, called the rich and the poor ; to strengthen and widen the partition between them ; and give ascendancy to the rich. The dull, the ignorant, and uncultivated, are generally rich. ' Poets and philosophers,' it is said, ' are always poor.' Those who, neglecting inferior objects, have pursued enlargement of intellectual views, are generally poor. Penury usually goes along with cultivation of parts ; and love of money is usually the associate of dullness and narrow thoughts. Now, it seems as if the leading aristocrats of this world thought, by keeping the female mind uncultivated and dull, to make women (especially such as have wealth) hate and despise those of the other sex who are cultivated ; (and no likelier recourse, for such as have no learning are disaffected at the signs of it in others) lest otherwise, that is if they were cultivated, thousands of them might intermarry with the others out of pure affection, in spite of poverty : and this, you know, would

tend to *level*: this would be to profane the porcelain clay of the nobility by an intermixture of the plebeian spawn, and confound or obliterate the choicest distinctions of civil society. For they know, that since marriage depends more on the wills of women than of men, if women that are rich, or are heirs to wealth, should marry the poor; or if, being poor, it should be so fashionable that they should have influence in common custom, to marry the rich; it would defeat *their* design, which is to keep the wealth of this world within the paws of the brutish and fatwitted, where it is likely to keep close, compact, concentrated and secure. Should it unfortunately get into the hands of the cultivated, it would be liable to be diffused and scattered abroad over the stage of civil life; for such would delight even to distribute it to the poor. So the liberal arts and sciences are thought to be imprudently trusted in the hands of females; they being naturally tender hearted, and more readily inclined to benignant emotions, it is thought that by their influence, they would with such means, diffuse and equalize the concentrated wealth of aristocratical monopolies. These arch emissaries that affect to control by underhand influences, the condition of society, are well aware that if girls were enlightened and refined in their understandings, it would be incident for them to intermarry with the poor: that is, they would choose men for their talents and accomplishments, rather than for their wealth; because they would be competent to discern some other charms between those of wealth and beauty. If they were so liberal and ingenuous as a cultivation of mind would make them, they would choose men for their real worth, and not for their fortune; and thence would prefer a cultivated intelligence with no estate, to one who being wealthy is void of erudition and art. For this cultivation gives them a capacity to apprehend the blandishments that

appertain to a refined and enlarged understanding : gives them a perception of moral and intellectual beauty, transcendant to corporeal beauty. For any that has learning, is sensible to the charms of it in others. The same thing, also, would make them despise wealth. Now, as a greater proportion of those who are cultivated are poor than rich ; and women, both before and after their marriage, have great influence over the men, it is plainly seen, by these sly grovelling mongers of aristocratical distinctions, that such care of the female mind would tend to resolve the knots of worldling monopolists ; to disband and disseminate their hateful and disgraceful masses of pelf ; and to distribute into many parts what would be serviceable to thousands of others. It requires cultivation of mind, to be able to estimate men according to their real worth. Women, if they be *able* to estimate men according to their real worth, are *inclined* to do it ; as they are naturally predisposed to benignity.

If this were not the reason, wherefore should we so frequently hear so many respectable persons affirm that ‘ girls ought not to have much learning ’—‘ it is never worth while to send girls to school a great deal ? ’ So this operates at the very ground-work of literary education. This reason operates with the choice spirits, the few, that lead the fashions of the day. The bulk of the ‘ children of the world,’ for the gain they expect by their service, aim to make mere drudges of women, like brutes designed solely to subserve the domestic economy by propagation or labor. But their views are coincident with those of the other : emanating from another motive, they terminate in the same effect, so far as it regards the mind. For it is the main lever of both to keep *that* dull and circumscribed. It is the interest of both these parties to keep the female mind in a state of vulgarity, and as inept and fatuous as possible. For it indeed is truly said that those

select distinguished individuals who wish for such a state of things, and intently study to promote aristocracy, are but a small part of civil society ; therefore cannot consistently presume upon bringing it about. Yet it must not be denied that they have great influence upon the rest, and even controul them, the rather perhaps because they drive at the same point. If it be not so, how comes it about that we find so few females, even among the politer circles, who have any noted extent of erudition (did I say ?)—nay, that understand so much as the structure of their vernacular language, whereby they might be enabled to pursue the meditations of others to the knowledge of things ? How comes it about that we have to observe in them such an indifferency to the subject of erudition and literary achievements ? Why are books, schools, and scientific pursuits spoken of so diminutively ? How is it that they are treated with such total aspersion, not only by young ladies themselves, but by those of their parents who are abundantly able to invest them with very liberal accomplishments of mind, and who yet deem it a more considerable object for their daughters to make a stylish head-dress, or embroider a curtain, than to be familiar with the classics. Whence comes it that a sedate votary of the muses, who mute-ly moils in the mines of literature, cannot present his real sentiments (of ever so respectful a cast) to the understandings of that sex in the vehicle of elegant language, and in such expressions as comport with an accurate and familiar acquaintance with the practical principles of philology ? Suppose one of this condition has a desire to cultivate an acquaintance with an individual of that sex, by whose languishment of form or moving he is pleasingly ingratiated, and that for that purpose he chooses to direct her a card in as elegant yet intelligible a style as he is capable of, to which also shall be superadded the blandishments of

oratory. Shall he have a reply? Shall he be noticed with any degree of respect? Shall he be understood? Shall he be regarded as one who aims to treat that person ingenuously and sympathetically as an intelligent person having common information of her native language? And shall he not rather be despised for presuming to communicate his ideas in such a way? Indeed he shall be reckoned a novice in the 'ways of the world!' shall indeed be held in derision for that which is literally to the object addressed, a piece of gibberish! It is truly a subject of regret that the love of philosophy should exclude one from civil society; yet this is a state of things perfectly conformable to the views and wishes of the vulgar minions of aristocracy. That the finest and fairest part of the creation should be always immersed in vulgarity; that in females delicacy of form should be deemed an adequate substitute for developement of intellectual excellence, and a nice outside for an improved understanding and liberal heart, is seriously to be deplored. It is very unnatural, perhaps impossible, for the serious and contemplative to use some coarse hacknied mechanic processes to communicate their sentiments, their wishes, or emotions; while it were not only easy but improving to make use of literature for such purpose. That which exercises the mind as much as the senses, and calls to early trials the highest faculties of our nature, is really delightful to speculative persons as a medium of such enunciation: whereas the stiff formal ways in use amongst the crowd, are disgusting, and repel the acquiescence of the heart.

Those vague symbolical formalities, that have no other original than the caprice of those who have gone before us, encumber the intercourse of the sexes with modes forbidding to the considerate.

I would not be thought to upbraid with their ignorance and indocility those whose fate has been beset

with a succession of such circumstances as are repressive of all learning, and which utterly extinguish or misapply curiosity. But I think it not an illaudable wish to apprize them of the importance of a proper application of their faculties while now it is in their power to meliorate their condition in this respect ; to awaken an attendance to this subject in persons who have influence to enlarge female cultivation ; and to justly expose that contracted sentiment, that hacknied saying, 'girls ought not to have so much learning as boys,' than which none can be more puerile. Some recommend very punctiliously to apportion and limit the studies of females : as if they should say "needle-work, plain sewing, embroidery, penmanship, reading, and simple arithmetic, are all that women ought to learn ;" they speak of the pursuits of scholastic establishments. But does not every faculty of their soul, every latent endowment of their nature, require culture and supervision ? Give their mind general improvement ; particularly set it right in morals, and it will of course betake itself to a diligent employment of its faculties. The female mind requires universal improvement ; and needs the same thorough cultivation as that of the male. What is said of the comparative urgency of cultivating them, is very fallacious and very illusory. When it is said 'girls ought not to have so much learning as boys,' this should be considered as put rashly, in a very doubtful sense. There are indeed certain arts and sciences of a masculine appropriation, which in the ordinary course of things in the civilized world at large, women are never called to make a practical application of ; such as navigation, mechanics, geometry, &c. and of which therefore they may not properly give up any considerable part of their time to the study. But what time they do not appropriate to the pursuit of these objects, they should employ in studying other themes that are more useful in

their particular conditions: and while the boys are studying the mathematics, astronomy, navigation, mechanics, surveying, &c. the girls should be diligently applying their studies to the grammar of their native language, universal grammar, ancient history, logic, metaphysics. They require as much study, as great a quantity of learning, however it may vary in its quality. There is no time for them to lose; there is the same length for them to go to the perfection of their faculties. In such an arrangement of things, they have the chance to be more critical philologists and judicious moralists than the boys. Not that their faculties require any less exercise in order to give them the same degree of aptness and facility in operation, or extent of comprehension; nor that as intelligent agents they need less improvement, for otherwise we make them an inferior rank of beings, or else the soul is inferior to the body. It is quite a common notion that it is inconsistent with the propriety of the female character to be addicted to close thought and reasoning: that they are more pleasant companions if not encumbered with any heavy concerns of reflection; and that thoughtfulness is highly unbecoming a lady of fashion. There is considered, however, a difference of rank; and a kitchen-maid or a washer may with more seeming propriety appear considerate and studious; a drudge or waiter may be allowed to think deeply, and shew some marks of a speculative frame of mind. But the appearance of it exquisitely deforms a lady of quality. Such would grossly shock a circle of the choice wares of the species. Light thoughts and superficial remarks of things are the most fashionable traits of the female character. But let me ask who they make them more agreeable companions to? To the vulgar only: for to such as are refined they are no longer pleasing than they exemplify what is correspondent to the favorite exercise of mind, of such skillful and

considerate observers. They are those who are critical and speculative that are fitted to please and captivate the affections of others that are ; for *they only* can reflectively and thoroughly sympathize with them. The society of the thoughtful pleases the thoughtful ; and vacant minds please vacant minds, in their society. In the first place, the society of women more or less attracts all. Now if it be proper for us all to be vacant-minded, it is proper for women to be so. For the more those who associate together assimilate each other's views and capacities, the more harmonious is the society.

There are many reasons why women should not only be addicted to serious thought, but possess extensive erudition ; among which there is none perhaps more weighty than that the first part of the education of children falls principally upon their hands. The study of metaphysick and physiology is signally appropriate to their stations.

The negligent and careless manner in which our females are educated, is seen also in their ignorant and pert behavior ; their scornful and rude carriage towards strangers and studious persons, not unlike that of obstreperous house dogs that incessantly berattle passers by, who carry any appearance to which they are unused. Hence arises coquetry, the barbarous recreation of illuding and tantalizing men. Even assaults of the coarsest insolence sometimes from this quarter shock the surprised feelings of the considerate observer as he passes among them. When a man passes a house and hears from a window a peal of horse-laugh bursting from female observers of some peculiarity in his gait or personal appearance, he is constrained to infer a gross deficiency in their early education, wherein moral principles seem to have had no participation at all but as names to excite contempt. It is pity that in the most tender and elegant part of the human family

the cultivation of sympathy should be abandoned ; which surely we cannot suppose to have any great degree in those who do not scruple to mimic a stranger's oddities, in reproach : yet instances of this deportment are not unknown in the civilized world. If urbanity is not to begin with the soft enchanting community that presides in the domestic scene, where is it to emerge ? Here, I say, the mocking and malignant arts of coquetry take their rise, i. e. in a total want of thought of other's feelings ; and this immediately results from a contracted view, by a profane repression of the intellectual energy in early youth. This defect of education likewise shews itself in the almost universal pursuit of pageantry and fashions. Due cultivation of mind would tend directly to dissipate this flaring envelope of vanity. But there comes a time of reflection in *age*, when the stimula of juvenile amusements are exhausted, when the mind must feed on reflections, or sink into mere insipience and dotage ; and when these reflections must either be pleasant or unpleasant. If the understanding have not been cultivated in early life by insuring it in a proper manner to those exercises that tend to make its operations habitual and pleasing, these reflections assuredly will not be pleasant. But if the moral powers have not been properly improved, and by this sort of negligence the memory be charged with abuses of talents, privileges, means and opportunities of doing good, these reflections must be pointedly contristating. Moreover the most delightful reflections arise from a sedulous improvement of all our talents to the best use practicable. The most sublime, durable, and substantial enjoyment of our existence, is in our reflections. Here is the depository of all the variety in nature. The mind is the most noble, the most elevated, and the most precious part of the human system ; and the pleasures of it are more secure, constant, easy of ac-

cess, and extensively diversified, than those of any other part : which part, if we have earnestly cultivated, and inured ourselves to contemplation in the early part of life, we fail not to inherit a copious and ample round of solid entertainment, to the irremeable verge of our existence.

RULE XXII. *If you determine to travel extensively either for amusement or for science, set out with no particular suspense in your considerations of matrimony as an object of your practical course.*

The design of this rule is to avert anxiety, and thereby give that freedom to thought, indispensable to the advantage of observation. In application to this, if your choice be not conclusively fixed upon celibacy ; either enter into such a conditional contract of future establishment, within the round of your acquaintance, as you can complacently rely upon ; or else decisively defer the determination to another place and time. But a mind that is wandering and at random with respect to these concerns, or under any particular entanglement of suspense, is not likely to get much solid improvement by exploring the varieties of different regions and communities.

RULE XXIII. *Contemplate the relation of the wants and feelings of other individuals of your species, to your own.*

This improves sympathy. These wants and feelings are of two classes : 1. Natural, original ; such as are the very same in every human creature : 2. Habitual ; such as rise out of custom and peculiar courses of indulgence in diverse individuals.

RULE XXIV. *Practice the social and private virtues ;*

Social virtue, in its sublimest sense may be defined, intentionally advancing the greatest good of the system of percipient beings with whom we can intelligently reciprocate any emotion. In a little more limited sense, it may be called that sort of voluntary action that goes directly to promote the good of our fellow creatures. Otherwise, it is doing to others in every particular case, that which we are apt to desire them to do to us.

The social virtues are philanthropy, hospitality, gratitude, justice, patriotism, charity, meekness.

Philanthropy is, speculatively, that emotion of love and sympathetic regard to beings of the human species, and in fact to percipient beings in general, that moves us to desire their preservation and happiness. Actively, it is beneficence. Hospitality is kindness and benignity practised particularly upon strangers; as protection, sustenance, employment, information, direction, &c.; and is no more than active philanthropy qualified to this sort of objects. Gratitude is, speculatively, the emotions of love and good will towards those who have been the intentional causes of any good to us: actively, the practice of such actions as tend to confer a return or retribution of such good, whether in the same kind or otherwise. Justice is giving, in thought, determination, word, or deed, their exact due to all volitive agents that come within the sphere of our reciprocation; i. e. rendering the appropriate assignment to merit and demerit. In a larger sense, it is doing unto others what we would have them do unto us; and this is justly the due of one sympathetic being from another. In this sense it comprehends the essence of all the social virtues; which are but various modifications of it. But in the sense in which it here stands distinguished from the rest of the social virtues, it is *requimenti* and doing to others what ought to be done to ourselves in the like cases, in reference to the

good of the universe. Yet in its *inflictive* application it is not to be practiced by an individual, but by the collected power and choice of a community. To turn it out of this channel, in civil society, is to convert it to injustice.

Patriotism has been thought not to be reconcileable to philanthropy, and indeed it is not in any other point of view than considered as a prevailing attachment to a particular nation on account of its having adopted a frame of government which is signally favorite and applicative of philanthropy; and actively, the practice of such things out of a zealous attachment to, and veneration of, such frame of government, as are necessary to those purposes of its support, which we wish all mankind, friends and foes, to acquiesce in and implicitly subserve.

Charity is exercising compassion and beneficence on those who are in want of the comforts of life, or of any desideratum whose privation makes them unhappy.

Meekness is negative and actual: as 1. Forbearance of resentment; and 2. Forgiving injuries. Clemency also is included in this virtue.

What are called private virtues are those modes and recourses necessary for preserving the health of the body and of the mind; for preserving the order of the trains of thought regular, clear, and serene; and for acquiring and retaining the ascendancy and controul of the necessary materials for executing all purposes of social virtues. They are patience, industry, fortitude, temperance, continence, cleanliness, frugality, &c.

Let the person who conducts education, keep close to these few plain rules I have set down in the preceding pages, for each stage of life; and I hesitate not to assert that he will find his work not only without insuperable difficulties, but to prosper beyond what from a cursory advertence to them he is apprized of.

APPENDIX.

A MORAL CATECHISM.

QUESTION. *What is the chief end of man?*

ANSWER. Happiness.

Q. *In what sense is happiness the chief end of man?*

A. Happiness is the chief end of man in this sense, that it is the chief end of his pursuit, the prevailing object in which all his wishes terminate, and that to which his desires and aversions have continual reference.

Q. *What is happiness?*

A. Contentment or satisfaction.

Q. *What is contentment or satisfaction?*

A. The possession of such a state of mind as from a clear view of the realities that environ us, and to which our capacities are competent, precludes the prevalence of desire over serene pleasure.

Q. *What does contentment immediately depend upon?*

A. Such a contemperament of the motions in the human constitution, as precludes violent desire; inasmuch that a greater degree of pleasure than of uneasiness, is in that constitution.

Q. Is happiness capable of being increased?

A. It is capable of being made more permanent and more sublime.

Q. How can it be made more permanent?

A. By rendering more permanent the causes upon which it depends : and this is done chiefly by expunging what is fluctuating, from the usual exciting objects of desire, and reducing them in number.

Q. How can it be made more sublime?

A. By abstracting and subliming the relations of desire, and by relaxing its attachments to sensible objects. The principal secret of procuring the greatest degree of happiness our constitution admits of, consists in reducing the objects that prevail to move desire, to such as are within the controul of our power ; so that those objects shall be the pleasure of doing good, the pleasure of knowledge, and the pleasure of exercising the highest faculties.

Q. What proceeding is that by which men bring about these effects?

A. Exercise of the power of voluntary thinking.

Q. Is it this alone that is sufficient to carry man to this consummation?

A. No ; but this is the beginning of what is within his power to contribute towards it, and is first necessary. The effect of his actions upon other beings has great influence either to retard or accelerate this accomplishment.

Q. What rule is that by which man is to be guided in the measures of his conduct, in order to attain the greatest degree of happiness he is capable of attaining?

A. The law of the universe.

Q. What is the law of the universe?

A. That law by which all the motions in the universe are directed and have their constant effects.

Q. But what does the law of the universe essentially consist in?

A. It essentially consists in the active and passive powers of all the beings in the great system of substances, whereby they are capacitated to act upon each other and be influenced by each other, according to certain measures, and the events which constitute these operations have their continued causality.

Q. What is the enforcement of the law of the universe?

A. A chain of causes and effects that invariably follow one another throughout duration and space. In a general view, "the state of the universe in this present instant, may be considered as the effect of the state of the universe in the preceding instant and the cause of the state of the universe in the next succeeding instant."

Q. Is not the law of the universe exceedingly implicit?

A. It is so; and in its axioms as much diversified as are the kinds of beings which compose the universe; in which varieties it is the same that some have called the "laws of nature."

Q. In what manner do the massy parts of visible nature, obey this law?

A. By attraction and gravitation. Herein this immutable law, which the plastic original of all impressed upon each particle or atom of substance, so operates upon the bulky portions of matter as to hold intervolv'd systems of planets and comets in a steady circulation at proportionable distances about more massy

globes, whose attractive influence balances *their* centrifugal tendency.

Q. Are not those of the same kind of properties that exhibit their effects in the operations of smaller pieces of matter?

A. The very same: thus stones thrown to a certain distance from its surface, directly redound to the earth by virtue of their gravitating tendency. Also flame ascends from the earth's surface, and likewise smoke till it reaches a region of the atmosphere where air of the same volume is of the same weight with its own. Water is invincibly prone to seek a level, or to be continually gliding, one particle over another, till all become level.

Q. How does the law of the universe affect the different races of percipient beings?

A. In general by uniformly subjecting them all to the consequences that flow from the property of perceptivity.

Q. Are all the races of perceiving beings social, and have fellow feeling for the same species?

A. Most of those we are acquainted with, particularly mankind, are gregarious, and have peculiar feelings among themselves in regard one individual for another.

Q. Does not the law of the universe annex to a certain species of organization peculiar powers, active and passive, and to those powers certain effects, which are inseparable from their operations and relations?

A. It does; and we find that man has some powers and properties which far exceed those of all other races which we are acquainted with, and in consequence of them is subject to, and capable of, a great number of feelings and actions, which never come within the comprehension of those.

Q. *Are not the tendencies of our voluntary actions imposed by the law of the universe ?*

A. Certainly they are ; and we can no more alter those tendencies than we can alter the motions of the planets, suns, and comets.

Q. *But if the very causes of men's actions, as of all things, are the natural ascendancy of certain properties impressed upon atoms by the originary principle of mobility, what skill can man put into practice to shape his course, what counsel can he take, what has he to do ?*

A. Man has liberty ; therefore man has much to do.

Q. *What is liberty ?*

A. A power to do or forbear to do what one will.

Q. *What is will ?*

A. A movement in the sensorium, contrary to perception.

Q. *What is the sensorium, so called by the physiologists ?*

A. A substance that distinguishes organized locomoving systems from vegetables, and is supposed to be the constituent matter of the brain and nerves ; its centre being the central part of the brain.

Q. *What is that which immediately causes the motion of the sensorium ?*

A. A substance supposed to be secreted from the atmosphere, and to be the same as electric fluid.

Q. *What are the powers of the sensorium ?*

A. They are four ; the power of irritation, the power of sensation, the power of association, and the power of volition, from which follows voluntary action. The results of these several powers exerted are respectively called modes of the sensorium, or of sensorial operation.

Q *What are these modes?*

A. Irritation is a movement in the extreme parts of the sensorium that reside in the secondary organs of motion and sense, in consequence of the appulse of external bodies. Sensation is a movement of the central parts of the sensorium or of the whole of it, beginning in the extreme parts residing in the secondary organs of motion and sense. Association is such a connecting of two or more motions of different fibres as makes them simultaneous, or follow one another in immediate consecution. Volition is a movement of the central parts of the sensorium, or of the whole of it, beginning in the centre, and terminating in some of the extreme parts which reside in the secondary organs of motion and sense. Volition is called the act of the will; it is the beginning of voluntary exertion, and whatsoever action follows it in consecution of dependency, is called voluntary action.

Q. *What is that which determines the will?*

A. Desire. The greatest uneasiness of desire at the present moment felt, usually determines the will rather than the idea of any future good however clearly discerned, or rationally adjudged to be a greater good than is the gratification of the present desire. But in a prudent man these are collateral; the greatest desire is that of the greatest good.

Q. *If then the successive motives that determine the will in the actions that make up our lives, have their place in the concatenation of effects that comes from original impressions upon substance, and sometimes seeming chance, and if a concurrence of extraneous causes may make one desire to prevail rather than another, and it is out of the province of will to determine which at any particular time shall be the greatest desire, where is liberty?*

A. Liberty comes after the act of the will. Liberty being a power to do, and to forbear to do, what one will, (to forbear being equally in one's power as to do,) it is evident that it essentially consists in these two things: 1. An indifferency in the operative faculties to action or rest; and 2. A power to suspend the operative faculties from proceeding consecutively to the first volition, into the execution of what the will has therein directed, and, in the interval, to deliberate upon its eligibility. Here then is liberty. Here is the highest degree of freedom we can form any notion of. Man then is a free agent in those cases wherein he has this power to hold his operative faculties in suspense so far as respects a particular act of his will. For when man exercises this power to *forbear to do* what he has willed, and, suspending the consecution of his action, deliberates and applies his reasoning power to the balancing of the consequences of those respective actions which are equally in his power, he becomes the modifier of his own motives, — the motives that determine his will. For if the last determination be different from the first volition, it is beyond question that that suspension and deliberation constitute the efficient cause of it. This state of mind and ascendancy of the motive, are brought about by the man's free exercise of the power to forbear to act. If we extend his freedom a hair's breadth farther than this, we give man the power of creation: for we cannot conceive man to have any higher power than this, without supposing him to have a power equal to the renovation of the whole system of things. And also this is the highest degree of liberty and all the free agency of which we are competent to an adequate and distinct idea; whether any other degrees of this kind of power are possessed by superior beings or no.

Q. *What is morality?*

A. Morality is that which is used instead of the word ethics, to denote that science which directs us to the appropriate means and processes to attain the greatest degree of happiness we are capable of ; and in order to this end, to improve our active powers to their highest perfection in habit : which, for this purpose, takes into view not only the specific powers and properties of our constitution, and the causality and tendency of our actions, but also several measures and rules to direct our conduct towards the attainment of that end. The main business of its inculcation is to define the particular duties that arise from our several relations to other parts of the universe, especially to individuals of our own race ; and to render those duties pleasant

Q. *Does not morality draw all its dogmas from the law of the universe ?*

A. It does. The law of the universe contains the principles of all the maxims of ethics.

Q. *What particular part of the law of the universe is that upon which is grounded the reason of our sense of obligation towards other living creatures ?*

A. Sympathy

Q. *What is sympathy ?*

A. A species of imitation.

Q. *What is imitation ?*

A. Acting over, or copying, such movement as is acted, or conceived to be acted, by another subject.

Q. *How many sorts of imitation are there ?*

A. Three sorts ; physical, sensitive, and voluntary.

Q. *What is physical imitation ?*

A. Physical imitation is that which takes place among the parts of an organized animated system, independently of a perception of the movement that is imitated : as the fibres of the face imitate the stomach

in a vivid action when the latter is excited by a copious meal. The salivary glands are imitated by the pancreas in the degree and manner of their action. This sort also is called sympathy by the physicians, and is called *reverse sympathy* when one part imitates or follows another in its change of motion or course, yet acts contrarily in the degree of the movement to which it changes : as the nerves of the head, on the quiescence or decreased motion of the stomach, increase in action ; and vice versa.

Q. What is sensitive imitation ?

A. It is the imitating or acting over, by our nerves of sense (or sensitive fibres) the motions of correspondent parts of other individual systems, in consequence of the conception or idea of their existence in those foreign subjects. Thus on seeing the arm of an individual bruised or violently torn, we feel pain in a correspondent part of ourselves, by reason of the nervous fibres of our own arm approximating an imitation of those of the wounded limb, in their movement. Seeing one we judge to be cheerful or serenely delighted, we feel serene pleasure obsequiously to the irritation of the significant concomitant. And thus also the appearance of a depressed countenance makes us sad.

Q. What is voluntary imitation ?

A. That which is free, and follows volition : as monkeys imitating the actions of men ; one man imitating the manners or pursuits of another,—as aping one's style, gait, dress, &c.

Q. What is that species of imitation which is called sympathy, as in the concerns of morality it relates to our accountability as social beings ?

A. Sensitive imitation. Sensitive imitation is that sort which in this view takes the name of sympathy : in which we consider ourselves put in the places of oth-

ers in regard of those particular feelings, the ideas of which produce such movement. This is refined and extended as the operations of intellect are improved, and may be called *reflective* sympathy; when we sympathize with the *reflections* and enter into the views of others. When this concerns those things that stand immediately connected with voluntary exertion, it is sometimes called *moral* sympathy.

Q. What is the distinction of sympathy when applied in the concerns of morality?

A. Sympathy, as applied in the concerns of morality, is distinguished into direct and indirect. Direct sympathy is assimilation of our thoughts and feelings, or emotions, to those of another. Indirect sympathy is the like conformity of our thoughts and feelings, or emotions, to those of a third party, in the consequence to thoughts, feelings, and emotions, in another party, and which, in relation to the latter, may be either congenial or repugnant,—as gratitude for good received, and resentment for evil; when we are said to sympathize with the *approbation* or with the *disapprobation* of others. Thus indirect sympathy has a double reference; direct sympathy, only a single and immediate reference.

Q. Does our voluntary power extend to our thoughts?

A. We have the power to direct and determine the trains of our thought: and what follows this direction, is called voluntary thinking. It is also called reflection; it being a diverse operation upon those ideas we get by way of our senses; the possibilities of the varieties of which operation are called faculties.

Q. How many sorts of voluntary thinking are there?

A. Discerning, comparing, compounding, attention, contemplation, study, abstracting, recollection, and reasoning which is compounded of several of the oth-

ers. These are called the modes of voluntary thinking. There is also *resverie* which is merely an intent continued course of voluntary thinking, comprising any or all of the foregoing modes directed to some determinate theme, wherein the energy of the voluntary exertion excludes all other sensorial operations in every instance that does not conspicuously coincide with the train that immediately occupies the mind. Memory and imagination are not voluntary; but may be called modes of sensitive thinking, although ideas that have been voluntary are sometimes resuscitated, in their trains.

Q. *By what distinctions do you define these several modes?*

A. *Discerning* is perceiving the relation and mutual habitude of two ideas, in their difference or likeness,—as their proportion, &c. *Comparing* is taking a view of two ideas or objects, one in reference to another, in order to determine their relative aspects. *Compounding* is considering two or more of those appearances successively in addition one to another. *Attention* is a more than ordinary alert observation of any perception or succession of thoughts; or otherwise a circumspect voluntary notice of the train of our perceptions and reflections. *Contemplation* is the retaining of one idea or train of ideas under a single view of the understanding for a considerable time together. *Study* is a deliberate curious examining of an idea or number of ideas on all sides and in all habitudes in which they may be considered. This is made up of attention, comparing, and discerning. *Abstracting* is the forming of general ideas that represent whole classes and races of beings; which is done by separating any particular idea or select contexture of ideas from those circumstances of connection which determine it to a subject of particular existence, and considering it as representative of a large number of indi-

vidual beings which correspond in that particular. *Recollection* is the voluntary seeking to revive ideas formerly impressed ; and voluntary excitation of all possible accompaniments that lead to such revival. *Reasoning* is the process for discerning the agreement or disagreement of two ideas remote from each other whose aspects do not at once appear, by the agreement or disagreement of two or more other ideas immediately compared together ; thus deducing and deriving propositions at present unknown, from other propositions previously known and established ; and consists of four parts, or stages. 1. Finding out intermediate ideas for the purpose,— these intermediate ideas are called proofs ; 2. Laying them together in just order : 3. Perceiving their agreement or disagreement ; 4. Drawing the conclusion ; which is determining the agreement or disagreement of the two extreme ideas thereby. Therefore this is made up of attention, comparing, compounding, and discerning. Besides these, there is a state of mind called *resverie*, which is a train of voluntary thinking that surmounts the irritation of external objects of sense, so far as they counterview a certain point which for the time being concentrates the whole energy of contemplation. This excludes the intervention of all other notices that do not fall within an experienced connection with, or resolve themselves into, the immediate object of this voluntary energy. Remembrance is a revival of any of those appearances, images, ideas of sensation or reflection, that have before existed in the mind. This is done without the aid of volition and is incompatible with it ; therefore this is not voluntary thinking. So neither is imagination, which is a succession of ideas which do not immediately arise by way of volition, sensation, or irritation, but rather by association, whereby different ones are made to appear than those which have been formerly perceived, by the various coalescing of

such particulars as have been before experienced by any or all the ways of thinking.

Q. What is conscience?

A. That sense whereby we distinguish right and wrong in our voluntary actions, and whereby delight is accompanied with the idea of right, and pain or uneasiness with that of wrong; which is no other than the faculty of discerning applied to the relation of our free actions to a rule. It is also called the moral sense, and the moral faculty.

Q. What is conscience derived from?

A. Sympathy.

Q. What is right and wrong?

A. The direct and confessed tendency of an action to produce happiness in any of our fellow creatures, or to produce pain; or else, in its ultimate efficiency, of one action to produce more happiness than pain, and of another to produce more pain than happiness.

Q. What then is the rule to which our actions are referred as to a standard?

A. The law of the universe. So, as one has more extended knowledge and adequate conceptions of this part of the law of the universe which relates to the actions of men, the greater is his power of conscience, that is, the keener his sensibility of right and wrong.

Q. How does the law of the universe determine the right and wrong of actions?

A. By fixing and bounding their tendency; directing it to the ultimate production of pleasure or pain in others; and making some actions to be the causes of happiness and others to be the causes of misery; whence it is said to command some actions to be done in order to avoid the misery to which they regularly tend. And the relation of those actions which, conformably to this

placit of the law of the universe tend to produce happiness, is called *right*, or moral good ; and the actions themselves virtuous actions ; and the relation of those actions to the same principle of the law of the universe, which by being contrary to this command tend to produce pain or misery, is called *wrong*, or moral evil ; and the actions themselves vicious actions.

Q. What is passion when applied to morality ?

A. Passion is an emotion originating either in irritation, perception, or memory, which partakes of more than one of the operations of the sensorium ; in which either sensation or volition predominates, and is therefore either sensitive or voluntary. There are numerous and various passions. Those passions in which voluntary motion predominates, may be denominated voluntary passions ; and those in which sensation of pleasure or pain predominates, may be denominated sensitive passions.

Q. How can this definition be true ?

A. In every passion is voluntary thought and sensitive thought ; one or the other of which predominating, must properly fix the distinctive character of the passion, and denominate it either voluntary or sensitive. Irritation has no share in a passion, actually ; and association has less to do than the other two modes. There is unquestionably attention, for without attending to the objects that cause emotion, no emotion could be developed. Attention is a voluntary act ; therefore passion participates, in some degree, of voluntary exertion. Surprise, and all its degrees, are affections of the mind, which are indifferent to the accompaniment of either pleasure or pain, and therefore surprise is not specifically a passion. It moreover may accompany a passion : it frequently accompanies fear. Surprise is an incident of our ideas as they flow or arise in succession ; and passion is an incident of our sensorial motions.

Q. *How are the passions distributed?*

A. The passions are either primary or compounded.

Q. *What are the primary passions?*

A. The primary passions are those which are original, and have their distinctive characters without any mixture with other particular passions. They are desire, love, anger, joy, hope, fear, sorrow, hatred, pity, despair, grief, envy, shame.

Q. *What is desire?*

A. Desire is uneasiness felt in the want of pleasurable sensation, and incitement of volition towards the procurement of that which is the cause of such pleasure. This is the approach towards volition; the first struggle of the voluntary power with sensation, towards any object. This might therefore be called a voluntary passion: but it being uneasiness, partakes of sensation, and is painful; which also being its beginning, and first excitement, it is probably with more propriety termed a sensitive passion.

Q. *What is love?*

A. Love is the emotion that accompanies the thought of an object the possession of which is apt to delight. Love is mostly a gentle sensation, originating from an idea of memory, or imagination, or irritation.

Q. *What is anger?*

A. Anger is a thought of an injury received, voluntarily kept in view, with strong impulsions of the voluntary energy towards the purpose of revenge, i. e. towards a determination on the return of injury for it. This is obviously a voluntary passion; yet it is seen also to participate of sensation, in that it is a painful and uneasy emotion. Anger, in its intensity, suppresses sympathy.

Q. *What is joy?*

A. Joy is distinguished by the assurance of some present possession or event which is capable of causing delight. Joy is principally a pleasing sensation, rising from a sensitive idea, either in memory, imagination, or perception.

Q. What is hope?

A. Hope is that emotion which attends the thought of the probable possession of some future good. This is a pleasing sensation, and differs from joy in these two respects, it has not so perfect assurance with it, wherefore the sensation is less intense; and always has reference to something future, as its object.

Q. What is fear?

A. Fear is what attends a thought of some evil that is likely to befall, or of the approach of some object that has power to produce pain in us. Fear is a painful sensation. It has several degrees and modifications, which are called awe, panic, terror, horror, cowardice, pusillanimity, laziness.

Q. What is sorrow?

A. Sorrow is a painful emotion attending the thought of some good which is lost or prevented, and gives place to uneasiness. The lowest degree of it is regret, which implies a thought of some action which it was once in our power to do, the opportunity whereof we no longer have, the benefit of which we now want.

Q. What is hatred?

A. Hatred is an emotion that prompts us to fly from its objects, and is the thought of an object which is apt to produce fear, disgust, or pain, of which object we generally have at the same time a strong desire to be rid of the perception. This though partaking much of sensation, is rather a voluntary passion.

Q. What is pity?

A. Pity is a sympathizing with a being that is in distress or trouble ; and is a disagreeable sensation arising either out of perception or memory or imagination ; also voluntary movement prompting to reflect on that distress.

Q. *What is despair ?*

A. Despair is that state of mind which with a thought of some distant good, unites that of unattainableness.

Q. *What is grief ?*

A. Grief is what arises from the thought of some present evil, or from the assurance of something befalling us or having befallen us that causes present trouble. Grief therefore is the antipode of joy.

Q. *What is envy ?*

A. Envy is an uneasy feeling on the thought of some good possessed by another, which we wish to possess, and are thereby excluded from ;—when another is thought to excel unduly in that whereon we could not but value ourselves.

Q. *What is shame ?*

A. Shame is that disagreeable agitation of mind which comes from a thought, of some action or some circumstance of ourselves, which is apt to cause offence to others, and make us objects of unsocial emotions in them.

Q. *What are the compounded passions ?*

A. They are combinations and associations of the primary passions. They are pride, ambition, avarice, jealousy, compunction, and admiration.

Q. *What is pride ?*

A. Pride is composed of love and joy and the lowest degree of hatred ; the two first being directed to one's self as their moving object, and the latter to others. It also has with it a desire of rule and domina-

tion. The intensity of this passion suppresses sympathy.

Q. What is ambition?

A. Ambition is compounded of desire and hope. This is a voluntary passion.

Q. What is avarice?

A. Avarice is a compound of desire and fear: desire of getting gain or money, and fear of losing it.

Q. What is jealousy?

A. Jealousy consists of a mixture of love, hatred, anger, shame, envy, and fear.

Q. What is compunction?

A. Compunction is a sort of sorrow and grief which have for their moving object the loss of innocence, and are excited by the remembrance of actions done by ourselves, which are wrong, and of which we disapprove, because they produce or have produced pain in others: it has also a mixture of desire to make atonement for them. This is an effluence of sympathy.

Q. What is admiration?

A. Admiration is compounded of a mixture of love, fear, and joy, to which is joined some degree of that which is called surprize, which is the effect of an instantaneous severing of the train of our ideas by an abrupt and unexpected irritation, as by the supervention of a new or strange object.

Q. What is obligation?

A. A necessity and fitness of the performance of an action, resulting from a dependency of other beings' feelings on our determinations, and of our own upon theirs, founded in the nature of things.

Q. What is obligation deduced from and supported by?

A. Sympathy. Were no society, no obligation could be: if but an individual of a kind exist, no such thing as obligation to others can exist, because no sympathy. And if numbers exist, if no sympathy, then no sense of obligation, because no apprehension of others' feelings.

Q. *What is meant by being under obligation?*

A. Being in a relation or condition that makes any particular action necessary, fit and proper, in reference to our greatest good

Q. *Can a man be under an obligation to himself?*

A. Strictly not; unless he divide himself into agent and object and personify the reciprocal relations of his parts. Hence it is only figuratively that a man is said to owe an obligation to himself, when is a necessity and a fitness in certain actions in his power, to promote his own private interest exclusive of all consideration of that of others

Q. *What are the limits of obligation?*

A. Those of power and knowledge. Obligation can extend no farther than power and knowledge. That no obligation can be where is no possibility to perform an action, is obvious; for there can be no fitness in what is not possible. Knowledge of any kind of action, and of the necessity of it for our enjoyment as rational creatures, may be reckoned essential to the power. Without a knowledge of the tendency of an action, obligation cannot exist. For obligation being the consequence of a dependency of our feelings on the impression made upon others by an action of our power, as well as that of others' feelings on that action, cannot be where we can realize no such dependancy; which is the case when we cannot apprehend the tendency of an action. For an obligation means an urgency, from a rational fitness, that a man should go

about the performance of a certain action, or a certain sort of action. Now this supposes the man to be rational, and to have knowledge of the object and habitude of the action; and the delirious, the insane, the lunatic, are not said to be under any obligation.

Q. What examples of obligation can be produced?

A. In regard to promises, in the first place we have obligation to deliberate upon the effect of a promise, and our ability to perform it. Secondly, when we have once made a promise to any of our fellow creatures, we are under obligation to perform it, so far as we are able. We are under a general obligation to speak truth; and also to do to others what is reasonable they should do to us in the like cases.

Q. Are there not certain cases wherein we have obligation to deceive others?

A. To preserve life in others or ourselves we have sometimes obligation to deceive a delirious or an insane person; as when we take weapons from a maniac and conceal them; or persuade a man in a raging fever that we give him water, when we give him some potion that is necessary to save his life. Also to prevent another from committing murder, and preserve our own life to be useful to others, it is sometimes necessary to deceive that class of the insane who being in power ask the question what is our secret belief concerning things that are doubtful, while they stand ready to take away life if we do not profess a proposed creed. It is necessary and fit to deceive these on such occasions. In many instances the reverse is calamitous to the feelings of rational and considerate persons with whom we stand connected. In a few such extreme cases it is right to speak contrary to what we think?

Q. What is duty?

A. Any action that we are under obligation to do, and any just action that is necessary to enable us fully to perform such as we are under obligation to do. Thus if it be my duty to fulfil my promises, to requite my benefactors, to pay my debts, it is also my duty to preserve my life, and to protect and defend what belongs to me, that I may have the opportunity and means wherewith to do those things.

Q. *What is habit ?*

A. Facility in, and disposition to the performance of any sort of action, whether intellectual or corporeal, arising from custom or practice, which is the continued repetition of an action.

Q. *What is art ?*

A. A habit in the mind prescribing a systematic arrangement of causes for the production of certain effects, and a consequent power of producing those effects readily.

Q. *What is the summary of the true process to attain our greatest degree of happiness ?*

A. Habitual exercise of our highest faculties, and practice of virtue.

Q. *What are our highest faculties ?*

A. Our intellectual faculties, or powers of reflection.

Q. *What are the highest employments of our highest faculties ?*

A. Study, reasoning, abstraction, contemplation of abstract ideas, projects of philanthropy, and cultivation of sympathy.

Q. *What is cultivation of sympathy ?*

A. The considering of others' feelings in comparison with our own, and governing ourselves by this consideration in those actions in our power whereby those feelings are probably affected. In this way we are

said to 'put ourselves in the places of others,'—or 'make their cases our own.'

Q. In what manner does the exercise of our highest faculties contribute to the production of our greatest degree of enjoyment?

A. By centering our satisfaction in those circumstances of which the modification immediately depends upon our own will, or at least is within its influence, and which are removed from the contingences of external fortune.

Q. What is virtue?

A. Any sort of voluntary action, whether intellectual or corporeal, that intentionally goes to promote the good of others, directly or indirectly.

Q. How many sorts of virtue are there?

A. Two; called private virtue and social virtue.

Q. What is the distinction?

A. The distinction is, that although all virtue has a view to the good of others, there being even in thrift, neatness, and industry, a continual reference to the feelings of other beings, yet, whereas social virtue has the good of others for its primary end, private virtue has for its primary end the good of one's self, his family, or kindred.

Q. Is there no other distinction of virtue?

A. Yes. Virtue is distinguished also into speculative and active. The former reaches no farther than the operations of our minds; as contemplation, good wishes, good purposes, &c. The latter proceeds to corporeal action that carries those purposes into execution.

Q. What are the social virtues?

A. The social virtues are philanthropy, hospitality, justice, gratitude, patriotism, charity, and meekness.

Q. What is philanthropy?

A. Philanthropy consists in those motions of love and good will directed to all beings of the human species, which have for their object their preservation, well-being, and true happiness. In its practical part it is called beneficence.

Q. What is hospitality?

A. Hospitality is philanthropy directed to strangers; as protecting them and providing for their exigences.

Q. What is justice?

A. Justice is rendering to every being its due. Justice is either universal or commutative. Universal justice is doing to every volitive being what we would have that being do to us, and in this sense it comprehends all the social virtues. Commutative justice is doing or forbearing those actions which we feel ourselves under special obligation by the law of the universe, to do or forbear to do to other beings, in consideration of something actually done or to be done by them to us; which is doing what we perceive ought to be done to us in the like cases, in reference to the good of the universe.

Q. What is gratitude?

A. Gratitude is a complacency and sympathetic regard exercised towards those who have done us good offices or been the intentional causes of any good to us, and a promptness in remunerating them therefor. In other words, gratitude is, *speculatively*, a strong sense of obligation prompting us to perform certain actions by way of repayment for benefits received from others: *actively*, it is the performing of those actions according to our ability.

Q. What is patriotism?

A. Patriotism is the principle of philanthropy directed to that community or body of men which we

have chosen for our country on account of their adopted government being adapted to promote the true weal of the species at large ; and the practice of certain actions for the effectuating of purposes calculated to support it, which we from the same principle wish all ranks of mankind to acquiesce in and subserve.

Q. What is charity ?

A. Charity is relieving the distressed and destitute, by supplying them with the necessaries and comforts of life ; and also exercising candor and sympathy in our thoughts and discourse of those who appear in a bad light.

Q. What is meekness ?

A. Meekness is forbearance of revenge, forgiveness of injuries, and also clemency in inflicting condign pain.

Q. What are the private virtues ?

A. The private virtues are temperance, continence, cleanliness, industry, frugality, fortitude, and patience.

Q. What is temperance ?

A. Temperance is habitually circumscribing those gratifications of the natural appetites, hunger and thirst, necessary to sustain our being, to such a compass as consists with the due temperament and healthy action of all parts of the animal frame.

Q. What is continence ?

A. An abstaining from all irregular and immoderate indulgences of venereal pleasures which are destructive of health and peace ; and is by another word called chastity.

Q. What is cleanliness ?

A. The preserving of one's person, clothes, furniture, and dwelling, clear from all unnecessary foulness, dirt, and filth, which gradually tend to engender

disease. This is necessary for health. Show is sometimes mistaken for this;—as wearing a fine neat coat that is tainted with contagious effluvia rather than a ragged one; and scouring of floors at the approach of holidays.

Q. What is industry?

A. Industry is a cheerful, assiduous, and active attendance upon the performance of our duties or whatever is appropriate to execute our purposes.

Q. What is frugality?

A. Frugality is a habitual saving from waste whatever things, coming within our controul, are capable of a valuable appropriation in reasonable purposes; and is opposed to prodigality.

Q. What is fortitude?

A. Fortitude is a persevering in any actions for a desired end, in defiance of the danger of any pain or inconvenience that lie in the way to it.

Q. What is patience?

A. Patience is an unruffled continuance, by a judicious and conscientious perpension, in any course or condition in spite of present pain, privation, or difficulty, that discommodes it.

Q. In what way does the practice of virtue contribute to increase our happiness?

A. By making us the exciting objects of complacency and benevolence in others: whereby, by recommending ourselves to mutual approbation, we remove all suspicion and apprehensions of moral evil.

Q. What are reward and punishment?

A. The consequences of actions, as they affect the agents. As pain that follows bad or vicious actions; and pleasure that follows good or virtuous actions. Rewards and punishments are of two kinds: necessa-

ry and instituted. Of the first kind are those consequences our actions inevitably draw upon us from the natural constitution and course of things according to the universal law,—such as remorse, dread, suspicion, resentment of others, &c. that follow as the necessary effects of injuring and wronging our fellow creatures; and self-approbation, complacency, and tranquillity, that follow the exercises of justice, hospitality, charity, and meekness. Instituted rewards and punishments are such as men have contrived to follow certain actions as the arbitrary consequents of them, which are brought about by the direction of voluntary power and choice in individuals who have superior influence and efficiency;—as the cutting off of a man's ears for stealing a sheep; or giving a man a piece of silver for killing a crow.

Q. Who were the greatest preachers of ethics that have appeared in the world, that are recorded in the history extant?

A. Confucius, Epictetus, Socrates, Seneca, and Jesus Christ.

Q. In what chiefly consists the excellence of Jesus Christ's preaching?

A. In its universality, and its levelling all manner of monopoly and pride.

Q. What particular discourse of Jesus Christ's contains the most of his moral maxims plainly expressed?

A. His sermon on the mount.

Q. What is the most sublime and benignant precept that he delivered?

That which is called the golden rule: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them."

Q. What was the cause of his speaking cabalistically?

A. The opposition of the Jewish government to his designs ; the barbarity and jealousy of the leaders in it.

Q. *Why do men, since his time, labor to obscure the tenor of his doctrine, and make it supernatural instead of making it plain ?*

A. For the same reason that the Jews sought to kill him.

ERRATA.

- Page 22, line 19, "radietion," read radication.
63, line 28, "all" read at all.
98, line 21, "inconsiderable," read inconsiderate.
117, line 12, "their," read these.
119, line 6 from bottom, "the," read this.
126, line 8 from bottom, "particular," read practical.
133, line 9 from bottom, "envolve," read evolve.
143, line 19, dele "and."
164, line 3 from bottom, "herofore," read herefor.
361, line 13, "to," read of.
381, line 8, "unattainableness," read its unattainableness.

It having been incident to the process of the foregoing discourse to use several words in some variety of sense, and to apply some words not in common usage precisely as they are applied in these instances; I shall faithfully set down the following list of those which I have used in various or peculiar senses, and of the particular places where I have so used them.

Advance, page 20, 181, to serve to execute; to help forward.

Advance, 187, to bring forward, to develop.

Advance, 144, to hold forth, bring to view.

Advance, 184, to proceed, to progress.

Accomplish, 13, 32, 187, to endow, to qualify.

Accomplished, 168, 185, gifted, endowed, qualified.

Accomplishment, 2, 60, 180, 183, 184, 189, 193, 197, 207, 211, 216, 243, 253, qualification, acquired excellence.

Accomplish 137, 287, 325, 345, to execute, bring to effect.

Accomplishment, 7, 32, 126, 129, 169, 286, execution, and completion of effect.

Capacity, 23, 30, 55, 67, 209, 251, 257, province of efficiency.

Capacity, 330, compass of representative power.

In all other places, this word is used to signify extent of power, active or passive.

Nerval, 22, consisting of nerve.

Outset, 42, 79, a setting out in any business, a beginning.

Scrupulosity, 40, fear of acting.

Scruplosity, page 67, conscientious care.

Compass, 337, same as point of the compass.

Susceptive, 98, 101, 181, 254, capable or incident to be admitted, (distinct from *susceptible*, and correlative to it;) likewise in every other instance.

Humanity, 136, 166, 181, human nature.

Urgency, 201, press of need or importance.

Accelerate, 238, to hasten the approach to.

Acceleration, 234, promotion and insurance.

Bias, 295, bent, propension.

Climax, 324, as climacteric.

Pursuit, 294, 325, 357. the thing pursued, object, end.

Appetency, 287, fitness and aptness to receive what is required in support of organic parts.

Concourse, 202, casual assemblage and conspiring together towards one event.

Recession is used generally for recess; a retiring from, or being retired from; ceasing, and being absented.

Stock, when confronted with offspring, invariably means parent.


Reversion I have constantly used to signify the total changing of a thing, either for its opposite, or for something that is incompatible with its existence.

Apprehension, 389, expectation with dread. In all other places, it means the power applied, of taking cognizance of any object, by sense or intuition.









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